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The Plaintiff, the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, challenged the Pittsfield Charter Township, the Township Board, Township Supervisor Mandy Grewal, and six Township Board of Trustees Members for their refusal to re-zone the area surrounding the Plaintiff so that the Plaintiff could expand and build a school. Although an independent outside planner endorsed the rezoning, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondents denied rezoning due to concerns from community members, stemming largely from an animus to the Islamic faith. By denying the rezoning proposal on this basis, the Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents discriminated against the organization in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and "state law claims" in the Michigan state constitution. The Respondents filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the Township Board of Trustees' individual liability under Section 1983. However, the District Court dismissed the other claims alleging violations of RLUIPA, the US Constitution, and the Michigan Constitution.

English text of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, Act No. LXII of 1976, amending the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

English translation of the 2004 Constitution of Niger (1999 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, as amended to 2004).

English text of the remaining pages (170 on) of the 2018 Constitution of Pakistan (1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as amended to the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act of 2018).

English text of the first 170 pages of the 2018 Constitution fo Pakistan (1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as amended to the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act of 2018). The remaining pages can be found in a second document denoted "2018 Constitution of Pakistan (p. 170 on)".

The appellant sought to challenge Decision: 0011/Pdt.G/2014/PA.Bjw of the Bajawa Religious Court (lower court), which had acceded to the respondent's request to revocably divorce the appellant. The lower court had also ordered the respondent to pay to the appellant IDR 300,000 per month for the period of iddah (three-month period after which divorce has been granted), and granted custody of the parties' first child to the respondent. The lower court had also granted the appellant custody of the parties' third and fourth children, as well as ordering the respondent to pay IDR 200,000 per month in child support for the third child until the child had reached adulthood.

The court affirmed the decision of the lower court, but amended the decision in order that the respondent pay to the appellant at least IDR 500,000 per month for the maintenance of the parties third, fourth and fifth children.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

J bin T passed away on 24 January 2008, stipulating as his beneficiaries: C binti S (wife and first appellant); J binti J (daughter); A (mother); P binti T (sister); R binti T (brother); T bin T (brothers); and N binti T (sister and fifth respondent).

The Meulaboh Shari'a Court (lower court) declared as joint property of the deceased and first appellant two shophouses, two parcels of land, accumulated social security monies totalling IDR 770 million, the remaining proceeds from the sale of a truck (IDR 70 million), and insurance monies totalling IDR 100,000. As the estate of the deceased alone, the lower court stipulated four separate parcels of land.

The lower court distributed to the first appellant half of what was determined to be the joint property of the first appellant and deceased, while the other half, along with the deceased's personal estate, was distributed among the stipulated beneficiaries.

The Court amended the decision of the lower court, applying the Supreme Court-endorsed principle that, if the deceased had a child/children, his estate was only to be devised/bequeathed to his parents, spouse and children, to the exclusion of all other beneficiaries. Accordingly, as the deceased was survived by his daughter (second appellant), his estate was to be distributed among both appellants and the deceased's mother.

The Court also disagreed with the lower court's finding that the social security monies (IDR 770 million) and the insurance monies (IDR 100,000) were the joint property of the deceased and first appellant, because art 22(1) and (2) of Government Regulation No. 14 of 1993 requires that life insurance be paid to the surviving spouse or child/children, and in the event there is no surviving spouse or child/children, to the closest living blood relative(s). Accordingly, the monies were to be paid to the appellants. As for the insurance policy monies, art 1(1) of Law No. 2 of 1992 on Insurance Companies required that those monies be paid to the parties specified in the deceased's policy.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.