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The sister of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, sued Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, seeking compensatory damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages following her brother’s wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), she alleged that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, granting $2,500,000 in compensatory damages, while noting that punitive damages were not allowed against a foreign state.

The widow of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for compensatory damages for wrongful death, solatium (referring to “the mental anguish, bereavement, and grief that those with a close relationship to the decedent experience as a result of the decedent’s death”), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. She sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran provided financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $18,297,000 in compensatory damages for economic and emotional loss. The Court noted, however, that it could not award punitive damages against a foreign state.

The estate and family members of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for his wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (a law that allows foreign nations to be immune from lawsuits from American citizens in most cases), they alleged that Iran should be held liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the family, granting compensatory damages in the amount of $13,241,486 to the serviceman’s widow, parents, and children.

Injured survivors of a suicide bombing attack in Israel, allegedly by Hamas, and the family members of the deceased, sued Iran, its Ministry of Information and Security, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for compensatory damages for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of prospective income, and solatium (appropriate “when extreme and outrageous conduct has caused grief and anguish to plaintiffs closely related to a victim of terrorism”), as well as punitive damages. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them  compensatory damages in the amount of $111,963,607.87 for physical damages and economic and emotional loss, as well as punitive damages in the amount of $300,000,000 against the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The plaintiffs, the surviving family members and the estate of an American citizen who was assassinated, allegedly by Hezbollah, while serving as the president of the American University of Beirut, brought a wrongful death action against Iran. They sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $31,525,296 to the family for economic loss as well as mental anguish.

A Muslim former Naval engineer sued the Secretary of the Navy under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to ethnic slurs and jokes, leading to a hostile work environment. The Court adopted the report by the magistrate judge granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies before bringing the case to court. The Court further noted that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the compensatory damage issue.

The children of an American citizen who was killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel by Hamas sued Iran, its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and several high-ranking Iranian officials. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court awarded the victim’s estate $1,000,000 for the pain and suffering she experienced before death. The Court further awarded the four children compensatory damages in the amount of $3,000,000 each, for a total of $12,000,000. The Court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $300 million against all defendants besides Iran jointly and severally.

Plaintiff Sultan Chowdhury sued his employer under Title VII for discrimination, retaliation, and creating a hostile work environment. In this action, the Court reviewed the defendant’s supplemental motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. (The defendant had previously filed a motion for summary judgment that was dismissed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, and the Court ordered further briefing for the hostile work environment claim.) The plaintiff also amended his previous claim, detailing the hostile work environment claims, alleging discrimination on the basis of his religion (Islam), including belittling and humiliation in front of his co-workers, exclusion from important meetings, and interference with his attempts to seek transfer. The Court held that the named instances provided sufficient evidence for jurors to find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim. It therefore denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to move forward to trial. On March 7, 2011, a jury trial delivered a partial verdict in the case, as the jury did not answer all of the questions raised but awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,125,000. The Court directed the parties to file a joint status report in August 2011 if they were seeking mediation on the outstanding issues.

The plaintiff’s legal counsel asserted that, on 24 August 2011, the plaintiff (deceased) and defendant (Bank BRI Syari’ah Cabang Surabaya) entered into a financing agreement (Al Qardh) to enable the plaintiff to purchase precious metals. Articles 1 and 2 of the agreement stated that the defendant would lend to the plaintiff IDR 95.4 million to be used to purchase 200 grams of gold from the precious metals company Antam. The gold was valued at IDR 106 million, and required a down payment of IDR 10.6 million. Pursuant to art 3 of the agreement, the plaintiff was required to repay the defendant in instalments of IDR 1,590,000, over a period of 60 months (until 24 August 2016). Upon repayment of two instalments, the plaintiff was then entitled to a cash back incentive, notably after repaying the first three instalments, as well as the twelfth instalment. Article 5(1) of the agreement also specified that to guarantee the return of the monies loaned, the plaintiff was to use the 200 grams of gold as collateral. To ensure the gold was cared for and stored for the period of the loan, the plaintiff paid to the defendant a monthly fee of IDR 1,033,500, making his total monthly repayments IDR 2,623,500.

The plaintiff successfully made these repayments for 29 months (until January 2014), while the defendant upheld its end of the bargain by paying to the plaintiff the cash back incentives up until November 2013, after which it defaulted. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to act in good faith, providing a variety of reasons to postpone the payment of the cash back incentives. The plaintiff paid to the defendant the remainder of his debt owing (IDR 49,290,000 as of 7 February 2014), hoping that the defendant would then repay to the plaintiff all its cash back incentives. The defendant, however, continued to provide the plaintiff with reasons as to why it could not uphold its end of the bargain. Finally, on 23 May 2014, the defendant paid to the plaintiff the cash back for January 2014 (IDR 912,925) and March 2014 (IDR 981,825) totalling IDR 1,894,750.  The plaintiff told the court he had instigated proceedings to recoup the unpaid cash back incentives totalling IDR 21,893,175. The plaintiff also objected to the defendant unlawfully debiting the plaintiff’s bank account for IDR 3,100,500 when the principal debt had been repaid. The defendant claimed that this debit was to cover the plaintiff’s ijarah (fee) for February 2014, in addition to a fine equal to two months’ ijarah, resulting from the plaintiff repaying the entire principal. The plaintiff, however, claimed that the debit was clearly unlawful and in contravention of arts 2(3) and 4(1)(c) of the ijarah agreement, which stated that the ijarah period concluded when the gold/items being stored and cared for by the defendant no longer constituted a surety and had been returned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought actual damages to the value of IDR 52,044,637, as well as compensatory damages to the value of IDR 1 billion for pain and suffering. For every day the defendant failed to pay after the seven day deadline he sought the court to enforce, the plaintiff requested that the defendant pay a one per cent fine. Moreover, if the defendant was unable to pay the damages sought by the plaintiff, the plaintiff recommended that the court order it to sell a property it owned and pay the damages from the proceeds of the sale. The plaintiff also recommended the court hand down judgment, the implementation of which could not be delayed if the defendant sought to appeal the decision.

The defendant lodged an exception to the plaintiff’s case, stating that the court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. The defendant argued that art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking permits parties to specify in an agreement their preferred mode of dispute resolution, which does not have to be a religious court, that being a state court or arbitration body. It argued that the parties’ express desire, as stated in art 12 of the agreement, was to resolve any disputes relating to the agreement before the National Shari’a Arbitration Board (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional – Basyarnas), if initial discussions and deliberation (musyawarah) were unsuccessful. Moreover, that any decision made by Basyarnas was first and final. The defendant also cited art 59 of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, which acknowledges arbitration as a final and binding form of civil dispute resolution, based on a written agreement by the parties to the dispute. In the event one of the parties to a dispute does not abide by the ruling of the arbiter, art 59(3) enables the other party to lodge an application with the Chief Justice of the state court (Pengadilan Negeri) to compel the non-abiding party to do so. The defendant also noted that the elucidation of art 59(1) defines 'arbitration' as including shari’a arbitration.

In regards to the plaintiff’s principal claim, the defendant retorted that the plaintiff’s calculations in regards to the cash back payments were excessive. It also argued that the monthly instalments owed by the plaintiff were IDR 2,623,500 (this figure comprised IDR 1,590,000 based on the Al-Qard agreement, and IDR 1,033,500 per the ijarah agreement). The defendant asserted that the cash back arrangement derived from the Al-Qard agreement, because it would otherwise have been a violation of the current law and the agreement itself, meaning that it must be calculated based on the ijarah agreement, on the condition the plaintiff paid all repayments for the entire 60 months, without defaulting. For the plaintiff to repay the entire contract price, and then to expect to receive all cash back payments at once, was not what the parties had agreed to in the ijarah agreement. The defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had overpaid the defendant by IDR 2,067,100 when paying out the contract price, and was happy to return the excess monies. In regards to the actual damages sought by the plaintiff, the defendant struggled to understand the plaintiff’s reasoning and calculations. More fascinating, however, was its summation of the IDR 1 billion sought in compensatory damages, which it described as a "fantastic number that fell from the sky" (nilai yang fantastis yang jatuh dari langit) that had no basis.

The court acknowledged that the parties had, in art 12 of the agreement, agreed to resolve any disputes via arbitration. It cited Surat Al-Maidah, verse 1, which encourages Muslims to uphold the agreements they make, as well as art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), which requires parties to an agreement to treat that agreement as law, and art 4(1) and (2) of Law No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, which permits parties to agree to arbitration as their preferred mode of dispute resolution. In regards to the Constitutional Court’s (No. 93/PUU-X/2012) decision regarding the elucidation of art 55(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008, and vesting in the religious judiciary absolute jurisdiction over shari’a banking cases, the court said it needed to consider the opinion of Prof Dr Laica Marzuki, former Supreme Court and Constitutional Court Justice, that Constitutional Court judgments have no retroactive application, but are prospectively binding. As the parties had reached their agreement on 21 August 2011, the court found that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was inapplicable and, therefore, the parties were bound by the contents of the agreement.

The plaintiff submitted that, since November 2012, it had worked with the first defendant in a gold investment joint-venture, the plaintiff as the investor and the first defendant as the funds manager. As the investor, the plaintiff maintained it was entitled to claim interest and capital returns. Moreover, that had the first defendant been punctual in providing the plaintiff its investment returns, the plaintiff could have invested those monies in the property market since 2013, thereby yielding a 20 per cent return (IDR 226,008,700) per annum. The plaintiff based other similar claims on other invoices to which it believed it was entitled to the resulting interest.

The third defendant was the Shari’a Supervisory Council (Dewan Pengawas Syariah) and acted as the halal certification body. It was also a share-holder in the first defendant, and worked with the first defendant. It had provided the first defendant with MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) halal logos, which were placed on invoices between the plaintiff and first defendant. In an email to the fourth defendant, the third defendant had conceded that it had provided halal and shari’a labels to the first defendant, whereas the first defendant had already sold intangible investment products that were not halal and shari’a-compliant. While it knew about this, the third defendant continued to provide the first defendant with halal and shari’a labels. The fourth defendant, other than being the Economic and Halal Product Chair, and Chair of Yayasan Dana Dakwah Pembangunan (Proselytisation Funds Foundation), was the primary financial stake holder of the first defendant, as well as its accountant, and had already been negligent in managing its finances, resulting in a financial irregularity. The fifth defendant, as a 10 per cent shareholder, the plaintiff alleged, should also be held responsible for financial mismanagement because it received a 10 per cent profit from the first defendant annually.

The second defendant had transferred IDR 1 billion to the fifth defendant as a 'donation', establishing its involvement in the first defendant’s default, the plaintiff claimed. The plaintiff also asserted that the second defendant had spent approximately IDR 56 billion on the former management, not on customers or any new developments. As a result, the plaintiff lodged three warning notices with the first respondent to pay its financial obligations resulting from the invoices. The plaintiff alleged that the first and second respondents did not heed its warnings and, in bad faith, attempted to avoid their financial obligations vis-à-vis the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought IDR 1,130,043,500 in actual damages, and a 4.5 per cent late fee per month, totalling IDR 50,851,957, calculated from March 2013. In compensatory damages, it sought IDR 10 billion. The court found, however, that as the plaintiff had failed to properly identify the first defendant, its claim had to fail.