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A Pakistani Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff claimed that he was terminated for discriminatory reasons, as his supervisor made comments that the plaintiff felt were derogatory. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was terminated because of inconsistencies in his re-accreditation application to qualify him for work at the healthcare organization (as plaintiff had failed to disclose that he was suspended when working for a previous employer). The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Additional information. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 782 (1973) burden-shifting test.  This test requires plaintiffs to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  If they are successful, the burden shifts back to the defendant (usually a company or a company representative) to demonstrate they it a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.  Finally, it then becomes the burden of the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated by the defendant was a pretext for the true discriminatory motive.

A Pakistani Muslim banker sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff alleged that her coworkers and supervisors made derogatory remarks to her about her diet, dress, and prayer schedule; and that this discriminatory animus was the real reason that she was terminated. The defendant argued that she was fired for insubordination when she left work in the middle of a shift without permission. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Eighth Circuit upheld this decision on appeal, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the defendant offered for terminating her employment.

A Jordanian Muslim sued his former employer, a life insurance firm, under the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was terminated from his job because he was a Muslim and of Middle Eastern origin. The defendant claimed that he was fired for failing to meet job performance standards; the plaintiff responded that the company’s explanation was a pretext, arguing that the company applied different job performance evaluation standards to him as compared to his non-Muslim co-workers. Employing the burden-shifting test established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (where the plaintiff alleges a prima facie claim, the company responds with a reason, and the plaintiff will prevail if he can show that the reason is a pretext for actual discrimination), the Court found that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence of a discriminatory motive to establish a prima facie case and allow the suit to proceed before a jury. Accordingly, the Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

A Bangladeshi Muslim worker sued her former employer under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was fired and not rehired by the defendant because of her religion and national origin. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, but contended that she did not rebut or rebuff the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the company had for not rehiring her—which it claimed was due to poor job performance in her previous job assignments. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff offered no proof that she was not rehired due to religious discrimination.

The Court granted the defendant Marriott International’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Plaintiff Nagy Edrisse sued Marriott and several of its employees under Title VII, § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiff alleged that the hotel created or tolerated a hostile work environment in that his direct manager made frequent derogatory racial, religious, and ethnic statements, including asking the plaintiff whether he was going to blow up the building and whether he was a terrorist. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the hotel fired him out of discriminatory animus based on his religion, race, and ethnicity. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to inappropriate behavior at the workplace (including using racial slurs directed at fellow employees), rather than his race, religion, or ethnicity. The Court dismissed the claim against the employees who were not directly involved, but denied summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the facts were sufficient to make out a prima facie case to move forward. In other words, the Court concluded that a jury could consider the evidence presented to be severe and pervasive enough to allow for a finding of a hostile work environment.

The plaintiff sued her former employer, Neiman Marcus, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, color, and national origin; failure to accommodate her religion; failure to stop harassment; and retaliation for her filing of a religious and national origin discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which allowed her suit to proceed in court. The defendant company argued that, because of the statue of limitations, the plaintiff failed to make a claim. Many of the plaintiff’s claims, including allegations of her co-worker directing racial epithets at her, and being compelled to work on religious holidays, were time-barred and thus could not be introduced to the court. The court found that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination as required by McDonnell Douglas, concluding that she did not prove that she was treated differently because of her religion, race, or national origin. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant company on these claims; however, the Court denied the company’s motion for summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could consider allegations that the company permitted so-called sale-stealing, when an employee rings up the sale of a client that a co-worker was working with thereby receiving their commission, to be an adverse employment action in the claim that was not time-barred, and thus the suit on this issue could move forward.

A Pakistani Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, JP Morgan Chase, under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and disparate treatment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she received a lower salary than her co-workers in the same position and that her reasonable requests to work a different shift so she could care for her daughter were denied. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court concluded that the incidents that the plaintiff cited to support her claim of a hostile work environment were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a jury to find for the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court did not see any adverse employment action as a result of alleged disparate treatment (which is an element that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green test for discrimination requires in cases lacking direct evidence). Finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

Masroor Siddiqui, a Muslim of Pakistani origin, sued his former employer, Autozone, under Title VII, alleging race-based harassment; discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion; and retaliation. The plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment when, after 9/11, he was barraged with racial epithets. He further alleged that he was passed by for promotions because of his race, religion, and national origin (citing comments from his supervisor that they would never promote “people like him”), and that he was ultimately terminated as a result of these factors. The defendant argued that, even if the court found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company legitimately denied the promotion of, and ultimately fired, the employee because of poor work performance. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that no jury would consider the evidence produced by the plaintiff severe or pervasive enough for a hostile work environment claim; however, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment in respect to the promotion claim, allowing the case to go forward.

A former Islamic prison chaplain sued his former employer, the State of Maryland, under Title VII, alleging that the State created a hostile work environment, subjected him to constructive discharge, and was liable for breach of contract for failing to abide by the terms of an earlier attempted settlement. The plaintiff alleged that he was harassed because of his religion for several years, including being involved in physical altercations with other non-Muslim employees, while working as an Islamic chaplain, and that this led to a hostile work environment and to his constructive discharge. The Court dismissed the contract claim, as the state has sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; but the Court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the other two counts, concluding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination.