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[Sharifian Decree of May 16, 1930] 919 Jarīda Rasmiyya 1322 (June 6, 1930): As the famous “Berber Decree,” this conferred official legitimacy to the Berber jamaʿas and their chiefs for civil matters (Article One), while Article Six notoriously called for all penal matters within Berber jurisdictions to be adjudicated in French courts. Although this Decree became renowned for the intense reaction it provoked in the nascent nationalist milieu, most of its stipulations (including Article Six) were never implemented.

The expansion of the authority of the Court of Religion in Aceh and the subsequent change of its name to Mahkamah Syar’iyah has created an overlap of jurisdiction in the processing of civil and criminal cases. This was due to the granting of the special province status for Aceh in 1999 which entails the right for Aceh to implement Islamic law in the region. Mahkamah Syar’iyah was then granted the authority to process both civil and criminal cases for Aceh’s Muslim citizens, a jurisdiction previously shared between the Indonesian General Courts (Peradilan Umum) and the Courts of Religion (Pengadilan Agama). 

The decision of the Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court signifies the relegation of authority previously held by the Indonesian General Court to Mahkamah Syar’iyah in Aceh.

The relegated authorities are as follow:

1. Muamalah (civil law) cases of Muslim citizens of Aceh regulated in Aceh Qanun
2. Jinayah (Islamic criminal law) cases regulated in Aceh Qanun

In this excerpt from his manual on judicial practice, Abū Bakr Ahmad b. ʿAlī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980) discusses "different types of duties to fight based on residence: an enhanced duty existed for people in frontier lands bordering enemy territory as compared to those living in the interior." Like many medieval jurists, Jaṣṣāṣ "privileges the ruler’s authority to utilize the jihād duty" for a variety of reasons, including additional strategic objectives beyond territorial defense. He also states that if a ruler desires to offensively engage the enemy in their territory, then the obligation is on individuals. For more on jihād, read Adnan A. Zulfiqar's essay “Territory and Jurisdiction” in the Roundtable on the History of Islamic International Law on the Islamic Law Blog.

This status update derives from Indonesian Constitutional Court decision MK Nomor 101/PUU-VII/2009 (30 December 2009), where the Court found that art 4(1) of Law No. 18 of 2003 conflicted with the 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945). Specifically, the Court found that the section had no legally binding authority if the phrase 'in an open session of a High Court in a legal jurisdiction' ('di sidang terbuka Pengadilan Tinggi di wilayah didomisili hukumnya') was not met. Moreover, this phrase was not to be interpreted as 'a High Court, pursuant to a legal order, shall swear an oath for advocates before they join the profession, without associating with the membership of the Organisation of Advocates which, de facto, exists at this moment, in the two years from when these findings are pronounced.'

Later replaced by Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Administration, this statute acknowledges some element of regional autonomy granted to regional jurisdictions. In its preamble it states that implementation of regional administration, apart from being based on the principles of decentralisation and deconcentration, is based on the principle of duty to assist (tugas pembantuan). Moreover, that the status of regional governments is to be, as much as is possible, uniform.

The statute places great emphasis on the duty to assist, noting that the central government can assign level I regional governments tasks, and level I regional governments can, in turn, assign tasks to level II regional governments. It also regulates the appointment, dismissal, authority, and permissible conduct, of regional heads.

This fatwa states that, pursuant to the information collated from nine books on Ahmadiyya, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) has determined that Ahmadiyya is a religious congregation (jama'ah) outside of Islam that is misled and misleading. The fatwa acknowledges that Jemaat Ahmadiyah is a recognised legal entity in the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia, but that for Muslims it has resulted in:

1. disquiet, because its teachings are contrary to Islamic teachings;
2. disunity, especially in regards to prayer (shalat), marriage (munakahat), etc; and
3. a threat to state order and security.

This regulation was issued to provide certainty, clarity, and a legal basis in administering national government authority in Aceh, as well as to implement art 270(1) of Law No. 11 of 2006 on the Administration of Aceh. It grants the national government to legislate with regards to Acehnese government matters that cover:

1. foreign affairs, defence, security, jurisdictional affairs, national monetary and fiscal affairs;
2. certain religious affairs; and
3. matters of national administration in Aceh.

In the elucidation, 'certain religious affairs' ('urusan tertentu dalam bidang agama') is defined as covering, among other things, stipulating national religious holidays, providing recognition of religions, stipulating policies in the administration of religious life, and the like.

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals harmed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, brought tort claims for damages incurred during that attack against thirty-two distinct defendants. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the charges against seven of the thirty-two defendants, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi government charity, and several Saudi princes, concluding that none of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) exceptions (which would allow suit to proceed against sovereigns or diplomats) were applicable in those cases. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and further dismissed the case against a Saudi banker for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The survivor and the family of two men who were kidnapped and held for three weeks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) sued the PKK under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, as well as Syria, its Ministry of Defense, and several high-ranking Syrian officials under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (which allows individuals to sue nations that sponsor terrorism). Syria moved to have the case dismissed, citing a lack of jurisdiction, insufficient process, and failure to make a claim. The Court allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to address the points brought up by the defendants in an amended complaint, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss was denied. In July 2009, a status report was filed by the defendant, and the case was still open as of August 2011.

This 2013 case is part of an ongoing legal custody battle in Malaysia between a Hindu woman, Indira Gandhi Mutho against her former husband Pathmanathan Krishnan, who converted from Hinduism to Islam in 2009. In this case, the [civil] Federal High Court ruled that the conversion certificates of Gandhi’s children to Islam should be declared null and void because Krishnan had not converted the three children aged twelve, eleven, and eleven months to Islam in accordance with the Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004. The Federal High Court also reasoned that the applicant’s rights were upheld through international rights and standards, and articles 11 and 12(4) in the Federal Constitution. Significantly, the Federal High Court also claimed that it held jurisdiction over the syariah courts on this matter.

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāra agreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid for the building, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision.The trial court ruled it had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 

In this paper, Muftī Muhammad Abu Bakar determines that cryptocurrency is permissible under Islamic law in principle as it is treated as a good with value, as evidenced by its high market price on global exchanges and its acceptance as a form of payment at a wide variety of global merchants. He further notes that the permissibility of cryptocurrency is determined by its classification as currency in a governing legal and regulatory environment. Where jurisdictions prohibit dealing with cryptocurrency, its usage is prohibited in Islamic law as well. Muftī Abu Bakar adds that, before trading with cryptocurrency, users must consider its volatility and associated risks, given that preservation of wealth is one of the fundamental objectives (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) of Islamic law. He concludes that, overall, it is not advisable to buy cryptocurrency for investment purposes, but to utilize it as a system of payment instead. 

The plaintiff , an American citizen whose wife was killed in a suicide bombing in Israel, sued Iran under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (allowing suit against sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism), for intentional infliction of emotional distress and economic loss due to wrongful death of his wife in a suicide bomber’s attack in Israel. The plaintiff argued that Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security should be held financially liable, as there were financial ties between the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran. Iran failed to make an appearance or file an answer. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $10,380,568 for emotional and economic loss.

Additional commentary. The FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a) is the terrorism exception to FSIA and what plaintiffs depend on to get jurisdiction over Iran. §1605(a)(1) stays that “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” While there is no direct connection to Islamic law, there is a dispute that centers around whether Iran -- an Islamic constitutional state -- sponsors military operations conceived of as jihad under the guise of Islamic law.

The Act replaced the Iranian Family Protection Act 1975 and modified other family law provisions as embodied in the Civil Code and the Divorce Act 1992. It contains procedural matters (Family Courts, Family Consultation Centers) as well as substantial ones (marriage, divorce, custody, nafaqa, alimony and pensions) and the criminal sanctions. Major changes introduced generally are:

A) The Family Court now involves a female consultant judge who is to give her opinion in each case, which the sitting judge (a man as in other courts) has to consider, but not to follow, in deciding the case;

B) The jurisdiction of the Family Court is now extended to additional matters, including child adoption, embryo donation, and sex change;

C) The process for divorce by mutual consent is facilitated;

D) The value of the Mahr (or the portion of the Mahr) for collecting which the debtor imprisonment provisions can be invoked is now limited to a specified amount (equal to 110 gold coin);

E) Temporary marriage needs not be registered now save in specific situations;

The appellants sought to challenge the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), which had stipulated the beneficiaries of the deceased, as well as the manner in which the estate of the deceased was to be distributed.

The Court concurred with the decision of the lower court, but added that the appellants' claim in regards to the daughter procuring the estate in its entirety, based on Indonesian Supreme Court Jurisdiction No. 184K/AG/1995, was inpplicable in this case because the child of a beneficiary had passed away, rather than the child surviving the beneficiary.

Moreover, the Court held that the respondents' objection in regards to the standing of the replacement beneficiary, unknown in Sunni fiqh, was not a valid reason, because Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1991 (Compilation of Islamic Laws) had already provided positive jurisprudential guidelines in this regard. The Court cited the qaedah that permits a government to remove any inconsistency or difference.

The court found that the respondents had principally sought from the lower court a distribution of the estate of D.G, who had passed away in 1945. Citing Supreme Court Jurisdiction No. 181.K/AG/1994, the court noted that the rights of a deceased's children, parents and spouse take precedence over those of any other concerned parties. This decision, the court found, was all the more authoritative as it was based on the opinion of Ibnu Abbas, an interpreter and commentator from Muhammad's inner-circle, who interpreted the word 'walad' in verse 176 of Surah An-Nisa' to include both boys and girls.

Accordingly, the court found that A binti D.G (sibling of the deceased H.G) could not be stipulated as a beneficiary of H.G because H.G had a daughter, Z binti H.G. That said, Z binti H.G could similarly not be stipulated as a beneficiary of A binti D.G's estate, despite having been stipulated as a replacement beneficiary, because A binti D.G was survived by her daughter M binti D.

The lower court's distribution of D.G's estate did not reflect this, causing the court to pass its own, far more detailed judgment. The distinguishing inclusion was a lineage of beneficiaries relevant to the distribution of the estate.

The Court noted that the appellant had lodged his complaint as illegal misconduct (perbuatan melawan hukum), something outside the jurisdiction of the religious courts. It acknowledged, however, that the basis of the appellant's claim did indeed constitute a shari'a economy case, for the purposes of the elucidation of Law No. 3 of 2006, art 49(22)(i). This was because the basis of the appellant's claim derived from a Murabahah (sale-purchase) financial agreement, and a power of attorney, which the appellant believed to be legally invalid. Under the power of attorney, the respondent was authorised to sell, transfer and relinquish all rights over a parcel of land to any person, including itself, if the appellant had failed to pay its debt owing to the respondent. The appellant submitted, however, that as he had signed the agreement without properly understanding its content and effect, it, along with the Murabahah agreement, should be declared null and void. The Court disagreed with the appellant, upholding the ruling of the lower court.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 2 October 2004 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had three children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of marriage, which would then enable them to obtain birth certificates for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 15 May 1979 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had five children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of marriage, which would then enable them to obtain birth certificates for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 26 August 1997 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a one-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had three children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.