SHARIAsource

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Tuvalu, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Tuvalu's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Nauru, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Nauru's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of New Zealand, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under New Zealand's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Bahrain (Mamlakat al Bahrayn), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bahrain’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status, and is the principal source of legislation.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Iran's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Jumhuriyat Misr al Arabiyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Egypt's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Serbia (Republika Srbija), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Serbia’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

This fatwa (in its attachment) states that the provision of alms (zakat) for educational purposes, especially in the form of scholarships, is rightful (sah) because it constitutes a benevolent act of charity (ashnaf fi sabilillah). More specifically, that scholarships are a form of assistance derived from alms based on the Qur'an, surah At-Taubah, verse 60, based on the understanding that charity according to a group of legal scholars (fiqh ulama) from several schools of thought (mazhab), as well as exegisis scholars (ulama tafsir), is a general utterance (lafaznya umum).

The fatwa also states that Muslim students, as recipients of alms-derived scholarships:

1. should strive for academic achievement;
2. be prioritised based on their level of impecuniosity; and
3. study that which will benefit the Indonesian nation.

Diniyah Takmiliyah is a non-formal religious education stream designed to complement formal religious (Islamic) education at every level of education. Its curriculum comprises study of the Qur'an and Hadith, creed (aqidah), legal understanding (fiqh), Islamic cultural history, Arabic, and the practice of worship (ibadah) (art 12). Compulsory Diniyah Takmiliyah study aims to enable students to comprehend and to put into practice religious teaching values and/or to become critical, creative, and innovative religious experts (art 4). The overall term of study for Diniyah Takmiliyah Awaliyah is four tyears, while Diniyah Takmiliyah Wustho and Diniyah Takmiliyah Ulya is two years (art 5). Diniyah Takmiliyah study is to be implemented in the late afternoon or outside of formal school hours (art 8).

This regional regulation makes provision for Diniyah Takmiliyah Awaliyah education, the purpose of which is to provide students with the ability to develop into devout, pious Muslims (art 3). The term of Diniyah Takmiliay Awaliyah education is four years for children aged 7-12 years (art 4(1)). Students at integrated Islamic primary schools, Muhamadiyah primary schools, and integrated state primary schools, are not obliged to attend Diniyah Takmiliyah Awaliyah classes per se, however, their curriculum must include Diniyah Takmiliayh Awaliyah-specific curriculum (art 4(2)). Diniyah Takmiliyah Awaliyah curriculum, at a minimum, comprises:

1. Qur'anic study;
2. Hadith study;
3. creed and morals (aqidah akhlak);
4. fiqh (legal understanding);
5. Islamic cultural history;
6. Arabic;
7. the practice of worship (praktek ibadah) (art 9(a)).

On September 23, 2022, the Texas Supreme Court remanded a divorce case to the trial court in which it had originally been heard, deciding that the lower court had erred in its initial judgment. The case involved two agreements that had been signed in 2008 when the couple was first married; one was an Islamic “Marriage Contract,” and the other was an “Islamic Prenuptial Agreement.” The wife sued for divorce, claiming that she had not known at the time exactly what she was signing and had assumed that the prenuptial agreement was just a copy of the marriage contract. The prenuptial agreement stated that any conflicts arising from the marriage were to be “resolved according to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and Islamic Law in a Muslim court, or in [its] absence by a Fiqh Panel,” whose decision was to be “binding and final.” The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in determining the enforceability and validity of the prenuptial agreement, and that the conflicts arising from the marriage should be determined by a court according to U.S. law, rather  than by a so-called fiqh panel of Islamic law experts. The Court’s per curiam opinion came in response to an appeal from the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, whose ruling can be viewed here. 

The parties were married on 15 November 2000 and had four children. At the time of the proceeding, the defendant was serving an eight-month prison sentence for having beaten the plaintiff on 25 October 2014. The plaintiff submitted that entering the third year of their marriage, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. This was due to:

1. a difference of opinion over domestic matters;
2. the defendant's insistence on using profane language and physically assaulting the plaintiff when they would argue, resulting in the plaintiff having to see a psychologist; and
3. the defendant having carried on an extra-marital affair with another woman, to whom he had also provided financial assistance.

The parties had been separated, as a result, since November 2014. The plaintiff, therefore, requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra), and that it order the defendant to provide her with maintenance back-payments.

The court found that the marriage could no longer fulfil the purposes of marriage as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. It was, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiff had met the evidentiary burden contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The court also cited fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) from Kitab Al Muhadzdzab juz II, page 164, and Kitab l'anatut Thalibin, page 85, both of which state that a husband is to provide maintenance back-payments to his wife in the event he had neglected to provide for her and their children for a period. It distinguished this fiqh, however, on the grounds that the parties had been separated for that time. In regards to the parties' four children, the court ordered that the two children under the age of 12 (belum mumayyiz) remain in the custody of the plaintiff. Accordingly, it ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff at least IDR 800,000 per month until the children reach the age of 21.

Biography of Mālikī jurist and theologian Abū ʿUmar Yūsuf b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Barr (368/978–463/1071), known as Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the print edition al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī (Harvard Series in Islamic Law), edited and translated by Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette (PIL/HUP, 2019).

The appellants sought to challenge the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), which had stipulated the beneficiaries of the deceased, as well as the manner in which the estate of the deceased was to be distributed.

The Court concurred with the decision of the lower court, but added that the appellants' claim in regards to the daughter procuring the estate in its entirety, based on Indonesian Supreme Court Jurisdiction No. 184K/AG/1995, was inpplicable in this case because the child of a beneficiary had passed away, rather than the child surviving the beneficiary.

Moreover, the Court held that the respondents' objection in regards to the standing of the replacement beneficiary, unknown in Sunni fiqh, was not a valid reason, because Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1991 (Compilation of Islamic Laws) had already provided positive jurisprudential guidelines in this regard. The Court cited the qaedah that permits a government to remove any inconsistency or difference.

The applicant had submitted a marriage ratification request to the court, dated 8 January 2010. The request stated that she and M. Yusuf bin Jafar (deceased, 29 December 2009) were married in accordance with Islamic shari'a on 10 June 1949, with her older brother Muhammad Yunas acting as her marriage guardian. The marriage was witnessed by two other persons, the names of whom the applicant could not recall. The applicant's dowry was IDR 40.

The applicant required a marriage ratification certificate in order to access her deceased husband's pension, life insurance, and widow's pension. The marriage had never been registered pursuant to current legal provisions. The applicant and her husband, however, had seven children, all of whom were now adults. Moreover, they had never divorced and no one had ever had any objections to their marriage.

In acceding to the applicant's request, the court cited arts 7(2) and (3)(d) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which granted it powers to solemnise a marriage, as well as one that preceded the enactment of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage. The Court also cited the rule of fiqh contained in Kitab Tuhfah Jilid IV, which mandates the recognition of the marriage of a woman who is of age and sound mind ('aqil baligh).

This fatwa recognises the increase in shari'a-type business, as well as the demand for clarification on fiqh muamalah maliyah (commercial goods law), in order to increase its status and role. It also recognises that shari'a financial institutions have requested a fatwa for the development of syndicated shari'a financial products. The fatwa defines syndicated financing (al-tamwil al-mashrifi al-mujamma') as an agreement between several financial institutions (be they all shari'a financial institutions, or some shari'a financial institutions and some conventional financial institutions) to jointly-finance a specific project. Syndicated financing agreements can take the form of sale-purchase agreements, rental agreements, and joint-venture agreements. In the event all financial institutions are shari'a-based, all relevant information can be contained in one document. If some of the participating financial institutions are conventional, i.e. not shari'a-based, the conventional institutions must have their relevant information in a separate document from that of the shari'a-based financial institutions.

A procedural law, containing provisions governing the organization of registry system, the processes of delimitation and registration of real properties, registration of deeds, notary services, administrative enforcement of official deeds, offenses and penalties and the service fees. It, nonetheless, includes one important modification in substantive contract law as well, which is one of the first socially-motivated deviations from the system of ‘freedom of contracts’ as conceived in Shi’i fiqh:

Sale had long been used as a fictional guise for the unlawful intention of the parties to make an interest-bearing loan. This gave the buyer/borrower the additional advantage of appropriating the item of sale/collateral in case of seller/lender’s default, even if the value of collateral be much higher than the price/ loan sum. The Registry Act changed this situation: Regardless of the title the parties give to their contract, whenever the real function of the transaction is to provide security for a debt, the creditor can take only a portion of the collateral equal to the value of the debt, and needs to do this always through judicial or administrative enforcement procedure.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 7 March 1992 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been seven mayam worth of gold in cash. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. The parties had never divorced nor had they left Islam (murtad). There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had two children. They had never, however, received a marriage certificate issued by the Office of Religious Affairs. The parties, therefore, requested that the court ratify their marriage for civil administration purposes.

The court cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, and Kitab Ushu al-Fiqh by Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, as examples of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 4 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.