SHARIAsource

English text of the 1981 Constitution of Pakistan (1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as amended to 1981).

The Court denied defendant Merrill Lynch’s motion for summary judgment, adopting the opinion of the magistrate judge, which held that the employee established a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff Abdul-Giyath Mayale-Eke sued his former employer and direct supervisor under Title VII, §1981, the Rhode Island Fair Employment Act, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff alleged that, as a Muslim who had immigrated from Nigeria, he was treated differently and ultimately fired from his position as an investment specialist because of his race, national origin, and religion; specifically, he claimed that he was frequently asked questions about his heritage and was subject to derogatory comments. Defendant Merrill Lynch claimed that it fired plaintiff after giving him numerous warnings of his failure to meet set performance standards. The Court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had alleged enough specific facts to make the claim not just conceivable but plausible before a jury.

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

An Arab Muslim professor sued his former employer, Saint Francis College, under Title VII, §1981, §1983, §1985(3), §1986, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, alleging that the College denied him tenure because he was an Arab Muslim. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the College’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded that decision, holding that discrimination against Arabs constitutes racial discrimination, and that the statute of limitations restrictions imposed by the lower court were incorrectly applied, as the acts in question occurred before the statute of limitations was passed into law.

An Indian Muslim professor sued his former employer, CUNY, under Title VII, §1981, and §1983, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied tenure and additional compensation because of his race and religion. The Court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to establish that the reason he was denied tenure and additional compensation was discrimination.

This statute on criminal procedure replaced Het Herziene Inlandsch Reglement (the Revised Internal Rules and Regulations) (Staatsblad of 1941 No. 44). Among other topics, it regulates criminal investigation, investigators, prosecution of crimes, arrest, detention, body searches, home inspections, seizures and search warrants, suspects and those accused of having committed crimes, legal aid, the content of crime reports, as well courts with the authority to adjudicate criminal trials.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that matters pertaining to the division of Muslims' joint assets (barang gono-gini) are included in the authority of the state courts.

Text of the 1989 Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, amending the 1978 Constitution of Sierra Leone.

The Court granted the defendant Marriott International’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Plaintiff Nagy Edrisse sued Marriott and several of its employees under Title VII, § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiff alleged that the hotel created or tolerated a hostile work environment in that his direct manager made frequent derogatory racial, religious, and ethnic statements, including asking the plaintiff whether he was going to blow up the building and whether he was a terrorist. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the hotel fired him out of discriminatory animus based on his religion, race, and ethnicity. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to inappropriate behavior at the workplace (including using racial slurs directed at fellow employees), rather than his race, religion, or ethnicity. The Court dismissed the claim against the employees who were not directly involved, but denied summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the facts were sufficient to make out a prima facie case to move forward. In other words, the Court concluded that a jury could consider the evidence presented to be severe and pervasive enough to allow for a finding of a hostile work environment.

An unmarried African-American Muslim worker sued the defendant, Del Monte Sales Company, under Title VII and §1981 for discrimination based on race, sex, marital status, and religion, as well as for libel, slander, and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff argued that he was not hired for a job with the defendant due to his race and religion, alleging that his interviewer made derogatory and discriminatory remarks to this effect. The defendant argued that it did not hire the plaintiff because he was not outgoing or pleasant, which are necessary traits for a job as a salesman. The Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, which had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss (noting a lack of evidence offered by the plaintiff).

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 17 August 1981, and ordered them to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs, pursuant to art 2(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

In this case the court released the accused and dismissed the prosecution's case on the grounds that the prosecution's submissions had failed to meet the requirements contained in art 191 of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure.

In this case the court released the three co-accused and dismissed the prosecution's case on the grounds that the prosecution's submissions had failed to meet the requirements contained in art 191 of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure.

In this case the court released the accused and dismissed the prosecution's case on the grounds that the prosecution's submissions had failed to meet the requirements contained in art 191 of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure.

In this case the court released the accused and dismissed the prosecution's case on the grounds that the prosecution's submissions had failed to meet the requirements contained in art 191 of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure.

The prosecution submitted that, on 19 April 2011 at around 9.00pm, the accused was found providing gambling facilities to the public. Specifically, the accused had been faciliting bingo-style (toto gelap) bets to Hong Kong. The prosecution submitted that this type of activity was in contravention of arts 5 and 23(1) of Aceh Qanun No. 13 of 2003 on Gambling.

On the grounds, however, that neither the prosecution nor accused attended court, pursuant to art 191(1) of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure, the court dismissed the case and ordered that the state pay costs.

The Tapaktuan Shari'a Court (lower court) found that Siti Aminah (deceased) had left to her husband one-quarter of her estate, to her daughter Rosmalena binti Djamiudin (appellant) one-quarter, and her son Ridwansyah B.Ac bin Djamiudin (respondent) two-quarters. As her husband (Djamiudin) had also already passed away, his one-quarter share was left to his three children as follows: one-fifth to the appellant, two-fifths to the respondent, and two-fifths to the replacement beneficiary and wife (following respondent) of his deceased son Sofyan bin Djamiudin, Anita. Of Sofyan bin Djamiusin's two-fifths, he had bequeathed one-eighth to his wife (following respondent), more than one-half (58.33 per cent) to his son Fadel Muhammad, and more than one-quarter (29.166 per cent) to his daughter Hirah Manda Sofyani.

The Court found that the lower court had erred in stipulating the co-respondent as the replacement beneficiary of her deceased husband Sofyan because her relationship with Sofyan was one through marriage, not blood. The Court also found that a bequest, supposedly made by Siti Aminah on 15 October 1981, was rendered null and void as Siti Aminah had passed away on 29 April 1981. Accordingly, it redistributed the various estates based on these findings.

This fatwa was issued in response to a letter received by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) from Bambang Sulastomo regarding the transfer of a corpse from the holy land (tanah Suci - Mecca) to the homeland (tanah air - Indonesia). After convening on 13 October 1981, the Council determined that it would be preferable for the deceased's body to remain in the holy land where it had already been buried. The only exception to this would be if a reason existed according to shari'a. Imam Maliki stated that transferring a corpse already buried would be permissible if a reason could be found that pertained to the welfare of others, including to make the pilgrimage easier or to enable the body to be buried with other deceased family members. Government instructions would also be necessary if a body was to be repatriated.

This regional regulation amends art 3(4) of Kampar Regency Regulation No. 17 of 2007 on Social Ill Countermeasures, in relation to the consumption, production, distribution, sale, storage, stockpiling, and making available, of alcohol.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Palau (Beluu er a Belau), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Palau's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.