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This order implements the decision from the District Court of Colorado in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez, who adopted the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang that government officials not receive immunity but that the court dismiss Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions. This order implements that recommendation and decision adopted by the district court.

In this decision, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez adopts the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review of the record, Judge Martinez agreed with Judge Wang’s recommendation that the government officials were not entitled to immunity, as petitioner Ray Anthony Smith had made sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie claim. Also following Judge Wang’s recommendations, Judge Martinez dismissed Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to aḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of hisḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon reviewing the record, in Smith v. Crockett, U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang determined that the petitioner alleged actions that sufficed to make out a basic claim and recommended that government officials should not receive immunity. The Judge recommended, however, dismissal of Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

In a Q&A fatwa format, Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Husaini Sistani is asked whether it is permissible to slaughter an animal, based on the Islamic halal rituals, that has been stunned before slaughter. It is noted that this way of slaughtering an animal–using the technology to stun– the animal has become common. The answer published is yes.  

In two Q&A fatwas, Ayatollah Nasir Makarim Shirazi is asked about the permissibility of electrical shock to the animal (stunning) before zibh (ritual slaughter). Ayatollah Nasir Makarim Shirazi allows for such conduct as long as the animal is not dead as a result of stunning. He goes one step further in calling stunning the animal a preferred method if it is proven that it reduces the pain of the animal.

This statute regulates the halal certification of food and beverages, how to obtain certification, and what to do with certification. It also identifies who can act as a halal certifying body and who can act as a halal auditing body.

The Plaintiff Amir Shabazz challenged the Pleasant Valley State Prison for their policy of denying Muslim inmates ḥalāl meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The Plaintiff contended that Muslim inmates were denied ḥalāl meat, instead forcing them to eat vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff argued that this constituted religious discrimination under RLUIPA and the Fourteenth Amendment, since Jewish inmates were provided with kosher options and therefore were not forced to similarly eat the vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff claimed that this treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court found that the facts put forth by the plaintiff were "vague and inconsistent," and therefore that the Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claim against the Respondent. 

Plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, challenged prison policies that (1) failed to provide a Muslim chaplain and an adequate number of Islamic services; (2) prohibited religious meetings without a volunteer present; (3) failed to provide ḥalāl meals and a location where he may perform five daily ṣalāt (prayers); and (4) prohibited him from wearing a kufi (prayer cap) or an Islamic medallion outside of his clothing. The Court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison's policies substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, as required for a finding of a violation of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and that where plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial burden, the prison had demonstrated that its policies were the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest in safety and security.

Plaintiff Sturgeon Stewart, an inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) brought suit against Respondents Vernestene Dulin, head of prison food services, and various other prison officials for alleged violations of his rights to religious free exercise on the claim that the prison served Muslim inmates the same ḥalāl food menu for all meals of the day, and that these meals excluded meat. Ḥalāl food is meat prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual law, and free of pork and alcohol. The Plaintiff contended that this repetition was not a nutritional religious-accommodating alternative to regular prison meals. The Court found for the Respondents, determining that Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided ḥalāl meat entrees. Rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ḥarām (prohibited under Islamic law). The Court found that, as long as the Plaintiff was given an alternative to eating non-ḥalāl meat, he did not suffer a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. The Court determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with alternatives to non-ḥalāl meat, but that the Plaintiff was “simply not happy with the substitutions offered.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations, construed as true, failed to establish a violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.

The plaintiff, Tracey Taylor, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Illinois), brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the respondents Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart for alleged violations of his civil rights in denying him access to Islamic prayer services and by failing to serve ḥalāl meat (prepared in accordance with Islamic law). The respondents moved for summary judgment after alleging that Taylor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they violated his constitutional rights. The Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, determining that the denial of Islamic prayer services was related to a legitimate penological interest, and that the prison had adequately provided the plaintiff with sufficiently nutritious Islamic meals, even though they were vegetarian/vegan.

The plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, sued state and prison officials for failing to provide Muslim inmates with ḥalāl meat options while incarcerated. The defendants claimed that inmates in the custody of the state are not entitled, under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA, to a diet that includes ritually-slaughtered meat. The defendants also requested summary judgment because they claimed that Wells-Bey did not have an allergy to eggs that inhibited his ability to eat a lacto-ovo diet as a substitute for meat. The Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff claimed he had an egg allergy and therefore could not subsist off the vegetarian meal plan; however, the Court allowed the defendants to refile their motion if they were able to obtain more information about the plaintiff's "alleged allergy."

The Plaintiff, Marcus Leeotis Watts, sued the Respondents, various prison officials at the Perry Correctional Institution in South Carolina, for allegedly violating his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment when the prison failed to provide Muslim prisoners with ḥalāl meat. The Respondents contended that the vegetarian meal option that complied with Islamic law was adequate, and sought summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Respondents, citing earlier case law providing that the failure to provide a ḥalāl diet containing meat did not substantially burden prisoners' exercise of religion because a Muslim prisoner is not religiously-obligated to eat meat.

This fatwa regulates the consumption of halal products in food, drinks, medicine, cosmetics, etc.

This fatwa regulates the standardisation of halal labelling for food, drinks, the use of names and ingredients, microbes and the consumption of frogs.

This fatwa regulates the lawful slaughter of animals, the quality of the animal, the role and duties of the slaughterer, the standard quality of the devices used for slaughtering, and the standardisation of processing, preservation and shipping.

This fatwa states that the use of cosmetics is permissible provided that those cosmetics:

1. comprise halal and holy ingredients;
2. are used for shari'a-compliant purposes; and
3. are not hazardous.

The fatwa forbids the use of internal cosmetics that contain unclean (najis) or forbidden (haram) ingredients, but permits external cosmetics that contain such ingredients provided those ingredients are not pork products, and the person using such cosmetics washes themselves afterwards. Among other provisions, the fatwa also states that cosmetics containing genetically-modified microbes that contain swine or human genes are forbidden. Moreover, cosmetics containing halal animal products where the method of slaughter of the animal is unknown are disliked (makruh tahrim), and should therefore be avoided, as should cosmetics that potentially contain pork-based products until it is clear as to whether or not they in fact do.

The Plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, challenged prison policies that 1) failed to provide adequately nutritional ḥalāl meals, and 2) denied them the ritual end-of-Ramadan feast. The District Court found that the ḥalāl meals provided did not substantially burden the Plaintiffs' religious practice. The District Court also decided that although the denial of the ritual feast marking the end of Ramadan substantially burdened the Plaintiffs' beliefs, the prison demonstrated that this policy was the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in security.

The plaintiff, Kiaza Loccenitt, a Muslim inmate in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction, sued New York City and several prison officials for allegedly violating his civil rights by denying him ḥalāl meals and by denying him and other Muslim inmates in his unit the services of an imām (Muslim chaplain). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, as well as New York Corrections Law § 610. In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against some of the prison officials (who were not directly involved in the alleged violations or the creation of policies that led to the alleged violations), but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to add factual details to his allegation about being denied ḥalāl meals, and about "the impact of that denial on the practice of his religion."

The plaintiff, Sefidkar Janali, a Shi'a Muslim, claimed that he should be allowed to attend a worship service apart from Sunni Muslims. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment rights and RLUIPA because Muslims are not allowed different worship times, while other denominations have separate times. The plaintiff also alleged that he should be provided a ḥalāl diet (upon entering the prison, he was given the choice of a regular meal, vegetarian meal, or Jewish Kosher meals). The District Court found that the prison officials did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment or RLUIPA rights because there were legitimate security and administrative concerns with offering separate Shi'a and Sunni services. The District Court similarly found that the meal options provided for Muslim inmates was adequate because they were lawful options for Muslims. The District Court therefore granted summary judgment for the respondents.