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Holding: A Mormon minister is entitled to tax exemptions under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, which exempts “all clergymen of any Christian denomination regularly engaged in their vocation” from the obligation of paying personal taxes.

Procedural posture: Tax collector filed for assumpsit (a common law action brought to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract) to recover defendant’s personal taxes in the District Court of Koolauloa, HI. The Court, sitting without a jury, found for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not relevant, except that the defendant testified he is not “a Mohammedan” and does not “accept the Koran,” and that the Court noted that “Mohammedanism” is one of the four “grand systems” of the religious world.

Judgment: Judgment for the defendant, in an opinion authored by Judge McCully.

Facts: Defendant Henry Richards was a minister of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church) who was sent as a missionary to Hawaii. At trial, to determine whether he qualified as a “Christian clergyman” exempt from personal taxes under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, Richards testified as to his religious beliefs. They included belief in, inter alia, baptism, the Gospels, revelation, polygamy, the atonement of Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the Book of Mormon. The Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Hawaii found that, because the defendant believed in Christ and accepted the Old and New Testament, he was a Christian clergyman for tax purposes. The Court addressed the concern that Mormons have more scriptures than the Bible by stating that the Roman Catholic Church has accepted revelation and papal infallibility, but is still considered Christian. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because Richards did not himself practice or preach polygamy in Hawaii, his belief was not grounds for excluding him from being a Christian minister. Therefore, the Court concluded that, as a Mormon minister, Richards qualified for the personal tax exemption given to Christian ministers.

The ACLU brought suit objecting to the use of taxpayer money to fund what it termed a religious charter school as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The defendant academy and its sponsor, Islamic Relief, submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not a state actor. The Court found that the evidence regarding Islamic Relief’s role as a state actor was not clear, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in 2011. As of August 2011, the case was still ongoing.

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāraagreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid the amount for the building's construction, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. 

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāra agreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid for the building, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision.The trial court ruled it had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāra agreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid for the building, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment on the basis of the Tax Injunction Act, which prohibits federal courts from hearing challenges to tax obligations if the taxpayer has adequate access to judicial review in state courts.  

This government regulation regulates the types of zakat (alms) or obligatory religious donations that are tax-deductible.

This fatwa permits the provision of reserve funds, provided those funds derive from profits of the relevant shari'a financial institute. Such an approach, therefore, eliminates the possibility of having an adverse effect on the customer. The fatwa also states that, for tax purposes, a shari'a financial institute may source such reserve funds from its overall profits.

The Court granted defendant Freedom Financial Network’s motion for summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging discrimination. Following the EEOC dismissal of his claim, the Court found that the plaintiff, in his second amended complaint, still failed to state a claim warranting relief despite being given several chances to amend his complaint. Plaintiff Reginald Ringgold was an employee of defendant and claimed that he was fired because he was a Muslim and a Free Moorish American National. The defendant responded that it let the employee go because he claimed to be a tax-exempt non-citizen of the United States on several occasions, but his documentation showed that he was born in Connecticut. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that his employer knew he was a Muslim or Free Moorish American National, and thus there was no actionable claim of discrimination.

In his treatise on the land tax (kharāj), Yaḥyā b. Ādam (d. 203/818) cites a report from the ʿAlid descendant ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan according to which ʿUmar, the second caliph, gave Yanbuʿ to ʿAlī after ʿAlī asked him about it. In her chapter on land and leadership in early Islamic societies in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Intisar Rabb uses this source to show the range of accounts concerning ʿAlī’s acquisition of land at Yanbuʿ, noting that ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan had a personal investment in his version of the narrative and that he appeared in court claiming to have entitlement rights to the land.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts,ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources  and other material used in and related to the book.

In this passage from his work on statecraft, Māwardī discusses judges (quḍāt)and magistrates (ḥukkām). He describes how the ruler delegates the authority of judgment to judges and magistrates, who represent the scales of justice (al-mawāzīn al-qisṭ, alluding to Q. 21:47, “We shall set the scales of justice for the Day of Resurrection, and no soul shall be wronged in aught”). These appointees are to fulfill the rightful claims of weak claimants and to rectify the injustices suffered by the oppressed. However, judges and magistrates with poor morals have the potential to undermine the ruler’s authority and to destroy religion, and their appointments reflect poorly on the ruler. Judges should thus be chosen only on the basis of sound qualities, including a positive demeanor, trustworthiness, patience, restraint, and a lack of greed. Justices should also be learned and have memorized central texts of the Muslim legal tradition. The selection and performance of judges are of paramount importance for Māwardī, as illustrated by his citation of a report concerning the judge of the ʿAbbasid caliph al-Maʾmūn. In the report, the judge counsels al-Maʾmūn against imposing taxes on the sawādlands of Iraq. The caliph heeds the judge’s advice and averts fiscal harm. In her analysis of Islamic mirrors-for-princes literature on judging in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Louise Marlow cites these passages to demonstrate the emphasis that Māwardī places on the ruler’s task of appointing just judges.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

Mohammad Fadel (Professor of Law, University of Toronto) and Connell Monette (Vice President of Academic Affairs, American Academy Casablanca) organized a PIL Forum Roundtable on the recent publication of al-Muwaṭṭaʾ – Recension of Yahya b. Yahya al-Laythī (d. 234/848) by Mālik b. Anas, distributed through Harvard University Press. This translation is based on the recently published Royal Moroccan Edition of the Muwaṭṭaʾ (Casablanca: Maṭbaʿat al-najāḥ al-jadīda, 2013/1434), and was commissioned by the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. A team of Moroccan translators, under the supervision of Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette, editors, working over the course of several years, prepared the translation.

Below are the essays contributed to the Roundtable on the ISLAMICLAWblog. Leading scholars which scholars comment on various aspects of the translation; some engage substantively with particular topics or themes in the Muwaṭṭaʾ, others comment on the translation and its style, and some combine elements of both.

Part of the Online Companion for Al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī.

The reconsideration (peninjauan kembali) applicant, previously the plaintiff/appellant/cassation applicant, herein referred to as the plaintiff, submitted a request for reconsideration in its claim against the reconsideration respondents and reconsideration co-respondents, previously the cassation respondents/defendants/respondents and co-cassation respondents/co-defendants/co-respondents, herein referred to as the defendants and co-defendants. The plaintiff submitted that he had purchased from a Bapak (Mr) Munasan a 250m² property on 29 August 1975, and that the village head was aware of the purchase. The property had been transferred into the plaintiff's name in 1979 for the purposes of property tax and regional building fees. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, however, on 29 July 2000, the property was bequeathed to another party, the fifth defendant, pursuant to a deed drafted by the first co-defendant. Furthermore, the fifth defendant requested that the first co-defendant have the second co-defendant issue the transfer of title in the name of the fifth defendant, with the second, third and fourth defendants serving as trustees (nadzir). On 12 May 2001, the plaintiff submitted that he was invited by the first defendant to discuss the matter of the land endowment. There he was shown a draft statement requiring his signature. Then, on 17 November 2010, the defendants, believing the statement was erroneous, drafted an invalidation of land endowment deed for the second co-defendant. On 29 July 2011 at the local office of religious affairs, the defendants prepared an invalidation report and invalidation declaration and deed of land endowment in relation to the property. The plaintiff submitted that, therefore, the defendants' conduct was evidence the plaintiff was the lawful owner of the property and that the defendants sought legal certainty over the matter in the form of a decision from the Bandung Religious Court. Moreover, that the plaintiff was entitled to IDR 500,000 per day for every day the court's decision was not implemented.

In dismissing this final appeal, the court found that the reason for reconsideration submitted by the plaintiff, that being that new evidence in the form of a relevant document had been discovered that had not been considered in the previous proceeding, failed to meet the prescribed requirement for new and admissible evidence in art 67(b) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Iceland (Lydveldid Island), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Iceland's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the United Republic of Tanzania (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Tanzania's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

In April 2022 [1443 AH], the Dār al-ʿUlūm al-Sharʿiyya press published The Islamic Emirate and Governmental System, authored by the Chief Justice of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, ʿAbd al-Ḥākim al-Ḥaqqānī, with a foreword by the current Taliban head, Hibatullāh Akhunzāda. The book was published in Arabic, with the intention of reaching a broad Muslim audience, beyond Afghanistan. The 312-page book discusses governance, education, laws of war (jihād), political leadership, education, and the rights and roles of women. The book opens by stating that, following the withdrawal of American-allied forces from Afghanistan, the goal of the new Islamic State is the implementation of divine law in accordance with Islamic law generally and Hanafī jurisprudence specifically. This book claims to be a manifesto encompassing the political and governance policies of the Taliban, even though it definitely represents the beliefs of al-Ḥaqqānī and his allies, rather than the philosophy of the entire Taliban movement—which has some internal variation. The book's principal assertions follow.

The book begins by defining two types of government: al-jabāya and al-hidāya. Al-jabāya refers, essentially, to the levying of taxes, while al-hidāya refers to religio-moral guidance. The author maintains that an Islamic government should be one of al-hidāya, where the government serves the role of providing advice and guidance to the people, rather than al-jabāya, wherein a government exploits the poor for the personal gain of government officials. Under a government of al-hidāya, the author asserts that the legitimate form of law is divine, not man-made.

The book acknowledges several sources of sharīʿa. Those sources include but are not limited to the Qur’ān, the ḥadīth (prophetic reports), qiyās (deductive analogical reasoning), ijmā‘ (scholarly consensus), and khayr (benevolence).

The book further establishes that the justice system of the Islamic Emirate should be in accordance only with Hanafī jurisprudence, and that no credence should be given to other schools of Islamic law that are and have historically been minoritarian in Afghanistan. The author asserts that accommodations made for religious minorities will lead to the justice system falling apart, as in the Ottoman Empire.

According to the author, citizens of the Islamic Emirate may continue to adhere to local customs (in Afghanistan: Pashtunwali or the code of the Pashtun people). Such customs may be upheld so long as they do not conflict with sharīʿa and may include wearing traditional Afghan clothes.

The head of the global Islamic state, the book asserts, should be called the Amīr al-Mu’minīn and should be appointed according to the same methods used in selecting the first Four Rāshidūn Caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad: through the formation of a council of influential and prominent people, not through democracy, which the author considers un-Islamic. Obedience to the Amīr al-Mu’minīn by the entire Islamic world is mandatory, the author asserts, and disobedience is punishable by death. As to criteria for leadership, the author maintains that the Amīr must be a man, and that women are to stay home and avoid participation in politics, for fear that their participation would compromise the political state.

The book discusses the various political institutions that form the Islamic Emirate: a Council of Ministers, the Armed Forces, and a Judiciary. It also calls for the creation of an all-male legislative body known as the Islamic Council.

On education, the book maintains that the educational system should include mandatory education in madrasas, and optional non-Islamic education. The author states that a co-educational system is forbidden (ḥarām), but that education of women itself is not necessarily prohibited (ḥarām). According to the author, a woman’s education should occur within the home and should be carried out by her family members. Further, he maintains that women should pursue careers that are suitable for them, such as medicine, caretaking, home sciences, and teaching; and they are to interface only with other women and girls in those professions.

The book specifically discusses women’s roles in society. It requires women to fully cover themselves in ḥijāb and stipulates that they should not engage in any pursuit that would require them to be alone for longer than three days. Finally, the author notes that women should not travel long distances without a male guardian, and that they should not unnecessarily leave their residences.

Overall, the book’s claims are seldom backed with references, and the sources employed by the author are not listed.

Islamic finance creates financial products specifically aimed at Muslims that are sharīʿa compliant. Many scholars have condemned Islamic finance for condemning ribā (interest) on the one hand, particularly where usurious, but then many others have created workarounds that allow modern big-finance firms to avoid it in name only on the other hand. Those who argue against the workaround argue that nominal interest-avoidance goes against the spirit of the guidelines set forth in Islamic law (sharīʿa). Weighing in on the controversy, University of Toronto Law Professor Mohammad Fadel considers whether ribā might serve a function that goes beyond simple definitions of it as either interest or usury. Historically, the prohibition on interest was a means of regulating medieval financial industries, in ways that have little application to the modern financial instruments. The medieval prohibitions and the modern controversies about Islamic finance then, he argues, are misaligned and need rethinking. This post provides a "plain English" review of the article: Mohammad H. Fadel, Ribâ, Efficiency and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, 25 Wisconsin Journal of International Law 655 (2008).