SHARIAsource

In this literary source purportedly recounting early episodes of judges, Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) issues a clever ruling for ʿAbbāsid Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, effectively saving his son – a prince – from an accusation of zinā (fornication or adultery) by operation of the “doubt canon,” which requires legal officials to “avoid criminal punishments in cases of doubt.” The doubt here is a judicial knowledge, rather than established evidence by a confession or witnesses. He is rewarded by being made Chief Judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of Baghdad.

This case is an appeal of a zinā (fornication) conviction by the Upper Sharīʿa Court of Gwadabawa, Nigeria, on several grounds, including: the trial court's lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the Sharīʿa Penal Code upon which the appellant's trial and conviction was based came into existence after the alleged commission of the offense, and the failure of the trial court to explain the nature of the crime to the accused person. During the proceedings, the Appellant's counsel retracted the confession that the appellant had made to the trial court. The Court held that a person cannot be punished for an offense not known to law at the time of commission. The Court further determined that, because the Sharīʿa Penal Law of Sokoto State had not been enacted at the time the offense was committed, the conviction was invalid. Furthermore, it determined that the confession of the Appellant before the trial court was invalid due to the defects in the charge and the failure to explain the offense to the Appellant. Even if the confession had been valid, its retraction upon appeal was valid because retraction of confession is valid at any time before judgment. Pregnancy by a divorced or widowed woman is not conclusive proof of zinā where such pregnancy occurs within 5-6 years of the previous marriage. It is an overriding principle (according to the doubt canon) that where doubt exists, fixed criminal penalties (ḥadd penalties) should be avoided. The Court quashed the conviction.

Two people were accused of jointly committing the offense of zinā (fornication). The Court determined that zinā is established through a confession, the evidence of witnesses, or pregnancy in the case of an unmarried woman or a woman without a husband. As a divorcee, the woman’s confession, pregnancy, and birth of a child constituted sufficient proof of the commission of zinā. The Court convicted her and sentenced her to death by stoning. The Court further determined that the accused man’s declaration of innocence backed by an oath on the Qurʾān was sufficient to exculpate him. The Court discharged him. The woman appealed her conviction.

Amina Lawal appealed the decision of the Upper Sharīʿa Court, Funtua, upholding her conviction of the capital crime of zinā (fornication) by the Sharīʿa Court of Bakori. As she had done in the appeals court, the Appellant retracted the confession made before the trial court. The Court held that a single confession is not a sufficient ground for a zinā conviction. Therefore, it determined that the Appellant's confession before the trial court was not a sufficient basis for conviction. Further, it determined that retraction of a confession for an offense that impinged on the “rights of God” [ḥuqūq Allāh] (such as zinā or alcohol consumption) is permissible and valid even after judgment, if made before the execution of a sentence. The Court also held that a child born by an unmarried woman within seven years of a former marriage is affiliated with the former husband [following the paternity canon in Islamic law], and under such circumstances, childbirth does not constitute proof of zinā. The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

Amina Lawal appealed her zinā (fornication) conviction by the lower court on several grounds, including: the inconclusive proof of zinā by the appellant's pregnancy because she had been married within the previous five years; the improper constitution of the Court as the kadi (qāḍī) had sat alone, without two other members, as required by law; and the invalidity of the appellant's confession by the failure of the Court to explain the meaning of zinā. Along with the grounds of appeal, the appellant’s counsel tendered a retraction of the confession that was made before the lower court. All grounds of the appeal failed. The Court held that the appellant’s confession before the lower court was valid as her testimony there indicated that she understood the meaning of zinā. This valid confession coupled with her failure to assert that her divorced husband fathered the child constituted proof of commission of zinā. The Court determined that sharīʿa (based on its understanding of Qurʾān, ḥadīth [prophetic reports], ijmāʿ [consensus], ijtihād [interpretation], and ʿurf [custom]) is supreme and overrides legislative enactments on the composition of the court. Therefore, the failure of the trial court to be constituted as required by legislation does not invalidate the decision, because the decision was issued in compliance with the dictates of sharīʿa. Amina Lawal successfully appealed this decision to the Sharia Court of Appeal.

In Ayub Masih v. State (23 Aug 2022), Justice Qazi Faez Isa and Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah granted bail on an interim petition, pending trial, to the plaintiff Salamat Mansha Masih, who was arrested for “preaching and making blasphemous remarks” in April 2021. Masih was denied bail by the Sessions Judge and the Judge of the High Court, who relied on the First Information Report (FIR), which alleges that the petitioner was a preacher, and the statements of the four witnesses. Upon review, the Supreme Court declared that an “examination of the charge reveals material deficiencies ... [and] does not contain a number of prescribed requirements with regard to the framing of the charge,” casting doubt on the reliablity of the FIR and testimony from the four witnesses. Namely, the Court pointed to the misidentification of the petitioner as a preacher, and the lack of corroborating evidence for the witness testimony. Remanding the case without deciding on the merits, the Court charged the lower courts with observing the constitutional requirements for fair trials in blasphemy and other criminal law cases. Constitutional requirements of applying shari'a, alongside its fundamental rights and fair trial provisions, include consideration of the Islamic law doubt canon instructing judges to ”avoid criminal punishments in cases of doubt”), and thereby requiring heightened procedures, a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for criminal convictions. For further studies of the doubt canon, together with the heightened procedures, standards of proof, and interpretive norms requiring lenity in Islamic criminal law, see Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2015).

In his work entitled al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir, Ibn Nujaym (d. 969/1563), examines similar historical legal cases and fatwas through collecting substantive legal canons and interpretive legal canons that “distinguish, explain, and guide varied outcomes in cases with seemingly similar facts.” As a principal work authored early in the Ottoman Era collecting legal canons in Ḥanafī law, Muslim jurists of many schools frequently reference his work. For example, drafters of the Ottoman Code of 1869, also known as the Mecelle, primarily relied on this work to select 99 legal canons to preface a new commercial code based on Ḥanafī law that would both modernize and reform Ottoman law based on traditional or classical Islamic legal norms, through reference to legal canons.

For more, view the full print edition or see Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) and “Experiments in Tracking Canons across the Mecelle” (Islamic Law Blog, March 16, 2022).

The Pakistan Supreme Court has acquitted Asia Bibi of blasphemy charges, removing her from death row. A Pakistani Christian woman, Asia Bibi, was arrested in 2010 after a dispute with her Muslim co-workers in which they claimed that she insulted the Prophet Muhammad. The state prosecutor charged her with blasphemy and the trial court sentenced her to death. The courts subsequently dismissed her appeal to the Lahore High Court. After a lengthy series of appeals, the Pakistan Supreme Court acquitted Asia Bibi of blasphemy charges, vacating her sentence. The decision navigates between affirming the law and reversing its application to Ms. Bibi. The Court notes on the one hand that blasphemy was a severe offense under classic Islamic law, and it upholds capital punishment for it, citing Muhammad Ismail Qureshi v. Pakistan (PLD 1991 FSC 10). The Court concludes, on the other hand, that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant “beyond reasonable doubt.” It noted “glaring and stark contradictions in the evidence,” and cited evidence that the prosecution’s witnesses harbored ill will against Asia Bibi and thus may have fabricated the allegations. According to the Court, “even if there was some grain of truth in the allegations … the glaring contradictions in the evidence … clearly show that the truth in this case had been mixed with a lot which was untrue.” In the end, the Court notes the abuse of the blasphemy charge, and condemns people with “nefarious designs” who level false allegations of blasphemy, citing Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State (PLD 2016 SC 17). This decision thus upholds blasphemy laws but cautions against broad and false applications of it.

In September 2019, a Multan Sessions Court (state trial court) issued its decision in State v. Muhammad Waseem et. al, a high-profile honor killing case in Pakistan. The case involved the killing of Qandeel Baloch, a controversial social media star, who was found strangled to death in her home on July 16, 2016. In a witness statement on the day of the occurrence, the deceased’s parents accused their son (Muhammad Waseem) for killing their daughter. Waseem was arrested and, shortly thereafter, admitted to murdering his sister “in the name of Gairat” during interrogation. The next day, Waseem repeated the confession in front of a Judicial Magistrate in a recorded statement. In December 2018, the State instituted a criminal case against Waseem and five other defendants for the offenses of qatl-i-amd (intentional homicide) and “abetment” of qatl-i-amd. At the onset of trial, Waseem retracted his judicial confession and the victim’s parents waived their right of qisas (retribution) against him. After evaluating the facts, circumstances, and evidence admitted at trial, the court held that the prosecution had proved “beyond shadow of reasonable doubt” that Waseem strangled his sister to death and that this was a case of honor killing. Despite a waiver of qisas (pardoning of the accused) by the deceased’s legal heirs, the court sentenced Waseem to life imprisonment as ta’zir (discretionary punishment). The other defendants were acquitted for lack of sufficient circumstantial evidence against them.

A Maryland court ruled that Sharīʿa Court lacked jurisdiction in a custody case since the couple never resided in the jurisdiction of the Sharīʿa Court. 

A petition sent to the Ottoman Sultan from Egypt in 1155 AH (1742-3), concerning a dispute between a Muslim and a Christian in the town of Zifta. The Muslim petitioner attempts to enforce the regulation of the Pact of 'Umar that forbids non-Muslims from having houses taller than those of Muslims. Baldwin's commentary on the petition focuses on how the petitioning process relates to the sharīʿa court system in the Ottoman Empire.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.