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A Muslim man from Algeria sued his former employer, SUNY College at Brockport, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was not selected for a job at the university because of the Department of Foreign Languages’ head’s prejudice against him. The hiring committee voted in favor of the plaintiff for a permanent position, but the decision ultimately went to the department head, who the plaintiff claimed did not select him out of discriminatory animus toward his race and religion. The department head responded that the plaintiff was not hired because of his lack of research experience. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury may find that the defendant’s reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretexts for discriminatory motives.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

A Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FRCA), alleging religious discrimination and breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired when his employer learned that he was a Muslim. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim, because the plaintiff failed to establish that an employee-employer relationship existed between himself and the defendant; and that it similarly did not have jurisdiction to hear the contract claim because it was below the requisite amount for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the FCRA claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing that the decision-makers knew he was a Muslim when they decided to terminate his employment.

A Bangladeshi Muslim worker sued her former employer under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was fired and not rehired by the defendant because of her religion and national origin. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, but contended that she did not rebut or rebuff the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the company had for not rehiring her—which it claimed was due to poor job performance in her previous job assignments. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff offered no proof that she was not rehired due to religious discrimination.

A Pakistani Muslim banker sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff alleged that her coworkers and supervisors made derogatory remarks to her about her diet, dress, and prayer schedule; and that this discriminatory animus was the real reason that she was terminated. The defendant argued that she was fired for insubordination when she left work in the middle of a shift without permission. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Eighth Circuit upheld this decision on appeal, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the defendant offered for terminating her employment.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

Holding: To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, an applicant need show only that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer had knowledge of his need. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Scalia on June 1, 2015. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Facts: Respondent (Abercrombie) refused to hire Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf that she wore pursuant to her religious obligations conflicted with Abercrombie’s employee dress policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit on Elauf’s behalf, alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, inter alia, prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated without undue hardship.

Procedural Posture: The EEOC prevailed in the District Court, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, awarding Abercrombie summary judgment on the ground that failure-to-accommodate liability attaches only when the applicant provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation.

Sources: Opinion Syllabus; SCOTUSblog Case Page (with further reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case).

Muslim inmate Imam Abd’Allah Halim Abdul Akbar (aka Phillip M. Hudson) sued several prison officials under §1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the prison denied his attempts to start a Muslim inmate group. The prison officials argued that the denial resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to follow the proper procedures for creating such a group. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the prison did not deprive the plaintiff of his ability to practice his religion and that the regulations governing creation of inmate groups were consistent with legitimate penological objectives of preventing gang activity and maintaining order in the prison population. 

Faris Matiyn, an inmate at the Attica prison, mounted a § 1983 claim against the commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and prison superintendent Walter Kelly. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment free exercise right by not allowing Sunnī and Shīʿī Muslims—the two major Muslim denominations—to have separate worship services. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff did not speak for the majority of the Sunnī Muslim community and that keeping the two groups together satisfied legitimate penological objectives, such as maintaining a safe prison environment. 

Mr. Zafar Hasan, a Muslim of Indian heritage, sued his former employer, Foley & Lardner LLP, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, national origin and color. The plaintiff claimed that his work assignments were cut and he was ultimately terminated because he was Muslim. For support, he points to the cut in his assignments that occurred immediately after 9/11, a comment made by one partner that “those people [Muslims] don’t belong here…they should kick them all out,” a warning by another partner to be careful about displaying articles the plaintiff had written on his view that Islam is a peaceful religion, and the fact that the other two Muslims in his department were either transferred or terminated in the same time period. The defendant company responds that it cut Mr. Hasan’s work and then terminated him due to poor work performance. The Circuit Court reversed and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough direct evidence of religious discrimination to allow the case to move forward.

A Pakistani Muslim bank employee suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) sued his former employer, Bank of America, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin; under the American Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination on the basis of disability; and under Title VII and the ADA for retaliatory firing following his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his religious beliefs required him to take several prayer breaks throughout the workday, and that this practice ultimately led to his firing. The defendant responded that the employee was fired because of poor work performance. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment that the plaintiff did not dispute. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the plaintiff had established no connection between the EEOC filing and his termination. 

An Arab-American police officer in New York City sued his employer under §1981 (providing “a cause of action for race-based employment discrimination based on a hostile work environment”), New York Executive Law Section 290, and New York Administrative Code Section 9-101 (both state laws imposing “liability on aiders and abettors of unlawful discriminatory practices”), as well as laws prohibiting the creation of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff worked for the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and claimed that the Department made him read anti-Muslim and anti-Arab rhetoric in the form of briefings from an anti-terrorism consultant. According to the plaintiff, these briefings entailed the consultant instructing the reader to not trust Muslims in law enforcement and making comments like “a good Muslim…can’t be a good American.” The Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim to proceed. It thus denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go forward. The case was ultimately closed in 2010 after an order of dismissal without ever going to trial. The plaintiff did not lodge an explicit claim on the basis of Islamic law, but his allegations about religion may have included ritual practice or dress related to Islamic law.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff James McRoy claimed that prison officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by cancelling some of the scheduled Muslim prayer services without notice, limiting the number of services that Muslim inmates could attend each week, limiting the number of Muslim inmates who could attend each service at any given time, subjecting Muslim inmates to strip searches before they could leave their cells to attend services, prohibiting imams from bringing religious publications onto the prison’s premises, and prohibiting Muslim inmates from exclusively living together in one of the prison’s living units. The prison officials, however, claimed that their actions resulted from a lack of volunteers to organize services and the need to curtail inmate movement on some days because of heightened security concerns. The Court held that McRoy did not sufficiently demonstrate that a jury could conclude that he had been subjected to a violation of his rights. It thus entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

An Arab Muslim truck driver for Swift Transportation Company sued his former employer under Title VII, Tennessee state law, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as intentional economic harm under state law and the FMLA. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that non-Arabs and non-Muslims received better work assignments and that fellow drivers made “hateful” comments regarding his religion and national origin. However, he did not provide any specifics regarding these claims. The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not report an accident within the timeframe mandated by the company. The Court granted the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating employment, and because the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative measures before pursuing a case in court. The plaintiff madeno explicit connection to Islamic law, except that to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included religious practice.

The plaintiff, Kiaza Loccenitt, a Muslim inmate in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction, sued New York City and several prison officials for allegedly violating his civil rights by denying him ḥalāl meals and by denying him and other Muslim inmates in his unit the services of an imām (Muslim chaplain). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, as well as New York Corrections Law § 610. In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against some of the prison officials (who were not directly involved in the alleged violations or the creation of policies that led to the alleged violations), but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to add factual details to his allegation about being denied ḥalāl meals, and about "the impact of that denial on the practice of his religion."

Plaintiff Leo Pittman-Bey, a Muslim inmate, sued Texas prison officials for allegedly violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and his constitutional right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment by denying him after-sunset meals during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Previous prison regulations allowed practicing Muslim inmates to receive after-sunset meals during Ramadan, but only if they had attended jumuʿa (Friday prayer) services in the 60 days prior to Ramadan or had received a special exception from the Muslim chaplain. Pittman-Bey did not attend the services because, as an adherent of the Ḥanafī school of Sunnī Islam, he said he believed that jumuʿa services are not proper if conducted in nonpublic settings like prisons. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that denying Ramadan meals in accordance with the jumuʿa attendance policy did not violate the First Amendment.

On appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the Court upheld the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The EEOC brought a case under Title VII on behalf of Asthma Suliman, a Muslim employee of Kelly Services (a temporary employment agency), alleging religious discrimination. Suliman claimed that the company required her to remove her headscarf (khimār) to work at Nahan (one of Kelly’s work placement facilities) because of the risk that loose clothing posed to the wearer due to the heavy machinery. The defendant company argued that, even if the Court determined that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company had “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” An earlier precedent, Ollis v. Hearthstone Homes, Inc., recognized the operation of heavy machinery as a legitimate basis for requiring headscarf-removal and as a proper defense to a claim of discrimination in such instances. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the EEOC could not prove that the employee was discriminated against as a direct result of her religious beliefs, and that the defendant had demonstrated a safety-related reason for the lack of accommodation.

A Muslim woman, Zahra Mowafy, sued her former employer and her supervisors under Title VII and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging discrimination and job termination based on religion, race, national origin, and age. The plaintiff alleged that, during her time working for the company, it had created a hostile work environment by failing to stop her student interns from mocking her religious prayer rituals or asking insensitive questions about her religion. The Court found that, although the plaintiff narrowly made a prima facie case demonstrating religious discrimination (as no other non-Muslims were similarly fired), the defendant company had non-discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff, specifically poor work performance (which was not disputed by the plaintiff). Furthermore, on the hostile work environment claim, the Court concluded that the incidents detailed by the plaintiff were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a successful claim. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment is favor of the defendant.