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Article 15(a) of this regional regulation prohibits all forms of excessive noise, inside or outside, that can disturb the peace of surrounding residents, unless that noise is for religious purposes and it has been been approved by the regional government. While not prescribed in the legislation, it would be presumed that this permits authorised mosques to project the azan (call to prayer), or other similar sounds, into public spaces.

Article 21(1) of this regional regulation prohibits all forms of excessive noise after 10.00pm (22.00), inside or outside, that can disturb the peace of surrounding residents, unless that noise is for religious purposes and it has been been approved by the regent (Bupati). While not prescribed in the legislation, it would be presumed that this permits authorised mosques to project the azan (call to prayer), or other similar sounds, into public spaces regardless of the time of day.

Article 21(a) of this regional regulation prohibits all forms of excessive noise after 10.00pm (22.00), inside or outside, that can disturb the peace of surrounding residents, unless that noise is for religious purposes and its has been been approved by the regent (Bupati). While not prescribed in the legislation, it would be presumed that this permits authorised mosques to project the azan (call to prayer) or other similar sounds into public spaces regardless of the time of day.

This regional regulation makes provision for the prohibition on the placement, production, sale, distribution, and storage of alcoholic beverages in Fakfak regency, West Papua (Papua Barat) (art 3(1)). This prohibition also applies to the production or treatment and sale/distribution of traditional alcoholic beverages (art 4). Other than the regional government, surveillance of this prohibition is also to be conducted by an independent team comprising customary deliberative organisations, religious figures, civil society figures, inter-church organisations, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), church youth leaders, mosque youth leaders, tertiary institutes, regional press, and NGOs dealing with alcoholic, narcotics, HIV and AIDS (art 9(1)).

Fatwā concerning the legality, based on their interpretation of Islamic law, of fulfilling the Friday prayer (Jumuʿa) at home, instead of at a mosque (masjid) or public prayer venue. The answer provided by the Mufti of Australia and The Australian Fatwa Council, dated 18 March 2020, is that their interpretation of Islamic law permits for a Muslim, in the event of a pandemic that threatens one’s life, such as COVID-19, which is spread through close social interaction, to not have to attend the daily congregational prayers and Friday prayer.

This is a reference to the location of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's house in Medina, which can be found in the oldest partially-surviving account of the city by Ibn Shabba (d. 262 AH). Al-Ṣādiq's house was located southeast of the Prophet's mosque next to the house of the prominent Companion Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī (d. 52 AH).

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

The applicant's husband, Usman bin Abd. Latif, passed away in 2001 due to illness. He and the applicant had married in 1955 in Baiturrahim Mosque in Beutong, Labuhan Haji Timur, South Aceh, and had five children. Usman had worked as a farmer his whole life and never had a steady income. The applicant did not hold a certified marriage certificate, however, which she needed in order to apply for a passport so that she could embark on the hajj. Therefore, she requested that the court ratify her marriage.

Acceding to the applicant's request, the court found that the applicant's marriage to the deceased met the requirements of marriage according to Islam, as enunciated in art 14 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Moreover, it met the requirements of art 7(3)(d) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, in that the marriage took place prior to the enactment of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

In this excerpt from his chronicle, Ibn al-Jawzī relates an incident in 530/1135–6 in which a woman was publicly immolated in the central mosque. In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange cites this example of punitive burning to make the point that judges viewed their own function in adjudication along lines similar to divine judgment: in spite of the circulation of ḥadīths such as “Only the Lord of Fire punishes with fire,” rulers and judges had no qualms about burning criminals.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt from his manual on judicial practice, Khaṣṣāf describes the appropriate etiquette that the qāḍīmust observe when undertaking his judicial activities.  Khaṣṣāf describes the qāḍī’s preliminary rituals, the location of the parties within the courtroom, and the handling of the archive containing files pertaining to the day’s cases.In her chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Nahed Samour uses this passage to provide a spatial description of a court’s setting in a mosque, confirming the presence of jurist-advisors next to the judge.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Municipal Rural Affairs and Housing has issued a draft law forbidding any public firm from using the names of any kings of Saudi Arabia, the crown prince, or heads of states of friendly countries without the government’s permission. The law also forbids naming any public firms using the names of the Three Holy Mosques and most of the 99 Names of Allah. Public facilities may also not be named in contradiction to Islamic law. The draft bill allows for naming public facilities after heads of state of friendly countries who made outstanding contributions to supporting the position of Saudi Arabia, Islamic religious scholars, martyrs on duty, names of battles fought by the Prophet in which Muslims were victorious, and the most eminent early and contemporary Muslim scholars.

In this excerpt, Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) relays cases in which a presiding judge revealed the falsity of the petitioner’s or defendant’s claim by employing shrewd investigative techniques to detect their guilt. For example, in one case the petitioner accused the defendant of failing to return money he had entrusted to him. The judge bade the petitioner to go to the mosque in Karkh where he claimed the money had been transferred and fetch a page of the Qurʾānic muṣḥaf kept there, so the defendant might swear his innocence on it. Once the petitioner was on his way, the judge asked the defendant whether he thought the petitioner had already reached the mosque. Although the defendant had claimed that he was not familiar with the site in question, he answered, “Not yet.” Having caught the defendant in a lie, the judge decided the defendant was deceitful and must return the money to the petitioner. In a second case, the judge of Hamadān discerned the dishonesty of a man who was called to give testimony by noting a difference in his stride. The man usually walked with a measured stride, taking a certain number of steps through the courtyard when he was called as a witness, but this time the judge noticed that the crossing took him several additional steps, “indicating that he walked slower to feign dignity.” The judge thus drew on his individual knowledge of the witness’s behavior to reject the latter’s credibility on the basis of subtle evidence. In his chapter on circumstantial evidence in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Hossein Modarressi cites these cases to illustrate how the judge might employ various forms of evidence, including his own knowledge, in order to resolve a case and achieve justice. However, he notes that both instances occurred before the stage of the case at which procedural due process begins, and thus they do not prove that the judge can employ personal knowledge later.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt from Quḍāt Qurṭuba, Khushanī (d. 361/971) describes a scene in which a woman appears before a certain judge Sulaymān b. Aswad al-Ghāfiqī (d. after 273/886), who was known for being both austere and prone to jesting, and says to him, “Look at your wretched one!” (meaning herself). The judge replies with a joke: “You are not my wretched one! My wretched one is Ibn ʿAmmār’s mule, which spends the whole day eating away at the bit at the door of the mosque!” The judge is referring to the starving mule of Ibn ʿAmmār, a professional witness, who keeps his mule with him at all times. In her chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, MaribelFierro refers to this account in the course of a discussion of judges’ diverse personalities to show that there were judges who were both serious and humorous.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Tajikistan (Jumhurii Tojikiston), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Tajikistan's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

Holding: The Court granted the adult petitioner leave to change her name from Eloise McCloud Wing to Zakiyyah Ashraf after her conversion to Islam, but denied leave to change petitioner’s eleven-year-old daughter’s name from Cheryl Ann Wing to Hafsah Ashraf. The Court held that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have a foreign-sounding Muslim name that would “set her apart and seem strange.”

Procedural Posture: Petitioner applied to the City Court of the City of New York for leave to change her and her daughter’s names. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the petitioner wished to change her and her daughter’s names to names from what she understood to be the Islamic tradition.

Judgment: Petitioner was granted leave to change her name, but not her daughter’s name, in an opinion authored by Justice Baer.

Facts: Eloise McCloud Wing converted from Christianity to Islam. Her eleven-year-old daughter, Cheryl Ann Wing, lived with Eloise following Eloise’s separation from her husband two years before the name-change petition. After Eloise’s conversion, Cheryl attended religious classes at a mosque and played with Muslim friends, and her mother said Cheryl wanted to be a Muslim and have a Muslim name. Eloise petitioned the court to change her and her daughter’s names to Zakiyyah Ashraf and Hafsah Ashraf, respectively. The Court stated that while an adult’s name change should be approved, a child’s name change should be approved only if it is in the child’s best interest. The Court found no compelling need for Cheryl’s name change, and noted that such a change might actually have an “adverse effect”: the proposed name would “set her apart and seem strange and foreign to her schoolmates and others.” The Court stated that the petition for Cheryl’s name change could be renewed when Cheryl turned 16, and was therefore old enough to make a mature decision about it on her own.

The Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 establishes the fatwā legalization process in the state of Selangor, Malaysia. It also establishes and outlines the role of the mufti as the chairman of Selangor’s state fatwā committee. It is the main piece of legislation governing Selangor's syariah courts, Islamic finance guidelines, individual conversion to Islam, as well as other Islamic regulations the state has determined to regulate. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Shri Lanka Prajatantrika Samajavadi Janarajaya/Ilankai Jananayaka Choshalichak Kutiyarachu), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Sri Lanka's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

The parties were married on 2 December 1971 and had three children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties had remained happily married for 29 years until 1998, when it became apparent that the defendant had married three other women, unbeknownst to the plaintiff. In 2000, when the defendant returned home to the plaintiff, the plaintiff provided the defendant with an ultimatum: remain with his new wife or return to the plaintiff. The defendant informed the plaintiff that he had no intention of divorcing his other wife, and that if the plaintiff wished to divorce the defendant, he would not object. For the next 10 years, the defendant had failed to provide the plaintiff or their children with any financial support, which, the plaintiff submitted, contravened art 34(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 80(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought from the defendant financial maintenance back payments for the past 10 years totalling IDR 180 million.

The plaintiff submitted that, on 18 October 2010, three persons attended the plaintiff's home to inform the plaintiff that the defendant intended to return to the home to renovate and reside on the second storey. Despite the parties' eldest child objecting to the defendant's return, the defendant insisted he was entitled to return to the home as he had built it himself, and that, furthermore, he was entitled to evict everyone living in it if he so chose. As the parties' marriage was no longer 'joyful and enduring', as envisaged by art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, the plaintiff sought a judicial divorce. She also sought to obtain her share of the parties' joint assets, namely the property in question.

The defendant disputed several of the plaintiff's submissions, namely that the defendant had married three other women, unbeknownst to the plaintiff. Rather, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff had provided him with money to annul his marriage to his second wife, that she had frequently invited the defendant to Gorontalo, that the parties had jointly applied for bank credit to increase the capital of their kiosk business, that the plaintiff and other persons had sought the defendant's permission to construct a mosque in front of the home, and that the parties' eldest child and her husband had visited the defendant and his second wife. The defendant conceded he had married for a third time, but only after he divorced his second wife, and that the third marriage only lasted a little under a year. The defendant also maintained that the plaintiff had never made any requests to him for money. Moreover, in 2000, his pension was a mere IDR 664,000 per month, while the plaintiff had ample funds from the parties' kiosk business, as well as from renting out several rooms in the parties' home to other persons.

With regard to the plaintiff being visited by three persons, the defendant maintained they had only done so to inform the plaintiff that the defendant wished to repair the parties' marriage. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff's assertion regarding art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage and the state of the parties' marriage was unfortunate given it did not consider the parties' ages, nor the consequences of divorce. Finally, the defendant requested that the court disregard the plaintiff's claims to the parties' property.

The court acknowledged witness evidence, provided pursuant to art 22(2) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, that the parties had been separated since 2000, and that the defendant had only visited the parties' property in 2005 and 2009 when two of the parties' children married. Therefore, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's claim for financial maintenance back payments, acknowledging the defendant's appeal to the small amount his pension afforded him on a monthly basis. Pursuant to art 35(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, it declared the property a joint asset of the parties and ordered a 50/50 split. The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay costs (IDR 1,701,000).

The plaintiff (KH. Moch. Yusman Roy) was the caretaker of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf, an i'tikaf (seclusion in a mosque) study group venue in Malang, East Java, where Qur'anic study and recitation activities were held, and the production of prayer carpets (sajadah), pillows, and bolsters was conducted. The defendant, the Regent (Bupati) of Malang, had issued a decree declaring the cessation of the activities of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf. The plaintiff submitted that he had received the decree, dated 7 May 2005, through a family member. On 6 May 2005 at 8.00pm, however, the plaintiff submitted that he had been arrested and interrogated by the Malang Regional Police. Therefore, the legal process had been implemented prematurely and without authority. Moreover, that in issuing the decree, the defendant had acted unilaterally, without considering all the relevant concerns. Therefore, pursuant to art 53(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of Law No. 9 of 2004 on Amendments to Law No. 5 of 1989 on the State Administration of the Judiciary, as the plaintiff had suffered loss as the result of a state administrative decree, he was entitled to submit a written application to the authorised court seeking that the decree be declared null and void, and seeking damages as an additional remedy. The plaintiff also requested that the court suspend the implementation of the defendant's decree, pursuant to art 67(2) of Law No. 5 of 1986, and that the investigation of the case be conducted as quickly as possible, pursuant to art 98 of Law No. 5 of 1986.

In its exceptions, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff's submissions were incorrect and inaccurate because the plaintiff had already submitted a request for protection, dated 6 May 2005, to the Malang Regional Police, expressing concern and fear for the consequences of his having taught sholat and do'a (prayers) in both Arabic and Indonesian. The plaintiff's conduct had allegedly generated a negative reaction from the community towards the plaintiff. It was in accordance with the plaintiff's request that the Malang Police conducted its investigation and arrest on 7 May 2005. The legal consequences that followed had, therefore, resulted from the plaintiff's request, rather than the issuance of the regental decree. The regental decree had been issued in consideration of Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion, meaning that both an administrative action and criminal conduct had occurred, for the purposes of art 10 of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Administration. Moreover, purusant to art 27(1)(c) of Law No. 32 of 2014, the regental decree had been issued in accordance with the obligations of a regional head to maintain peace and order. More specifically, it was issued in anticipation of anarchic reactions from other parties who did not share the religious opinions of the plaintiff that it was acceptable to conduct sholat in Indonesian, as well as the original Arabic.

The defendant also submitted that the state administrative court was precluded from adjudicating the case pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 5 of 1986, because it had issued the regental decree during a time when the public interest dictated it do so. In addition to adhering to Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965, the regental decree also accorded with art 156(a) of the Criminal Code because it acknowledged that the plaintiff's conduct was defamatory towards a religion.

The court dismissed the defendant's exceptions in their entirety. It reiterated the constitutioanlly-guaranteed freedom to practise one's religion and beliefs in accordance with their own conscience, as found in art 28E(1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution, as well as Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. The court noted that these guarantees derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which identifies basic human rights and freedoms which are naturally connected to, and inseparable from, humans from the moment they are born. The court also noted, however, that as the defendant had deemed the activities of Pondok Iktikaf Jamaah Njagi Lelaku to have the potential to disturb the peace and order of the community, it was of the opinion that the cessation of these activities constituted a preventative measure to protect the human rights of others, and that maintaining the peace was in the public interest, per art 73 of Law No. 39 of 1999, which states that rights and freedoms can only be limited by, and pursuant to, statute. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's request that the regental decree issued by the defendant be revoked on the grounds that it was not contrary to any statute. Moreover, it dismissed the plaintiff's request that the defendant reinstate the good name of the plaintiff on the same grounds.

A petition sent to the Ottoman Sultan from Egypt in 1155 AH (1742-3), concerning a dispute between a Muslim and a Christian in the town of Zifta. The Muslim petitioner attempts to enforce the regulation of the Pact of 'Umar that forbids non-Muslims from having houses taller than those of Muslims. Baldwin's commentary on the petition focuses on how the petitioning process relates to the sharīʿa court system in the Ottoman Empire.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.