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Holding: The Court granted the adult petitioner leave to change her name from Eloise McCloud Wing to Zakiyyah Ashraf after her conversion to Islam, but denied leave to change petitioner’s eleven-year-old daughter’s name from Cheryl Ann Wing to Hafsah Ashraf. The Court held that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have a foreign-sounding Muslim name that would “set her apart and seem strange.”

Procedural Posture: Petitioner applied to the City Court of the City of New York for leave to change her and her daughter’s names. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the petitioner wished to change her and her daughter’s names to names from what she understood to be the Islamic tradition.

Judgment: Petitioner was granted leave to change her name, but not her daughter’s name, in an opinion authored by Justice Baer.

Facts: Eloise McCloud Wing converted from Christianity to Islam. Her eleven-year-old daughter, Cheryl Ann Wing, lived with Eloise following Eloise’s separation from her husband two years before the name-change petition. After Eloise’s conversion, Cheryl attended religious classes at a mosque and played with Muslim friends, and her mother said Cheryl wanted to be a Muslim and have a Muslim name. Eloise petitioned the court to change her and her daughter’s names to Zakiyyah Ashraf and Hafsah Ashraf, respectively. The Court stated that while an adult’s name change should be approved, a child’s name change should be approved only if it is in the child’s best interest. The Court found no compelling need for Cheryl’s name change, and noted that such a change might actually have an “adverse effect”: the proposed name would “set her apart and seem strange and foreign to her schoolmates and others.” The Court stated that the petition for Cheryl’s name change could be renewed when Cheryl turned 16, and was therefore old enough to make a mature decision about it on her own.

The applicant submitted that he and his wife were married on 18 April 1996 and had three children. When the applicant went to make the necessary arrangements for his third child's birth certificate, however, he encountered difficulties because his name on his marriage certificate differed from the name on his residence card, family card, and the birth certificate of his second child. In order to overcome this problem and have his third child's birth certificate issued, the applicant requested a court determination stating that he was the person in all the aforementioned official documents.

The court acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds that changing one's name is appropriate provided such a request is made in good faith. In accordance with the applicant's request, the court also ordered the applicant to register his change of name with a marriage registrar at the Blitar Religious Affairs Office.

This statute regulates the administration and documentation of key events relating to the Indonesian population, including births, deaths, marriage, divorce, court decisions, change of address, and change of name and status.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that if a person submits to having rights over land based on a gift (hibah), that person must be able to establish ownership based on that gift, as specified in art 210(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Moreover, if the land is obtained based on a gift, then the land needs to be placed in the recipient's name immediately. If this does not happen and a dispute subsequently arises, the status of the land remains as is, unless a change of ownership can be established.

The applicant had encountered problems registering the birth of her second child due to her marriage certificate (dated 26 September 2001) not including her correct name. Accordingly, she submitted to the court a request for permission to change her name as it appeared on her marriage certificate, as well as a fee exemption. She was married on 26 September 2001 and lived with her husband and two children (aged 12 years, and 3 months).

The court, pursuant to art 33(4) of Decision No. 298 of 2003 of the Minister of Religion on Marriage Records, acceded to the applicant's request based on her producing to the court satisfactory proof of identity.

The Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court) had stipulated as joint assets of the parties one property, half a rice field, a Toyota vehicle, and some household appliances. The lower court had ordered that the assets be split on a 50/50 basis between the parties.

The appellant appealed the decision unsuccessfully on several grounds, namely that the intervention procedures implemented throughout the process were unlawful. The Court, however, found the procedures applied were correct and in accordance with the law.

The appellant also claimed that the respondent's initial claim incorrectly identified the street on which the property was located. The Court found this irrelevant, noting that when an inspection of the site was conducted, the appellant had conceded in a court report (dated: 19 February 2010, proceeding 27, page 2) that it was the correct property, despite the street name having changed.

The Court found the appellant's final objection to be similarly unfounded. The appellant had claimed he would purchase from the respondent her share of half of the rice field with IDR 2 million, which he would be able to obtain from his mother. The appellant had, however, been unable to prove to the lower court that he indeed had access to this money. The Court concurred with the lower court that the appellant's inability to prove such access meant the rice field became a joint asset.

The expansion of the authority of the Court of Religion in Aceh and the subsequent change of its name to Mahkamah Syar’iyah has created an overlap of jurisdiction in the processing of civil and criminal cases. This was due to the granting of the special province status for Aceh in 1999 which entails the right for Aceh to implement Islamic law in the region. Mahkamah Syar’iyah was then granted the authority to process both civil and criminal cases for Aceh’s Muslim citizens, a jurisdiction previously shared between the Indonesian General Courts (Peradilan Umum) and the Courts of Religion (Pengadilan Agama). 

The decision of the Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court signifies the relegation of authority previously held by the Indonesian General Court to Mahkamah Syar’iyah in Aceh.

The relegated authorities are as follow:

1. Muamalah (civil law) cases of Muslim citizens of Aceh regulated in Aceh Qanun
2. Jinayah (Islamic criminal law) cases regulated in Aceh Qanun

This document is the first draft of Criminal Procedure Bill prepared and adopted by the parliament and sent to the Guardian Council for review.

These excerpts fromKindī’s (d. 350/961) book on governors and judges, which correspond to excerpts from Ibn Ḥajar’s Rafʿ al-iṣr,recount an anecdote about the Egyptian judge Bakkār b. Qutayba, a Ḥanafī native of Basra, who was appointed qādīof Cairo by the caliph al-Mutawakkil in 246/860. While heading to Egypt, Bakkār met Muḥammad b. Abī Layth, who was returning from Egypt to Iraq. The former asked the latter for advice on individuals whom he might consult and rely on in his new city, of which he knew nothing. Ibn Abī Layth mentioned the names of Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā and Mūsā b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Qāsim. Upon his first meeting with Bakkār, Yūnus was able to persuade him to change his stance on a case of inheritance law disputed between the Mālikīs and the Ḥanafīs, known as “the house of the elephant.” In her chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Nahed Samour cites this passage as an example of cooperation across legal schools in the field of adjudication, with jurisconsults being chosen not on the basis of school affiliation but on the strength of their trustworthiness and their grasp of local laws and customs.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

These excerpts fromKindī’s (d. 350/961) book on governors and judges, which correspond to excerpts from Ibn Ḥajar’s Rafʿ al-iṣr,recount an anecdote about the Egyptian judge Bakkār b. Qutayba, a Ḥanafī native of Basra, who was appointed qādīof Cairo by the caliph al-Mutawakkil in 246/860. While heading to Egypt, Bakkār met Muḥammad b. Abī Layth, who was returning from Egypt to Iraq. The former asked the latter for advice on individuals whom he might consult and rely on in his new city, of which he knew nothing. Ibn Abī Layth mentioned the names of Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā and Mūsā b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Qāsim. Upon his first meeting with Bakkār, Yūnus was able to persuade him to change his stance on a case of inheritance law disputed between the Mālikīs and the Ḥanafīs, known as “the house of the elephant.” In her chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Nahed Samour cites this passage as an example of cooperation across legal schools in the field of adjudication, with jurisconsults being chosen not on the basis of school affiliation but on the strength of their trustworthiness and their grasp of local laws and customs.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

Ibn Ḥārith al-Khushanī recorded the following case as a ḥikāya, an anonymous report: A Christian appeared before the judge Aslam b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, petitioning to be executed. The anecdote offers insight into the historical role of judges during a period of religious dissent in the Umayyad Caliphate, while the author's narrative voice demonstrates past judicial approaches to rationality, humor, and violent penalization. 

This text is part of Maribel Fierro, The Judges of al-Andalus, forthcoming.

This is the summary of Abouzahr v. Abouzahr 361 N.J.Super. 135.

A petition sent to the Ottoman Sultan from Egypt in 1155 AH (1742-3), concerning a dispute between a Muslim and a Christian in the town of Zifta. The Muslim petitioner attempts to enforce the regulation of the Pact of 'Umar that forbids non-Muslims from having houses taller than those of Muslims. Baldwin's commentary on the petition focuses on how the petitioning process relates to the sharīʿa court system in the Ottoman Empire.

This fatwa states that the Islam Jama'ah sect commenced in Indonesia in the 1970s. As its teachings were misled and misleading, and led to disquiet among Indonesian society, its interpretation of Islam was prohibited by the government in 1971. Islam Jama'ah, however, continued to operate under different names, which continued to change until 1977-78. The philosophy of Islam Jama'ah was that there were 72 categories of Muslims who were not part of Islam Jama'ah and would, therefore, be directed to hell.

The sect believed it had to appoint a Leader of Believers (Amirul Mukminin) as its central leadership; a leader who must be obeyed. Adherents had to pledge allegiance to this Leader in order to be guaranteed passage to heaven, and the only rightful and permissible Islamic teachings came from ther Leader. Adherents of the sect also had to cut off ties with persons from these other categories, even if those people were their parents; they were not allowed to pray behind people who were not adherents of Islam Jama'ah; they were not allowed to wear clothing for prayers that had been touched by people who were not adherents unless it had been cleansed; husbands even had to endeavour to make their wives join the sect, and if their wives refused, they would have to divorce them. A legitimate marriage was one officiated by the sect's leader, and for a sermon to be legitimate it would have to be conducted in Arabic.

This fatwa states that Islam Jama'ah, Darul Hadits (or whatever other pseudonym the sect may have adopted), is contrary to the teachings of Islam, and that its dissemination is designed to destablise the state. It implores Muslims to avoid its teachings and to return to the pure teachings of Islam with the intent and desire to similarly save those who have already chosen Islam as their religion from the wrath of Allah. It also implores people to report to their local public prosecutor any evidence of activities conducted by Islam Jama'ah.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Independent State of Samoa (Malo Sa'oloto Tuto'atasi o Samoa), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Samoa's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Czech Republic/Czechia (Ceska Republika/Cesko), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the Czech Republic's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea/North Korea (Choson-minjujuui-inmin-konghwaguk), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under North Korea's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The plaintiff submitted a claim for child maintenance from the defendant (her biological father), who was previously married to her biological mother from 1995-2001. Since September 2000, four months before her parents divorced, until the time of the proceeding, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not provided her with any financial support, either via her biological mother or directly. The plaintiff submitted that, from the age of 4-19 years, the defendant had neglected his financial obligations to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff quantified at IDR 1.5 million per month, or IDR 264 million in total for the past 14 years and eight months. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant was obligated to provide her with IDR 2 million per month in financial support until she reached 21 years of age, and that as a university lecturer with a PhD, he earned sufficient income to afford these payments.

The defendant submitted an objection to the plaintiff's case on the grounds that the plaintiff's biological mother had unilaterally changed the plaintiff's name and altered her birth certificate, the new certificate having been issued on 11 January 2007. Meanwhile, the birth certificate the defendant had in his possession was a copy of the original (dated 8 February 1996). The defendant submitted that the effect of this alteration was that it was no longer clear who the plaintiff's actual biological father was.

As part of the defendant's primary defence, he submitted that, following his divorce from the plaintiff's mother, he had finalised all financial issues through deliberatons with the plaintiff's great-aunt (now deceased), as well as the matter of the custody of the plaintiff. At the time, the defendant had abided by the plaintiff's mother's wishes and allowed the plaintiff to remain in her mother's care until she was of an age where she could knowingly choose which parent she wished to follow.

The defendant also suggested to the court that it was more likely that the plaintiff's mother had instigated the claim, given that there had been no tension in the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, as well as the fact that the parties had only recently reunited in September 2014 after more than 13 years apart. Moreover, the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff's mother had been fractured at best, meaning that the defendant had not known of the plaintiff's specific whereabouts, other than that she had been living with her mother and grandmother in Makassar. In short, the lack of communication between the defendant and the plaintiff's mother made providing the plaintiff with financial assistance logistically unfeasible. Indeed, when the plaintiff visited the defendant with her aunt at his residence for the first time in 13 years, the defendant happily provided the plaintiff with IDR 1 million, while the defendant's father (the plaintiff's grandfather) gave her IDR 500,000. The defendant informed the court that the plaintiff later requested IDR 8 million from the defendant to cover certain educational costs. As the defendant had only recently returned from completing postgraduate study in Yogyakarta at the time of the request, however, the defendant and his wife could only afford to provide the plaintiff with IDR 4 million, which the plaintiff had refused.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection on the grounds that the plaintiff's original birth certificate had never been declared null and void by the authorised agency, and, therefore, its legal authority remained intact.

In regards to the plaintiff's claim, the court noted the conflicting laws as to the legal age of an adult: while art 47(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 47(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, define an adult as someone who is 18 years of age, art 98 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws defines an adult as a person of 21 years of age. Meanwhile, customary law (hukum adat) stipulates 15 as the relevant age. In choosing to follow that legislation that defined the legal age as 18, the court thereby found that the plaintiff was already an adult as she was 19 years of age. In reaching its decision, the court considered that the plaintiff and defendant had been separated for 13 years, that the defendant and defendant's father had offered the plaintiff IDR 1.5 million collectively on their first meeting in 13 years, and that the plaintiff had refused to accept IDR 4 million from the defendant to cover educational costs. The court also cited Indonesian Supreme Court Decision No. 608 K/AG/203 (23 March 2005), where the Supreme Court declared that the obligations of a father to provide financially for his child were Lil Intifa rather than Lil Tamlik, that is, the obligation to meet a child's needs is shared by the child's parents, and therefore, does not rest solely on the father (art 77(3) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws; art 45(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage). Accordingly, back payments were not necessary as the child's past needs were assumed to have already been met. Pursuant to the defendant's concession that he was happy to provide the plaintiff with financial assistance, provided it was within his own means, as well as surat Al Baqarah verse 233, the court ordered the defendant to pay to the defendant IDR 2 million per month until she reaches 21 years of age.