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Plaintiff John Knapp, a state prisoner and observant Muslim [following the general requirements of Islamic ritual law], filed suit against the Respondents, prison officials in their individual and official capacities, for an alleged violation of his rights under RLUIPA on the claim that the prison facility lacked weekly Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services. The prison employed a volunteer policy, which allowed Muslims in the prison community to volunteer to lead the Friday prayer service in order to enable group worship. But because there were no volunteers or future prospect of volunteers, the Friday prayer service was not conducted. The magistrate judge determined that the volunteer policy challenged by the Plaintiff could violate the prisoner’s rights under RLUIPA if such a policy was not the least restrictive means by which the government could achieve a compelling state interest, and that the Plaintiff’s allegations sufficed to assert a claim. The magistrate judge therefore recommended that the Plaintiff’s claim under RLUIPA be allowed to proceed.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman filed an action against the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. The Plaintiff claimed that these rights had been violated in over 12 policies, including the policy that limited his purchase of prayer oil to once a week, a grooming policy that prevented him from growing a beard, and a CD policy limiting inmates’ purchase of spoken religious word CDs to a single vendor. The District Court dismissed all claims against the Respondent except for claims related to the CD policy, which the District Court determined was not related to any legitimate penological interest.

Plaintiff Sha-Heed Rahman, a Shīʿī Muslim prisoner in the New York Department of Corrections (“DOCS”), brought this lawsuit against the respondents, various DOCS prison officials, alleging that the respondents violated a settlement agreement, retaliated against him, and conspired to punish him for pursuing his First Amendment rights to exercise his religion and access the courts. The plaintiff originally brought a civil rights lawsuit in 2004, claiming that the respondents violated his First Amendment rights by only employing Sunnī chaplains at DOCS facilities and not allowing inmates to observe Shīʿī holy days. The plaintiff and the respondents entered into a settlement agreement which included the plaintiff’s right to an alternative Shīʿī Friday prayer (jumuʿa) service. In this current suit, the plaintiff claimed that the respondents had failed to provide a separate Shīʿī service and failed to provide Shīʿī study classes. The plaintiff also claimed that when he filed grievances in an attempt to enforce the settlement agreement terms, he was sent to the Special Housing Unit as punishment. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the claim. The District Court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss, determining that the plaintiff failed to state a claim. However, the District Court granted the plaintiff leave to amend the claim regarding his First Amendment and retaliation concerns with respect to the provision of Shīʿī study classes.

Prison inmate Lawrence Cochran filed a §1983 claim against prison officials for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by not allowing him to have food in his cell at night to break the Ramadan fast and by limiting his attendance of religious services. The Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that incarceration necessarily curtails some freedom, and that, in this context, the curtailment did not go so far as to place a substantial burden on Muslim inmates’ ability to practice their religion.

Plaintiffs, Muslim prisoners, sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, alleging violations of state and federal law, including the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Plaintiffs alleged that being patted down by female prison guards violated their First Amendment free exercise rights inasmuch as it contravened the tenets of their Islamic faith, which forbids intimate contact between unrelated members of the opposite gender. The Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for most of the claims, but denied it with respect to the RLUIPA and the Massachusetts General Law claims, concluding that a jury would best be able to determine whether the alleged infraction violated the terms of these two statutes.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

Petitioner Kofi Easterling, an inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), filed suit against the Respondents, various prison officials, alleging that they ignored the Petitioner's instructions as to when Ramadan began. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondents’ Ramadan date violated his religious beliefs under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. In the District Court, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in response. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Respondents, finding that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim failed because he had produced no evidence of a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under RLUIPA, he similarly failed to establish that the Respondents burdened a “central religious belief or practice” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Plaintiff Derrick Lafurr Brown, a Muslim inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed a suit against the Respondents, who were various prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for interrupting the Islamic services [Friday services specified in Islamic ritual law] out of an alleged general bias against Islam. The magistrate judge determined that the prison officials were acting in response to the Plaintiff’s repeated disobedience, and that their measure of standing in the doorway to block entry to the services was related to a legitimate penological interest and therefore did not interfere with the inmate's free exercise of religion. The magistrate judge recommended that the plaintiff's civil rights claims be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, a group of inmates held at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Concord, filed suit against Massachusetts prison officials for alleged violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiffs alleged that the prison officials violated these rights by refusing to provide separate accommodations for adherents of the Nation of Islam, whose practices (according to one of the plaintiffs) are "distinctly different" from those of Sunnī Islam. The magistrate judge recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be allowed because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies within the prison system.

The plaintiff, Kiaza Loccenitt, a Muslim inmate in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction, sued New York City and several prison officials for allegedly violating his civil rights by denying him ḥalāl meals and by denying him and other Muslim inmates in his unit the services of an imām (Muslim chaplain). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, as well as New York Corrections Law § 610. In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against some of the prison officials (who were not directly involved in the alleged violations or the creation of policies that led to the alleged violations), but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to add factual details to his allegation about being denied ḥalāl meals, and about "the impact of that denial on the practice of his religion."

Plaintiff Leo Pittman-Bey, a Muslim inmate, sued Texas prison officials for allegedly violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and his constitutional right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment by denying him after-sunset meals during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Previous prison regulations allowed practicing Muslim inmates to receive after-sunset meals during Ramadan, but only if they had attended jumuʿa (Friday prayer) services in the 60 days prior to Ramadan or had received a special exception from the Muslim chaplain. Pittman-Bey did not attend the services because, as an adherent of the Ḥanafī school of Sunnī Islam, he said he believed that jumuʿa services are not proper if conducted in nonpublic settings like prisons. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that denying Ramadan meals in accordance with the jumuʿa attendance policy did not violate the First Amendment.

Plaintiff William Welch claimed the Saginaw Correctional Facility violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by providing meals that provided insufficient nutrition and calories. The appellate court agreed that Welch had demonstrated a potential violation of his constitutional rights, and affirmed the district court's earlier denial of qualified immunity to the defendants. 

The Plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, challenged prison policies that 1) failed to provide adequately nutritional ḥalāl meals, and 2) denied them the ritual end-of-Ramadan feast. The District Court found that the ḥalāl meals provided did not substantially burden the Plaintiffs' religious practice. The District Court also decided that although the denial of the ritual feast marking the end of Ramadan substantially burdened the Plaintiffs' beliefs, the prison demonstrated that this policy was the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in security.

The Plaintiffs, Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) prisoners Eric Dowdy, Averis X Wilson, Roger Hunt, Amira Salem, Tom Traini, Patricia L. Caruso, Dave Burnett, and Michael Martin, alleged that the Defendants, various MDOC employees, violated their rights under federal and state constitutional provisions and RLUIPA by unlawfully restricting their religious practices. Specifically, the Plaintiffs challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate certain religious practices which they claimed must be observed during particular days and times each week. The Muslim Plaintiffs specifically challenged that the inability to attend Friday (jumuʿa) prayer services without obtaining permission to exercise a “call-out”—permission which is often denied—violated their federal and state constitutional rights. The Muslim Plaintiffs also challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate their religious dietary restrictions and their observance of the Eid al-Fīṭr and Eid al-Aḍḥā feasts. In response to the first allegation, the Respondents claim that there is a legitimate governmental interest in prison security that would be compromised if inmates were allowed to attend prayer services. The District Court determined, however, that while a legitimate governmental interest existed, the restriction of prayer services was not the least restrictive means of protecting this compelling interest in prison security. Accordingly, the District Court did not grant summary judgment in response to the Plaintiffs’ Friday prayer claim. In response to the second allegation, the Court determined that failure to provide Muslim inmates with a ḥalāl diet substantially burdens a religious exercise, but found that a question of fact exists as to whether the Plaintiffs received such a diet.

This case was brought on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, prison officials (Warden Jack Lee, Assistant Warden Gene Shinault, and Correctional Officer K. Lester). Petitioner Leroy Lovelace was removed from a “pass list” (which gives inmates access to Ramadan prayer services and special meals) after prison officials claimed that he broke his fast by eating during the day. Lovelace argued that his removal was due to his complaints about expired food, and was thus in violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and the requirements of Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) (protecting prisoners from having their religious practices substantially burdened, without a compelling government interest). Section 3 of RLIUPA states that “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. §2000cc-1(a). The Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Lester, the prison official who reported the alleged fast breaking, as well as against Warden Lee, who was in charge of overseeing the prison, concluding that both officials played direct roles in the incident. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the plaintiff had made out a valid due process claim, and the Court affirmed the remainder of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The Court reversed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant prison officials, John McGinnis, Patrick McGann, and Gordon Lord. Plaintiff Wayne Ford sued under § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights by the denial of his request to attend the Eid al-Fitr feast (the holiday at the end of Ramadan); prison officials had moved the event to fall several days after its official occurrence in order that it coincide with a weekend. Defendants argued that their denial of plaintiff inmate’s request to attend the event did not amount to a constitutional violation because the event, once moved, no longer fell on a date of religious significance. The Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because the matter required closer scrutiny of the Turner/O’Lone Test (which balances prisoners' religious accommodation requests with legitimate penological concerns) than the District Court accorded it before finding in favor of either party.

A former Islamic prison chaplain sued his former employer, the State of Maryland, under Title VII, alleging that the State created a hostile work environment, subjected him to constructive discharge, and was liable for breach of contract for failing to abide by the terms of an earlier attempted settlement. The plaintiff alleged that he was harassed because of his religion for several years, including being involved in physical altercations with other non-Muslim employees, while working as an Islamic chaplain, and that this led to a hostile work environment and to his constructive discharge. The Court dismissed the contract claim, as the state has sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; but the Court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the other two counts, concluding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination.

The Plaintiff, Muslim prisoner Davis Totten, brought this civil rights claim against employees of Ryan Correctional Facilities alleging religious discrimination. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom because they 1) threatened the Plaintiff with disciplinary action if he attended the Friday (jumuʿa) prayer service, the Islamic study class (taʿlīm) or any Islamic seminar while on a work or school assignment; 2) tried to control how Muslims appoint their spiritual leader for the Friday prayer services; and 3) failed to make preparations for the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service, among other alleged offenses. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, on the claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Respondents’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of convincing the Court that it was clearly established law that an official’s failure to allow prisoners to attend the Friday prayer service, the Islamic study class, or any Islamic seminar violate the First Amendment right to practice religion. The Magistrate Judge found the Respondents entitled to summary judgment on the second issue, because the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiff did not indicate that any prison officials actually appointed an inadequate spiritual leader who interfered with his right to practice his religion. On the third issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on this claim, because the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his ability to attend the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service—which is mandated by his religion and is a “sincerely held” practice—had been infringed upon, and was not related to a legitimate penological interest.

Plaintiff Kareem Hassan Milhouse, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), filed aBivens-styled complaint against several Federal Bureau of Prisons and USP-Lewisburg officials. The Plaintiff asserted that he had been denied access to the courts on three occasions and denied the practice of his religious requirements in violations of his right to free exercise, on the bases that: (1) there was no Islamic chaplain for Muslim inmates nor services for Special Management Unit inmates to attend services physically, nor were services provided through the radio as were other institutional programs, and (2) there was no Islamic celebration after the Ramadan fast, nor special meal of the types given for holidays of other faiths, and no Muslim chaplain with whom to discuss articles of faith. [He believed both of these types of services to be requirements stipulated by Islamic ritual law.] The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the alleged conduct did not fall within the scope of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which applies to free exercise of religion claims under the First Amendment raised by prisoners, because the Plaintiff did not establish that a “substantial burden” had been placed on his ability to exercise his religion. The Court further determined that the Plaintiff had alternative means of worship available to him and that the Defendants’ conduct of providing the meal to non-Muslim inmates did not inhibit or curtail his ability to express adherence to his Islamic faith and beliefs. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet the substantial burden test with respect to both of these freedom of religion claims, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Plaintiff Horace Crump, an inmate in the Michigan Department of Corrections, brought this compliant against the Respondent, Deputy Warden Winn at the Saginaw Correctional Facility, for changing the Muslim prayer time. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondent changed the Muslim prayer time in such a way as to place a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s free exercise of his religion, and that this was done in retaliation for having complained about his and other Muslim inmates’ complaints during Ramadan. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, and the case was referred for a report and recommendation by a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge determined that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden, because while the Respondent did not offer a specific penological justification for changing the prayer time, the prison immediately reinstated the religiously required Friday prayer time, such that the Plaintiff did not in fact suffer a “substantial burden” on the practice of his religion. The magistrate judge then found that the fact that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden on the practice of his religion also showed that he did not suffer adverse action, a necessary element of his retaliation claim. For these reasons, the magistrate judge recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.