SHARIAsource

The plaintiffs submitted that they had entered into a murabahah financing agreement with the first defendant on 19 September 2011 for IDR 175 million. The money was to be used to finance a shop, and the plaintiffs agreed to repay the money to the first defendant within 60 months, leveraging their 224m² family property in Jabon village, Mojokerto. The plaintiffs submitted that they had chosen to borrow from a shari'a bank because they were both Muslims and wished to conduct business in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah.

Between October 2011-August 2012, the plaintiffs adhered to the repayment structure, and made 11 repayments (IDR 47,500,000). By September 2012, however, the plaintiffs' business had become less profitable as the number of market competitors increased. The plaintiffs still made their monthly repayment on 29 September 2012, but submitted that they had requested a restructuring of the agreement to accommodate their recent financial hardship. Moreover, they also submitted that the first defendant should have provided the plaintiffs with an opportunity to sell the property on their own to enable them to make future repayments. Instead, on 24 April 2013, the first defendant sent to the plaintiffs a letter stating its intentions to auction the leveraged property the following morning (25 April 2013).

The plaintiffs learned that the third defendant, who had successfully bid at auction for the property, had already visited the property before auction with an employee of the first defendant, expressing an interest to purchase it for IDR 225 million. The plaintiffs had rejected the offer, wishing instead to resolve the dispute through legal channels. The plaintiffs submitted that the first and third defendants had clearly colluded to acquire the plaintiffs' family property. Moreover, that the property should have been able to attract IDR 400 million at auction.

The plaintiffs requested that the court:

1. invalidate the auctioning of their property;
2. afford them the opportunity to sell their property on their own; and
3. prohibit the second defendant from dealing with the property.

The court found, however, that it was precluded from adjudicating the case as the parties had agreed to resolve any disputes before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional).

The parties were married on 19 May 2012. They had no children. The applicant submitted that, since the beginning of June 2012, he and the respondent had quarrelled regularly. This was the result of:

1. the parties' frequent difference of opinion;
2. the appellant reverting to Christianity (Protestantism) from Islam; and
3. the respondent's temperamental and emotional nature, which would often result in the respondent becoming vulgar and using profane language, which left the appellant feeling that to continue domestic life with the respondent would be untenable.

Consequently, the parties had separated for approximately six months leading up to the proceeding. The applicant had also attempted to deliberate with the respondent to reach a truce, but to no avail. Accordingly, the applicant applied to the court for a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The respondent disputed the applicant's three primary submissions, maintaining that it was the applicant who was temperamental, aggressive, and had threatened to divorce the respondent. More specifically, it was the applicant who had instigated the quarrelling so that he had a legal reason to divorce the respondent (ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975), because he had already reverted to Christianity, and had become involved with another woman.

In her counterclaim, the respondent sought the following monetary compensation, in accordance with the applicant's monthly salary of IDR 20 million: IDR 45 million for iddah (100-day period following divorce) and IDR 150 million for mut'ah (divorce compensation). The respondent also asserted that she had spent IDR 104,568,000 of her own money on the apartment in which the parties had lived in Central Jakarta prior to marrying the applicant, as well as IDR 69.5 million on personal effects (total: IDR 174,068,000).

While the court acceded to the applicant's claim that the parties' marriage was untenable, it could not grant the applicant himself a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) because he had already reverted to Christianity. Instead, pursuant to the 2010 revised edition of the Guidelines on the Implementation and Administration of the Religious Judiciary (Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas dan Administrasi Peradilan Agama), it granted the applicant an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) and ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent IDR 15 million for iddah, as well as IDR 50 million for mut'ah. The court acceded to the respondent's claim that she had paid IDR 174,068,000 of her own money towards accommodation and personal effects prior to marrying the applicant, stipulating the monetary value of the parties' joint assets as IDR 53,832,000. The court ordered the applicant to transfer to the respondent IDR 26,916,000, and to auction the parties' property and divide the proceeds if necessary. The court also ordered the applicant to pay costs of IDR 416,000.

Plaintiff Joey Kenneth Priddy, a Virginia inmate, filed this civil rights action alleging that the Respondents, various prison officials at Bland Correctional Center, violated his constitutional rights by allowing Muslim inmates to conduct prayer groups in common areas of the prison facility. The Plaintiff sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint, determining that the challenged prison practices did not deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. The District Court found that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause, because the prison officials allowed Muslim inmates to conduct informal prayer groups in common areas, but that this opportunity is equally open to any inmate of any other religious persuasion. Therefore, the accommodation of Muslim inmates’ beliefs did not constitute an improper endorsement of Islam over other religions.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

Plaintiff Charles Glenn, an inmate at the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the Respondents, various DOC prison officials, for alleged violations of his rights to free exercise [of his ability to exercise Islamic ritual law] under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Specifically, the Plaintiff – a practicing Muslim – argued that there had been no Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services at the New Hampshire State Prison for the past three years and that he had no access to an Imam (a Muslim prayer leader), a Qur’an, or other Islamic literature, which placed constraints on his ability to practice Islam [specifically, it's ritual law aspects]. In conducting a Preliminary Review, the Court applied the four-part test for examining the constitutionality of a regulation that restricts an inmate’s First Amendment free exercise of religion found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). The Court assessed the four Turner factors -- (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) what impact accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) whether there was an absence of alternatives to the prison regulation. The Court found that the prison’s policy of denying Friday Prayer (jumuʿa) services, which are a central and essential element of religious practice, impinged on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion.

In April 2022 [1443 AH], the Dār al-ʿUlūm al-Sharʿiyya press published The Islamic Emirate and Governmental System, authored by the Chief Justice of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, ʿAbd al-Ḥākim al-Ḥaqqānī, with a foreword by the current Taliban head, Hibatullāh Akhunzāda. The book was published in Arabic, with the intention of reaching a broad Muslim audience, beyond Afghanistan. The 312-page book discusses governance, education, laws of war (jihād), political leadership, education, and the rights and roles of women. The book opens by stating that, following the withdrawal of American-allied forces from Afghanistan, the goal of the new Islamic State is the implementation of divine law in accordance with Islamic law generally and Hanafī jurisprudence specifically. This book claims to be a manifesto encompassing the political and governance policies of the Taliban, even though it definitely represents the beliefs of al-Ḥaqqānī and his allies, rather than the philosophy of the entire Taliban movement—which has some internal variation. The book's principal assertions follow.

The book begins by defining two types of government: al-jabāya and al-hidāya. Al-jabāya refers, essentially, to the levying of taxes, while al-hidāya refers to religio-moral guidance. The author maintains that an Islamic government should be one of al-hidāya, where the government serves the role of providing advice and guidance to the people, rather than al-jabāya, wherein a government exploits the poor for the personal gain of government officials. Under a government of al-hidāya, the author asserts that the legitimate form of law is divine, not man-made.

The book acknowledges several sources of sharīʿa. Those sources include but are not limited to the Qur’ān, the ḥadīth (prophetic reports), qiyās (deductive analogical reasoning), ijmā‘ (scholarly consensus), and khayr (benevolence).

The book further establishes that the justice system of the Islamic Emirate should be in accordance only with Hanafī jurisprudence, and that no credence should be given to other schools of Islamic law that are and have historically been minoritarian in Afghanistan. The author asserts that accommodations made for religious minorities will lead to the justice system falling apart, as in the Ottoman Empire.

According to the author, citizens of the Islamic Emirate may continue to adhere to local customs (in Afghanistan: Pashtunwali or the code of the Pashtun people). Such customs may be upheld so long as they do not conflict with sharīʿa and may include wearing traditional Afghan clothes.

The head of the global Islamic state, the book asserts, should be called the Amīr al-Mu’minīn and should be appointed according to the same methods used in selecting the first Four Rāshidūn Caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad: through the formation of a council of influential and prominent people, not through democracy, which the author considers un-Islamic. Obedience to the Amīr al-Mu’minīn by the entire Islamic world is mandatory, the author asserts, and disobedience is punishable by death. As to criteria for leadership, the author maintains that the Amīr must be a man, and that women are to stay home and avoid participation in politics, for fear that their participation would compromise the political state.

The book discusses the various political institutions that form the Islamic Emirate: a Council of Ministers, the Armed Forces, and a Judiciary. It also calls for the creation of an all-male legislative body known as the Islamic Council.

On education, the book maintains that the educational system should include mandatory education in madrasas, and optional non-Islamic education. The author states that a co-educational system is forbidden (ḥarām), but that education of women itself is not necessarily prohibited (ḥarām). According to the author, a woman’s education should occur within the home and should be carried out by her family members. Further, he maintains that women should pursue careers that are suitable for them, such as medicine, caretaking, home sciences, and teaching; and they are to interface only with other women and girls in those professions.

The book specifically discusses women’s roles in society. It requires women to fully cover themselves in ḥijāb and stipulates that they should not engage in any pursuit that would require them to be alone for longer than three days. Finally, the author notes that women should not travel long distances without a male guardian, and that they should not unnecessarily leave their residences.

Overall, the book’s claims are seldom backed with references, and the sources employed by the author are not listed.