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Holding: Witness oaths in court must be administered according to their opinions, as it most affects their consciences. Swearing a witness by an uplifted hand, without a bible, is valid and legal.

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff sued defendant for slander in the lower court of Crawford, IL, for defendant’s claim that plaintiff swore falsely in a judicial proceeding before a justice of the peace. The lower court sustained defendant’s motion to exclude the justice of the peace’s testimony about how plaintiff was sworn in on grounds that it did not prove that a legal oath was administered. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois to determine whether plaintiff’s oath was legally cognizable. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that “a Turk [is sworn] upon the Koran” when taking an oath in court.

Judgment: Reversed and remanded in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Reynolds.

Facts: Gill sued Caldwell for slander after Caldwell charged that Gill swore falsely in a certain judicial proceeding. In the lower court, the justice of the peace in that proceeding, Thomas Kennedy, testified that Gill was administered “what he conceived to be an oath,” which consisted of swearing by an uplifted hand with no Bible. The lower court excluded this testimony on the grounds that it did not prove a legal oath was administered. The Supreme Court of Illinois found that, at common law, “oaths are to be administered to all persons according to their own opinions, and as it most affects their consciences.” The legislature codified this principle in an 1807 statute. Therefore, the Court concluded that an oath by an uplifted hand, but without scripture, is valid and legal. In a footnote, the Court further noted that at common law, witnesses are sworn “according to the form which [they hold] to be the most solemn, and which is sanctified by the usage of the country or the sect to which [they belong].” This includes, for example, “[a] Jew [swearing] upon the Pentateuch, and a Turk [swearing] upon the Koran.”

Holding: For an oath to be legally valid, the person who is sworn must be aware that his statement is a solemn appeal to a Supreme Being, believe that what he declares is true, and include some corporal act, such as an uplifted hand or a hand placed upon scripture.

Procedural posture: Defendant moved to quash the return of Magistrate Robert Carson. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except the Court notes that “a Mohammedan [is sworn] upon the Koran” when taking an oath in court.

Judgment: Motion to quash the return of the magistrate denied in an opinion authored by Judge Staake.

Facts: Magistrate Robert Carson left his own district and entered another for the purpose of holding a bail hearing for the defendant, who was charged with a violation of the act of assembly. The defendant contended that state law prohibited the magistrate from acting outside of his own district, and that he had no authority to hold a hearing there. The defendant also argued that the oath administered to the complainant, upon which the arrest warrant was based, was not properly administered because it was not sworn upon the Bible and was not repeated verbatim with an upraised hand. The Philadelphia County Court of Quarter Sessions found that the magistrate performed a “purely ministerial act” in holding a hearing simply to fix bail, and that such ministerial functions could be performed outside of his district. With regard to the oath, the Court found that an oath need not be recited verbatim for it to be valid. Rather, the witness must recognize that he is solemnly being sworn and do some corporal act in appealing to God about the truth of his testimony. It may be administered “in any mode peculiar to the belief of the person sworn, or in any form binding on his conscience.” The Court notes that Jews can be sworn upon the Pentateuch and Muslims upon the Qurʾān, and that there is even a special procedure for “the Chinaman.” Therefore, the Court concluded, because the complainant’s oath was administered solemnly with a corporal act, the oath was valid.

Holding: A Mormon minister is entitled to tax exemptions under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, which exempts “all clergymen of any Christian denomination regularly engaged in their vocation” from the obligation of paying personal taxes.

Procedural posture: Tax collector filed for assumpsit (a common law action brought to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract) to recover defendant’s personal taxes in the District Court of Koolauloa, HI. The Court, sitting without a jury, found for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not relevant, except that the defendant testified he is not “a Mohammedan” and does not “accept the Koran,” and that the Court noted that “Mohammedanism” is one of the four “grand systems” of the religious world.

Judgment: Judgment for the defendant, in an opinion authored by Judge McCully.

Facts: Defendant Henry Richards was a minister of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church) who was sent as a missionary to Hawaii. At trial, to determine whether he qualified as a “Christian clergyman” exempt from personal taxes under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, Richards testified as to his religious beliefs. They included belief in, inter alia, baptism, the Gospels, revelation, polygamy, the atonement of Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the Book of Mormon. The Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Hawaii found that, because the defendant believed in Christ and accepted the Old and New Testament, he was a Christian clergyman for tax purposes. The Court addressed the concern that Mormons have more scriptures than the Bible by stating that the Roman Catholic Church has accepted revelation and papal infallibility, but is still considered Christian. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because Richards did not himself practice or preach polygamy in Hawaii, his belief was not grounds for excluding him from being a Christian minister. Therefore, the Court concluded that, as a Mormon minister, Richards qualified for the personal tax exemption given to Christian ministers.

Holding: Under N.C. Acts of 1871­–72, c. 193, § 25 (Rev. § 2105), a husband who lives with his wife is liable for her torts, even though he was not present when she committed them and did not know of them.

Procedural posture: Plaintiff sued defendants husband and wife to recover damages for wife’s slander against him. Jury found for plaintiff and awarded damages, which plaintiff was entitled to recover from both husband and wife. Defendants appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the concurrence notes that “even [women] living in semicivilized countries under the domination of the Koran” have had greater legal rights than American women.

Judgment: Affirmed in an opinion by Justice Allen, with a concurrence by Chief Justice Clark.

Facts: The plaintiff sued the defendants, a husband and wife pair, for the wife’s slander against him. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the judge stated that the husband was liable on the theory that husbands are liable for their wives’ torts. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld this opinion, based on N.C. Acts of 1871­–72, c. 193, § 25 (Rev. § 2105), which states that “[e]very husband living with his wife shall be jointly liable with her for all damages accruing from any tort committed by her.” The Court found that this statute codified the previous common law rule.

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Clark stated that theory of merger, in which a wife’s legal personality and property is “merged” into those of her husband upon marriage, is an antiquated common law proposition. He argued that this theory “is the source of all the legal degradation of women,” and that it is especially outdated now that women have the right to vote. Compared to other women in both “civilized” and “semicivilized countries under the domination of the Koran,” in his view, American women have inferior rights under the common law system. However, he agreed with the majority that the N.C. Act of 1872 codified the common law principle, and because courts have no power to modify a statutory principle, the lower court’s ruling must stand.

Holding: Any religious belief, whether Christian or not, that recognizes the existence of a God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood, either in this or a future life, is sufficient as a basis on which to swear a witness in court.

Procedural posture: Objection to competency of a witness. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that “a Mohammedan [may be sworn] on the Koran” and considers Muslims to be acceptable sworn witnesses based on beliefs akin to those of Christianity and cognate religious traditions.

Judgment: Objection sustained in an opinion authored by Judge Neterer.

Facts: The government offered a Mr. Kirkland as a witness in a criminal case being heard in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The defendant objected, on the grounds that Kirkland could not be sworn because he did “not believe in the existence of a God, who is the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood,” having admitted as much when questioned. Judge Neterer found the common law rule to be that a witness may only be sworn if he believes in a God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood. This need not be a Christian belief; Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Chinese may similarly be sworn, because they fulfill these criteria. Because Kirkland does not believe in a God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood, the Court concluded that he may not be sworn and the objection was sustained.

Holding: A witness must believe in a God in order to be sworn in court. A court may hear testimony about a witness’ belief or disbelief to determine whether the witness may be sworn. Whether a witness believes or disbelieves in a future state of rewards and punishments goes only to his credibility as a witness, not to his ability to testify.

Procedural posture: Plaintiff objected to the competency of a witness in a case before a Massachusetts court of common pleas, and the Court overruled the objection. The jury found for defendants, and plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that a “mahometan” belief suffices for swearing an oath.

Judgment: Reversed and objection sustained in an opinion authored by Justice Wilde.

Facts: The plaintiff objected to the competency of a witness on the grounds that the witness did not believe in God. The plaintiff offered testimony from other witnesses to prove this assertion. The lower court declined to hear the testimony and overruled the objection. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that the general rule of evidence does not allow a witness to disqualify himself by declarations not made under oath. However, there is an exception for cases such as this one to prove the witness’ belief or disbelief in God, as only those who believe in God may testify in court. Article 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution—which protects citizens from being “hurt, molested, or restrained, in [their] person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of [their] own conscience”—does not apply to atheists, and even if it did, rejecting a witness for being an atheist would not violate the statute. Therefore, the Court concluded, the plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce testimony showing that the witness did not believe in God and therefore could not be sworn.

Holding: The Court granted the adult petitioner leave to change her name from Eloise McCloud Wing to Zakiyyah Ashraf after her conversion to Islam, but denied leave to change petitioner’s eleven-year-old daughter’s name from Cheryl Ann Wing to Hafsah Ashraf. The Court held that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have a foreign-sounding Muslim name that would “set her apart and seem strange.”

Procedural Posture: Petitioner applied to the City Court of the City of New York for leave to change her and her daughter’s names. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the petitioner wished to change her and her daughter’s names to names from what she understood to be the Islamic tradition.

Judgment: Petitioner was granted leave to change her name, but not her daughter’s name, in an opinion authored by Justice Baer.

Facts: Eloise McCloud Wing converted from Christianity to Islam. Her eleven-year-old daughter, Cheryl Ann Wing, lived with Eloise following Eloise’s separation from her husband two years before the name-change petition. After Eloise’s conversion, Cheryl attended religious classes at a mosque and played with Muslim friends, and her mother said Cheryl wanted to be a Muslim and have a Muslim name. Eloise petitioned the court to change her and her daughter’s names to Zakiyyah Ashraf and Hafsah Ashraf, respectively. The Court stated that while an adult’s name change should be approved, a child’s name change should be approved only if it is in the child’s best interest. The Court found no compelling need for Cheryl’s name change, and noted that such a change might actually have an “adverse effect”: the proposed name would “set her apart and seem strange and foreign to her schoolmates and others.” The Court stated that the petition for Cheryl’s name change could be renewed when Cheryl turned 16, and was therefore old enough to make a mature decision about it on her own.

Holding: When multiple family members die in the same event, such as a natural disaster, the named beneficiary of an insurance policy is prima facie presumed the recipient of the payout unless another claimant can show that the beneficiary died in the event before the policy holder. Here, both the policy holder and his wife, who was his beneficiary, died in a flood, and without evidence showing that his wife predeceased him, the policy holder’s sister could not claim the insurance payout.

Procedural Posture: An insurance company filed interpleader in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against the claimants of a life insurance payout. The Court found that the payout should go to the administrator of the deceased’s children. The deceased’s sister and the administrator of the deceased’s wife’s estate each appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court compares the American system to “the Mahometan law of India,” which it understands to presume in inheritance cases that relatives who died in the same event, such as a natural disaster, died at the same moment.

Judgment: Affirmed in part and reversed in part in an opinion authored by Justice McSherry.

Facts: Walter Hoopes, his wife Maria Hoopes, and their two children died in a flood in May 1889. Walter Hoopes had life insurance and named his wife as his beneficiary. According to the insurance regulations, should his wife pre-decease him, the payout was to go to his children; if they did not survive him, the payout was to go to his mother, then to his father, and finally to his siblings. After their deaths, Walter Hoopes’ sister, the administrator of Maria Hoopes, and the administrator of the children claimed rights to the insurance payout. The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted first that other legal systems, including Roman law, the Napoleonic Code, “the Mahometan law of India,” and ancient Danish law employed various presumptions based on age, gender, and time to help courts determine the survivorship order when multiple family members died at the same time or in the same event. However, it concluded that the American common law system has no such presumptions, and survivorship “must be proved by the party asserting it.” In this case, there was no evidence or way to know who predeceased whom in the flood. Because the wife, as the named beneficiary, had prima facie title to the insurance payout, her estate’s title could only be extinguished by a satisfactory showing by Walter Hoopes’ sister that the wife died before Walter. There is nothing in the record to indicate this was the case, so, the Court concluded, the payout belongs to the wife’s estate.

Holding: In a judicial proceeding to determine whether a defendant should be denied entry to the United States, the court is not bound by the decision of a U.S. customs officer or collector. Rather, it must investigate and weigh the evidence offered by both parties, including any visas or certificates from defendant refuting evidence from the government.

Procedural posture: United States commissioner ordered defendant, a Chinese immigrant with a student visa, deported from the U.S., based on a decision of the deputy collector at the port where defendant had tried to enter the country. Defendant appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the Court notes that some of the alleged evidence on which the deputy collector based his decision was so intangible that “the collector could have justified his course as well by asserting . . . that it was supported by the revelations of the Koran.”

Judgment: Reversed and remanded in an opinion authored by Judge Coxe.

Facts: The defendant applied for admission to the United States at the port of Malone, NY, on Oct. 13, 1884, with a valid certificate permitting him to enter as a student. The deputy collector at Malone initially found the defendant’s papers to be valid. However, two days later, he met a Mr. Clemenshire in New York, who said that the people at the address at which the defendant said he would be staying in the U.S. knew nothing about the defendant and that the defendant was actually going to work “in laundry” in Connecticut. The deputy collector then telegraphed the port to have the defendant returned to Montreal. At the defendant’s deportation hearing, the commissioner ordered the defendant deported after finding the deputy collector’s decision final and controlling.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York found that the defendant had not received a fair hearing. It found that the collector’s action “was based upon an irrelevant rumor,” because Mr. Clemenshire’s information was “conjecture.” Having previously believed the defendant’s papers to be valid, the collector’s subsequent decision was not based on valid statutory grounds. Furthermore, the commissioner was not barred from investigating and deciding the case on the merits; he had a duty to determine the status of the defendant by investigating the entry certificate and any contrary proof a customs officer might introduce. Therefore, the decision was reversed and remanded for the commissioner to reconsider based on the evidence offered by each party.