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Fatwā concerning the legality, based on their interpretation of Islamic law, of a) the responsibility of mosque officials to prevent unwell congregants from entering a mosque’s premises and b) the temporary suspension of congregational and Friday prayers, and subsequent mosque closures. The answer provided by the Fatwa Committee, who met on 18 February 2020, is that a) mosques’ management has the religious duty to request or prohibit any unwell congregants from entering the mosque area, whether for performing prayers or other matters and the closing of a mosque and b) the suspension of congregational prayers and Friday prayers during this situation, is required.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

The Malaysian Islamic Development Department (Jakim) recently shared a post on its Facebook account reminding a 2015 fatwā by the Special Meeting of the Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia declaring the use of electronic cigarettes impermissible under Islamic law.

Plaintiff John Walker Lindh, a convicted "American Taliban," challenged prison policies that allowed for individual prayer in cells, but banned group congregation for prayer due to "security concerns." The Plaintiff sued the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution of Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The District Court found that the Plaintiff did have sincerely held religious beliefs, and therefore turned its inquiry to whether the ban on group prayer furthers the compelling interest of security and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. The District Court ultimately determined that the warden-Respondent failed to establish that the total ban on daily congregational prayer by the Plaintiff was the least restrictive means of meeting the warden's security concerns.

Plaintiff Peter McDaniels sued various prison officials, alleging that they intentionally failed to provide him with pre-sunrise meals during Ramadan and with an Eid al-Fitr meal at the conclusion of Ramadan, in violation of his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The Plaintiff also contended that the lack of provision of ḥalāl meat and deprivation of an Arabic Qurʾān for nine months were discriminatory violations of his rights. The Respondents moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Respondents' request for summary judgment on the Ramadan meals issue, stating that the Plaintiff failed to show that such failures to provide a meal on isolated incidents imposed a significant restriction on his religious practice. However, the District Court decided that the Respondents did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the religious diet policy furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the Respondents deprived the Plaintiff of his rights by not allowing him access to a Qurʾān, finding that the Respondents were not required to provide the Plaintiff with an Arabic Qurʾān or dates to be used in his devotional practice, given the absence of any showing that Respondents prevented him from obtaining such items. The Plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief, but the Court found that the individual Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, so they could not be held liable for personal damages under RLUIPA.

Plaintiff Kareem Hassan Milhouse, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), filed aBivens-styled complaint against several Federal Bureau of Prisons and USP-Lewisburg officials. The Plaintiff asserted that he had been denied access to the courts on three occasions and denied the practice of his religious requirements in violations of his right to free exercise, on the bases that: (1) there was no Islamic chaplain for Muslim inmates nor services for Special Management Unit inmates to attend services physically, nor were services provided through the radio as were other institutional programs, and (2) there was no Islamic celebration after the Ramadan fast, nor special meal of the types given for holidays of other faiths, and no Muslim chaplain with whom to discuss articles of faith. [He believed both of these types of services to be requirements stipulated by Islamic ritual law.] The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the alleged conduct did not fall within the scope of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which applies to free exercise of religion claims under the First Amendment raised by prisoners, because the Plaintiff did not establish that a “substantial burden” had been placed on his ability to exercise his religion. The Court further determined that the Plaintiff had alternative means of worship available to him and that the Defendants’ conduct of providing the meal to non-Muslim inmates did not inhibit or curtail his ability to express adherence to his Islamic faith and beliefs. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet the substantial burden test with respect to both of these freedom of religion claims, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

The parties were married on 27 February 2009. The plaintiff submitted that by June 2009, however, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome. This was the result of the lack of responsibility the defendant had shown his family, including not providing the plaintiff and their child with enough financial support to meet their daily needs.

Problems escalated in June 2014 as the defendant continued to provide the plaintiff with insufficient financial support. This triggered the plaintiff to instigate an argument with the defendant, resulting in the defendant leaving the matrimonial home. The parties had remained separated since.

The court found that ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was sufficient reason to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The applicant submitted that he and the respondent were married on 25 March 1976 and had five children. As the respondent had suffered a stroke in 2008, the applicant submitted that he intended to marry another woman. Moreover, that his IDR 3 million per month salary was sufficient to meet the needs of both his current and prospective wives, as well as his children.

The court acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds that the applicant was financially capable of providing for his wife and children, pursuant to art 58(1)(b) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Furthermore, as provided by art 8(a)-(f) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as arts 39-44 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, there were no grounds to prohibit their marriage between the applicant and his prospective second wife.

The applicant submitted that he and the respondent were married on 5 February 2004. The respondent, however, was unable to fall pregnant, and the applicant submitted that he intended to marry another woman in order that he could have a child. Moreover, his IDR 4.3 million per month salary was sufficient to meet the needs of both his current and prospective wives, as well as any future children.

In acceding to the applicant's request, the court acknowledged that the reasons and criteria for polygamy contained in arts 4(2) and 5(1) in Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage had been met. The court also cited verse 3 of Surah An-Nisa' from the Qur'an, which permits a man to take up to four wives.

The applicant submitted that he and the respondent were married on 5 January 1991 and had two children. The respondent, however, subsequently suffered from a heart condition, shortness of breath and high blood pressure. Her health problems had prevented her from being physically intimate with the applicant, who had a heightened libido. The respondent had also consented to the applicant taking another wife to prevent him from committing adultery. The applicant submitted that his IDR 2 million per month salary was sufficient to meet the needs of both his current and prospective wives, as well as the parties' children.

In acceding to the applicant's request, the court acknowledged that the reasons and criteria for polygamy contained in arts 4 and 5 in Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage had been met. The court also cited verse 3 of Surah An-Nisa' from the Qur'an, which permits a man to take up to four wives.

Plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, challenged prison policies that (1) failed to provide a Muslim chaplain and an adequate number of Islamic services; (2) prohibited religious meetings without a volunteer present; (3) failed to provide ḥalāl meals and a location where he may perform five daily ṣalāt (prayers); and (4) prohibited him from wearing a kufi (prayer cap) or an Islamic medallion outside of his clothing. The Court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison's policies substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, as required for a finding of a violation of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and that where plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial burden, the prison had demonstrated that its policies were the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest in safety and security.

William Knuckles and several other inmates, all adherents of the Nation of Islam, filed a §1983 claim against prison officials, alleging a violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that they were not allowed to correspond with their religious leaders, receive books and periodicals, "wear Muslim medals," or have a special dietary plan. In finding that the inmates were entitled to be visited by qualified ministers, the Court cautioned that all meetings should remain of a religious nature and could be supervised by prison officials.

The plaintiff submitted that, since October 2011, she and the defendant had quarrelled regularly. This was a result of the defendant:

1. only providing the plaintiff with as much financial support as he saw fit, meaning the plaintiff also had to work to meet their domestic needs; and
2. often staying out late for trivial purposes such as hunting, fishing or seeing his friends.

Problems escalated in December 2012, causing the plaintiff to move to the defendant's parents' home. Since then the parties had shared no physical intimacy, and despite the plaintiff's attempts to patiently stand by the defendant, the defendant's behaviour had not changed. The defendant also failed to attend court, despite having been summonsed formally.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's application for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu Ba'in Sughro) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, per art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 22 July 2005. The plaintiff submitted that, since June 2009, however, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome. This was a result of the defendant:

1. never working and not being able to provide the plaintiff with sufficient financial support, resulting in the plaintiff relocating to Malaysia for work to meet the parties' joint needs; and
2. already having a child with another woman, but the plaintiff not knowing the identity of this other woman, and only knowing about the child from the defendant's family and members of the public having seen him with this other woman.

In November 2009, believing their problems were irreconcilable, the plaintiff left the defendant and returned to her parents' home after no longer being able to cope with the poor way in which the defendant was treating her. The defendant also failed to attend court, despite having been summonsed formally.

The court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu Ba'in Sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, and that the parties had been separated for more than two years, per art 19(f) and (b) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) and (b) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 13 May 2004. The plaintiff submitted that after 10 years and one month the parties separated in June 2014, and had remained so until the proceeding. The reasons for the breakdown of the parties' marriage included:

1. a difference in principles and way of thinking, including the defendant not allowing the plaintiff to work outside the home;
2. the plaintiff not being allowed to work outside the home despite the fact that the defendant's salary could not meet their daily needs; and
3. the defendant providing the plaintiff with no financial and emotional support.

Despite having been summonsed formally, the defendant had failed to attend the proceeding. Regardless, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 30 January 2009. The plaintiff submitted that, in 2011, the marriage had become quarrelsome. This was the result of the defendant:

1. being ambivalent towards domestic matters and needs;
2. often going out at night and rarely being at home;
3. becoming romantically involved with another woman; and
4. providing the plaintiff with insufficient financial support, forcing her to rely on financial assistance from her parents to meet her daily needs.

Problems escalated on 21 July 2013 when the plaintiff first discovered that the defendant had been having an extra-marital affair. When the plaintiff inquired about the defendant's extra-marital affair, the defendant reacted strongly and verbally divorced the plaintiff. On 30 July 2013, the parties agreed to divorce and had lived separately since.

Despite being summonsed formally, the defendant failed to attend the proceeding. Regardless, the court found that ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was sufficient reason to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The parties were married on 2 April 2000 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted that, after 12 years of marriage, she and the defendant had begun to quarrel regularly. This was the result of:

1. the plaintiff often catching the defendant telephoning other women;
2. the defendant often directing profanities at the plaintiff; and
3. the defendant not providing the plaintiff with adequate financial support, meaning the defendant had to sell daily items to meet the parties' children's needs.

The defendant refuted the allegation that he had telephoned other women, submitting that, in actual fact, the plaintiff had been involved with another man via Facebook when the defendant went to Pekanbaru. Moreover, while he acknowledged that he had directed profanities at the plaintiff, he disputed the frequency with which he had done so as alleged by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff further alleged that problems escalated in October 2013, resulting in the plaintiff leaving the matrimonial home. The parties had remained separated since. The defendant argued that the actual reason the plaintiff left was because she had asked to return to her village to seek medical treatment.

Due to evident ongoing conflict between the parties, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The plaintiff submitted that she and the defendant had been happily married for 22 years. Around the middle of 2012, however, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. This was the result of the defendant:

1. often gambling, despite the plaintiff asking him to stop;
2. accusing the plaintiff of being unfaithful, for no apparent reason; and
3. not working, causing the plaintiff to have to sell construction parts to meet their daily needs.

Problems escalated in July 2014 when the defendant accused the plaintiff of having an extra-martial affair with another man. Despite the plaintiff assuring the defendant she had done nothing of the sort, the defendant did not believe the plaintiff and instead struck her in the face. The defendant then drove the plaintiff to her parents' home and, since then, the parties had lived separately.

The court found that ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was sufficient reason to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (thalak satu bain shughra).

The parties were married on 12 February 2014 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted, however, that, as early as March 2014, the marriage had begun to deteriorate because the defendant had:

1. refused to work, meaning he could not meet the parties' domestic needs, thereby compelling the plaintiff to work, and the plaintiff's parents to cover their needs; and
2. physically assaulted the plaintiff.

Problems escalated and, in December 2014, the defendant left the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that she had attempted to reconcile with the defendant, but to no avail. It followed that the plaintiff believed the only feasible option remaining was divorce, pursuant to art 19 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

Based on the information before it, including witness statements, the court acceded to the plaintiff's application, granting her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, Kitab Fiqih Sunnah Juz II, and Manhaj al-Thullab juz VI. Despite failing to attend the proceeding, the court acknowledged that the defendant had been summonsed officially, pursuant to art 26 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 138 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

Plaintiff Sultan Chowdhury sued his employer under Title VII for discrimination, retaliation, and creating a hostile work environment. In this action, the Court reviewed the defendant’s supplemental motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. (The defendant had previously filed a motion for summary judgment that was dismissed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, and the Court ordered further briefing for the hostile work environment claim.) The plaintiff also amended his previous claim, detailing the hostile work environment claims, alleging discrimination on the basis of his religion (Islam), including belittling and humiliation in front of his co-workers, exclusion from important meetings, and interference with his attempts to seek transfer. The Court held that the named instances provided sufficient evidence for jurors to find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim. It therefore denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to move forward to trial. On March 7, 2011, a jury trial delivered a partial verdict in the case, as the jury did not answer all of the questions raised but awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,125,000. The Court directed the parties to file a joint status report in August 2011 if they were seeking mediation on the outstanding issues.