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Muslim inmate John McGlothlin brought a case under §1983, alleging that the prison chaplain and other prison officials violated his right to free exercise under the First Amendment. The plaintiff claimed that Muslim inmates were treated differently from fellow inmates of other religious beliefs, exemplified by comparing the announcements on the bulletin board for Muslims with one run by the Christian Fellowship. A report by the U.S. Magistrate recommended that this case should be dismissed, and the District Court agreed. Specifically, the Court found that the plaintiff’s claims against the prison’s non-denominational chaplain should be dismissed as the chaplain was not a state actor; it further dismissed the claims against the other officials because the plaintiff’s claims failed to demonstrate a disparity of treatment based on religion.

Muslim inmate Imam Abd’Allah Halim Abdul Akbar (aka Phillip M. Hudson) sued several prison officials under §1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the prison denied his attempts to start a Muslim inmate group. The prison officials argued that the denial resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to follow the proper procedures for creating such a group. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the prison did not deprive the plaintiff of his ability to practice his religion and that the regulations governing creation of inmate groups were consistent with legitimate penological objectives of preventing gang activity and maintaining order in the prison population. 

Faris Matiyn, an inmate at the Attica prison, mounted a § 1983 claim against the commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and prison superintendent Walter Kelly. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment free exercise right by not allowing Sunnī and Shīʿī Muslims—the two major Muslim denominations—to have separate worship services. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff did not speak for the majority of the Sunnī Muslim community and that keeping the two groups together satisfied legitimate penological objectives, such as maintaining a safe prison environment. 

A Somali Muslim bus driver for American University sued his former employer and supervisor under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin as well as retaliation for asking for reasonable religious accommodation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was frequently denied the chance to attend Muslim Friday prayer services and that his supervisors made several derogatory comments regarding Muslims. He further argued that he was ultimately terminated because of his religion and in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding a lack of reasonable religious accommodation (in the form of a schedule that accommodated his weekly prayer services). The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the University’s reason for firing the plaintiff was a pretext for actual discrimination. However, the Court dismissed the retaliation claim, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence to support it.

The EEOC represented a group of Muslims suing their former employer, Norwegian Cruise Lines, under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that these discriminatory motives caused the company to target them for increased scrutiny, to create a hostile work environment by allowing their co-workers to verbally harass them (in part, by referring to them as terrorists), and finally, to terminate them. The plaintiffs further entered a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these bases. The defendants argued that they terminated the plaintiffs for inconsistent answers given to background questions and because they were “positive matches in the FBI database.” The Court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but concluded that the discrimination case could go forward as plaintiffs had established a prima facie discrimination case such that a jury could find that the company’s reasons given for terminating the plaintiffs were pretexts for a discriminatory reason.

A Pakistani Muslim bank employee suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) sued his former employer, Bank of America, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin; under the American Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination on the basis of disability; and under Title VII and the ADA for retaliatory firing following his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his religious beliefs required him to take several prayer breaks throughout the workday, and that this practice ultimately led to his firing. The defendant responded that the employee was fired because of poor work performance. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment that the plaintiff did not dispute. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the plaintiff had established no connection between the EEOC filing and his termination. 

A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

The EEOC represented an African-American Muslim suing his former employer under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed he had been the recipient of many offensive comments (such as being called a “towel head” and “Taliban”) and degrading actions (such as his co-workers hiding his time card while he was at prayer services). The Court reversed and remanded a decision by the District Court for the District of Maryland to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment and that his employer had notice of the ongoing conduct; it thus denied the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed.

The plaintiff, a Muslim occupational health physician, sued his former employer, the Department of Veteran Affairs and its Secretary, Jim Nicholson, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He filed the claim after he heard his supervisor refer to Muslims as a threat and after his supervisor’s wife made comments about how she and her husband do not like Muslims and the way they live—presumably referring to his observance of prayers, fasting, and other aspects of Islamic ritual law. The plaintiff discovered that his position was being eliminated sometime after these comments were made, but continued to consult with his former employer about infectious diseases. Three months following his position’s elimination, the plaintiff saw a job advertisement for the same position at his former place of employment and filed a claim with the EEOC for discrimination. Immediately after his supervisor found out about his claim, the plaintiff contends that he was no longer allowed on the property and that other employees were barred from contacting him for consultations. The Court concluded that the timing was questionable enough that a jury could find that the events described were examples of retaliation. The Court reversed and remanded the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to go forward. The parties ultimately settled the case, and the case was closed in December of 2008.

An Arab-American police officer in New York City sued his employer under §1981 (providing “a cause of action for race-based employment discrimination based on a hostile work environment”), New York Executive Law Section 290, and New York Administrative Code Section 9-101 (both state laws imposing “liability on aiders and abettors of unlawful discriminatory practices”), as well as laws prohibiting the creation of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff worked for the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and claimed that the Department made him read anti-Muslim and anti-Arab rhetoric in the form of briefings from an anti-terrorism consultant. According to the plaintiff, these briefings entailed the consultant instructing the reader to not trust Muslims in law enforcement and making comments like “a good Muslim…can’t be a good American.” The Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim to proceed. It thus denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go forward. The case was ultimately closed in 2010 after an order of dismissal without ever going to trial. The plaintiff did not lodge an explicit claim on the basis of Islamic law, but his allegations about religion may have included ritual practice or dress related to Islamic law.

The Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, Supervalu Holdings, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, she argued that the company overlooked her for a position with more responsibility because of her religion. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she neither proved that non-Muslims were treated better, nor did she allege that she suffered an adverse employment action (as the higher-level position did not offer additional compensation or benefits). Thus, this Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing a Muslim former employee of the defendant, the EEOC sued the company, operating as a car dealership, under Title VII, alleging that it subjected the employee to a hostile work environment because of his religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged he suffered numerous instances of harassment because of his religion after 9/11, including being called Taliban by his supervisor and receiving a warning saying he was acting like a Muslim. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the conduct severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim, and thus reversed the District Court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The case settled in October 2007.

A female Muslim employee sued her former employer under Title VII and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) for discrimination based on religion. The plaintiff claimed that she was suspended and then terminated from her job for failing to remove her religiously mandated head-covering (ḥijāb). The Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely, having passed the statute of limitations for both Title VII and the DCHRA.

Plaintiff John Walker Lindh, a convicted "American Taliban," challenged prison policies that allowed for individual prayer in cells, but banned group congregation for prayer due to "security concerns." The Plaintiff sued the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution of Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The District Court found that the Plaintiff did have sincerely held religious beliefs, and therefore turned its inquiry to whether the ban on group prayer furthers the compelling interest of security and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. The District Court ultimately determined that the warden-Respondent failed to establish that the total ban on daily congregational prayer by the Plaintiff was the least restrictive means of meeting the warden's security concerns.

The Plaintiffs, three Muslim individuals (Hamid Raza, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia), two mosques (Masjid Al-Ansar, Masjid at-Taqwa), and a non-profit Muslim organization (Muslims Giving Back), alleged that the NYPD violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through unlawful, "suspicionless" surveillance and sought an injunction to prevent further surveillance. The Plaintiffs sought to prove discriminatory intent in one or two of the ways identified in Brown: (1) an express classification theory—by showing that "the NYPD expressly classified Muslims by adopting a policy of singling them out for heightened policy scrutiny"; or (2) a discriminatory application theory—"to the extent that Respondents claim they had a legitimate law enforcement interest in  Plaintiffs, . . . by showing that [Plaintiffs] were subject to NYPD investigations of unequal and unwarranted scope, duration, and invasiveness as a result of their religious beliefs and activities." Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999). The Respondent, the City of New York, filed for bifurcated discovery, and the Plaintiffs responded with a move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the necessary standard for justifying expedited discovery. The District Court granted the expedited motion in part, but set up a two-stage schedule for discovery.

The Plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, challenged prison policies that 1) failed to provide adequately nutritional ḥalāl meals, and 2) denied them the ritual end-of-Ramadan feast. The District Court found that the ḥalāl meals provided did not substantially burden the Plaintiffs' religious practice. The District Court also decided that although the denial of the ritual feast marking the end of Ramadan substantially burdened the Plaintiffs' beliefs, the prison demonstrated that this policy was the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in security.

The Plaintiff, Christopher B. Scott, brought suit against Dekalb County prison officials. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment constitutional rights by 1) not providing a Muslim chaplain; 2) not allowing Muslim prisoners to wear a kufi; 3) failing to provide a secure and private place to pray five times a day; and 4) not providing a special meal at the end of Ramadan. The Respondents sought summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, claiming that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedies necessary to bring suit. The Magistrate Court recommended that the Respondents' motion for summary judgment be granted on the Plaintiff's claims concerning the wearing of a kufi and concerning the celebration of an end-of-Ramadan meal. Summary judgment for all other claims was denied.

The Plaintiff Akeem Muhammad, an inmate in the Florida penal system, filed suit against the Respondents (prison officials Marvin Davis, Alex Taylor, and R. Graham; the Food Service Administrator of the Fla. Dept. of Corrections; and the Assistant Warden and Warden of Florida State Prison) for their refusal to provide him with a daily pre-fasting meal. The District Court determined that the plaintiff could not sue individual Respondents for monetary damages under RLUIPA. The District Court also determined that the Respondents failed to demonstrate that the policy of refusing to provide Muslim prisoners with a pre-twilight meal during Ramadan is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, the District Court denied the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on the RLUIPA claim.

The Plaintiff Amir Shabazz challenged the Pleasant Valley State Prison for their policy of denying Muslim inmates ḥalāl meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The Plaintiff contended that Muslim inmates were denied ḥalāl meat, instead forcing them to eat vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff argued that this constituted religious discrimination under RLUIPA and the Fourteenth Amendment, since Jewish inmates were provided with kosher options and therefore were not forced to similarly eat the vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff claimed that this treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court found that the facts put forth by the plaintiff were "vague and inconsistent," and therefore that the Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claim against the Respondent. 

Petitioner Fedwa Khalik, an Arab-American who was born in Kuwait and practiced Islam, sued her former employee, alleging discrimination because of race, religion, national origin, and ethnic heritage under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Petitioner alleged she was grabbed in the office and subjected to false investigation and discrimination. The Appellate Court held for the Respondent after determining that the Petitioner’s allegations were not plausible under the Twombly/Iqbal standard [two cases which announced a new federal pleading standard, allowing district court judges to dismiss a complaint if it does not set out a “plausible” claim: Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)] because (1) several of her allegations were not entitled to the assumption of truth because they were entirely conclusory, and (2) the remaining facts did not sufficiently allege discrimination or retaliation since her claims were based solely on the fact that she was Muslim and Arab-American.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman filed an action against the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. The Plaintiff claimed that these rights had been violated in over 12 policies, including the policy that limited his purchase of prayer oil to once a week, a grooming policy that prevented him from growing a beard, and a CD policy limiting inmates’ purchase of spoken religious word CDs to a single vendor. The District Court dismissed all claims against the Respondent except for claims related to the CD policy, which the District Court determined was not related to any legitimate penological interest.

Plaintiff Mitchell Theophilus Garraway filed an action against the Respondent, a Lewisburg penitentiary, for a claimed violation of RLIUPA. The Plaintiff alleged that various Federal Bureau of Prisons rules and policies severely and unnecessarily burden his right to private religious exercise of his Islamic faith. The Plaintiff cited, among other reasons, that the prison did not make the chapel available to all Muslims to congregate for Friday prayer, and also placed other restrictions on Muslims’ ability to perform all their prayers together as one group. The District Court decided that the penitentiary had a legitimate governmental interest—the need to maintain order and security—that was rationally connected to the policy regarding congregation for prayer. 

Plaintiff Jim Davis challenged a prison policy that imposed a temporary, total ban on the purchase and receipt of prayer oil as a violation of both his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights. The Respondents, the prison administration and various officers individually named in the complaint, counterclaimed that a ban on prayer oils furthered a legitimate government interest, as prayer oils posed a fire, health, and safety hazard. The Plaintiff alleged in a second claim against the Respondents that they retaliated against him for filing a grievance regarding this prison policy by restricting the purchase of religious items to the quarterly packages he could receive while incarcerated. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff stated a cognizable First Amendment and RLUIPA violation with respect to the prayer oil ban, because the Plaintiff sufficiently showed that the prayer oils were not flammable and therefore did not pose a risk. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss with regard to the second claim because the District Court determined that restricting religious items to the quarterly packages did not sufficiently burden his practice of religion, as he was not denied all access to prayer oil and was still allowed to order oil in quarterly packages.

The Plaintiff, Muslim prisoner Davis Totten, brought this civil rights claim against employees of Ryan Correctional Facilities alleging religious discrimination. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom because they 1) threatened the Plaintiff with disciplinary action if he attended the Friday (jumuʿa) prayer service, the Islamic study class (taʿlīm) or any Islamic seminar while on a work or school assignment; 2) tried to control how Muslims appoint their spiritual leader for the Friday prayer services; and 3) failed to make preparations for the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service, among other alleged offenses. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, on the claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Respondents’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of convincing the Court that it was clearly established law that an official’s failure to allow prisoners to attend the Friday prayer service, the Islamic study class, or any Islamic seminar violate the First Amendment right to practice religion. The Magistrate Judge found the Respondents entitled to summary judgment on the second issue, because the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiff did not indicate that any prison officials actually appointed an inadequate spiritual leader who interfered with his right to practice his religion. On the third issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on this claim, because the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his ability to attend the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service—which is mandated by his religion and is a “sincerely held” practice—had been infringed upon, and was not related to a legitimate penological interest.

The Plaintiffs, Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) prisoners Eric Dowdy, Averis X Wilson, Roger Hunt, Amira Salem, Tom Traini, Patricia L. Caruso, Dave Burnett, and Michael Martin, alleged that the Defendants, various MDOC employees, violated their rights under federal and state constitutional provisions and RLUIPA by unlawfully restricting their religious practices. Specifically, the Plaintiffs challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate certain religious practices which they claimed must be observed during particular days and times each week. The Muslim Plaintiffs specifically challenged that the inability to attend Friday (jumuʿa) prayer services without obtaining permission to exercise a “call-out”—permission which is often denied—violated their federal and state constitutional rights. The Muslim Plaintiffs also challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate their religious dietary restrictions and their observance of the Eid al-Fīṭr and Eid al-Aḍḥā feasts. In response to the first allegation, the Respondents claim that there is a legitimate governmental interest in prison security that would be compromised if inmates were allowed to attend prayer services. The District Court determined, however, that while a legitimate governmental interest existed, the restriction of prayer services was not the least restrictive means of protecting this compelling interest in prison security. Accordingly, the District Court did not grant summary judgment in response to the Plaintiffs’ Friday prayer claim. In response to the second allegation, the Court determined that failure to provide Muslim inmates with a ḥalāl diet substantially burdens a religious exercise, but found that a question of fact exists as to whether the Plaintiffs received such a diet.

Plaintiff Sha-Heed Rahman, a Shīʿī Muslim prisoner in the New York Department of Corrections (“DOCS”), brought this lawsuit against the respondents, various DOCS prison officials, alleging that the respondents violated a settlement agreement, retaliated against him, and conspired to punish him for pursuing his First Amendment rights to exercise his religion and access the courts. The plaintiff originally brought a civil rights lawsuit in 2004, claiming that the respondents violated his First Amendment rights by only employing Sunnī chaplains at DOCS facilities and not allowing inmates to observe Shīʿī holy days. The plaintiff and the respondents entered into a settlement agreement which included the plaintiff’s right to an alternative Shīʿī Friday prayer (jumuʿa) service. In this current suit, the plaintiff claimed that the respondents had failed to provide a separate Shīʿī service and failed to provide Shīʿī study classes. The plaintiff also claimed that when he filed grievances in an attempt to enforce the settlement agreement terms, he was sent to the Special Housing Unit as punishment. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the claim. The District Court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss, determining that the plaintiff failed to state a claim. However, the District Court granted the plaintiff leave to amend the claim regarding his First Amendment and retaliation concerns with respect to the provision of Shīʿī study classes.

Plaintiff Joey Kenneth Priddy, a Virginia inmate, filed this civil rights action alleging that the Respondents, various prison officials at Bland Correctional Center, violated his constitutional rights by allowing Muslim inmates to conduct prayer groups in common areas of the prison facility. The Plaintiff sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint, determining that the challenged prison practices did not deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. The District Court found that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause, because the prison officials allowed Muslim inmates to conduct informal prayer groups in common areas, but that this opportunity is equally open to any inmate of any other religious persuasion. Therefore, the accommodation of Muslim inmates’ beliefs did not constitute an improper endorsement of Islam over other religions.

Plaintiff William C. McKinnedy, a South Carolina inmate, brought this suit against the Respondents, over 30 South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) staff members and state government officials, alleging that the Respondents violated his religious beliefs by 1) refusing to provide a food tray prior to sun-up during Ramadan; and 2) not allowing the Plaintiff to attend the Eid feast at the conclusion of Ramadan. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that on multiple occasions the Plaintiff informed the Chaplain that he did not consider himself part of the Muslim community. The Magistrate Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, determining that the Defendants’ refusal to allow the Plaintiff to participate in Ramadan was related to a legitimate penological interest, such as security concerns.

Prison inmate Lawrence Cochran filed a §1983 claim against prison officials for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by not allowing him to have food in his cell at night to break the Ramadan fast and by limiting his attendance of religious services. The Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that incarceration necessarily curtails some freedom, and that, in this context, the curtailment did not go so far as to place a substantial burden on Muslim inmates’ ability to practice their religion.

William Knuckles and several other inmates, all adherents of the Nation of Islam, filed a §1983 claim against prison officials, alleging a violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that they were not allowed to correspond with their religious leaders, receive books and periodicals, "wear Muslim medals," or have a special dietary plan. In finding that the inmates were entitled to be visited by qualified ministers, the Court cautioned that all meetings should remain of a religious nature and could be supervised by prison officials.

In a divorce proceeding, the Circuit Court of Fairfax County upheld a couple’s marriage contract. On appeal, defendant Ali Afghahi raised several arguments against the validity of the contract, and claimed that upholding it would be inequitable; he also made several evidentiary objections, including that the marriage contract as admitted was not the original document and should therefore be barred according to the “best evidence rule.” He further argued that as no expert was called to testify about the meaning of marriage in Islamic cultures, the judgment was unenforceable. The appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgment against him (and in favor of the validity of the marriage contract), concluding that his objections were untimely because he had not raised them in the lower court.

At issue in this case is the validity of a marriage performed in the Islamic tradition, where the husband sought an annulment of an initial “traditional” marriage and recognition of a subsequent civil marriage. The law of the Philippines does not require a couple to obtain a marriage certificate if their marriage is performed according to the Islamic tradition; accordingly the couple married under traditional Islamic law and obtained no certificate. In seeking annulment of that marriage and recognition of a subsequent marriage, appellant Rafiqul Islam argued that the first marriage was not official; he further argued that the union was not truly Islamic because his so-called wife was not Muslim, because the wedding ceremony was performed by a clerk rather than a religious official, and because neither party intended to enter into a marital relationship. On appeal, the Court upheld the trial court’s decision that the first marriage was a legitimate, state-recognized union, and thus that any subsequent marriage would be considered void.

In divorce proceedings, a wife appealed the decision of the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, granting her husband’s motion to dismiss her claims and recognize their previous divorce, which occurred when the couple was in India. Specifically, she contested the validity of the “triple ṭalāq” divorce (a version of final, irrevocable divorce under Indian and Islamic law, performed unilaterally by the husband) that her husband performed in India, and filed for divorce in Michigan. The trial court concluded that the certificate of divorce that the defendant husband produced from their earlier divorce was sufficient evidence to dismiss the case under Michigan Compiled Laws 2.116(C)(7) (which bars claims based on prior judgment). The Court of Appeals reversed and found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the Indian divorce violated due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution art. 1, § 2, as it gave the wife no chance to plead her case concerning the divorce before a court. The Court also concluded that allowing the divorce to stand would be contrary to state public policy, as it privileged the Muslim personal law of India (which placed women in a weaker position regarding property division in the event of a divorce than would Michigan state law) over Michigan state law and the rights and protections extended to persons living in the state.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to enforce an Islamic marriage contract, which called for a postponed dowry (mahr) owed by the husband to the wife upon death or divorce of $25,000. The Court found that the groom was coerced into signing the agreement, and thus it was not valid. The Court did not delve into the potential First Amendment Establishment Clause issues considered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed a state district court’s decision to uphold an Islamic marriage contract that awarded the wife a deferred dowry (mahr), an amount agreed upon at the time of marriage and due to the wife from the husband or his estate upon death or divorce, of $50,000. The district court had concluded that the amount was due pursuant to a marital contract made by the parties “in contemplation of a forthcoming marriage,” constituting “a valid, binding, and enforceable contract under Sections 4.001-003 of the Texas Family Code.” The appellate court reversed and remanded to the lower court, concluding that the agreement was not a valid premarital contract under the state law, defined as “an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage,” because the religious wedding ceremony occurred before the contract was signed. As the contract fell outside of the definition of premarital contract, the Court concluded that it could not be enforced like one. 

The plaintiff petitioned the Court to bury his wife according to Islamic legal requirements over the objections of her family. The plaintiff claimed that he and his wife had shared the Islamic faith and had married by way of an Islamic marriage ceremony the previous year. However, they never obtained a marriage license, and there was no proof of her faith or burial wishes. The Court found in favor of the deceased’s parents, concluding that, without a marriage license, the plaintiff was not her surviving spouse before the law. Therefore, the deceased was to be buried according to her parents' wishes. The Court did not view this as a potential First Amendment Free Exercise issue.

The appellate court upheld the Superior Court of Orange County’s refusal to divide marital property in the context of a divorce according to Islamic law. The plaintiff introduced a marriage certificate as a “premarital contract,” which, among other things, lays out a set amount to be paid to the wife in the event of a divorce. The lower court refused to consider the certificate a “contract,” as it was not clear that both parties were expressly agreeing to the same terms, consistent with their understanding of Islamic law and custom.

This Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County that prevented a wife from collecting her deferred dowry (sadaq), the dowry due from the husband to the wife upon marriage, a portion of which is deferred by agreement to be paid upon death or divorce. The husband argued that, under Islamic law, the wife forfeits her contractual right to the deferred dowry if, as here, she is the one to seek the divorce. This Court upheld the contract, holding that it was binding because there was a meeting of the minds, and the parties agreed that the deferred dowry would be due upon divorce.

In a divorce proceeding involving a prenuptial agreement (Islamic marriage contract) between a Muslim husband and wife, the California Court of Appeals considered the validity of a provision requiring the husband to pay 3,000 Jordanian dinars as well as 2,000 dinars of either cash or household furniture as a “deferred dowry” (known as mahr or ṣadāq) due to the wife upon death or divorce. The husband claimed that the deferred dowry is not due where, as here, the wife initiates the divorce proceeding. The court concluded that, regardless of the individual claims, requiring payment of one party to the other upon divorce was an example of prohibited “divorce profiteering” and that, “if the court had accepted the position of wife’s expert, the contract would not have been enforceable under the public policy of the state.” Accordingly, the Court upheld the lower court's decision not to enforce that provision of the agreement.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

A Lebanese Muslim physician sued his former employer, represented by Secretary of Veteran Affairs Jim Nicholson, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed that the VA Medical Center, his place of employment, subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his identity as both Lebanese and Muslim [presumably related to his observance of Islamic ritual law] and that his supervisors retaliated against him for filing a claim with the EEOC. He further argued that the employer's discrimination ultimately led to his termination. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative options before initiating a lawsuit in court, and that he had not demonstrated that his termination was retaliatory.  

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

Plaintiff Jerry Lemons, a Muslim prisoner confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, brought this complaint against the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for a violation of his freedom to exercise his religion when the Respondents did not provide a special menu for an Islamic holy day in December 2008. The judge determined that the fact that a single meal service was disrupted or missed did not create a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s ability to practice religion, and recommended that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim be dismissed.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

Plaintiff Lavotte Saunders, a Muslim African-American male, brought this claim of discrimination based on race and religion against the Respondent, the Plaintiff’s former employer Apothaker & Associates. Two days after the Plaintiff was hired, he was fired on the basis of having a criminal record, but later discovered that several other employees of the Respondent had criminal records (including felony convictions) and were not fired. Therefore, the Plaintiff brought suit on the basis that he was fired as a result of disparate treatment due to religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court found that claims of discrimination are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden shifting analysis: First, the Plaintiff had to state a prima facie case, and then the burden shifted to the Respondent to “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination.” The Court found that the Plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case, because he could not prove that he was qualified for the position in the first place. Therefore, the Court granted the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Joe Burgos Vega, a practicing Muslim prisoner at the Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”), brought this action against the Respondents, officials at the DOC, claiming that Respondents’ 1) denial of the Plaintiff’s request to be circumcised; 2) denial of access to suitable Islamic prayer oils; and 3) frequently canceled Friday congregational prayer constituted a violation of his right to exercise his religion. The Respondents argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. The Court sided with the Respondents, finding that 1) prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to a surgery that is not medically necessary; 2) DOC officers did not violate the Plaintiff’s right with regard to prayer oils, because they provided him with access to the imam-approved commissary oil; and 3) that although prisoners have the right to participate in group religious services, the frequent Friday prayer cancellations were reasonable because they occurred due to a shortage of volunteer imams and that other opportunities for religious practice were available to Muslim inmates.

Appellant Amina Aden appealed her contempt citations and sentences, contending that they violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  During the Appellant’s criminal trial for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota cited the Appellant for criminal contempt for repeatedly failing to stand when the court convened and recessed as required by pretrial order. This Court found that the lower court erred in evaluating the Appellant’s former contentions that standing at these times would violate her religious belief. The Court found that in the RFRA context, the district court erred by evaluating the orthodoxy and sophistication of the Appellant’s belief, instead of simply evaluating whether her practice was rooted in sincerely held religious belief.  Because the district court only applied a First Amendment analysis, it did not apply an RFRA analysis that evaluated whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.  Therefore, the Court vacated the contempt citations and remanded to the district court to evaluate whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to further that or other compelling interests.

Plaintiff Sturgeon Stewart, an inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) brought suit against Respondents Vernestene Dulin, head of prison food services, and various other prison officials for alleged violations of his rights to religious free exercise on the claim that the prison served Muslim inmates the same ḥalāl food menu for all meals of the day, and that these meals excluded meat. Ḥalāl food is meat prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual law, and free of pork and alcohol. The Plaintiff contended that this repetition was not a nutritional religious-accommodating alternative to regular prison meals. The Court found for the Respondents, determining that Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided ḥalāl meat entrees. Rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ḥarām (prohibited under Islamic law). The Court found that, as long as the Plaintiff was given an alternative to eating non-ḥalāl meat, he did not suffer a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. The Court determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with alternatives to non-ḥalāl meat, but that the Plaintiff was “simply not happy with the substitutions offered.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations, construed as true, failed to establish a violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.

This case was brought on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, prison officials (Warden Jack Lee, Assistant Warden Gene Shinault, and Correctional Officer K. Lester). Petitioner Leroy Lovelace was removed from a “pass list” (which gives inmates access to Ramadan prayer services and special meals) after prison officials claimed that he broke his fast by eating during the day. Lovelace argued that his removal was due to his complaints about expired food, and was thus in violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and the requirements of Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) (protecting prisoners from having their religious practices substantially burdened, without a compelling government interest). Section 3 of RLIUPA states that “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. §2000cc-1(a). The Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Lester, the prison official who reported the alleged fast breaking, as well as against Warden Lee, who was in charge of overseeing the prison, concluding that both officials played direct roles in the incident. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the plaintiff had made out a valid due process claim, and the Court affirmed the remainder of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The Plaintiff Nathaniel Hallman, a federal prisoner at the Lexington County Detention Center and an observing Muslim, brought this suit against the Respondents, Trinity Food Group, the Sheriff of Lexington County and several sheriff employees, for allegedly refusing to provide adequate and appropriate meals during Ramadan. The Respondents filed for summary judgment, asserting that the Ramadan meals provided to Muslim inmates were adequate. The Magistrate judge found that the prisoner requested to participate in Ramadan, during which members of the Islamic faith fasted during daylight hours. The detention center inmates observing Ramadan were not served a meal during the lunch period, but are provided a breakfast meal before sunrise and a dinner meal after sunset. The Magistrate judge recommended that the motions for summary judgment should be granted because the menu served to the inmates observing Ramadan was approved by a licensed dietician to ensure that the menu met those inmates' caloric and nutritional needs.

Plaintiffs, Muslim prisoners, sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, alleging violations of state and federal law, including the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Plaintiffs alleged that being patted down by female prison guards violated their First Amendment free exercise rights inasmuch as it contravened the tenets of their Islamic faith, which forbids intimate contact between unrelated members of the opposite gender. The Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for most of the claims, but denied it with respect to the RLUIPA and the Massachusetts General Law claims, concluding that a jury would best be able to determine whether the alleged infraction violated the terms of these two statutes.

Plaintiff James McRoy claimed that prison officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by cancelling some of the scheduled Muslim prayer services without notice, limiting the number of services that Muslim inmates could attend each week, limiting the number of Muslim inmates who could attend each service at any given time, subjecting Muslim inmates to strip searches before they could leave their cells to attend services, prohibiting imams from bringing religious publications onto the prison’s premises, and prohibiting Muslim inmates from exclusively living together in one of the prison’s living units. The prison officials, however, claimed that their actions resulted from a lack of volunteers to organize services and the need to curtail inmate movement on some days because of heightened security concerns. The Court held that McRoy did not sufficiently demonstrate that a jury could conclude that he had been subjected to a violation of his rights. It thus entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Plaintiff Andre Harvey, a Muslim inmate at the David Wade Correctional Center, filed this action against the Respondent, Chaplain Ray Anderson, for allegedly removing the Plaintiff from the list on inmates approved to receive a religious diet and for denying him access to the Islamic community chapel. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Plaintiff did not file any response.  The Magistrate judge determined that the Respondent did not remove the Plaintiff from the list without cause, but instead that the Plaintiff himself failed to attend Friday prayer services and continued to not attend religious events, thereby warranting his removal from a list of Muslim inmates. The Magistrate judge therefore recommended that the motion for summary judgment be granted, and the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

The Court reversed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant prison officials, John McGinnis, Patrick McGann, and Gordon Lord. Plaintiff Wayne Ford sued under § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights by the denial of his request to attend the Eid al-Fitr feast (the holiday at the end of Ramadan); prison officials had moved the event to fall several days after its official occurrence in order that it coincide with a weekend. Defendants argued that their denial of plaintiff inmate’s request to attend the event did not amount to a constitutional violation because the event, once moved, no longer fell on a date of religious significance. The Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because the matter required closer scrutiny of the Turner/O’Lone Test (which balances prisoners' religious accommodation requests with legitimate penological concerns) than the District Court accorded it before finding in favor of either party.

The Court affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Jerry Charles, who alleged a violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to practice his religion. Specifically, the plaintiff requested accommodations that would allow him to have prayer oil, which he contended was a necessary part of his religious practice. The Department of Corrections challenged RLUIPA as unconstitutional, but the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.

Plaintiff Daniel O’Neil Ruffin, the only practicing Muslim in the Downeast Correctional Facility in Machiasport, Maine, brought this suit against the Respondents, facility program manager Carol Geel, facility director Scott Jones, and former commissioner of the Maine Department of Corrections Martin Magnusson for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by denying his request to be allowed to conduct religious services in the common area. The Respondents claimed that they denied the request because it would have been impracticable to assign an officer to supervise a single prisoner, and that they tried to accommodate the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by allowing him to conduct services in his room. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court referred to a Magistrate judge for a recommended decision. The Magistrate judge recommended that the Respondents be entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights.

Plaintiff Horace Crump, an inmate in the Michigan Department of Corrections, brought this compliant against the Respondent, Deputy Warden Winn at the Saginaw Correctional Facility, for changing the Muslim prayer time. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondent changed the Muslim prayer time in such a way as to place a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s free exercise of his religion, and that this was done in retaliation for having complained about his and other Muslim inmates’ complaints during Ramadan. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, and the case was referred for a report and recommendation by a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge determined that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden, because while the Respondent did not offer a specific penological justification for changing the prayer time, the prison immediately reinstated the religiously required Friday prayer time, such that the Plaintiff did not in fact suffer a “substantial burden” on the practice of his religion. The magistrate judge then found that the fact that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden on the practice of his religion also showed that he did not suffer adverse action, a necessary element of his retaliation claim. For these reasons, the magistrate judge recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff Abdus Shahid brought this claim against the Respondent, the Borough of Eddystone, for discrimination against him on the basis of race, national origin and religion after the Respondent deliberately engaged in a four-year-long campaign to prevent him from living in or renting out a property he owned in Eddystone because it did not want a Muslim in the area. Following the complaint, the Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court previously granted in part and denied in part, holding that while the Plaintiff was barred by the Heck v. Humphrey and Rooker-Feldman doctrines from challenging the validity of his convictions for violating Eddystone ordinances, there were also genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on the remaining claim that Eddystone denied him a certificate of occupancy and preventing him from renting the property because of his race, religion and national origin. Following a jury trial, the Court analyzed testimony evidence about alleged statements by Eddystone officials acknowledging the existence of a discriminatory housing policy and evidence that similarly situated white property owners were treated more favorably. However, the Court determined that the Plaintiff failed his burden of proof with regards to his claim that the Respondent violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, because he produced no concrete credible evidence showing that he was treated differently than white property owners, and that the Respondent’s actions were anything other than genuine attempts to enforce the Eddystone housing code. The Court concluded that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race, religion or national origin. Therefore, the Court entered judgment in favor of the Respondent.

Plaintiff Kareem Hassan Milhouse, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), filed aBivens-styled complaint against several Federal Bureau of Prisons and USP-Lewisburg officials. The Plaintiff asserted that he had been denied access to the courts on three occasions and denied the practice of his religious requirements in violations of his right to free exercise, on the bases that: (1) there was no Islamic chaplain for Muslim inmates nor services for Special Management Unit inmates to attend services physically, nor were services provided through the radio as were other institutional programs, and (2) there was no Islamic celebration after the Ramadan fast, nor special meal of the types given for holidays of other faiths, and no Muslim chaplain with whom to discuss articles of faith. [He believed both of these types of services to be requirements stipulated by Islamic ritual law.] The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the alleged conduct did not fall within the scope of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which applies to free exercise of religion claims under the First Amendment raised by prisoners, because the Plaintiff did not establish that a “substantial burden” had been placed on his ability to exercise his religion. The Court further determined that the Plaintiff had alternative means of worship available to him and that the Defendants’ conduct of providing the meal to non-Muslim inmates did not inhibit or curtail his ability to express adherence to his Islamic faith and beliefs. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet the substantial burden test with respect to both of these freedom of religion claims, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

Petitioner Kofi Easterling, an inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), filed suit against the Respondents, various prison officials, alleging that they ignored the Petitioner's instructions as to when Ramadan began. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondents’ Ramadan date violated his religious beliefs under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. In the District Court, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in response. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Respondents, finding that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim failed because he had produced no evidence of a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under RLUIPA, he similarly failed to establish that the Respondents burdened a “central religious belief or practice” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Plaintiff Charles Glenn, an inmate at the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the Respondents, various DOC prison officials, for alleged violations of his rights to free exercise [of his ability to exercise Islamic ritual law] under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Specifically, the Plaintiff – a practicing Muslim – argued that there had been no Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services at the New Hampshire State Prison for the past three years and that he had no access to an Imam (a Muslim prayer leader), a Qur’an, or other Islamic literature, which placed constraints on his ability to practice Islam [specifically, it's ritual law aspects]. In conducting a Preliminary Review, the Court applied the four-part test for examining the constitutionality of a regulation that restricts an inmate’s First Amendment free exercise of religion found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). The Court assessed the four Turner factors -- (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) what impact accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) whether there was an absence of alternatives to the prison regulation. The Court found that the prison’s policy of denying Friday Prayer (jumuʿa) services, which are a central and essential element of religious practice, impinged on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion.

Plaintiff Jack Robinson, a formerly incarcerated inmate at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (“MDC”), brought an action against Respondent, Officer Jimminez, a correctional officer at MDC, for allegedly depriving the Plaintiff of his right to religious worship under the First Amendment. The Plaintiff claimed that, although he reserved the prison’s religious room for Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services, the Respondent allowed Jewish prisoners to also use the room. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiff’s religious service was “stopped due to a scheduling conflict with another group of inmates who had also reserved the religious room for the same time as plaintiff.” The Respondent moved for summary judgment, and the district court judge referred the Respondent’s motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge determined that the Respondent’s decision to stop one religious service was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests because the action was undertaken to maintain order and prevent an altercation between Muslim and Jewish prisoners, and therefore recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted.

Plaintiff Derrick Lafurr Brown, a Muslim inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed a suit against the Respondents, who were various prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for interrupting the Islamic services [Friday services specified in Islamic ritual law] out of an alleged general bias against Islam. The magistrate judge determined that the prison officials were acting in response to the Plaintiff’s repeated disobedience, and that their measure of standing in the doorway to block entry to the services was related to a legitimate penological interest and therefore did not interfere with the inmate's free exercise of religion. The magistrate judge recommended that the plaintiff's civil rights claims be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff Tariq A. Vaughn, Sr., an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics alleging that he told prison officials that he did not want to be housed with a Muslim inmate, and after he was placed in a cell with a Muslim inmate, that the Muslim inmate stabbed him in the head and back. The magistrate judge recommended that the Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint be dismissed with prejudice because it was frivolous, and alternatively for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. [There seemed to be no stated religious or Islamic law basis for the claim.]

Plaintiff Leila Diab, an observant Muslim teacher who was hired to teach social studies and English as a second language, filed a suit against the Respondents, the Chicago Board of Education and John F. Kennedy High School Principal George Szkapiak, alleging that the Respondents discriminated and retaliated against her, and further subjected her to a hostile work environment, on the basis of her Islamic faith. The Plaintiff alleged that she was forced to resign from her teaching position following anti-Islamic comments made by the principal and various teachers at the Kennedy high school. The Plaintiff further claimed that she received a hate mail note (which read: “Israel is doing OK) and that her Qur'an was desecrated on school property [in violation of norms taken to be governed by Islamic ritual law, of treating the Qur'an with respect]. In response, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint. The District Court determined that in order to prevail on her discrimination claims, the Plaintiff had to show that the Respondents subjected her to an adverse employment action, such as: "(1) termination or reduction in compensation, fringe benefits, or other financial terms of employment; (2) transfers or changes in job duties that cause an employee's skills to atrophy and reduce future career prospects; and (3) unbearable changes in job conditions, such as a hostile work environment or conditions amounting to constructive discharge." Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 2011 WL 4921603, at *4 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court granted the Respondent’s motion as to the Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims, finding that it could not conclude that a reasonable jury would find the note, taken together with the Qur'an incident nine months later, to create a hostile work environment. While the Court acknowledge that the incidents may have proved upsetting to her, it observed that the two incidents were not repeated and did not involve any physical contact or verbal abuse.

Plaintiff John Knapp, a state prisoner and observant Muslim [following the general requirements of Islamic ritual law], filed suit against the Respondents, prison officials in their individual and official capacities, for an alleged violation of his rights under RLUIPA on the claim that the prison facility lacked weekly Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services. The prison employed a volunteer policy, which allowed Muslims in the prison community to volunteer to lead the Friday prayer service in order to enable group worship. But because there were no volunteers or future prospect of volunteers, the Friday prayer service was not conducted. The magistrate judge determined that the volunteer policy challenged by the Plaintiff could violate the prisoner’s rights under RLUIPA if such a policy was not the least restrictive means by which the government could achieve a compelling state interest, and that the Plaintiff’s allegations sufficed to assert a claim. The magistrate judge therefore recommended that the Plaintiff’s claim under RLUIPA be allowed to proceed.

A Uzbek alien named Yusopov, who had previously been labeled a danger to the security of the nation by the Board of Immigration Appeals, petitioned the court for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The plaintiff argued that he would likely be tortured if returned to his home country of Uzbekistan on religious and political grounds, because he was a practicing Muslim. The Court granted asylum, concluding that the government had not presented evidence to prove that the petitioner posed a national security risk. NB: The Convention Against Torture provisions on withholding removal are codified into U.S. Law at 8 C.F.R. §1206.16 (c). Further obligations noted by the Court are described in the INA at 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(A), which “prohibits removal of an individual unlawfully in this country if the Attorney General believes that the individual's life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

The plaintiffs were survivors, family members, and representatives of the estates of the American victims of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiffs sued Iran, utilizing an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that allows the prosecution of foreign states that sponsor terrorism for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. The plaintiffs pointed to the financial ties between Hezbollah (who allegedly orchestrated the attack) and Iran when arguing that Iran should be held liable. Iran did not file an answer to this claim. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $1 billion in punitive damages.

The plaintiff , an American citizen whose wife was killed in a suicide bombing in Israel, sued Iran under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (allowing suit against sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism), for intentional infliction of emotional distress and economic loss due to wrongful death of his wife in a suicide bomber’s attack in Israel. The plaintiff argued that Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security should be held financially liable, as there were financial ties between the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran. Iran failed to make an appearance or file an answer. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $10,380,568 for emotional and economic loss.

Additional commentary. The FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a) is the terrorism exception to FSIA and what plaintiffs depend on to get jurisdiction over Iran. §1605(a)(1) stays that “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” While there is no direct connection to Islamic law, there is a dispute that centers around whether Iran -- an Islamic constitutional state -- sponsors military operations conceived of as jihad under the guise of Islamic law.

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals harmed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, brought tort claims for damages incurred during that attack against thirty-two distinct defendants. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the charges against seven of the thirty-two defendants, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi government charity, and several Saudi princes, concluding that none of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) exceptions (which would allow suit to proceed against sovereigns or diplomats) were applicable in those cases. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and further dismissed the case against a Saudi banker for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The defendant, an American Muslim man accused of attending a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, appealed a conviction for making false declarations to a grand jury, obstructing justice, and for making false material statements to the FBI. Specifically, the defendant was convicted for traveling to Pakistan in 1999 and attending a “jihadist training camp” in Afghanistan. While attending these camps were not a crime in 1999, the defendant subsequently lied about his travels and experiences. He argued that his conviction should be overturned because the lower court admitted irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence, and misapplied the sentencing guidelines for terrorism-related convictions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, concluding that neither the admitted evidence nor the application for the terrorism sentencing guidelines was inappropriate. While the case did not relate to Islamic law directly, the rules governing jihad, and petitioners' views of them, are often based on false definitions of Islamic law.

Two Uzbek “independent Muslim” men, Bekhzod Bakhtiyarovich Yusupov and Ismoil Samadov, applied for asylum and withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(A). Both men had entered the country on student visas and subsequently remained in the United States illegally. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that, while the men would be eligible for asylum under CAT, the national security exception to withholding removal, 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), applicable according to the Attorney General when “there is evidence that would permit a reasonable person to believe that the alien may pose a danger to national security,” barred the Board from allowing the men to stay in the country. The Court reversed and remanded the case, as the congressional intent indicated that the proper requirement for the national security exception is “is a danger” and not the “may pose a danger” argued by the Attorney General.

Additional information. This case would be heard by the 3rd Circuit again in Yusopov v. Att’y Gen., Nos. 09-3074, 2011 WL 2410741 (3rd Cir. 2011).  8 U.S.C. §1231 (b)(3)(A) provides that “…the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”.  8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) says that withholding of removal detailed in (b)(3)(A) would not apply if “here are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.”

The plaintiff sued his former attorneys for malpractice, on the basis that they did not seek punitive damages in the plaintiff’s successful claim against Iran for being held hostage in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiff argued that by failing to name the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security as a defendant in that case, his attorneys prevented him from collecting substantial punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. He also alleged that the attorneys charged him an excessive contingency fee. The Court dismissed the first claim, as the ability to collect punitive damages at the time was limited by President Clinton’s executive waiver of the punitive damages provision. The Court further ordered the parties to settlement discussions regarding the excessive fee complaint. The plaintiff later appealed this decision, but the case was ultimately dismissed.

Family members of an American citizen killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel sued Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for her wrongful death, alleging that Iran financially supported Hamas, which took responsibility for the bombing at the time of the attack. Iran did not file an answer to the charges. Invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exception for state-sponsored terrorism (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), the Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $9,879,023 to the victim’s husband for both economic and emotional loss of his wife. The Court awarded an additional $5,000,000 to each of the victim’s parents for emotional loss.

The sister of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, sued Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, seeking compensatory damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages following her brother’s wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), she alleged that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, granting $2,500,000 in compensatory damages, while noting that punitive damages were not allowed against a foreign state.

The estate and family members of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for his wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (a law that allows foreign nations to be immune from lawsuits from American citizens in most cases), they alleged that Iran should be held liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the family, granting compensatory damages in the amount of $13,241,486 to the serviceman’s widow, parents, and children.

The widow of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for compensatory damages for wrongful death, solatium (referring to “the mental anguish, bereavement, and grief that those with a close relationship to the decedent experience as a result of the decedent’s death”), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. She sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran provided financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $18,297,000 in compensatory damages for economic and emotional loss. The Court noted, however, that it could not award punitive damages against a foreign state.

The survivor and the family of two men who were kidnapped and held for three weeks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) sued the PKK under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, as well as Syria, its Ministry of Defense, and several high-ranking Syrian officials under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (which allows individuals to sue nations that sponsor terrorism). Syria moved to have the case dismissed, citing a lack of jurisdiction, insufficient process, and failure to make a claim. The Court allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to address the points brought up by the defendants in an amended complaint, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss was denied. In July 2009, a status report was filed by the defendant, and the case was still open as of August 2011.

The plaintiff, Wafaa Elwakil, brought this action against her former employer, Target Media Partners, claiming a violation of her rights pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff claimed that the company subjected her to discriminatory treatment because of her race, religion, and ethnicity; created a hostile work environment; and unlawfully retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Kenner Police Department. The company filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for Title VII discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation because the court found that the evidence indicated that the plaintiff did not engage in a "protected activity" for the purposes of her Title VII claim.

Injured survivors of a suicide bombing attack in Israel, allegedly by Hamas, and the family members of the deceased, sued Iran, its Ministry of Information and Security, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for compensatory damages for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of prospective income, and solatium (appropriate “when extreme and outrageous conduct has caused grief and anguish to plaintiffs closely related to a victim of terrorism”), as well as punitive damages. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them  compensatory damages in the amount of $111,963,607.87 for physical damages and economic and emotional loss, as well as punitive damages in the amount of $300,000,000 against the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The children of an American citizen who was killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel by Hamas sued Iran, its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and several high-ranking Iranian officials. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court awarded the victim’s estate $1,000,000 for the pain and suffering she experienced before death. The Court further awarded the four children compensatory damages in the amount of $3,000,000 each, for a total of $12,000,000. The Court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $300 million against all defendants besides Iran jointly and severally.

An Afghani Muslim security guard at a company that contracted with his former employer for his security guard services sued under Title VII and §1983, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin as well as a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed that, while working for the company, he was harassed by the property manager who asked him if he was from Afghanistan and if he was Muslim. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim, concluding that the plaintiff and defendant company did not have an employee-employer relationship, that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that the alleged actions were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment finding. The plaintiff made no explicit claim about Islamic law except to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included ritual practices based on Islamic law.

The plaintiff, a Turkish Muslim former employee of the defendant, challenged the New York Supreme Court of King’s County decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff had sued her previous employer under Executive Law §296 and the Administrative Code of New York §8-107, alleging that the company created a hostile work environment, subjected her to constructive termination, and retaliated against her for filing a discrimination claim. This Court reversed the lower court’s decision on the hostile work environment and constructive discharge, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence to allow the claims to move forward to a jury.

The plaintiffs, the surviving family members and the estate of an American citizen who was assassinated, allegedly by Hezbollah, while serving as the president of the American University of Beirut, brought a wrongful death action against Iran. They sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $31,525,296 to the family for economic loss as well as mental anguish.

An Arab Muslim truck driver for Swift Transportation Company sued his former employer under Title VII, Tennessee state law, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as intentional economic harm under state law and the FMLA. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that non-Arabs and non-Muslims received better work assignments and that fellow drivers made “hateful” comments regarding his religion and national origin. However, he did not provide any specifics regarding these claims. The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not report an accident within the timeframe mandated by the company. The Court granted the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating employment, and because the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative measures before pursuing a case in court. The plaintiff madeno explicit connection to Islamic law, except that to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included religious practice.

An Indian Muslim physician, who formerly worked at a Veteran Affairs Medical Center, sued the Secretary of Veteran Affairs under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin; the failure to promote; retaliation; a hostile work environment; and constructive discharge.  The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not receive a promotion due to unsatisfactory work performance. Concluding that the plaintiff did not prove he suffered an adverse employment action and therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Phillip Jean-Laurent brought an action against South Carolina prison officials for allegedly violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his Islamic religious tenets and the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the respondents prevented his attendance at Islamic religious services during Ramadan as retaliation for him using the law library, and deprived him of evening and morning meals required by Muslim religious exercises during Ramadan, in preparation for fasting during daylight hours. The District Court found that the respondents properly answered the interrogatories as to the policy of forbidding the plaintiff to attend prayer services, but that the respondents did not properly answer questions in document requests regarding the plaintiff's and other Muslim prisoners’ ability to secure Ramadan morning meals.

The plaintiff, Kiaza Loccenitt, a Muslim inmate in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction, sued New York City and several prison officials for allegedly violating his civil rights by denying him ḥalāl meals and by denying him and other Muslim inmates in his unit the services of an imām (Muslim chaplain). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, as well as New York Corrections Law § 610. In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against some of the prison officials (who were not directly involved in the alleged violations or the creation of policies that led to the alleged violations), but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to add factual details to his allegation about being denied ḥalāl meals, and about "the impact of that denial on the practice of his religion."

The plaintiff, Tracey Taylor, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Illinois), brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the respondents Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart for alleged violations of his civil rights in denying him access to Islamic prayer services and by failing to serve ḥalāl meat (prepared in accordance with Islamic law). The respondents moved for summary judgment after alleging that Taylor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they violated his constitutional rights. The Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, determining that the denial of Islamic prayer services was related to a legitimate penological interest, and that the prison had adequately provided the plaintiff with sufficiently nutritious Islamic meals, even though they were vegetarian/vegan.

Plaintiff Leo Pittman-Bey, a Muslim inmate, sued Texas prison officials for allegedly violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and his constitutional right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment by denying him after-sunset meals during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Previous prison regulations allowed practicing Muslim inmates to receive after-sunset meals during Ramadan, but only if they had attended jumuʿa (Friday prayer) services in the 60 days prior to Ramadan or had received a special exception from the Muslim chaplain. Pittman-Bey did not attend the services because, as an adherent of the Ḥanafī school of Sunnī Islam, he said he believed that jumuʿa services are not proper if conducted in nonpublic settings like prisons. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that denying Ramadan meals in accordance with the jumuʿa attendance policy did not violate the First Amendment.

Plaintiff Dorian Davis challenged the Kern Valley State Prison policy that prohibited Muslim prisoners from purchasing and possessing prayer oils in their cells. The prison officials, however, claimed that a compelling governmental interest made their policy the least restrictive means of ensuring prison safety. The District Court agreed with them, determining that the prison did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment rights because the Muslim chaplain had previously provided contraband to prisoners; in addition, it found that RLUIPA rights were not violated because the prison had to cancel Friday prayer services until another Muslim chaplain could be hired.

The plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, sued state and prison officials for failing to provide Muslim inmates with ḥalāl meat options while incarcerated. The defendants claimed that inmates in the custody of the state are not entitled, under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA, to a diet that includes ritually-slaughtered meat. The defendants also requested summary judgment because they claimed that Wells-Bey did not have an allergy to eggs that inhibited his ability to eat a lacto-ovo diet as a substitute for meat. The Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff claimed he had an egg allergy and therefore could not subsist off the vegetarian meal plan; however, the Court allowed the defendants to refile their motion if they were able to obtain more information about the plaintiff's "alleged allergy."

Petitioner Tyrone Walker alleged that the prison violated his civil rights when it refused to provide him with the opportunity to participate in jumu'ah (Friday prayer) services when he was confined to the SHU. The District Court determined that the Respondent did not violate the Petitioner's rights under RLUIPA, as the Respondent's decision to deny the requests for access to Friday prayer services through closed-circuit television or through an audio feed was reasonably related to articulable, legitimate penological interests, which included the safety and the cost of installing the necessary equipment.

Plaintiff Kevin Murray, an American taxpayer, sued Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve, arguing that the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), which established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by allowing funds to be used to support companies that invest in sharīʿa-compliant financial instruments. Applying the Lemon Test to assess whether there was excessive entanglement between religion and state related to Islamic financial instruments, the Court concluded that there was not; specifically, it determined that the Islamic financial instruments comprised only a small percentage of the complete business portfolio, that the purpose of the EESA was not religious, and that the primary effect of utilizing the Islamic financial instruments did not support or hinder any religion. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

At issue is this case is an Islamic financial instrument called a mudaraba agreement, by which a bank enters into a profit-sharing arrangement with a borrower. The Agreement at issue includes a clause stating that any disagreements are to be settled through arbitration in the Bahamas. The Court refused to uphold the Agreement because Vinewood Capital was not a signatory to the agreement, and thus denied the motion to compel arbitration of Vinewood’s claims. In May of 2011, the Court dismissed the appeal and closed the case.

Plaintiff Kevin Murray, an American taxpayer, sued Treasury Secretary Geithner and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, challenging use of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) to bailout AIG, a “market leader in Sharia-compliant financing.” The Court denied summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the bailout of AIG by the government may raise First Amendment Establishment Clause issues. This decision was overturned in a 2011 appeal, in which this same Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that the plaintiff had not made out a sufficient case that would allow a jury to conclude, under the Lemon Test (which assesses whether there is excessive entanglement of the Government with religion) that the Treasury Secretary violated the Establishment Clause by allowing AIG investment in sharīʿa-compliant financial instruments.

The U.S. accused a group of defendants of financial dealings with terrorists, on the basis that they had entered into Islamic financial agreements—specifically a profit-sharing arrangement known as a mudaraba contract—with a known leader of Hamas, a relative of one of the members of the defendant group. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas found them guilty. On appeal, this Court held that there was enough evidence to suggest that the defendants knew that their relative was a designated terrorist but continued to do business with him. The Court thus upheld the District Court’s guilty verdict.

The Court granted the defendant Marriott International’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Plaintiff Nagy Edrisse sued Marriott and several of its employees under Title VII, § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiff alleged that the hotel created or tolerated a hostile work environment in that his direct manager made frequent derogatory racial, religious, and ethnic statements, including asking the plaintiff whether he was going to blow up the building and whether he was a terrorist. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the hotel fired him out of discriminatory animus based on his religion, race, and ethnicity. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to inappropriate behavior at the workplace (including using racial slurs directed at fellow employees), rather than his race, religion, or ethnicity. The Court dismissed the claim against the employees who were not directly involved, but denied summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the facts were sufficient to make out a prima facie case to move forward. In other words, the Court concluded that a jury could consider the evidence presented to be severe and pervasive enough to allow for a finding of a hostile work environment.

The Court denied defendant Merrill Lynch’s motion for summary judgment, adopting the opinion of the magistrate judge, which held that the employee established a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff Abdul-Giyath Mayale-Eke sued his former employer and direct supervisor under Title VII, §1981, the Rhode Island Fair Employment Act, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff alleged that, as a Muslim who had immigrated from Nigeria, he was treated differently and ultimately fired from his position as an investment specialist because of his race, national origin, and religion; specifically, he claimed that he was frequently asked questions about his heritage and was subject to derogatory comments. Defendant Merrill Lynch claimed that it fired plaintiff after giving him numerous warnings of his failure to meet set performance standards. The Court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had alleged enough specific facts to make the claim not just conceivable but plausible before a jury.

Masroor Siddiqui, a Muslim of Pakistani origin, sued his former employer, Autozone, under Title VII, alleging race-based harassment; discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion; and retaliation. The plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment when, after 9/11, he was barraged with racial epithets. He further alleged that he was passed by for promotions because of his race, religion, and national origin (citing comments from his supervisor that they would never promote “people like him”), and that he was ultimately terminated as a result of these factors. The defendant argued that, even if the court found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company legitimately denied the promotion of, and ultimately fired, the employee because of poor work performance. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that no jury would consider the evidence produced by the plaintiff severe or pervasive enough for a hostile work environment claim; however, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment in respect to the promotion claim, allowing the case to go forward.

A group of Muslim employees sued their employer, Celestica Corporation, a manufacturing company, and Adecco USA, Inc., a temporary employment agency, under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the basis of religion, and also claimed that the defendants refused to reasonably accommodate their religiously-mandated prayer schedule despite repeated requests. The defendants argued that they offered the plaintiffs options to accommodate their prayer schedule, including changing shifts. The Court, however, found that there was enough evidence to allow a jury to conclude the defendants did not reasonably accommodate the religion of the plaintiffs; it thus denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

On appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the Court upheld the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The EEOC brought a case under Title VII on behalf of Asthma Suliman, a Muslim employee of Kelly Services (a temporary employment agency), alleging religious discrimination. Suliman claimed that the company required her to remove her headscarf (khimār) to work at Nahan (one of Kelly’s work placement facilities) because of the risk that loose clothing posed to the wearer due to the heavy machinery. The defendant company argued that, even if the Court determined that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company had “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” An earlier precedent, Ollis v. Hearthstone Homes, Inc., recognized the operation of heavy machinery as a legitimate basis for requiring headscarf-removal and as a proper defense to a claim of discrimination in such instances. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the EEOC could not prove that the employee was discriminated against as a direct result of her religious beliefs, and that the defendant had demonstrated a safety-related reason for the lack of accommodation.

Plaintiff Tarick Ali sued his former employer under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, claiming he was discriminated against on the basis of his religion. As an EMT and firefighter for the District of Columbia, Ali alleged that the District subjected him to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment after he filed a complaint about his supervisor’s lack of accommodation of his prayer schedule. He alleged that, on several occasions, his direct supervisor told him that he must choose between his religion and job, publicly mocked him when he returned from prayer, and ridiculed him for filing an internal complaint regarding the alleged discrimination. The Court denied the defendant government’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the evidence presented could allow a jury to find that the plaintiff was treated adversely because of his religion and was subjected to a hostile work environment on that basis.

Plaintiff Sultan Chowdhury sued his employer under Title VII for discrimination, retaliation, and creating a hostile work environment. In this action, the Court reviewed the defendant’s supplemental motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. (The defendant had previously filed a motion for summary judgment that was dismissed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, and the Court ordered further briefing for the hostile work environment claim.) The plaintiff also amended his previous claim, detailing the hostile work environment claims, alleging discrimination on the basis of his religion (Islam), including belittling and humiliation in front of his co-workers, exclusion from important meetings, and interference with his attempts to seek transfer. The Court held that the named instances provided sufficient evidence for jurors to find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim. It therefore denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to move forward to trial. On March 7, 2011, a jury trial delivered a partial verdict in the case, as the jury did not answer all of the questions raised but awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,125,000. The Court directed the parties to file a joint status report in August 2011 if they were seeking mediation on the outstanding issues.

The plaintiff sued her former employer, Neiman Marcus, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, color, and national origin; failure to accommodate her religion; failure to stop harassment; and retaliation for her filing of a religious and national origin discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which allowed her suit to proceed in court. The defendant company argued that, because of the statue of limitations, the plaintiff failed to make a claim. Many of the plaintiff’s claims, including allegations of her co-worker directing racial epithets at her, and being compelled to work on religious holidays, were time-barred and thus could not be introduced to the court. The court found that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination as required by McDonnell Douglas, concluding that she did not prove that she was treated differently because of her religion, race, or national origin. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant company on these claims; however, the Court denied the company’s motion for summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could consider allegations that the company permitted so-called sale-stealing, when an employee rings up the sale of a client that a co-worker was working with thereby receiving their commission, to be an adverse employment action in the claim that was not time-barred, and thus the suit on this issue could move forward.

A Pakistani Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, JP Morgan Chase, under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and disparate treatment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she received a lower salary than her co-workers in the same position and that her reasonable requests to work a different shift so she could care for her daughter were denied. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court concluded that the incidents that the plaintiff cited to support her claim of a hostile work environment were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a jury to find for the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court did not see any adverse employment action as a result of alleged disparate treatment (which is an element that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green test for discrimination requires in cases lacking direct evidence). Finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

A Muslim woman, Zahra Mowafy, sued her former employer and her supervisors under Title VII and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging discrimination and job termination based on religion, race, national origin, and age. The plaintiff alleged that, during her time working for the company, it had created a hostile work environment by failing to stop her student interns from mocking her religious prayer rituals or asking insensitive questions about her religion. The Court found that, although the plaintiff narrowly made a prima facie case demonstrating religious discrimination (as no other non-Muslims were similarly fired), the defendant company had non-discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff, specifically poor work performance (which was not disputed by the plaintiff). Furthermore, on the hostile work environment claim, the Court concluded that the incidents detailed by the plaintiff were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a successful claim. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment is favor of the defendant. 

A female Muslim police officer, Kimberlie Webb, sued the City of Philadelphia under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, alleging religion- and gender-based discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the City barring her from wearing a headscarf (ḥijāb) with her police uniform, and argued that the prohibition amounted to a failure to accommodate her right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. The City argued that the bar was consistent with Philadelphia Police Directive 78 and that allowing her to wear religious garb would cause an undue burden on the City and the Police Department, in that it would compromise a look of cohesiveness and uniformity among officers. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to exhaust internal remedies regarding her claim of gender discrimination and found the bar on the headscarf to be a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the Court upheld the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, granting the City’s motion for summary judgment.

Muslim plaintiff Iqbal Sulehria sued his employer, the New York City Department of Correction, and related officials under Title VII, §1983, and New York State and City anti-discrimination laws, alleging religious and national origin discrimination as well as retaliation for filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and through the prison administration. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that his co-workers and managers harassed him for being Muslim after the events of 9/11. The harassment consisted of verbal taunts, intrusive searches, withholding promotions, denying him use of the bathroom, forcing him to work in substandard conditions, and having his face imposed on the body of Osama bin Laden in photos left on the plaintiff’s desk. The Court upheld a magistrate judge’s report granting the City partial summary judgment, dismissing the retaliation and failure-to-promote claims, because the Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case; however, the Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could see the events as alleged to be severe and pervasive enough to allow the claim to go forward.

The Court considered questions of venue for a case related to Islamic financial instruments. The defendant, Dar al-Maal al-Islami Trust, petitioned the Court to compel the plaintiff, Vinewood Capital, to follow the arbitration clause of a profit-sharing (mudaraba) agreement. The Court determined that there was no single agreement listing both parties as signatories, and it thus refused to uphold the arbitration clause.

The defendant, Dar al-Maal al-Islami Trust, sought to enforce the terms of an arbitration clause, which required arbitration in the Bahamas upon disputes surrounding an Islamic financial profit-sharing arrangement known as a mudaraba agreement. The Court found that the clause was not enforceable, as Vinewood Capital was not a signatory party to the agreement. This decision was affirmed in 2008 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Court denied defendant Deloitte Consulting’s summary judgment motion, contesting plaintiff Zakaria Memon’s Title VII discrimination claim against the company. The plaintiff alleged that he was given fewer assignments and ultimately fired because his religiously-mandated prayer schedule interfered with his workday and allegedly made clients uncomfortable. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to poor work performance. The Court found that the prima facie case of discrimination was strong enough to survive the motion for summary judgment, and a status and scheduling conference was set for April 2011.

Plaintiff Skwikar Abdelkader alleged a Title VII violation against her former employer, Sears, for failing to accommodate her religion (Islam). The plaintiff alleged that Sears failed to accommodate her religious beliefs by asking her for work on Fridays (the day of communal Muslim prayer services) and on Muslim holidays; she also alleged that the company retaliated against her after she reported the alleged discrimination internally to the Human Resources department. The defendant responded that they neither forced her to work those days nor punished her for refusing to do so; it further noted that she was fired because she violated company policy by allowing a cashier to use her management discount card without the direct supervision required. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, finding that the company equally punished non-Muslims for misuse of the discount card. On that basis, the Court held that no disparate treatment occurred and therefore granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The Court granted defendant Freedom Financial Network’s motion for summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging discrimination. Following the EEOC dismissal of his claim, the Court found that the plaintiff, in his second amended complaint, still failed to state a claim warranting relief despite being given several chances to amend his complaint. Plaintiff Reginald Ringgold was an employee of defendant and claimed that he was fired because he was a Muslim and a Free Moorish American National. The defendant responded that it let the employee go because he claimed to be a tax-exempt non-citizen of the United States on several occasions, but his documentation showed that he was born in Connecticut. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that his employer knew he was a Muslim or Free Moorish American National, and thus there was no actionable claim of discrimination.

Representing a group of Muslim truck drivers, the EEOC brought suit under Title VII against the group’s employer, Pace Services (a trucking company), alleging that the company subjected them to a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the company did nothing to stop their supervisor from calling them a variety of derogatory names, such as al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Osama. The company argued a recognized affirmative defense against the discrimination claim by attempting to show that it took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any racially-discriminatory behavior and that the employee(s) failed to take advantage of said corrections. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant could not prove the essential elements of that defense, and thus, that summary judgment should be granted in their favor. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the defendant had provided evidence sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that they had adequately proved the elements of the affirmative defense.

A Jordanian Muslim sued his former employer, a life insurance firm, under the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was terminated from his job because he was a Muslim and of Middle Eastern origin. The defendant claimed that he was fired for failing to meet job performance standards; the plaintiff responded that the company’s explanation was a pretext, arguing that the company applied different job performance evaluation standards to him as compared to his non-Muslim co-workers. Employing the burden-shifting test established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (where the plaintiff alleges a prima facie claim, the company responds with a reason, and the plaintiff will prevail if he can show that the reason is a pretext for actual discrimination), the Court found that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence of a discriminatory motive to establish a prima facie case and allow the suit to proceed before a jury. Accordingly, the Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

An Iranian Muslim teacher sued his former employer, the Memphis Board of Education, under Title VII, alleging retaliation and discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied a permanent, full-time position because of his race and religion. The defendant argued that the denial was because the plaintiff received several unsatisfactory reports while serving in substitute positions. At trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Tennessee granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and that the defendant had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to offer the plaintiff a permanent position.

An Iranian Muslim professor sued his former employer, Case Western Reserve University, under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and nation origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied scheduled performance reviews and ultimately tenure because of his race and religion. The University argued that the professor was not qualified for tenure. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff’s qualification for tenure is a matter of fact, and as such, must be decided by a jury. The case was ultimately settled on June 26, 1998.

Representing himself and a class of unspecified American Muslims, a Muslim-American plaintiff petitioned the court to compel a radio station to include a Muslim panelist on its program regarding religion, under Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws. The Court denied the plaintiff’s request, concluding that he had failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not file an employment discrimination claim first with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is a requirement before a Title VII lawsuit can begin.

The ACLU brought suit objecting to the use of taxpayer money to fund what it termed a religious charter school as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The defendant academy and its sponsor, Islamic Relief, submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not a state actor. The Court found that the evidence regarding Islamic Relief’s role as a state actor was not clear, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in 2011. As of August 2011, the case was still ongoing.

A Muslim employee of the U.S. Army, who was a Syrian of Turkish origin, sued his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of age and of religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that he was not offered a position after previously resigning because of his age, religion, and national origin. The defendant argued that he was not rehired because of poor work performance on past assignments. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the defendant presented legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not rehiring plaintiff that the plaintiff did not rebut.

A Muslim female teacher sued her former employer, the Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia, as well as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. The defendant school board argued that it suspended and ultimately fired the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania Garb Statue (Public Law No. 282) when she refused to remove her headscarf while teaching. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found in favor of the defendant Commonwealth, but against the School Board. The Third Circuit affirmed the decision against the Commonwealth but reversed the decision against the School Board, holding that, while the statute may present conflicts with the First Amendment, to bring a claim under Title VII, as the plaintiff did, requires proving that the accommodation would not be an undue burden for the employer. The Court further held that allowing teachers to wear religious garb would be an example of an undue burden, as it threatens the religious neutrality of the public school system. The Court upheld the conclusion of the District Court that “the Commonwealth was not [plaintiff’s] employer within the meaning of Title VII."

An Arab Muslim professor sued his former employer, Saint Francis College, under Title VII, §1981, §1983, §1985(3), §1986, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, alleging that the College denied him tenure because he was an Arab Muslim. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the College’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded that decision, holding that discrimination against Arabs constitutes racial discrimination, and that the statute of limitations restrictions imposed by the lower court were incorrectly applied, as the acts in question occurred before the statute of limitations was passed into law.

An unmarried African-American Muslim worker sued the defendant, Del Monte Sales Company, under Title VII and §1981 for discrimination based on race, sex, marital status, and religion, as well as for libel, slander, and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff argued that he was not hired for a job with the defendant due to his race and religion, alleging that his interviewer made derogatory and discriminatory remarks to this effect. The defendant argued that it did not hire the plaintiff because he was not outgoing or pleasant, which are necessary traits for a job as a salesman. The Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, which had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss (noting a lack of evidence offered by the plaintiff).

An Indian Muslim professor sued his former employer, CUNY, under Title VII, §1981, and §1983, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied tenure and additional compensation because of his race and religion. The Court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to establish that the reason he was denied tenure and additional compensation was discrimination.

The plaintiff, Amr Elmenayer, sued his former employer, ABF Freight Systems, for failure to accommodate his religious practices and disparate treatment due to religion under Title VII. The plaintiff alleged that his supervisor failed to grant his reasonable request to attend Friday (jumu'a) prayer services. He also alleged that he was treated more harshly than other non-Muslim employees when he was terminated for failing to report an accident in a timely fashion, as per the company's policy. The defendant argued that it did try to accommodate the plaintiff’s religious practices by encouraging him to bid for a shift that would not conflict with his prayer duties. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination. This decision was affirmed in Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).

A former Islamic prison chaplain sued his former employer, the State of Maryland, under Title VII, alleging that the State created a hostile work environment, subjected him to constructive discharge, and was liable for breach of contract for failing to abide by the terms of an earlier attempted settlement. The plaintiff alleged that he was harassed because of his religion for several years, including being involved in physical altercations with other non-Muslim employees, while working as an Islamic chaplain, and that this led to a hostile work environment and to his constructive discharge. The Court dismissed the contract claim, as the state has sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; but the Court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the other two counts, concluding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination.

A Muslim man from Algeria sued his former employer, SUNY College at Brockport, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was not selected for a job at the university because of the Department of Foreign Languages’ head’s prejudice against him. The hiring committee voted in favor of the plaintiff for a permanent position, but the decision ultimately went to the department head, who the plaintiff claimed did not select him out of discriminatory animus toward his race and religion. The department head responded that the plaintiff was not hired because of his lack of research experience. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury may find that the defendant’s reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretexts for discriminatory motives.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

A Muslim man who sued his employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, challenged the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York's decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that his employer did not accommodate his religion when it refused to allow him to move his breaks to attend religiously-mandated Friday prayer (jumu'a) services. He further argued that he was treated differently (i.e., punished more severely for infractions such as failing to report an accident immediately) than non-Muslim employees. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the instances of alleged discrimination, though not time-barred, were insufficient to create a prima facie case of discrimination. 

A Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FRCA), alleging religious discrimination and breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired when his employer learned that he was a Muslim. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim, because the plaintiff failed to establish that an employee-employer relationship existed between himself and the defendant; and that it similarly did not have jurisdiction to hear the contract claim because it was below the requisite amount for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the FCRA claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing that the decision-makers knew he was a Muslim when they decided to terminate his employment.

A Bangladeshi Muslim worker sued her former employer under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was fired and not rehired by the defendant because of her religion and national origin. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, but contended that she did not rebut or rebuff the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the company had for not rehiring her—which it claimed was due to poor job performance in her previous job assignments. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff offered no proof that she was not rehired due to religious discrimination.

A Muslim former Naval engineer sued the Secretary of the Navy under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to ethnic slurs and jokes, leading to a hostile work environment. The Court adopted the report by the magistrate judge granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies before bringing the case to court. The Court further noted that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the compensatory damage issue.

A Pakistani Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff claimed that he was terminated for discriminatory reasons, as his supervisor made comments that the plaintiff felt were derogatory. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was terminated because of inconsistencies in his re-accreditation application to qualify him for work at the healthcare organization (as plaintiff had failed to disclose that he was suspended when working for a previous employer). The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Additional information. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 782 (1973) burden-shifting test.  This test requires plaintiffs to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  If they are successful, the burden shifts back to the defendant (usually a company or a company representative) to demonstrate they it a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.  Finally, it then becomes the burden of the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated by the defendant was a pretext for the true discriminatory motive.

A Muslim worker sued the defendant, the Philadelphia Housing Authority, under Title VII and §1983, claiming that he was terminated from employment due to his Muslim religion and in retaliation for acting as a witness in other cases against his employer. The defendant argued that he was terminated due to his participation in several crimes, such as forgery and theft. The Court found no evidence of a connection between the inappropriate remarks that were made toward the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's termination more than a year later. Thus, in 2002, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

A Pakistani Muslim banker sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff alleged that her coworkers and supervisors made derogatory remarks to her about her diet, dress, and prayer schedule; and that this discriminatory animus was the real reason that she was terminated. The defendant argued that she was fired for insubordination when she left work in the middle of a shift without permission. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Eighth Circuit upheld this decision on appeal, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the defendant offered for terminating her employment.

The Western Cape High Court in Cape Town declared the 1953 Wills Act inconsistent with the South Africa Constitution, because the statute’s provisions were previously interpreted to recognize only legal marriage and not Muslim marriages.

Summary for a case in which the Western Cape High Court in Cape Town declared the 1953 Wills Act inconsistent with the South Africa Constitution, because the statute’s provisions were previously interpreted to recognize only legal marriage and not Muslim marriages.

Holding: The Court granted the adult petitioner leave to change her name from Eloise McCloud Wing to Zakiyyah Ashraf after her conversion to Islam, but denied leave to change petitioner’s eleven-year-old daughter’s name from Cheryl Ann Wing to Hafsah Ashraf. The Court held that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have a foreign-sounding Muslim name that would “set her apart and seem strange.”

Procedural Posture: Petitioner applied to the City Court of the City of New York for leave to change her and her daughter’s names. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the petitioner wished to change her and her daughter’s names to names from what she understood to be the Islamic tradition.

Judgment: Petitioner was granted leave to change her name, but not her daughter’s name, in an opinion authored by Justice Baer.

Facts: Eloise McCloud Wing converted from Christianity to Islam. Her eleven-year-old daughter, Cheryl Ann Wing, lived with Eloise following Eloise’s separation from her husband two years before the name-change petition. After Eloise’s conversion, Cheryl attended religious classes at a mosque and played with Muslim friends, and her mother said Cheryl wanted to be a Muslim and have a Muslim name. Eloise petitioned the court to change her and her daughter’s names to Zakiyyah Ashraf and Hafsah Ashraf, respectively. The Court stated that while an adult’s name change should be approved, a child’s name change should be approved only if it is in the child’s best interest. The Court found no compelling need for Cheryl’s name change, and noted that such a change might actually have an “adverse effect”: the proposed name would “set her apart and seem strange and foreign to her schoolmates and others.” The Court stated that the petition for Cheryl’s name change could be renewed when Cheryl turned 16, and was therefore old enough to make a mature decision about it on her own.

Holding: When multiple family members die in the same event, such as a natural disaster, the named beneficiary of an insurance policy is prima facie presumed the recipient of the payout unless another claimant can show that the beneficiary died in the event before the policy holder. Here, both the policy holder and his wife, who was his beneficiary, died in a flood, and without evidence showing that his wife predeceased him, the policy holder’s sister could not claim the insurance payout.

Procedural Posture: An insurance company filed interpleader in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against the claimants of a life insurance payout. The Court found that the payout should go to the administrator of the deceased’s children. The deceased’s sister and the administrator of the deceased’s wife’s estate each appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court compares the American system to “the Mahometan law of India,” which it understands to presume in inheritance cases that relatives who died in the same event, such as a natural disaster, died at the same moment.

Judgment: Affirmed in part and reversed in part in an opinion authored by Justice McSherry.

Facts: Walter Hoopes, his wife Maria Hoopes, and their two children died in a flood in May 1889. Walter Hoopes had life insurance and named his wife as his beneficiary. According to the insurance regulations, should his wife pre-decease him, the payout was to go to his children; if they did not survive him, the payout was to go to his mother, then to his father, and finally to his siblings. After their deaths, Walter Hoopes’ sister, the administrator of Maria Hoopes, and the administrator of the children claimed rights to the insurance payout. The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted first that other legal systems, including Roman law, the Napoleonic Code, “the Mahometan law of India,” and ancient Danish law employed various presumptions based on age, gender, and time to help courts determine the survivorship order when multiple family members died at the same time or in the same event. However, it concluded that the American common law system has no such presumptions, and survivorship “must be proved by the party asserting it.” In this case, there was no evidence or way to know who predeceased whom in the flood. Because the wife, as the named beneficiary, had prima facie title to the insurance payout, her estate’s title could only be extinguished by a satisfactory showing by Walter Hoopes’ sister that the wife died before Walter. There is nothing in the record to indicate this was the case, so, the Court concluded, the payout belongs to the wife’s estate.

Holding: Witness oaths in court must be administered according to their opinions, as it most affects their consciences. Swearing a witness by an uplifted hand, without a bible, is valid and legal.

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff sued defendant for slander in the lower court of Crawford, IL, for defendant’s claim that plaintiff swore falsely in a judicial proceeding before a justice of the peace. The lower court sustained defendant’s motion to exclude the justice of the peace’s testimony about how plaintiff was sworn in on grounds that it did not prove that a legal oath was administered. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois to determine whether plaintiff’s oath was legally cognizable. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that “a Turk [is sworn] upon the Koran” when taking an oath in court.

Judgment: Reversed and remanded in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Reynolds.

Facts: Gill sued Caldwell for slander after Caldwell charged that Gill swore falsely in a certain judicial proceeding. In the lower court, the justice of the peace in that proceeding, Thomas Kennedy, testified that Gill was administered “what he conceived to be an oath,” which consisted of swearing by an uplifted hand with no Bible. The lower court excluded this testimony on the grounds that it did not prove a legal oath was administered. The Supreme Court of Illinois found that, at common law, “oaths are to be administered to all persons according to their own opinions, and as it most affects their consciences.” The legislature codified this principle in an 1807 statute. Therefore, the Court concluded that an oath by an uplifted hand, but without scripture, is valid and legal. In a footnote, the Court further noted that at common law, witnesses are sworn “according to the form which [they hold] to be the most solemn, and which is sanctified by the usage of the country or the sect to which [they belong].” This includes, for example, “[a] Jew [swearing] upon the Pentateuch, and a Turk [swearing] upon the Koran.”

Holding: For an oath to be legally valid, the person who is sworn must be aware that his statement is a solemn appeal to a Supreme Being, believe that what he declares is true, and include some corporal act, such as an uplifted hand or a hand placed upon scripture.

Procedural posture: Defendant moved to quash the return of Magistrate Robert Carson. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except the Court notes that “a Mohammedan [is sworn] upon the Koran” when taking an oath in court.

Judgment: Motion to quash the return of the magistrate denied in an opinion authored by Judge Staake.

Facts: Magistrate Robert Carson left his own district and entered another for the purpose of holding a bail hearing for the defendant, who was charged with a violation of the act of assembly. The defendant contended that state law prohibited the magistrate from acting outside of his own district, and that he had no authority to hold a hearing there. The defendant also argued that the oath administered to the complainant, upon which the arrest warrant was based, was not properly administered because it was not sworn upon the Bible and was not repeated verbatim with an upraised hand. The Philadelphia County Court of Quarter Sessions found that the magistrate performed a “purely ministerial act” in holding a hearing simply to fix bail, and that such ministerial functions could be performed outside of his district. With regard to the oath, the Court found that an oath need not be recited verbatim for it to be valid. Rather, the witness must recognize that he is solemnly being sworn and do some corporal act in appealing to God about the truth of his testimony. It may be administered “in any mode peculiar to the belief of the person sworn, or in any form binding on his conscience.” The Court notes that Jews can be sworn upon the Pentateuch and Muslims upon the Qurʾān, and that there is even a special procedure for “the Chinaman.” Therefore, the Court concluded, because the complainant’s oath was administered solemnly with a corporal act, the oath was valid.

Holding: A Mormon minister is entitled to tax exemptions under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, which exempts “all clergymen of any Christian denomination regularly engaged in their vocation” from the obligation of paying personal taxes.

Procedural posture: Tax collector filed for assumpsit (a common law action brought to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract) to recover defendant’s personal taxes in the District Court of Koolauloa, HI. The Court, sitting without a jury, found for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not relevant, except that the defendant testified he is not “a Mohammedan” and does not “accept the Koran,” and that the Court noted that “Mohammedanism” is one of the four “grand systems” of the religious world.

Judgment: Judgment for the defendant, in an opinion authored by Judge McCully.

Facts: Defendant Henry Richards was a minister of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church) who was sent as a missionary to Hawaii. At trial, to determine whether he qualified as a “Christian clergyman” exempt from personal taxes under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, Richards testified as to his religious beliefs. They included belief in, inter alia, baptism, the Gospels, revelation, polygamy, the atonement of Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the Book of Mormon. The Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Hawaii found that, because the defendant believed in Christ and accepted the Old and New Testament, he was a Christian clergyman for tax purposes. The Court addressed the concern that Mormons have more scriptures than the Bible by stating that the Roman Catholic Church has accepted revelation and papal infallibility, but is still considered Christian. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because Richards did not himself practice or preach polygamy in Hawaii, his belief was not grounds for excluding him from being a Christian minister. Therefore, the Court concluded that, as a Mormon minister, Richards qualified for the personal tax exemption given to Christian ministers.

Holding: Under N.C. Acts of 1871­–72, c. 193, § 25 (Rev. § 2105), a husband who lives with his wife is liable for her torts, even though he was not present when she committed them and did not know of them.

Procedural posture: Plaintiff sued defendants husband and wife to recover damages for wife’s slander against him. Jury found for plaintiff and awarded damages, which plaintiff was entitled to recover from both husband and wife. Defendants appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the concurrence notes that “even [women] living in semicivilized countries under the domination of the Koran” have had greater legal rights than American women.

Judgment: Affirmed in an opinion by Justice Allen, with a concurrence by Chief Justice Clark.

Facts: The plaintiff sued the defendants, a husband and wife pair, for the wife’s slander against him. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the judge stated that the husband was liable on the theory that husbands are liable for their wives’ torts. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld this opinion, based on N.C. Acts of 1871­–72, c. 193, § 25 (Rev. § 2105), which states that “[e]very husband living with his wife shall be jointly liable with her for all damages accruing from any tort committed by her.” The Court found that this statute codified the previous common law rule.

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Clark stated that theory of merger, in which a wife’s legal personality and property is “merged” into those of her husband upon marriage, is an antiquated common law proposition. He argued that this theory “is the source of all the legal degradation of women,” and that it is especially outdated now that women have the right to vote. Compared to other women in both “civilized” and “semicivilized countries under the domination of the Koran,” in his view, American women have inferior rights under the common law system. However, he agreed with the majority that the N.C. Act of 1872 codified the common law principle, and because courts have no power to modify a statutory principle, the lower court’s ruling must stand.

Holding: Any religious belief, whether Christian or not, that recognizes the existence of a God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood, either in this or a future life, is sufficient as a basis on which to swear a witness in court.

Procedural posture: Objection to competency of a witness. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that “a Mohammedan [may be sworn] on the Koran” and considers Muslims to be acceptable sworn witnesses based on beliefs akin to those of Christianity and cognate religious traditions.

Judgment: Objection sustained in an opinion authored by Judge Neterer.

Facts: The government offered a Mr. Kirkland as a witness in a criminal case being heard in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The defendant objected, on the grounds that Kirkland could not be sworn because he did “not believe in the existence of a God, who is the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood,” having admitted as much when questioned. Judge Neterer found the common law rule to be that a witness may only be sworn if he believes in a God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood. This need not be a Christian belief; Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Chinese may similarly be sworn, because they fulfill these criteria. Because Kirkland does not believe in a God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood, the Court concluded that he may not be sworn and the objection was sustained.

Holding: In a judicial proceeding to determine whether a defendant should be denied entry to the United States, the court is not bound by the decision of a U.S. customs officer or collector. Rather, it must investigate and weigh the evidence offered by both parties, including any visas or certificates from defendant refuting evidence from the government.

Procedural posture: United States commissioner ordered defendant, a Chinese immigrant with a student visa, deported from the U.S., based on a decision of the deputy collector at the port where defendant had tried to enter the country. Defendant appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the Court notes that some of the alleged evidence on which the deputy collector based his decision was so intangible that “the collector could have justified his course as well by asserting . . . that it was supported by the revelations of the Koran.”

Judgment: Reversed and remanded in an opinion authored by Judge Coxe.

Facts: The defendant applied for admission to the United States at the port of Malone, NY, on Oct. 13, 1884, with a valid certificate permitting him to enter as a student. The deputy collector at Malone initially found the defendant’s papers to be valid. However, two days later, he met a Mr. Clemenshire in New York, who said that the people at the address at which the defendant said he would be staying in the U.S. knew nothing about the defendant and that the defendant was actually going to work “in laundry” in Connecticut. The deputy collector then telegraphed the port to have the defendant returned to Montreal. At the defendant’s deportation hearing, the commissioner ordered the defendant deported after finding the deputy collector’s decision final and controlling.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York found that the defendant had not received a fair hearing. It found that the collector’s action “was based upon an irrelevant rumor,” because Mr. Clemenshire’s information was “conjecture.” Having previously believed the defendant’s papers to be valid, the collector’s subsequent decision was not based on valid statutory grounds. Furthermore, the commissioner was not barred from investigating and deciding the case on the merits; he had a duty to determine the status of the defendant by investigating the entry certificate and any contrary proof a customs officer might introduce. Therefore, the decision was reversed and remanded for the commissioner to reconsider based on the evidence offered by each party.

Holding: A witness must believe in a God in order to be sworn in court. A court may hear testimony about a witness’ belief or disbelief to determine whether the witness may be sworn. Whether a witness believes or disbelieves in a future state of rewards and punishments goes only to his credibility as a witness, not to his ability to testify.

Procedural posture: Plaintiff objected to the competency of a witness in a case before a Massachusetts court of common pleas, and the Court overruled the objection. The jury found for defendants, and plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that a “mahometan” belief suffices for swearing an oath.

Judgment: Reversed and objection sustained in an opinion authored by Justice Wilde.

Facts: The plaintiff objected to the competency of a witness on the grounds that the witness did not believe in God. The plaintiff offered testimony from other witnesses to prove this assertion. The lower court declined to hear the testimony and overruled the objection. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that the general rule of evidence does not allow a witness to disqualify himself by declarations not made under oath. However, there is an exception for cases such as this one to prove the witness’ belief or disbelief in God, as only those who believe in God may testify in court. Article 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution—which protects citizens from being “hurt, molested, or restrained, in [their] person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of [their] own conscience”—does not apply to atheists, and even if it did, rejecting a witness for being an atheist would not violate the statute. Therefore, the Court concluded, the plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce testimony showing that the witness did not believe in God and therefore could not be sworn.

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a revised Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (political activist Linda Sarsour, as well as 26 additional Muslim individuals) filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. While other litigation opposing the revised Executive Order were filed to enjoin only Sections 2 and 6 of the revised Executive Order, in this case the Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the enforcement of the revised Executive Order in its entirety. In order for the Plaintiffs to succeed, they had to prove that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008).

Petitioner Muneer Awad sued defendant members of the Oklahoma Election Board seeking to prevent certification of election results of a proposed state constitutional amendment that would have prevented Oklahoma state courts from considering or using "Sharia Law." The Petitioner claimed this state constitutional amendment would have violated his federal constitutional First Amendment rights and sought a preliminary injunction. The Appellate Court determined that the Petitioner asserted the kind of direct injury-in-fact necessary to create First Amendment Establishment Clause standing. Specifically, the Appellate Court determined that because the amendment would have been certified a week after it was passed, the injury was imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. The Appellate Court also found that the proposed amendment violated the Establishment Clause because it discriminated among religions, and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The Appellate Court ruled that the proposed amendment could not pass the strict scrutiny standard because the Oklahoma Election Board could not prove that the amendment was enacted to provide a compelling state interest, and therefore could not prove that the amendment was not “closely fitted” to that interest.

The Shah Bano case is a landmark and controversial case in India’s Supreme Court which dealt with the question of the length of time a Muslim ex-husband would have to provide his ex-wife with monthly maintenance payments after a divorce, considering Muslim personal law and Indian civil law.

During trial court proceedings in which a Muslim couple was dividing their marital property, the husband, Mr. Irfan Aleem, attempted to perform a “triple ṭalāq” divorce—a form of final, irrevocable dissolution of marriage under Pakistani law, initiated unilaterally by the husband. The Court refused to honor this type of divorce, concluding that it violated due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by not giving Mrs. Farah Aleem any role or voice in the divorce proceedings. The Court also concluded that allowing the ṭalāq divorce to replace court proceedings was contrary to the public policy interest of the people of Maryland, as it would allow Pakistani version of Islamic law, which grants all property to the husband as the default in divorce cases, to regulate distribution of property in the state of Maryland. The Court thus upheld the ruling of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, granting the wife’s petition for divorce, and applied the Maryland default rule that, in the absence of prior written agreement, marital property is to be divided fairly and equitably.

Plaintiff Syed Shamin brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against his former employer Siemens Industry, Inc. and his former supervisor Chandrashekar Dandekar (collectively, the Respondents). The Plaintiff alleged that after receiving derogatory comments about his accent at work and random “outbursts of yelling, profanity and insults” about his religion and ethnicity by his supervisor, the Plaintiff was discharged. The Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. After the EEOC mailed the Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Sue letter, the Plaintiff commenced this action. The Respondents subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, stating that because the Plaintiff only initially checked the retaliation box on the EEOC claim, the Plaintiff’s discrimination and hostile environment claims are procedurally barred. The Court found that generally, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included in his EEOC charge. Therefore, the Court determined that it must not consider the Plaintiff’s discrimination and hostile environment claims, thereby partially granting the Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff Shawn Sharp, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this civil rights action pursuant to the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA, claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group. The plaintiff claimed that the Sunni Muslim services offered at the DOC did not allow him free exercise of his religion, since he is a member of the so-called Habashi sect of Islam, which has ideological differences from the prison’s recognized Sunni group. The prison’s Muslim chaplain disagreed, stating that if Sharp was a Sunni Muslim, as he claimed to be, then there was no reason why Sharp could not attend the already-provided services of Sunni Muslims. The Court decided in favor of the Defendants, determining that the DOC successfully presented a qualified immunity defense, and that the plaintiff’s request had no rational connection to any legitimate penological interest.