SHARIAsource

A Muslim former Naval engineer sued the Secretary of the Navy under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to ethnic slurs and jokes, leading to a hostile work environment. The Court adopted the report by the magistrate judge granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies before bringing the case to court. The Court further noted that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the compensatory damage issue.

In this review and order to address noncompliant investment practices, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission determined that the New York-based robo-adviser Wahed Invest, LLC had made misleading statements on investments, breached its fiduciary duty to investors, and failed to comply with the law related to its sharīʿa advisory business. According to the SEC’s review, from September 2018 through July 2019, Wahed Invest advertised the existence of its own proprietary funds when no such funds existed, and the firm further promised investors that it would periodically rebalance their advisory accounts but did not do so. The SEC’s order also found that when Wahed Invest ultimately launched a proprietary Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) in July 2019, it used its clients’ advisory assets to seed the ETF without prior disclosure to those clients of any conflicts of interest. The order further found that Wahed Invest marketed itself as providing advisory services compliant with sharīʿa, or Islamic law, including marketing the importance of its income purification process on its website. Despite these representations, the review board determined that Wahed Invest did not adopt and implement written policies and procedures addressing how it would assure sharīʿa compliance on an ongoing basis. Wahed Invest consented to the entry of the SEC’s order finding that the firm violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rules 206(4)-1(a) and 206(4)-7; the firm further agreed to the Commission’s cease-and-desist order, to pay a $300,000 penalty, and to retain an independent compliance consultant, among other requirements.

The plaintiff (KH. Moch. Yusman Roy) was the caretaker of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf, an i'tikaf (seclusion in a mosque) study group venue in Malang, East Java, where Qur'anic study and recitation activities were held, and the production of prayer carpets (sajadah), pillows, and bolsters was conducted. The defendant, the Regent (Bupati) of Malang, had issued a decree declaring the cessation of the activities of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf. The plaintiff submitted that he had received the decree, dated 7 May 2005, through a family member. On 6 May 2005 at 8.00pm, however, the plaintiff submitted that he had been arrested and interrogated by the Malang Regional Police. Therefore, the legal process had been implemented prematurely and without authority. Moreover, that in issuing the decree, the defendant had acted unilaterally, without considering all the relevant concerns. Therefore, pursuant to art 53(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of Law No. 9 of 2004 on Amendments to Law No. 5 of 1989 on the State Administration of the Judiciary, as the plaintiff had suffered loss as the result of a state administrative decree, he was entitled to submit a written application to the authorised court seeking that the decree be declared null and void, and seeking damages as an additional remedy. The plaintiff also requested that the court suspend the implementation of the defendant's decree, pursuant to art 67(2) of Law No. 5 of 1986, and that the investigation of the case be conducted as quickly as possible, pursuant to art 98 of Law No. 5 of 1986.

In its exceptions, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff's submissions were incorrect and inaccurate because the plaintiff had already submitted a request for protection, dated 6 May 2005, to the Malang Regional Police, expressing concern and fear for the consequences of his having taught sholat and do'a (prayers) in both Arabic and Indonesian. The plaintiff's conduct had allegedly generated a negative reaction from the community towards the plaintiff. It was in accordance with the plaintiff's request that the Malang Police conducted its investigation and arrest on 7 May 2005. The legal consequences that followed had, therefore, resulted from the plaintiff's request, rather than the issuance of the regental decree. The regental decree had been issued in consideration of Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion, meaning that both an administrative action and criminal conduct had occurred, for the purposes of art 10 of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Administration. Moreover, purusant to art 27(1)(c) of Law No. 32 of 2014, the regental decree had been issued in accordance with the obligations of a regional head to maintain peace and order. More specifically, it was issued in anticipation of anarchic reactions from other parties who did not share the religious opinions of the plaintiff that it was acceptable to conduct sholat in Indonesian, as well as the original Arabic.

The defendant also submitted that the state administrative court was precluded from adjudicating the case pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 5 of 1986, because it had issued the regental decree during a time when the public interest dictated it do so. In addition to adhering to Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965, the regental decree also accorded with art 156(a) of the Criminal Code because it acknowledged that the plaintiff's conduct was defamatory towards a religion.

The court dismissed the defendant's exceptions in their entirety. It reiterated the constitutioanlly-guaranteed freedom to practise one's religion and beliefs in accordance with their own conscience, as found in art 28E(1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution, as well as Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. The court noted that these guarantees derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which identifies basic human rights and freedoms which are naturally connected to, and inseparable from, humans from the moment they are born. The court also noted, however, that as the defendant had deemed the activities of Pondok Iktikaf Jamaah Njagi Lelaku to have the potential to disturb the peace and order of the community, it was of the opinion that the cessation of these activities constituted a preventative measure to protect the human rights of others, and that maintaining the peace was in the public interest, per art 73 of Law No. 39 of 1999, which states that rights and freedoms can only be limited by, and pursuant to, statute. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's request that the regental decree issued by the defendant be revoked on the grounds that it was not contrary to any statute. Moreover, it dismissed the plaintiff's request that the defendant reinstate the good name of the plaintiff on the same grounds.

The plaintiffs, a group of inmates held at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Concord, filed suit against Massachusetts prison officials for alleged violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiffs alleged that the prison officials violated these rights by refusing to provide separate accommodations for adherents of the Nation of Islam, whose practices (according to one of the plaintiffs) are "distinctly different" from those of Sunnī Islam. The magistrate judge recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be allowed because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies within the prison system.

The Plaintiff, Christopher B. Scott, brought suit against Dekalb County prison officials. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment constitutional rights by 1) not providing a Muslim chaplain; 2) not allowing Muslim prisoners to wear a kufi; 3) failing to provide a secure and private place to pray five times a day; and 4) not providing a special meal at the end of Ramadan. The Respondents sought summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, claiming that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedies necessary to bring suit. The Magistrate Court recommended that the Respondents' motion for summary judgment be granted on the Plaintiff's claims concerning the wearing of a kufi and concerning the celebration of an end-of-Ramadan meal. Summary judgment for all other claims was denied.

The plaintiff, Dominic Ali, a Muslim inmate at the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility, sued several prison officials for allegedly violating his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the state's constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the prison failed to provide jumu'a (Friday prayer) services for Muslim inmates, failed to ensure that he was provided with healthy food during Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting), and denied him the ability to observe Ramadan by removing his name from the prison's internal Ramadan fasting list. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court agreed: it found that the plaintiff had not brought his grievances to the attention of the prison's commissioner, and therefore granted the defendants' motion.

The plaintiff, Tracey Taylor, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Illinois), brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the respondents Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart for alleged violations of his civil rights in denying him access to Islamic prayer services and by failing to serve ḥalāl meat (prepared in accordance with Islamic law). The respondents moved for summary judgment after alleging that Taylor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they violated his constitutional rights. The Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, determining that the denial of Islamic prayer services was related to a legitimate penological interest, and that the prison had adequately provided the plaintiff with sufficiently nutritious Islamic meals, even though they were vegetarian/vegan.