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The Plaintiff Kajauna Kenyatta Irvin named James A. Yates (warden), R. Fisher Jr. (associate warden), P.D. Brazelton (associate warden), K.R. Nash (correctional captain), M.C. Davis (associate warden), Dana B. Allen (correctional captain), A. Walker (correctional captain), Wendy K. Myers (community partnership manager), James D. Bennett (correctional lieutenant), S. Lantz (correctional lieutenant), E. McBride (correctional sergeant), D. McGee (protestant chaplain), E. Guthery (correctional officer), and Does 1-30 (PVSP correctional staff members) as the Respondents in this lawsuit, alleging that these individuals 1) forced Muslim prisoners to conduct their religious services outside; 2) failed to provide dietary accommodations for religious celebrations; 3) suspended purchase orders for religious oils; and 4) failed to hire a replacement Muslim chaplain. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff's complaint stated cognizable claims against Respondents McBride, Davis, Yates, Myers, Bennett, Allen, Nash, Walker, Brazelton, Guthery, McGee, and Does 1-30 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and under RLUIPA. The District Court provided the Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the District Court in regard to the remaining Respondents.

Fatwā concerning the legality, based on their interpretation of Islamic law, of a) the responsibility of mosque officials to prevent unwell congregants from entering a mosque’s premises and b) the temporary suspension of congregational and Friday prayers, and subsequent mosque closures. The answer provided by the Fatwa Committee, who met on 18 February 2020, is that a) mosques’ management has the religious duty to request or prohibit any unwell congregants from entering the mosque area, whether for performing prayers or other matters and the closing of a mosque and b) the suspension of congregational prayers and Friday prayers during this situation, is required.

The plaintiff, Tracey Taylor, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Illinois), brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the respondents Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart for alleged violations of his civil rights in denying him access to Islamic prayer services and by failing to serve ḥalāl meat (prepared in accordance with Islamic law). The respondents moved for summary judgment after alleging that Taylor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they violated his constitutional rights. The Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, determining that the denial of Islamic prayer services was related to a legitimate penological interest, and that the prison had adequately provided the plaintiff with sufficiently nutritious Islamic meals, even though they were vegetarian/vegan.

The plaintiff, Dominic Ali, a Muslim inmate at the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility, sued several prison officials for allegedly violating his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the state's constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the prison failed to provide jumu'a (Friday prayer) services for Muslim inmates, failed to ensure that he was provided with healthy food during Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting), and denied him the ability to observe Ramadan by removing his name from the prison's internal Ramadan fasting list. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court agreed: it found that the plaintiff had not brought his grievances to the attention of the prison's commissioner, and therefore granted the defendants' motion.

The Plaintiffs, Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) prisoners Eric Dowdy, Averis X Wilson, Roger Hunt, Amira Salem, Tom Traini, Patricia L. Caruso, Dave Burnett, and Michael Martin, alleged that the Defendants, various MDOC employees, violated their rights under federal and state constitutional provisions and RLUIPA by unlawfully restricting their religious practices. Specifically, the Plaintiffs challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate certain religious practices which they claimed must be observed during particular days and times each week. The Muslim Plaintiffs specifically challenged that the inability to attend Friday (jumuʿa) prayer services without obtaining permission to exercise a “call-out”—permission which is often denied—violated their federal and state constitutional rights. The Muslim Plaintiffs also challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate their religious dietary restrictions and their observance of the Eid al-Fīṭr and Eid al-Aḍḥā feasts. In response to the first allegation, the Respondents claim that there is a legitimate governmental interest in prison security that would be compromised if inmates were allowed to attend prayer services. The District Court determined, however, that while a legitimate governmental interest existed, the restriction of prayer services was not the least restrictive means of protecting this compelling interest in prison security. Accordingly, the District Court did not grant summary judgment in response to the Plaintiffs’ Friday prayer claim. In response to the second allegation, the Court determined that failure to provide Muslim inmates with a ḥalāl diet substantially burdens a religious exercise, but found that a question of fact exists as to whether the Plaintiffs received such a diet.

Phillip Jean-Laurent brought an action against South Carolina prison officials for allegedly violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his Islamic religious tenets and the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the respondents prevented his attendance at Islamic religious services during Ramadan as retaliation for him using the law library, and deprived him of evening and morning meals required by Muslim religious exercises during Ramadan, in preparation for fasting during daylight hours. The District Court found that the respondents properly answered the interrogatories as to the policy of forbidding the plaintiff to attend prayer services, but that the respondents did not properly answer questions in document requests regarding the plaintiff's and other Muslim prisoners’ ability to secure Ramadan morning meals.

Plaintiff Joe Burgos Vega, a practicing Muslim prisoner at the Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”), brought this action against the Respondents, officials at the DOC, claiming that Respondents’ 1) denial of the Plaintiff’s request to be circumcised; 2) denial of access to suitable Islamic prayer oils; and 3) frequently canceled Friday congregational prayer constituted a violation of his right to exercise his religion. The Respondents argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. The Court sided with the Respondents, finding that 1) prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to a surgery that is not medically necessary; 2) DOC officers did not violate the Plaintiff’s right with regard to prayer oils, because they provided him with access to the imam-approved commissary oil; and 3) that although prisoners have the right to participate in group religious services, the frequent Friday prayer cancellations were reasonable because they occurred due to a shortage of volunteer imams and that other opportunities for religious practice were available to Muslim inmates.

Petitioner Tyrone Walker alleged that the prison violated his civil rights when it refused to provide him with the opportunity to participate in jumu'ah (Friday prayer) services when he was confined to the SHU. The District Court determined that the Respondent did not violate the Petitioner's rights under RLUIPA, as the Respondent's decision to deny the requests for access to Friday prayer services through closed-circuit television or through an audio feed was reasonably related to articulable, legitimate penological interests, which included the safety and the cost of installing the necessary equipment.

The plaintiff, Amr Elmenayer, sued his former employer, ABF Freight Systems, for failure to accommodate his religious practices and disparate treatment due to religion under Title VII. The plaintiff alleged that his supervisor failed to grant his reasonable request to attend Friday (jumu'a) prayer services. He also alleged that he was treated more harshly than other non-Muslim employees when he was terminated for failing to report an accident in a timely fashion, as per the company's policy. The defendant argued that it did try to accommodate the plaintiff’s religious practices by encouraging him to bid for a shift that would not conflict with his prayer duties. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination. This decision was affirmed in Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).

The Plaintiff, Muslim prisoner Davis Totten, brought this civil rights claim against employees of Ryan Correctional Facilities alleging religious discrimination. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom because they 1) threatened the Plaintiff with disciplinary action if he attended the Friday (jumuʿa) prayer service, the Islamic study class (taʿlīm) or any Islamic seminar while on a work or school assignment; 2) tried to control how Muslims appoint their spiritual leader for the Friday prayer services; and 3) failed to make preparations for the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service, among other alleged offenses. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, on the claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Respondents’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of convincing the Court that it was clearly established law that an official’s failure to allow prisoners to attend the Friday prayer service, the Islamic study class, or any Islamic seminar violate the First Amendment right to practice religion. The Magistrate Judge found the Respondents entitled to summary judgment on the second issue, because the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiff did not indicate that any prison officials actually appointed an inadequate spiritual leader who interfered with his right to practice his religion. On the third issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on this claim, because the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his ability to attend the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service—which is mandated by his religion and is a “sincerely held” practice—had been infringed upon, and was not related to a legitimate penological interest.

A Somali Muslim bus driver for American University sued his former employer and supervisor under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin as well as retaliation for asking for reasonable religious accommodation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was frequently denied the chance to attend Muslim Friday prayer services and that his supervisors made several derogatory comments regarding Muslims. He further argued that he was ultimately terminated because of his religion and in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding a lack of reasonable religious accommodation (in the form of a schedule that accommodated his weekly prayer services). The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the University’s reason for firing the plaintiff was a pretext for actual discrimination. However, the Court dismissed the retaliation claim, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence to support it.

A Muslim man who sued his employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, challenged the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York's decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that his employer did not accommodate his religion when it refused to allow him to move his breaks to attend religiously-mandated Friday prayer (jumu'a) services. He further argued that he was treated differently (i.e., punished more severely for infractions such as failing to report an accident immediately) than non-Muslim employees. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the instances of alleged discrimination, though not time-barred, were insufficient to create a prima facie case of discrimination. 

The plaintiff, Michael Mootry, sued prison officials for implementing a policy that he claimed constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights. The policy banned inmate ministers from leading religious services without the direct supervision of a hired chaplain or volunteer. As a result of this policy, for two years, Muslim inmates were not accommodated with a hired chaplain to supervise jumu'a (Friday prayer) services. The Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss because it found that the defendants knew about the plaintiff being prevented from participating in the prayer services, that this was an ongoing issue, and that they did nothing to correct the situation.

Plaintiff Dorian Davis challenged the Kern Valley State Prison policy that prohibited Muslim prisoners from purchasing and possessing prayer oils in their cells. The prison officials, however, claimed that a compelling governmental interest made their policy the least restrictive means of ensuring prison safety. The District Court agreed with them, determining that the prison did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment rights because the Muslim chaplain had previously provided contraband to prisoners; in addition, it found that RLUIPA rights were not violated because the prison had to cancel Friday prayer services until another Muslim chaplain could be hired.

The plaintiff, state prisoner Horace Crump, filed suit against a Michigan Department of Corrections chaplain, David Leslie. The plaintiff alleged that he was barred from attending Friday prayer (jumu'a) services in retaliation for informing Muslim prisoners that the prison's suspension of Islamic religious services was unconstitutional. The respondent moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the respondent, finding that the plaintiff failed to adequately state his need to attend these services to the prison.

Plaintiff Jack Robinson, a formerly incarcerated inmate at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (“MDC”), brought an action against Respondent, Officer Jimminez, a correctional officer at MDC, for allegedly depriving the Plaintiff of his right to religious worship under the First Amendment. The Plaintiff claimed that, although he reserved the prison’s religious room for Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services, the Respondent allowed Jewish prisoners to also use the room. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiff’s religious service was “stopped due to a scheduling conflict with another group of inmates who had also reserved the religious room for the same time as plaintiff.” The Respondent moved for summary judgment, and the district court judge referred the Respondent’s motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge determined that the Respondent’s decision to stop one religious service was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests because the action was undertaken to maintain order and prevent an altercation between Muslim and Jewish prisoners, and therefore recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted.

Plaintiff Leo Pittman-Bey, a Muslim inmate, sued Texas prison officials for allegedly violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and his constitutional right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment by denying him after-sunset meals during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Previous prison regulations allowed practicing Muslim inmates to receive after-sunset meals during Ramadan, but only if they had attended jumuʿa (Friday prayer) services in the 60 days prior to Ramadan or had received a special exception from the Muslim chaplain. Pittman-Bey did not attend the services because, as an adherent of the Ḥanafī school of Sunnī Islam, he said he believed that jumuʿa services are not proper if conducted in nonpublic settings like prisons. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that denying Ramadan meals in accordance with the jumuʿa attendance policy did not violate the First Amendment.

Plaintiff Daniel O’Neil Ruffin, the only practicing Muslim in the Downeast Correctional Facility in Machiasport, Maine, brought this suit against the Respondents, facility program manager Carol Geel, facility director Scott Jones, and former commissioner of the Maine Department of Corrections Martin Magnusson for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by denying his request to be allowed to conduct religious services in the common area. The Respondents claimed that they denied the request because it would have been impracticable to assign an officer to supervise a single prisoner, and that they tried to accommodate the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by allowing him to conduct services in his room. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court referred to a Magistrate judge for a recommended decision. The Magistrate judge recommended that the Respondents be entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights.

This gubernatorial regulation states that the results from structural and functional analysis of the Technical Implementing Unit of the Islamic Religious Counselling Service and Da'i of the Aceh Islamic Shari'a Service are to be used as the basis for future and further policy-making.

The plaintiff submitted that, pursuant to a multi-service ijarah financing agreement (dated 13 September 2011), the first defendant, in agreement with the second defendant as his wife, received IDR 250 million from the plaintiff, and agreed to pay an ujrah (fee) of IDR 180 million. The term of the agreement was from 13 September 2011-13 September 2016, and the monies were to be used to cover print media costs to advertise the defendants' business. After the defendants defaulted on repayments, the plaintiff sent to the defendants several reminder notices and a subpoena. Despite being granted these opportunities by the plaintiff to make the necessary payments, the defendants failed to act, even by the time the plaintiff had filed its claim. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed a shari'a economy-related dispute claim, in accordance with art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006 on the Religious Judiciary, in conjunction with art 55(1) of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking.

In his written response to the plaintiff's claim, the first defendant explained his own financial hardships, and asserted that the ways in which the plaintiff had sought payment from someone in his predicament were inferior to those of a conventional bank. For example, the first defendant told the court that the plaintiff, which he had authorised to sell four shophouses he owned to pay any debts emerging from this agreement, offered the same price he had received for six other shophouses he had sold five years ago. The first defendant also alleged that the plaintiff had only ever sought its profit from the agreement, an agreement he had never properly understood, rather than inquiring into the defendants' hardships. Moreover, over two years, the first defendant had paid approximately IDR 60 million in interest (bunga), and had been ordered to pay another IDR 257 million, as well as the principal debt, meaning he had had to pay IDR 115 million over two years. The first defendant was astounded when he compared this with what a conventional bank would have charged (0.9-1 percent interest per month). The first defendant also told the court of his excellent credit history with other banks. The first defendant requested that the court dismiss the plaintiff's claim and, in order to repay the debt and to continue to pay the plaintiff in accordance with the agreement, provide him an opportunity to sell his shophouses for a reasonable price, as well as an opportunity for his business to grow.

The court, citing the Qur'an and arts 21(b), 44 and 46 of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws (Kompilasi Hukum Ekonomi Syari'ah), opted to enforce the agreement against the defendants, ordering them to pay IDR 252,393,450.