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The fatwa is a unanimous decision by forty Muslim muftis, affiliated with the Sunni Ittehad Council in Pakistan, declaring honor killing of women as “un-Islamic” or heresy (kuffur) and an “unpardonable sin” (gunah-e-qabir). The decree explicitly states that burning a woman alive, in the name of honor, for marrying a person of their choosing, is heresy and against the commands of Islam. The fatwa quotes a Quranic verse, verse number 232 of Surat al-Baqarah: [translated from the Urdu translation of the verse – as used in the fatwa – into English] “Oh woman’s family, do not say no to women for wanting to marry the husband [of their choice] if the two of them have consented to the marriage.” The fatwa states that Islam is the true guardian of rights of women and that it is imperative upon the leaders of an Islamic nation/government (hukumat) to ensure protection of women’s rights. For that purpose, the government should pass and implement laws that make burning and killing of women an unpardonable crime. The oppression and torture unleashed upon women has no relation to Islam. The fatwa then refers to an example (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad, as narrated in Sahih-Bukhari: The Prophet (s.a.w.) terminated the marriage contract (nikkah) of a woman who complained to him (s.a.w.) that she did not like the man her father had married her off to. The fatwa condemns the act of burning alive or killing one’s child for marrying someone of their choice and then “appeals” to the parents to focus on the ethical education and upbringing of their children in line with the teachings of Islam; and that the upcoming month of Ramadan will be devoted to raise awareness about women’s rights. Finally, the fatwa states that those who burn women and girls alive should be hanged to death.

The particular newspaper reporting (in Roznama Dunya) on this fatwa includes the names of twenty four clerics who signed the fatwa (the total number of clerics who joined in issuing the fatwa were forty but the newspaper article explicitly mentions just twenty four names).

In chapter one of Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Ahmed El Shamsy examines selected criteria used to exclude the testimony of certain types of witnesses in Islamic courts of the second century AH / eighth century CE. Specifically, the chapter seeks to make three points:

1. In the early second century, Muslim judges presiding over court cases applied a notion of communal enmity among confessional groups as a criterion for determining the admissibility of witness statements by members of one group against those of another. This criterion was used both in cases that crossed confessional lines and in cases involving coreligionists only.

2. Over the course of the second century, this criterion fell out of use and was replaced by other criteria for interconfessional testimony. These criteria included the a priori exclusion of witness statements by members of certain groups as well as individual ascertainment of the probity of potential witnesses.

3. The oral and cryptic nature of the sources from the early second century presented significant obstacles to later scholars’ understanding of the reasoning that underpinned the early criteria. They consequently opened the way for a fundamental reconceptualization of who counted as an acceptable witness.

This text documenting the positions of the jurist Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) relays a disagreement he had with the scholar Isḥāq Ibn Rāhawayh (d. 238/853). While Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal had maintained the non-Muslims might only testify regarding the last will of a deceased Muslim, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh upholds the opinion suggested by earlier jurists that non-Muslim scripturalists might testify in Muslim courts so long as they only testify against members of their own faith communities. Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh cites an event in the Prophet Muḥammad’s life as Sunnaic proof for the admissibility of non-Muslim testimony in court. He relays an incident in which Muḥammad apparently accepted the testimony of Jewish individuals against a Jewish couple accused of adultery. Ahmed El Shamsy notes in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts that Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh seems to be one of the only jurists of his day to employ this anecdote to permit non-Muslim testimony.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

Faris Matiyn, an inmate at the Attica prison, mounted a § 1983 claim against the commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and prison superintendent Walter Kelly. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment free exercise right by not allowing Sunnī and Shīʿī Muslims—the two major Muslim denominations—to have separate worship services. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff did not speak for the majority of the Sunnī Muslim community and that keeping the two groups together satisfied legitimate penological objectives, such as maintaining a safe prison environment. 

The plaintiff, Sefidkar Janali, a Shi'a Muslim, claimed that he should be allowed to attend a worship service apart from Sunni Muslims. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment rights and RLUIPA because Muslims are not allowed different worship times, while other denominations have separate times. The plaintiff also alleged that he should be provided a ḥalāl diet (upon entering the prison, he was given the choice of a regular meal, vegetarian meal, or Jewish Kosher meals). The District Court found that the prison officials did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment or RLUIPA rights because there were legitimate security and administrative concerns with offering separate Shi'a and Sunni services. The District Court similarly found that the meal options provided for Muslim inmates was adequate because they were lawful options for Muslims. The District Court therefore granted summary judgment for the respondents.

Plaintiff Shawn Sharp, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this civil rights action pursuant to the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA, claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group. The plaintiff claimed that the Sunni Muslim services offered at the DOC did not allow him free exercise of his religion, since he is a member of the so-called Habashi sect of Islam, which has ideological differences from the prison’s recognized Sunni group. The prison’s Muslim chaplain disagreed, stating that if Sharp was a Sunni Muslim, as he claimed to be, then there was no reason why Sharp could not attend the already-provided services of Sunni Muslims. The Court decided in favor of the Defendants, determining that the DOC successfully presented a qualified immunity defense, and that the plaintiff’s request had no rational connection to any legitimate penological interest.

This fatwa acknowledges the principal distinctions between Sunni and Shi'a Islam:

1. Shi'a Islam rejects hadith not narrated by the Prophet's family (Ahlu Bait), while Sunni Islam (Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'ah) does not differentiate between hadith provided that those hadith meet the criteria of the classification of hadith (mustalah hadis);
2. Shi'a Islam perceives imams as infallible (ma 'sum), while Sunni Islam does not;
3. Shi'a Islam does not acknowledge consensus (ijma') without the presence of an imam, while Sunni Islam does;
4. Shi'a Islam believes that political leadership/government is included in the pillars of religion, while Sunni Islam believes in general welfare with the aim of religious, spiritual, political leadership being to guarantee and protect the proselytisation and interests of the Islamic people (umat); and
5. Shi'a Islam, in general, does not acknowledge the succession of Abu Bakar as-Siddiq, Umar Ibnul Khatab, and Usman bin Affan, while Sunni Islam does.

Acknowledging these principal differences, especially with regard to government (imamah), the Indonesian Council of Ulama implores Indonesian Muslims to understand Sunni Islam in order to increase their own vigilence towards the flow of interpretations based on Shi'a Islam.

This fatwa states that the majority of Indonesian Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam, which rejects Shi'a Islam in general, and the teachings on temporary marriage (nikah mut'ah) more specifically. The fatwa forbids temporary marriage and states that such behaviour must be prosecuted before a court, pursuant to current regulations.

The Khoja Case, also known as the Aga Khan Case, is one of the rare cases profiling the Shia Imami Nizari Ismaili community (henceforth “Ismailis”). Decided in the High Court of Bombay in 1866 by the Honourable Sir Joseph Arnould, this case was brought by a series of Ismaili plaintiffs who argued that the Ismaili Community was a Sunni community, and therefore did not owe allegiance to the Aga Khan as its leader. The Court held that the Ismaili Community was in fact a Shi’a community, that the Aga Khan was the authoritative head of the community, and therefore, that he had the right to exercise his traditional modes of authority.

After fleeing worn-torn Syria, a married Syrian Sunni couple, a fourteen-year old woman, A, and twenty-one-year old man, H, arrived in Germany. Because A was a minor, Child Protective Services assumed legal guardianship over A, which H subsequently contested. As a result, A and H were allowed to spend weekends together. Child protective services, however, sought to assume full custody over A, thereby prohibiting any further interaction between A and H. The Higher State Court of Bamberg determined that according to Germany’s civil code (BGB) § 1633, stating that a married minor may decide herself where she would like to live and with whom she wants to interact, Child Protective Services may remain the legal guardian of A but cannot control where she lives.

The appellants sought to challenge the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), which had stipulated the beneficiaries of the deceased, as well as the manner in which the estate of the deceased was to be distributed.

The Court concurred with the decision of the lower court, but added that the appellants' claim in regards to the daughter procuring the estate in its entirety, based on Indonesian Supreme Court Jurisdiction No. 184K/AG/1995, was inpplicable in this case because the child of a beneficiary had passed away, rather than the child surviving the beneficiary.

Moreover, the Court held that the respondents' objection in regards to the standing of the replacement beneficiary, unknown in Sunni fiqh, was not a valid reason, because Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1991 (Compilation of Islamic Laws) had already provided positive jurisprudential guidelines in this regard. The Court cited the qaedah that permits a government to remove any inconsistency or difference.

This qanun was devised to foster and maintain the Islamic beliefs and religiosity of the individual and society in Aceh, providing legislative protection from misguided teachings. Crucially, at art 1(7), the qanun defines as Islamic creed (Aqidah Islamiah) a conservative interpretation of al-sunna wa'l-jama'a (Sunni Islam). It also seeks to increase understanding and the practice of worship, as well as the availability of appropriate places of worship. The qanun authorises the shari'a police (Wilayatul Hisbah) to conduct surveillance to ensure adherence thereto, and grants prosecutorial powers to general prosecutors to investigate and refer cases to the shari'a courts (Mahkamah Syar'iyah) in the event of a breach. Conduct punishable pursuant to this qanun includes disseminating un-Islamic teachings, apostasing, failing to attend Friday prayers (shalat jum'at) three times consecutively, and failing to provide prayer facilities. Punishment can include caning or imprisonment.

On 9 November 2019, the Supreme Court of India declared the final judgement in the case regarding disputed land in the Ayodhya region in the District of Faizabad, India where the Babri masjid once stood. The court decided that the 2.77 acres of land be transferred over to a governmental trust for the purpose of building the Ram Janmabhoomi temple and an alternative 5 acres of land be given to the Sunni Waqf Board in order to build a mosque. This decision overturned the 2010 decision by the Allahabad High Court to divide the disputed land among three parties. Until its demolition in 1992, the 16th century Babri masjid existed at this site. Based on archaeological evidence that examined the foundations of the Babri masjid, as well as biographical evidence pulled from Sikh scriptural texts, the Supreme Court reasoned that land’s Hindu history predates the construction of the mosque and should thus be the site of a newly constructed Hindu temple.

The Allahabad High Court decided on 30 September 2010 that the disputed 2.77 acres of land in the Ayodhya region in the District of Faizabad, India, where the Babri masjid once stood, will be divided among the three litigants. This majority 2:1 decision divided the disputed land between the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara, and the Hindu Maha Sabha who represent the party for ‘Ram Lalla’ or infant Ram. The central dispute of the case was over the title of the parcel of land. Although the three-judge bench upheld the decision, there was a dissenting opinion which held that the Babri masjid was not built on demolished ruins and that the ruins predated the construction of the mosque. The remaining judges held that, based on archaeological evidence, the Babri masjid was built after the demolition of a non-Islamic religious structure. The judges reasoned that there was insufficient documentary evidence for any sole party to hold the title over the land, and instead declared the title be jointly held by the three litigants.

This fatwa states that there are two conflicting opinions regarding divorce (pronouncement of talak). The first is that the pronouncement of talak three times at once is akin to the third talak. This opinion was held by the Companions of the Prophet (Sahaba), the Tabi'in (the next generation), and imams of all four schools (mazhab) of Sunni Islamic thought. The counter opinion is that pronouncement of talak three times at once is only akin to the first of three pronouncements of talak. This opinion was held by Thawus, the Imamiyah school (mazhab) of Shi'a Islamic thought, Ibnu Taimiyah, and Ahlu az-Zahir. The fatwa states that the Committee finds the former opinion to be more sound. It also notes that marriage and divorce is regulated for Muslims in ss 10 and 31 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and ss 14-18 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975.

The fatwa states that efforts must be made to prevent three pronouncements of talak at once occurring again. Moreover, that if state marriage laws are implemented correctly, there will be no more incidents of three pronouncements of talak at once in Indonesia. The fatwa also acknowledges the significance of the role of the religious courts (pengadilan agama) in preventing such incidents occurring in the future.

Mohammad Fadel (Professor of Law, University of Toronto) and Connell Monette (Vice President of Academic Affairs, American Academy Casablanca) organized a PIL Forum Roundtable on the recent publication of al-Muwaṭṭaʾ – Recension of Yahya b. Yahya al-Laythī (d. 234/848) by Mālik b. Anas, distributed through Harvard University Press. This translation is based on the recently published Royal Moroccan Edition of the Muwaṭṭaʾ (Casablanca: Maṭbaʿat al-najāḥ al-jadīda, 2013/1434), and was commissioned by the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. A team of Moroccan translators, under the supervision of Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette, editors, working over the course of several years, prepared the translation.

Below are the essays contributed to the Roundtable on the ISLAMICLAWblog. Leading scholars which scholars comment on various aspects of the translation; some engage substantively with particular topics or themes in the Muwaṭṭaʾ, others comment on the translation and its style, and some combine elements of both.

Part of the Online Companion for Al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī.

This entry provides a definition and analysis of the term ijtihād, drawing on works by SHARIAsource Senior Scholar Sherman A. Jackson, King Faisal Chair in Islamic Thought and Culture and Professor of Religion and American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California.

Sherman A. Jackson, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory: Muṭlaq and ʿĀmm in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 165–92.

*Note: All page numbers used as citations refer to the above article.

Islamic finance creates financial products specifically aimed at Muslims that are sharīʿa compliant. Many scholars have condemned Islamic finance for condemning ribā (interest) on the one hand, particularly where usurious, but then many others have created workarounds that allow modern big-finance firms to avoid it in name only on the other hand. Those who argue against the workaround argue that nominal interest-avoidance goes against the spirit of the guidelines set forth in Islamic law (sharīʿa). Weighing in on the controversy, University of Toronto Law Professor Mohammad Fadel considers whether ribā might serve a function that goes beyond simple definitions of it as either interest or usury. Historically, the prohibition on interest was a means of regulating medieval financial industries, in ways that have little application to the modern financial instruments. The medieval prohibitions and the modern controversies about Islamic finance then, he argues, are misaligned and need rethinking. This post provides a "plain English" review of the article: Mohammad H. Fadel, Ribâ, Efficiency and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, 25 Wisconsin Journal of International Law 655 (2008).