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A Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FRCA), alleging religious discrimination and breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired when his employer learned that he was a Muslim. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim, because the plaintiff failed to establish that an employee-employer relationship existed between himself and the defendant; and that it similarly did not have jurisdiction to hear the contract claim because it was below the requisite amount for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the FCRA claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing that the decision-makers knew he was a Muslim when they decided to terminate his employment.

The parties were married on 8 January 2006 and had three children. Before moving to their own home, they had first lived with the respondent's parents for three months, and then the applicant's parents for six months. The applicant submitted that, by July 2006, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because:

1. the parties once quarrelled because the applicant left the matrimonial home to attend a wedding because the bride and groom had hired his soundsystem;
2. in 2007, the parties quarrelled because the applicant had left for Kupang to be with his parents who were farewelling the applicant's sibling who was returning home to Java - the respondent objected to the applicant doing so, even becoming angry with the applicant and his parents;
3. in 2008, the parties quarrelled again when the applicant opened an internet cafe in Atambua, which resulted in the applicant often not returning home until the evening, the respondent becoming angry with the applicant, directing profanities at the applicant and even threatening to stab him with a knife;
4. at the end of 2008, the respondent would often conduct herself in an impolite manner, failing to show any appreciation for the applicant as her husband, even being impolite towards the applicant's parents; and
5. in October 2012, when the applicant wanted to leave for Betun to mourn the loss of a friend, the applicant had objected.

As a result, the parties had been separated since October 2012, the applicant living in Atambua, while the respondent had been living in Halilulik. The applicant submitted that it was no longer feasible for the parties to create a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) domestic life and, therefore, sought a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The respondent rejected all of the applicant's submissions, submitting that the marriage could be salvaged, and that the court should dismiss the applicant's request for a divorce.

The court acknowledged that the parties' evidence conflicted. It also noted, however, that the applicant had already failed, on two occasions, to produce two witnesses to attest to his submissions. Therefore, citing Kitab Al Muhadzdzab Juz II, page 320, the applicant's failure to provide sufficient evidence meant his request had to be dismissed.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Surakarta Religious Court, which had found that the then-plaintiff had been dutifully notified of the imminent auctioning of her property, but had failed to act to rectify her default in time. The court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant had still failed to show that she had acted to rectify her default prior to the auction.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic shari'a on 10 August 1998 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mas kawin) had been IDR 100,000. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a widower (aged 31 years) and the second applicant a divorcee (aged 27 years). The parties were not blood relatives nor had they shared a wet-nurse. There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had four children and no third party had ever sought to impugn the sanctity of their marriage. They had never, however, received a marriage certificate issued by the Office of Religious Affairs. The parties, therefore, requested that the court ratify their marriage for civil administration purposes.

The sole judge requested that the parties withdraw their application on the grounds that they had failed to submit relevant evidence and produce witnesses.

This case is an appeal of a zinā (fornication) conviction by the Upper Sharīʿa Court of Gwadabawa, Nigeria, on several grounds, including: the trial court's lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the Sharīʿa Penal Code upon which the appellant's trial and conviction was based came into existence after the alleged commission of the offense, and the failure of the trial court to explain the nature of the crime to the accused person. During the proceedings, the Appellant's counsel retracted the confession that the appellant had made to the trial court. The Court held that a person cannot be punished for an offense not known to law at the time of commission. The Court further determined that, because the Sharīʿa Penal Law of Sokoto State had not been enacted at the time the offense was committed, the conviction was invalid. Furthermore, it determined that the confession of the Appellant before the trial court was invalid due to the defects in the charge and the failure to explain the offense to the Appellant. Even if the confession had been valid, its retraction upon appeal was valid because retraction of confession is valid at any time before judgment. Pregnancy by a divorced or widowed woman is not conclusive proof of zinā where such pregnancy occurs within 5-6 years of the previous marriage. It is an overriding principle (according to the doubt canon) that where doubt exists, fixed criminal penalties (ḥadd penalties) should be avoided. The Court quashed the conviction.

In November 2010, the plaintiff permitted his daughter and son-in-law to use his property to secure a murabahah financing agreement for IDR 182,400,000 from the defendant. Rather than his daughter and son-in-law being parties to the agreement, it was in fact their company that became party to the agreement, a point to which the plaintiff did not object. On 22 November 2010, the defendant requested that the plaintiff sign a declaration acknowledging that he was financially responsible for the agreement, as well as a power-of-attorney granting the defendant authority to deal with his property as it saw fit, in the event his daughter's company defaulted on its repayments.

The plaintiff submitted that he did not know what the loan money was intended for, nor did he know about the repayment scheme agreed to by the parties to the agreement. On 24 April 2013, the plaintiff was informed that his property would be auctioned as his daughter and son-in-law's company had indeed defaulted on a repayment. While the plaintiff was informed by his son-in-law that the debt owing was IDR 118,604,000 (four monthly repayments), when the plaintiff requested the relevant information from the defendant to repay the debt, the defendant, the plaintiff submitted, failed to provide him with that information, confusing the plaintiff further by telling him that the total debt was not actually IDR 182,400,000. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant then unilaterally set the sale price of the property, rather than obtaining a quote from an independent and reputable appraisal company registered with the Ministry of Finance, contrary to Law No. 4 of 1996 on Mortgages of Land and Fixtures. The plaintiff further submitted that the credit arrangement was unlawful as the plaintiff had still not seen any evidence of an agreement, such as a repayment receipt. More significantly, contrary to art 18(1)(g) and (3) of Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, the plaintiff submitted that the defendant had included in the agreement a requirement that the plaintiff be subject to any new regulations the defendant sought to include. This conduct, the plaintiff asserted, was punishable by a maximum fine of IDR 2 billion (art 62 of Law No. 4 of 1996).

After court-sanctioned mediation failed, it initially appeared that the court had successfully counselled the parties, bringing them to reconcile. When this proved not to be the case, however, the plaintiff lodged an amended claim. In his amended claim, the plaintiff alleged that, in November 2010, the co-defendant, via his daughter, used the same property to secure the murabahah agreement. The plaintiff consented to this arrangement, pursuant to which the co-defendant secured IDR 182.4 million. On 22 November 2010, the plaintiff was asked by the defendant to sign a written statement that declared the plaintiff responsible for the financed amount, and that the plaintiff would fulfil all obligations pursuant to the agreement, pay all arrears and/or repayments, and provide his property as a security. On the same date, the plaintiff then signed a power of attorney before a notary, granting power of attorney to Limo Endriyanto, as head of the defendant's branch, to deal with the property as necessary in the event of a default. The plaintiff also signed a mortgage power of attorney in favour of the marketing department of the defendant, and a new mortgage deed was drafted on 20 December 2010. On 24 April 2013, the plaintiff was informed by the co-defendant that, owing to a default on the repayments to the defendant, the plaintiff's property would be auctioned on Wednesday 29 May 2013.

The plaintiff claimed that the co-defendant had informed him he would need to repay four instalments totalling IDR 118,604,000, however, he had only guaranteed repayment of IDR 182,400,000 in total. Moreover, despite his requests for further information to the defendant and co-defendant regarding the debt, the plaintiff received no information that clarified the situation.

On 25 December 2013, the plaintiff submitted, contrary to the mortgage deed, that the co-defendant visited him at his home and requested that he repay IDR 401,250,200, rather than the original IDR 182,400,000. The plaintiff also maintained that the co-defendant and defendant's conduct breached Law No. 4 of 1996 and Law No. 8 of 1999, as per the plaintiff's initial claim.

As a result of the confusion caused by the defendant and co-defendant, as well as time lost, the plaintiff submitted that he had suffered IDR 1 million in material damages. Moreover, due to the concern, disharmony and anxiety suffered by the plaintiff and his family, the plaintiff sought IDR 200 million in damages.

The court, however, finding that the plaintiff lacked the necessary legal standing as he was not a party to the original murabahah agreement, dismissed the plaintiff's claim.

An unmarried African-American Muslim worker sued the defendant, Del Monte Sales Company, under Title VII and §1981 for discrimination based on race, sex, marital status, and religion, as well as for libel, slander, and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff argued that he was not hired for a job with the defendant due to his race and religion, alleging that his interviewer made derogatory and discriminatory remarks to this effect. The defendant argued that it did not hire the plaintiff because he was not outgoing or pleasant, which are necessary traits for a job as a salesman. The Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, which had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss (noting a lack of evidence offered by the plaintiff).

The first defendant (Neima Mohamed, herein Neima), as the plaintiff in the court of first instance, had submitted that:

1. On 4 April 2004, she and the plaintiff (Mostafa Mohamed, herein Mostafa) were married;
2. On 28 February 2005, the parties had executed a pre-nuptial financial agreement that would regulate their financial affairs during and after their marriage;
3. The agreement stated that Mostafa should pay to Neima $50,000.00 if he initiated separation or divorce proceedings against her; and
4. On 11 September 2008, Mostafa Islamically divorced Neima.

Mostafa denied marrying Neima, did not admit points 2 and 3, and denied Islamically divorcing her. Moreover, Mostafa submitted that any separation of the parties had been initiated by Neima.

Before the court of first instance, Mostafa denied having been married to Neima under Islamic law. Her Honour Magistrate Trad did not answer that question, but rather found that the parties had been in a 'domestic relationship'. Regardless, the parties could not agree who initiated the separation and on which date the separation occurred. Mostafa claimed that Neima had initiated the separation on 11 September 2008 by taking his key to their Rockdale unit, while Neima claimed that Mostafa, on 11 April 2007, had asked her to leave their home, and alternatively, on 11 September 2008, had Islamically divorced her.

On the facts, Magistrate Trad found that Mostafa had initiated the divorce on 11 April 2007, further evidenced by him sending his daughter to tell Neima to leave by a certain date, with directions as to the division of their property. Therefore, her Honour found that sufficient evidence existed to activate cl 11 of the parties' agreement, compelling Mostafa to pay to Neima the agreed-upon sum of $50,000.00 (Moackar Sadak or dowry).

On appeal, Harrison AsJ found that Mostafa could appeal the initial decision pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, which granted the Court jurisdiction to quash the decision of a lower court if based on an error of law. Mostafa sought to dispute the findings of Magistrate Trad in their entirety on the following grounds:

1. that her Honour had made errors of fact and law;
2. that the decision suffered from jurisdictional error;
3. that her Honour had failed to acknowledge that the agreement had not been executed in accordance with the law;
4. that her Honour had failed to find that the agreement was unenforceable because it conflicted with public policy; and
5. that her Honour had erred by failing to find that the separation, for the purposes of the agreement, did not have to accord with shari'a law.

With regards to appeal ground 4, Mostafa submitted that her Honour had failed to recognise that the agreement was one of servitude in that it compelled Mostafa to remain in a relationship with Neima, lest he pay her $50,000.00. Moreover, it was contrary to public policy for her Honour to determine which party had left the relationship, and cl 11 was void for illegality as it was a penalty clause. The Court found the precedent cited in support of its submission by Mostafa's counsel to be somewhat irrelevant. It found the precedent cited by Neima's counsel, which stated that the court would, where possible, hold parties seeking separation or divorce to their agreement, relevant. The Court also acknowledged the issue of the payment of Moackar Sadak, noting that the lack of any precedent regarding such payment in Australia may necessitate seeing how other common law countries have approached such agreements. The Court also provided a brief discussion on mahr, based on Ann Black and Kerrie Sadiq's, 'Good and Bad Sharia: Australia's Mixed Response to Islamic Law' (2011) 17 UNSW Law Journal 82, noting that mahr appeared to be what the parties meant by Moackar Sadak. The Court found that cases dealing with mahr from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom all found such agreements enforceable, provided they could not be invalidated for other reasons. Counsel for Neima submitted that, while some customs might be contrary to public policy, what is of utmost importance in enforcing such an agreement is that the parties to the agreement knowingly and voluntarily adhered to those customs.

Harrison AsJ found that, in enforcing such agreements, courts of common law countries have applied common law or the relevant legislation (if any), rather than sharīʿa law. Moreover, that none of these courts found that agreements such as that made by the parties in this instance contradict public policy. Harrison AsJ also dismissed Mostafa's argument that it was not for the Court to decide who left the relationship, stating that '[c]ourts are often called upon, especially in family matters, to determine sensitive factual matters such as when a relationship has ended, or whether it was indeed a de facto relationship...'.

With regards to Mostafa's submission that cl 11 was a penalty clause, Harrison AsJ disagreed. Her Honour found that the Property (Relationships) Act and the Family Law Act allowed parties to enter into financial agreements. Moreover, that cl 11 formed part of the 'greater bargain' between the parties.

Harrison AsJ also dismissed Mostafa's submissions that the court of first instance did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the agreement, or to determine whether or not the parties' separation had to accord with sharīʿa law. The Court found that as the agreement had neither specified an appropriate dispute resolution forum or jurisdiction (common law or sharīʿa law), nothing precluded the court of first instance from adjudicating the case. Secondly, that Magistrate Trad had not considered the meaning of 'divorce' under sharīʿa law, instead determining when the separation had occurred on the facts. The Court also noted that Mostafa had not relied on any expert evidence relating to sharīʿa law, and that Magistrate Trad was in no way required to apply sharīʿa law to interpret the parties' agreement.

Mostafa's counsel conceded the inapplicability of the Property (Relationships) Act but argued that Magistrate Trad had applied it regardless. The Court found it irrelevant whether or not the agreement satisfied the requirements of the Property (Relationships) Act, stating that Magistrate Trad had correctly applied the laws of contract to the agreement.

Mostafa also submitted that as the parties had not been married under Australian law, the agreement was unenforceable because the terms 'separation' and 'divorce', per cl 11 of the agreement, are inapplicable to de facto relationships. The Court agreed to consider whether or not marriage under Australian law was a condition precedent to the enforceability of the agreement, but concurred with Neima's counsel that, among other submissions, the agreement did not specify marriage under Australian law as a condition precedent to the enforceability of the agreement, or to cl 11 specifically. Moreover, that the word 'separation' is distinct from 'divorce' and is applicable to the cessation of a de facto relationship. The Court also noted that the agreement was to secure the parties' individual assets, as both parties had been previously married and had significant assets individually.

With regards to which party initiated the separation and on what date, Harrsion AsJ noted Magistrate Trad's deliberations and that her Honour was unable to rely on any 'so-called independent witnesses' because all the evidence provided by witnesses had been informed by what the parties had told them. Magistrate Trad had, therefore, relied on Neima's evidence that, on 11 April 2007, the parties had argued and Mostafa had waved a knife in front of Neima. That evening Mostafa's daughter, accompanied by a police officer, had come to collect some of Mostafa's belongings and to give her a list separating the parties' belongings. On 13 April 2007, Neima moved out of the parties' unit. While the parties had attempted to reconcile, in September 2008, following another argument, Mostafa said the words 'you are divorced' to Neima. Mostafa denied this, stating that Neima had initiated the separation in September 2008 by asking him to leave their Lakemba unit. Mostafa also denied saying the words 'I divorce you'.

All other submissions made by Mostafa on appeal were dismissed on the grounds that they were not covered in Mostafa's submissions. Harrison AsJ also found that Magistrate Trad had made her findings pursuant to ample evidence. Harrison AsJ noted that this appeal raised religious and cultural issues not previously dealt with by the Australian courts, and that the question of how such agreements should be dealt with would be referred to the Australian Law Reform Commission and NSW Law Reform Commission for their consideration.

In Ayub Masih v. State (23 Aug 2022), Justice Qazi Faez Isa and Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah granted bail on an interim petition, pending trial, to the plaintiff Salamat Mansha Masih, who was arrested for “preaching and making blasphemous remarks” in April 2021. Masih was denied bail by the Sessions Judge and the Judge of the High Court, who relied on the First Information Report (FIR), which alleges that the petitioner was a preacher, and the statements of the four witnesses. Upon review, the Supreme Court declared that an “examination of the charge reveals material deficiencies ... [and] does not contain a number of prescribed requirements with regard to the framing of the charge,” casting doubt on the reliablity of the FIR and testimony from the four witnesses. Namely, the Court pointed to the misidentification of the petitioner as a preacher, and the lack of corroborating evidence for the witness testimony. Remanding the case without deciding on the merits, the Court charged the lower courts with observing the constitutional requirements for fair trials in blasphemy and other criminal law cases. Constitutional requirements of applying shari'a, alongside its fundamental rights and fair trial provisions, include consideration of the Islamic law doubt canon instructing judges to ”avoid criminal punishments in cases of doubt”), and thereby requiring heightened procedures, a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for criminal convictions. For further studies of the doubt canon, together with the heightened procedures, standards of proof, and interpretive norms requiring lenity in Islamic criminal law, see Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2015).

A Somali Muslim bus driver for American University sued his former employer and supervisor under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin as well as retaliation for asking for reasonable religious accommodation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was frequently denied the chance to attend Muslim Friday prayer services and that his supervisors made several derogatory comments regarding Muslims. He further argued that he was ultimately terminated because of his religion and in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding a lack of reasonable religious accommodation (in the form of a schedule that accommodated his weekly prayer services). The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the University’s reason for firing the plaintiff was a pretext for actual discrimination. However, the Court dismissed the retaliation claim, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence to support it.

A Maryland court ruled that Sharīʿa Court lacked jurisdiction in a custody case since the couple never resided in the jurisdiction of the Sharīʿa Court. 

Plaintiff Tarick Ali sued his former employer under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, claiming he was discriminated against on the basis of his religion. As an EMT and firefighter for the District of Columbia, Ali alleged that the District subjected him to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment after he filed a complaint about his supervisor’s lack of accommodation of his prayer schedule. He alleged that, on several occasions, his direct supervisor told him that he must choose between his religion and job, publicly mocked him when he returned from prayer, and ridiculed him for filing an internal complaint regarding the alleged discrimination. The Court denied the defendant government’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the evidence presented could allow a jury to find that the plaintiff was treated adversely because of his religion and was subjected to a hostile work environment on that basis.

A Pakistani Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, JP Morgan Chase, under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and disparate treatment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she received a lower salary than her co-workers in the same position and that her reasonable requests to work a different shift so she could care for her daughter were denied. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court concluded that the incidents that the plaintiff cited to support her claim of a hostile work environment were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a jury to find for the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court did not see any adverse employment action as a result of alleged disparate treatment (which is an element that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green test for discrimination requires in cases lacking direct evidence). Finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Idi Shari'a Court (lower court), which had granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The appellant strongly objected to the lower court's lack of sensitivity towards the fact that this case, he claimed, came under the jurisdiction of another shari'a court. The Court acknowledged the appellant's concern, noting that, pursuant to art 73(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989, amended by Law No. 3 of 2006, in conjunction with art 132(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the respondent had filed for divorce with the religious court in her new residential jurisdiction, despite the respondent having left the parties' place of residence without the appellant's permission, and relocating to Aceh Timur (East Aceh). As the evidence and reason relating to why the respondent had relocated was dubious, the Court found that the Idi Shari'a Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear the hearing at first instance, appointing the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court as the appropriate forum instead.

This document is the first draft of Criminal Procedure Bill prepared and adopted by the parliament and sent to the Guardian Council for review.

In September 2019, a Multan Sessions Court (state trial court) issued its decision in State v. Muhammad Waseem et. al, a high-profile honor killing case in Pakistan. The case involved the killing of Qandeel Baloch, a controversial social media star, who was found strangled to death in her home on July 16, 2016. In a witness statement on the day of the occurrence, the deceased’s parents accused their son (Muhammad Waseem) for killing their daughter. Waseem was arrested and, shortly thereafter, admitted to murdering his sister “in the name of Gairat” during interrogation. The next day, Waseem repeated the confession in front of a Judicial Magistrate in a recorded statement. In December 2018, the State instituted a criminal case against Waseem and five other defendants for the offenses of qatl-i-amd (intentional homicide) and “abetment” of qatl-i-amd. At the onset of trial, Waseem retracted his judicial confession and the victim’s parents waived their right of qisas (retribution) against him. After evaluating the facts, circumstances, and evidence admitted at trial, the court held that the prosecution had proved “beyond shadow of reasonable doubt” that Waseem strangled his sister to death and that this was a case of honor killing. Despite a waiver of qisas (pardoning of the accused) by the deceased’s legal heirs, the court sentenced Waseem to life imprisonment as ta’zir (discretionary punishment). The other defendants were acquitted for lack of sufficient circumstantial evidence against them.

The appellants sought to challenge Giri Menang Religious Court Decision No. 207 of 2013, which had ordered them to transfer to the respondents the respondents' share of the estate of Amaq and Inaq Sidin (deceased). The appellants based their appeal on several grounds:

1. that the respondents' initial claim had failed to include certain relevant parties in their claim, as was revealed by the evidence provided by certain witnesses, and that those relevant parties were then inserted into the claim by the lower court;
2. that the lower court's decision lacked a legal foundation, and that its decision had exceeded the parameters of the plaintiffs' claim;
3. that the lower court had erred in stipulating certain information relating to the dimensions of the land in dispute;
4. that the lower court had ignored documents submitted by the appellants regarding a certain portion of the land in dispute; and
5. that the lower court had included the incorrect boundaries of the land in dispute, in terms of a local inspection.

In dismissing the appeal, the court found that ground 1 was insufficient as the parties the appellants claimed had not been included were not beneficiaries (ahli waris) for the purposes of art 171(c) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and moreover, those parties had not been joined as parties to the claim by the lower court. The court found that the appellants had failed to establish ground 2, but conceded the appellants were correct in regards to ground 3. The court held, however, that it could simply amend the clerical errors raised in ground 3. Finally, the court dismissed ground 4, stating it had been acknowledged in the lower court's decision.

The parties were married on 17 January 2005 but had no children. After marrying in Bau-Bau, the parties had returned to Ambon and lived in a rental property from 2005-2006, before moving to their own home in December 2006. The plaintiff submitted that, since 2008, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the defendant had had an extra-marital affair in Ambon and Jakarta. The plaintiff had learned of the affair when she called the defendant and the other woman in question answered his phone, resulting in the plaintiff and other woman arguing over the phone.

The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant had failed to disclose to her that, after the parties had agreed to rent out their property for one year, the defendant had rented it out for two years, spending the proceeds from rent payments on the other woman. The defendant had also confessed to having a daughter with a non-Muslim woman, the child now being in the care of the defendant's older sister, as well as marrying another woman, with whom he had a four-year old daughter.

Problems escalated on 13 Feburary 2011 when the defendant extended the term of the rental agreement for their property without first consulting the plaintiff. The defendant then spent the rent proceeds on the other woman, the plaintiff submitted.

The defendant submitted that he did not live in Ambon, but rather in Central Jakarta, and therefore the Ambon Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Moreover, he rejected the plaintiff's submission that he had used proceeds from renting their home to fraternise with another woman. Rather, the defendant submitted that he had used that money to cover the plaintiff's university fees (the plaintif was attending university in Makassar and the defendant did not have sufficient finances to cover the costs). The defendant also rejected the plaintiff's submission that he had married another woman with whom he had a four-year old daughter.

The defendant also submitted that from the IDR 17 million per annum he made from renting the parties' home, he had spent IDR 4 million on plumbing, IDR 5 million on the issuance of a certificate from the National Land Body, provided the plaintiff with IDR 4 million to discharge a debt she owed to a colleague, and IDR 2 million to pay an instalment to the landowner as the land had not yet been paid-off in full.

Dismissing the defendant's claim that the court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, the court found that, based on both parties' submissions, it was evident that the parties were no longer compatible and had already been separated since February 2011. Pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the Court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The cassation applicants sought to challenge Decision: 160/ Pdt.G/2014/PTA.Smg. of the Semarang High Religious Court and Decision: 1721/Pdt.G/ 2013/PA.Pbg of the Purbalingga Religious Court, on the grounds that both courts had erred in their application of the law. More specifically, that:

1. the lower courts had failed to consider that the money obtained pursuant to the multi-service ijarah financing agreement was used for tabloid printing costs, while printing had stopped because the director of printing (Suyitno) had absconded, as stated in a report to Purbalingga Police, dated 21 October 2013;
2. the cassation applicants had provided a financial guarantee of IDR 25 million, which, while it was subsequently blocked by the cassation respondents, should have been used to reduce their arrears;
3. evidence was produced showing that the debt owed to the cassation respondents was in the name of Mulia Lastro Wibowo, not the cassation applicants, which should render the decision of the lower courts invalid; and
4. the Purbalingga Religious Court had noted in its judgment that the cassation respondents had produced witnesses, when in actual fact they had not.

The court allowed the appeal on the following different grounds:

1. that the Semarang High Religious Court was inconsistent in its findings with regard to the cassation applicants defaulting on repayments due, stating that a default had to be allowed until the agreement concluded in September 2016, while also concurring with the Purbalingga Religious Court that the cassation applicants had defaulted; and
2. that the Semarang High Religious Court decision lacked legal certainty because the cassation applicants, who were found to have defaulted, should have been ordered to pay damages rather than to simply discharge their arrears with the cassation respondents, because such an order did not remove the risk of the cassation applicants defaulting again.