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A female Muslim employee sued her former employer under Title VII and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) for discrimination based on religion. The plaintiff claimed that she was suspended and then terminated from her job for failing to remove her religiously mandated head-covering (ḥijāb). The Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely, having passed the statute of limitations for both Title VII and the DCHRA.

An Arab Muslim professor sued his former employer, Saint Francis College, under Title VII, §1981, §1983, §1985(3), §1986, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, alleging that the College denied him tenure because he was an Arab Muslim. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the College’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded that decision, holding that discrimination against Arabs constitutes racial discrimination, and that the statute of limitations restrictions imposed by the lower court were incorrectly applied, as the acts in question occurred before the statute of limitations was passed into law.

This statute, as stated in art 272, repeals and replaces Law No. 18 of 2001 on the Special Autonomy of Aceh. The statute regulates the governance of Aceh at all levels (provincial, regency/municipality, sub-district, residential and village). It defines the powers of the People's Representative Council of Aceh, as well as those of the People's Representative Councils for the respective regencies/municipalties (kabupaten/kota), and provides limits on the powers of the personnel therein. The statute also defines the authority and responsibilities of the Governor and regents/mayors, as well as other apparatus such as the Aceh Provincial Secretariat. The statute guarantees the rights of the Acehnese people to own land, to education, health, security, to protect their own culture, as well as to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to collectivise, freedom of movement, freedom to take industrial action, and freedom to truth and reconciliation, among others. The statute states that breaches of these human rights can be investigated and tried before a Human Rights Court in Aceh.

Importantly, art 129 states that Acehnese criminal law (hukum jinayah) applies to:

1. non-Muslims who commit a criminal offence (perbuatan jinayah) and submit themselves voluntarily; and
2. non-Muslims who commit an offence not covered in the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana) or that is outside the Indonesian Criminal Code, but regulated in qanun.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Shri Lanka Prajatantrika Samajavadi Janarajaya/Ilankai Jananayaka Choshalichak Kutiyarachu), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Sri Lanka's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Medan Religious Court (lower court). The lower court had determined that the non-issuance of a building permit from the Medan Spatial and Building Service (Dinas Tata Ruang dan Tata Bangunan Kota Medan) constituted a force majeure. Accordingly, it found that:

1. the respondent (then plaintiff) was released from any liability under the murabahah credit facility agreement it had entered into with the appellant (the defendant) on 10 September 2013; and
2. that the appellant must return to the respondent two deeds of title to properties leveraged by the respondent in return for the murabahah credit facility.

The appellant challenged the decision of the lower court on the following grounds:

1. that the decision was erroneous and not based in law, insofar as the object of the agreement was stated as being three units, whereas it was for the purchase of building construction materials;
2. that the lower court had incorrectly labelled the credit facility an al-bai', per art 20(2) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws, rather than a murabahah credit facility, that is, a credit facility that benefits both parties, provided by a shahib al-mal (creditor), per art 20(6) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws;
3. that the lower was incorrect in defining the non-issuance of a building permit as a force majeure for the purposes of arts 1244-1245 of the Indonesian Civil Code, and also incorrect in applying the law because a force majeure only results in the parties being released from demands for damages, costs and/or profits to the party experiencing the force majeure, which causes it to default; and
4. that the force majeure submitted by the respondent had already passed because the notice of unsuccessful application for a building permit was dated 5 May 2014, while the appellant was only informed of the notice on 19 August 2014 (three months after the fact), which was contrary to the 14-day statute of limitations contained in art 17(3) of the murabahah credit facility.

The court acceded to the appeal, concurring with the appellant's submission that the respondent was required to inform the appellant of the issuance (or lack thereof) of any relevant building permit, pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the court overturned the decision of the lower court, and ordered the respondent to pay costs.

The plaintiff (KH. Moch. Yusman Roy) was the caretaker of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf, an i'tikaf (seclusion in a mosque) study group venue in Malang, East Java, where Qur'anic study and recitation activities were held, and the production of prayer carpets (sajadah), pillows, and bolsters was conducted. The defendant, the Regent (Bupati) of Malang, had issued a decree declaring the cessation of the activities of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf. The plaintiff submitted that he had received the decree, dated 7 May 2005, through a family member. On 6 May 2005 at 8.00pm, however, the plaintiff submitted that he had been arrested and interrogated by the Malang Regional Police. Therefore, the legal process had been implemented prematurely and without authority. Moreover, that in issuing the decree, the defendant had acted unilaterally, without considering all the relevant concerns. Therefore, pursuant to art 53(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of Law No. 9 of 2004 on Amendments to Law No. 5 of 1989 on the State Administration of the Judiciary, as the plaintiff had suffered loss as the result of a state administrative decree, he was entitled to submit a written application to the authorised court seeking that the decree be declared null and void, and seeking damages as an additional remedy. The plaintiff also requested that the court suspend the implementation of the defendant's decree, pursuant to art 67(2) of Law No. 5 of 1986, and that the investigation of the case be conducted as quickly as possible, pursuant to art 98 of Law No. 5 of 1986.

In its exceptions, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff's submissions were incorrect and inaccurate because the plaintiff had already submitted a request for protection, dated 6 May 2005, to the Malang Regional Police, expressing concern and fear for the consequences of his having taught sholat and do'a (prayers) in both Arabic and Indonesian. The plaintiff's conduct had allegedly generated a negative reaction from the community towards the plaintiff. It was in accordance with the plaintiff's request that the Malang Police conducted its investigation and arrest on 7 May 2005. The legal consequences that followed had, therefore, resulted from the plaintiff's request, rather than the issuance of the regental decree. The regental decree had been issued in consideration of Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion, meaning that both an administrative action and criminal conduct had occurred, for the purposes of art 10 of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Administration. Moreover, purusant to art 27(1)(c) of Law No. 32 of 2014, the regental decree had been issued in accordance with the obligations of a regional head to maintain peace and order. More specifically, it was issued in anticipation of anarchic reactions from other parties who did not share the religious opinions of the plaintiff that it was acceptable to conduct sholat in Indonesian, as well as the original Arabic.

The defendant also submitted that the state administrative court was precluded from adjudicating the case pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 5 of 1986, because it had issued the regental decree during a time when the public interest dictated it do so. In addition to adhering to Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965, the regental decree also accorded with art 156(a) of the Criminal Code because it acknowledged that the plaintiff's conduct was defamatory towards a religion.

The court dismissed the defendant's exceptions in their entirety. It reiterated the constitutioanlly-guaranteed freedom to practise one's religion and beliefs in accordance with their own conscience, as found in art 28E(1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution, as well as Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. The court noted that these guarantees derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which identifies basic human rights and freedoms which are naturally connected to, and inseparable from, humans from the moment they are born. The court also noted, however, that as the defendant had deemed the activities of Pondok Iktikaf Jamaah Njagi Lelaku to have the potential to disturb the peace and order of the community, it was of the opinion that the cessation of these activities constituted a preventative measure to protect the human rights of others, and that maintaining the peace was in the public interest, per art 73 of Law No. 39 of 1999, which states that rights and freedoms can only be limited by, and pursuant to, statute. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's request that the regental decree issued by the defendant be revoked on the grounds that it was not contrary to any statute. Moreover, it dismissed the plaintiff's request that the defendant reinstate the good name of the plaintiff on the same grounds.