SHARIAsource

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals harmed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, brought tort claims for damages incurred during that attack against thirty-two distinct defendants. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the charges against seven of the thirty-two defendants, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi government charity, and several Saudi princes, concluding that none of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) exceptions (which would allow suit to proceed against sovereigns or diplomats) were applicable in those cases. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and further dismissed the case against a Saudi banker for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Representing a Muslim former employee of the defendant, the EEOC sued the company, operating as a car dealership, under Title VII, alleging that it subjected the employee to a hostile work environment because of his religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged he suffered numerous instances of harassment because of his religion after 9/11, including being called Taliban by his supervisor and receiving a warning saying he was acting like a Muslim. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the conduct severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim, and thus reversed the District Court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The case settled in October 2007.

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

Mr. Zafar Hasan, a Muslim of Indian heritage, sued his former employer, Foley & Lardner LLP, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, national origin and color. The plaintiff claimed that his work assignments were cut and he was ultimately terminated because he was Muslim. For support, he points to the cut in his assignments that occurred immediately after 9/11, a comment made by one partner that “those people [Muslims] don’t belong here…they should kick them all out,” a warning by another partner to be careful about displaying articles the plaintiff had written on his view that Islam is a peaceful religion, and the fact that the other two Muslims in his department were either transferred or terminated in the same time period. The defendant company responds that it cut Mr. Hasan’s work and then terminated him due to poor work performance. The Circuit Court reversed and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough direct evidence of religious discrimination to allow the case to move forward.

The EEOC represented a group of Muslims suing their former employer, Norwegian Cruise Lines, under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that these discriminatory motives caused the company to target them for increased scrutiny, to create a hostile work environment by allowing their co-workers to verbally harass them (in part, by referring to them as terrorists), and finally, to terminate them. The plaintiffs further entered a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these bases. The defendants argued that they terminated the plaintiffs for inconsistent answers given to background questions and because they were “positive matches in the FBI database.” The Court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but concluded that the discrimination case could go forward as plaintiffs had established a prima facie discrimination case such that a jury could find that the company’s reasons given for terminating the plaintiffs were pretexts for a discriminatory reason.

Muslim plaintiff Iqbal Sulehria sued his employer, the New York City Department of Correction, and related officials under Title VII, §1983, and New York State and City anti-discrimination laws, alleging religious and national origin discrimination as well as retaliation for filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and through the prison administration. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that his co-workers and managers harassed him for being Muslim after the events of 9/11. The harassment consisted of verbal taunts, intrusive searches, withholding promotions, denying him use of the bathroom, forcing him to work in substandard conditions, and having his face imposed on the body of Osama bin Laden in photos left on the plaintiff’s desk. The Court upheld a magistrate judge’s report granting the City partial summary judgment, dismissing the retaliation and failure-to-promote claims, because the Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case; however, the Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could see the events as alleged to be severe and pervasive enough to allow the claim to go forward.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The EEOC represented an African-American Muslim suing his former employer under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed he had been the recipient of many offensive comments (such as being called a “towel head” and “Taliban”) and degrading actions (such as his co-workers hiding his time card while he was at prayer services). The Court reversed and remanded a decision by the District Court for the District of Maryland to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment and that his employer had notice of the ongoing conduct; it thus denied the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed.

Masroor Siddiqui, a Muslim of Pakistani origin, sued his former employer, Autozone, under Title VII, alleging race-based harassment; discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion; and retaliation. The plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment when, after 9/11, he was barraged with racial epithets. He further alleged that he was passed by for promotions because of his race, religion, and national origin (citing comments from his supervisor that they would never promote “people like him”), and that he was ultimately terminated as a result of these factors. The defendant argued that, even if the court found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company legitimately denied the promotion of, and ultimately fired, the employee because of poor work performance. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that no jury would consider the evidence produced by the plaintiff severe or pervasive enough for a hostile work environment claim; however, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment in respect to the promotion claim, allowing the case to go forward.

This regional regulation prohibits conduct that:

1. violates moral decency (arts 2-5);
2. produces, stores and/or distributes alcohol (arts 6-8);
3. constitutes gambling (arts 9-11);
4. constitutes abuse of narcotics, psychotropics, and other addictive substances (arts 12-15).

Article 1(4) defines a 'violation of moral decency' ('pelanggaran kesusilaan') as covering prostitution, behaviour that can evoke lust, either through immoral behaviour, listening to songs, affixing pictures or writing, or other behaviour that contradicts religion, customs and traditions, and culture.