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A Somali Muslim bus driver for American University sued his former employer and supervisor under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin as well as retaliation for asking for reasonable religious accommodation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was frequently denied the chance to attend Muslim Friday prayer services and that his supervisors made several derogatory comments regarding Muslims. He further argued that he was ultimately terminated because of his religion and in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding a lack of reasonable religious accommodation (in the form of a schedule that accommodated his weekly prayer services). The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the University’s reason for firing the plaintiff was a pretext for actual discrimination. However, the Court dismissed the retaliation claim, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence to support it.

Mr. Zafar Hasan, a Muslim of Indian heritage, sued his former employer, Foley & Lardner LLP, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, national origin and color. The plaintiff claimed that his work assignments were cut and he was ultimately terminated because he was Muslim. For support, he points to the cut in his assignments that occurred immediately after 9/11, a comment made by one partner that “those people [Muslims] don’t belong here…they should kick them all out,” a warning by another partner to be careful about displaying articles the plaintiff had written on his view that Islam is a peaceful religion, and the fact that the other two Muslims in his department were either transferred or terminated in the same time period. The defendant company responds that it cut Mr. Hasan’s work and then terminated him due to poor work performance. The Circuit Court reversed and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough direct evidence of religious discrimination to allow the case to move forward.

The EEOC represented a group of Muslims suing their former employer, Norwegian Cruise Lines, under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that these discriminatory motives caused the company to target them for increased scrutiny, to create a hostile work environment by allowing their co-workers to verbally harass them (in part, by referring to them as terrorists), and finally, to terminate them. The plaintiffs further entered a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these bases. The defendants argued that they terminated the plaintiffs for inconsistent answers given to background questions and because they were “positive matches in the FBI database.” The Court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but concluded that the discrimination case could go forward as plaintiffs had established a prima facie discrimination case such that a jury could find that the company’s reasons given for terminating the plaintiffs were pretexts for a discriminatory reason.

A Pakistani Muslim bank employee suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) sued his former employer, Bank of America, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin; under the American Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination on the basis of disability; and under Title VII and the ADA for retaliatory firing following his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his religious beliefs required him to take several prayer breaks throughout the workday, and that this practice ultimately led to his firing. The defendant responded that the employee was fired because of poor work performance. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment that the plaintiff did not dispute. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the plaintiff had established no connection between the EEOC filing and his termination. 

A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

The EEOC represented an African-American Muslim suing his former employer under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed he had been the recipient of many offensive comments (such as being called a “towel head” and “Taliban”) and degrading actions (such as his co-workers hiding his time card while he was at prayer services). The Court reversed and remanded a decision by the District Court for the District of Maryland to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment and that his employer had notice of the ongoing conduct; it thus denied the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed.

The plaintiff, a Muslim occupational health physician, sued his former employer, the Department of Veteran Affairs and its Secretary, Jim Nicholson, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He filed the claim after he heard his supervisor refer to Muslims as a threat and after his supervisor’s wife made comments about how she and her husband do not like Muslims and the way they live—presumably referring to his observance of prayers, fasting, and other aspects of Islamic ritual law. The plaintiff discovered that his position was being eliminated sometime after these comments were made, but continued to consult with his former employer about infectious diseases. Three months following his position’s elimination, the plaintiff saw a job advertisement for the same position at his former place of employment and filed a claim with the EEOC for discrimination. Immediately after his supervisor found out about his claim, the plaintiff contends that he was no longer allowed on the property and that other employees were barred from contacting him for consultations. The Court concluded that the timing was questionable enough that a jury could find that the events described were examples of retaliation. The Court reversed and remanded the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to go forward. The parties ultimately settled the case, and the case was closed in December of 2008.

An Arab-American police officer in New York City sued his employer under §1981 (providing “a cause of action for race-based employment discrimination based on a hostile work environment”), New York Executive Law Section 290, and New York Administrative Code Section 9-101 (both state laws imposing “liability on aiders and abettors of unlawful discriminatory practices”), as well as laws prohibiting the creation of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff worked for the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and claimed that the Department made him read anti-Muslim and anti-Arab rhetoric in the form of briefings from an anti-terrorism consultant. According to the plaintiff, these briefings entailed the consultant instructing the reader to not trust Muslims in law enforcement and making comments like “a good Muslim…can’t be a good American.” The Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim to proceed. It thus denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go forward. The case was ultimately closed in 2010 after an order of dismissal without ever going to trial. The plaintiff did not lodge an explicit claim on the basis of Islamic law, but his allegations about religion may have included ritual practice or dress related to Islamic law.

The Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, Supervalu Holdings, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, she argued that the company overlooked her for a position with more responsibility because of her religion. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she neither proved that non-Muslims were treated better, nor did she allege that she suffered an adverse employment action (as the higher-level position did not offer additional compensation or benefits). Thus, this Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing a Muslim former employee of the defendant, the EEOC sued the company, operating as a car dealership, under Title VII, alleging that it subjected the employee to a hostile work environment because of his religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged he suffered numerous instances of harassment because of his religion after 9/11, including being called Taliban by his supervisor and receiving a warning saying he was acting like a Muslim. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the conduct severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim, and thus reversed the District Court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The case settled in October 2007.

A female Muslim employee sued her former employer under Title VII and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) for discrimination based on religion. The plaintiff claimed that she was suspended and then terminated from her job for failing to remove her religiously mandated head-covering (ḥijāb). The Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely, having passed the statute of limitations for both Title VII and the DCHRA.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

A Lebanese Muslim physician sued his former employer, represented by Secretary of Veteran Affairs Jim Nicholson, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed that the VA Medical Center, his place of employment, subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his identity as both Lebanese and Muslim [presumably related to his observance of Islamic ritual law] and that his supervisors retaliated against him for filing a claim with the EEOC. He further argued that the employer's discrimination ultimately led to his termination. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative options before initiating a lawsuit in court, and that he had not demonstrated that his termination was retaliatory.  

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

An Afghani Muslim security guard at a company that contracted with his former employer for his security guard services sued under Title VII and §1983, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin as well as a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed that, while working for the company, he was harassed by the property manager who asked him if he was from Afghanistan and if he was Muslim. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim, concluding that the plaintiff and defendant company did not have an employee-employer relationship, that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that the alleged actions were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment finding. The plaintiff made no explicit claim about Islamic law except to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included ritual practices based on Islamic law.

The plaintiff, a Turkish Muslim former employee of the defendant, challenged the New York Supreme Court of King’s County decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff had sued her previous employer under Executive Law §296 and the Administrative Code of New York §8-107, alleging that the company created a hostile work environment, subjected her to constructive termination, and retaliated against her for filing a discrimination claim. This Court reversed the lower court’s decision on the hostile work environment and constructive discharge, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence to allow the claims to move forward to a jury.

An Arab Muslim truck driver for Swift Transportation Company sued his former employer under Title VII, Tennessee state law, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as intentional economic harm under state law and the FMLA. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that non-Arabs and non-Muslims received better work assignments and that fellow drivers made “hateful” comments regarding his religion and national origin. However, he did not provide any specifics regarding these claims. The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not report an accident within the timeframe mandated by the company. The Court granted the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating employment, and because the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative measures before pursuing a case in court. The plaintiff madeno explicit connection to Islamic law, except that to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included religious practice.

An Indian Muslim physician, who formerly worked at a Veteran Affairs Medical Center, sued the Secretary of Veteran Affairs under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin; the failure to promote; retaliation; a hostile work environment; and constructive discharge.  The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not receive a promotion due to unsatisfactory work performance. Concluding that the plaintiff did not prove he suffered an adverse employment action and therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

An Iranian Muslim teacher sued his former employer, the Memphis Board of Education, under Title VII, alleging retaliation and discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied a permanent, full-time position because of his race and religion. The defendant argued that the denial was because the plaintiff received several unsatisfactory reports while serving in substitute positions. At trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Tennessee granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and that the defendant had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to offer the plaintiff a permanent position.

An Iranian Muslim professor sued his former employer, Case Western Reserve University, under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and nation origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied scheduled performance reviews and ultimately tenure because of his race and religion. The University argued that the professor was not qualified for tenure. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff’s qualification for tenure is a matter of fact, and as such, must be decided by a jury. The case was ultimately settled on June 26, 1998.

A Pakistani Muslim professor sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin. The plaintiff argued that she was denied tenure because of her religion and race, pointing to instances in which several members of the deciding committee had allegedly articulated biases against Muslims and Pakistanis. The defendant argued that it offered the position to the most qualified applicant, who was not the plaintiff. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not offer any direct evidence of discrimination nor did she prove that she was more qualified than the other successful candidate (which is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the absence of direct evidence).

Representing himself and a class of unspecified American Muslims, a Muslim-American plaintiff petitioned the court to compel a radio station to include a Muslim panelist on its program regarding religion, under Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws. The Court denied the plaintiff’s request, concluding that he had failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not file an employment discrimination claim first with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is a requirement before a Title VII lawsuit can begin.

A Muslim man from Algeria sued his former employer, SUNY College at Brockport, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was not selected for a job at the university because of the Department of Foreign Languages’ head’s prejudice against him. The hiring committee voted in favor of the plaintiff for a permanent position, but the decision ultimately went to the department head, who the plaintiff claimed did not select him out of discriminatory animus toward his race and religion. The department head responded that the plaintiff was not hired because of his lack of research experience. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury may find that the defendant’s reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretexts for discriminatory motives.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff, a Lebanese Muslim teacher in Alaska who alleged a workplace discrimination claim, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. Specifically, she alleged that she was not hired for a permanent position because of her religion and country of origin. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court had not considered all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (the plaintiff) in its consideration of the defendant’s summary judgment motion, and that a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff successfully articulated a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court thus reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration. Even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the District Court again granted summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff attempted to appeal several times, but was not successful.

A Muslim man who sued his employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, challenged the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York's decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that his employer did not accommodate his religion when it refused to allow him to move his breaks to attend religiously-mandated Friday prayer (jumu'a) services. He further argued that he was treated differently (i.e., punished more severely for infractions such as failing to report an accident immediately) than non-Muslim employees. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the instances of alleged discrimination, though not time-barred, were insufficient to create a prima facie case of discrimination.