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A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

The plaintiff, a Muslim occupational health physician, sued his former employer, the Department of Veteran Affairs and its Secretary, Jim Nicholson, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He filed the claim after he heard his supervisor refer to Muslims as a threat and after his supervisor’s wife made comments about how she and her husband do not like Muslims and the way they live—presumably referring to his observance of prayers, fasting, and other aspects of Islamic ritual law. The plaintiff discovered that his position was being eliminated sometime after these comments were made, but continued to consult with his former employer about infectious diseases. Three months following his position’s elimination, the plaintiff saw a job advertisement for the same position at his former place of employment and filed a claim with the EEOC for discrimination. Immediately after his supervisor found out about his claim, the plaintiff contends that he was no longer allowed on the property and that other employees were barred from contacting him for consultations. The Court concluded that the timing was questionable enough that a jury could find that the events described were examples of retaliation. The Court reversed and remanded the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to go forward. The parties ultimately settled the case, and the case was closed in December of 2008.

The Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, Supervalu Holdings, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, she argued that the company overlooked her for a position with more responsibility because of her religion. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she neither proved that non-Muslims were treated better, nor did she allege that she suffered an adverse employment action (as the higher-level position did not offer additional compensation or benefits). Thus, this Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

A Lebanese Muslim physician sued his former employer, represented by Secretary of Veteran Affairs Jim Nicholson, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed that the VA Medical Center, his place of employment, subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his identity as both Lebanese and Muslim [presumably related to his observance of Islamic ritual law] and that his supervisors retaliated against him for filing a claim with the EEOC. He further argued that the employer's discrimination ultimately led to his termination. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative options before initiating a lawsuit in court, and that he had not demonstrated that his termination was retaliatory.  

An Arab Muslim truck driver for Swift Transportation Company sued his former employer under Title VII, Tennessee state law, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as intentional economic harm under state law and the FMLA. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that non-Arabs and non-Muslims received better work assignments and that fellow drivers made “hateful” comments regarding his religion and national origin. However, he did not provide any specifics regarding these claims. The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not report an accident within the timeframe mandated by the company. The Court granted the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating employment, and because the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative measures before pursuing a case in court. The plaintiff madeno explicit connection to Islamic law, except that to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included religious practice.

An Iranian Muslim teacher sued his former employer, the Memphis Board of Education, under Title VII, alleging retaliation and discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied a permanent, full-time position because of his race and religion. The defendant argued that the denial was because the plaintiff received several unsatisfactory reports while serving in substitute positions. At trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Tennessee granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and that the defendant had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to offer the plaintiff a permanent position.

An Iranian Muslim professor sued his former employer, Case Western Reserve University, under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and nation origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied scheduled performance reviews and ultimately tenure because of his race and religion. The University argued that the professor was not qualified for tenure. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff’s qualification for tenure is a matter of fact, and as such, must be decided by a jury. The case was ultimately settled on June 26, 1998.

A Pakistani Muslim professor sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin. The plaintiff argued that she was denied tenure because of her religion and race, pointing to instances in which several members of the deciding committee had allegedly articulated biases against Muslims and Pakistanis. The defendant argued that it offered the position to the most qualified applicant, who was not the plaintiff. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not offer any direct evidence of discrimination nor did she prove that she was more qualified than the other successful candidate (which is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the absence of direct evidence).

A Muslim employee of the U.S. Army, who was a Syrian of Turkish origin, sued his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of age and of religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that he was not offered a position after previously resigning because of his age, religion, and national origin. The defendant argued that he was not rehired because of poor work performance on past assignments. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the defendant presented legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not rehiring plaintiff that the plaintiff did not rebut.

An Indian Muslim professor sued his former employer, CUNY, under Title VII, §1981, and §1983, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied tenure and additional compensation because of his race and religion. The Court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to establish that the reason he was denied tenure and additional compensation was discrimination.

A Pakistani Muslim bank employee suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) sued his former employer, Bank of America, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin; under the American Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination on the basis of disability; and under Title VII and the ADA for retaliatory firing following his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his religious beliefs required him to take several prayer breaks throughout the workday, and that this practice ultimately led to his firing. The defendant responded that the employee was fired because of poor work performance. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment that the plaintiff did not dispute. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the plaintiff had established no connection between the EEOC filing and his termination. 

Representing a Muslim former employee of the defendant, the EEOC sued the company, operating as a car dealership, under Title VII, alleging that it subjected the employee to a hostile work environment because of his religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged he suffered numerous instances of harassment because of his religion after 9/11, including being called Taliban by his supervisor and receiving a warning saying he was acting like a Muslim. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the conduct severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim, and thus reversed the District Court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The case settled in October 2007.

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

The plaintiff, Regina Z. Muhammad, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, asserting claims of religious and sexual harassment, religious-based disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII. The plaintiff contended that after her supervisor discovered she was Muslim, he made a number of discriminatory comments, and then certified other employees with whom the plaintiff had been co-trained, but not the plaintiff. The respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff could prove that her lack of training, which ultimately resulted in her termination, had a significant detrimental effect on her employment.

The plaintiff, Dennis Balk, a former professor at the New York Institute of Technology (NYIT) in Bahrain, brought this suit against the New York Institute of Technology after he was fired. Balk alleged that he was fired from his position after a daily Bahrain newspaper, Al-Ayam, published an article stating that he had posted to his class website a controversial cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad in rags. Balk brought this claim, which alleged discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff also brought a motion to compel the deposition of Dr. Mohammed Hussein, the Executive Director of the Middle East for NYIT. The District Court determined that Dr. Hussein's deposition was necessary in the "interest of justice" within the meaning of the Walsh Act because of his alleged involvement in the plaintiff's firing. The District Court additionally found that given Dr. Hussein's periodic travel to the US, it was not unreasonable to compel Dr. Hussein to appear.

The Court denied defendant Deloitte Consulting’s summary judgment motion, contesting plaintiff Zakaria Memon’s Title VII discrimination claim against the company. The plaintiff alleged that he was given fewer assignments and ultimately fired because his religiously-mandated prayer schedule interfered with his workday and allegedly made clients uncomfortable. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to poor work performance. The Court found that the prima facie case of discrimination was strong enough to survive the motion for summary judgment, and a status and scheduling conference was set for April 2011.

The Court granted defendant Freedom Financial Network’s motion for summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging discrimination. Following the EEOC dismissal of his claim, the Court found that the plaintiff, in his second amended complaint, still failed to state a claim warranting relief despite being given several chances to amend his complaint. Plaintiff Reginald Ringgold was an employee of defendant and claimed that he was fired because he was a Muslim and a Free Moorish American National. The defendant responded that it let the employee go because he claimed to be a tax-exempt non-citizen of the United States on several occasions, but his documentation showed that he was born in Connecticut. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that his employer knew he was a Muslim or Free Moorish American National, and thus there was no actionable claim of discrimination.

Representing himself and a class of unspecified American Muslims, a Muslim-American plaintiff petitioned the court to compel a radio station to include a Muslim panelist on its program regarding religion, under Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws. The Court denied the plaintiff’s request, concluding that he had failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not file an employment discrimination claim first with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is a requirement before a Title VII lawsuit can begin.

A Muslim man from Algeria sued his former employer, SUNY College at Brockport, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was not selected for a job at the university because of the Department of Foreign Languages’ head’s prejudice against him. The hiring committee voted in favor of the plaintiff for a permanent position, but the decision ultimately went to the department head, who the plaintiff claimed did not select him out of discriminatory animus toward his race and religion. The department head responded that the plaintiff was not hired because of his lack of research experience. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury may find that the defendant’s reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretexts for discriminatory motives.

The plaintiff, a Lebanese Muslim teacher in Alaska who alleged a workplace discrimination claim, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. Specifically, she alleged that she was not hired for a permanent position because of her religion and country of origin. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court had not considered all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (the plaintiff) in its consideration of the defendant’s summary judgment motion, and that a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff successfully articulated a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court thus reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration. Even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the District Court again granted summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff attempted to appeal several times, but was not successful.