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The Plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, challenged prison policies that 1) failed to provide adequately nutritional ḥalāl meals, and 2) denied them the ritual end-of-Ramadan feast. The District Court found that the ḥalāl meals provided did not substantially burden the Plaintiffs' religious practice. The District Court also decided that although the denial of the ritual feast marking the end of Ramadan substantially burdened the Plaintiffs' beliefs, the prison demonstrated that this policy was the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in security.

The Plaintiff, Christopher B. Scott, brought suit against Dekalb County prison officials. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment constitutional rights by 1) not providing a Muslim chaplain; 2) not allowing Muslim prisoners to wear a kufi; 3) failing to provide a secure and private place to pray five times a day; and 4) not providing a special meal at the end of Ramadan. The Respondents sought summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, claiming that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedies necessary to bring suit. The Magistrate Court recommended that the Respondents' motion for summary judgment be granted on the Plaintiff's claims concerning the wearing of a kufi and concerning the celebration of an end-of-Ramadan meal. Summary judgment for all other claims was denied.

Plaintiff William C. McKinnedy, a South Carolina inmate, brought this suit against the Respondents, over 30 South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) staff members and state government officials, alleging that the Respondents violated his religious beliefs by 1) refusing to provide a food tray prior to sun-up during Ramadan; and 2) not allowing the Plaintiff to attend the Eid feast at the conclusion of Ramadan. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that on multiple occasions the Plaintiff informed the Chaplain that he did not consider himself part of the Muslim community. The Magistrate Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, determining that the Defendants’ refusal to allow the Plaintiff to participate in Ramadan was related to a legitimate penological interest, such as security concerns.

The Court reversed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant prison officials, John McGinnis, Patrick McGann, and Gordon Lord. Plaintiff Wayne Ford sued under § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights by the denial of his request to attend the Eid al-Fitr feast (the holiday at the end of Ramadan); prison officials had moved the event to fall several days after its official occurrence in order that it coincide with a weekend. Defendants argued that their denial of plaintiff inmate’s request to attend the event did not amount to a constitutional violation because the event, once moved, no longer fell on a date of religious significance. The Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because the matter required closer scrutiny of the Turner/O’Lone Test (which balances prisoners' religious accommodation requests with legitimate penological concerns) than the District Court accorded it before finding in favor of either party.

The Plaintiffs, Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) prisoners Eric Dowdy, Averis X Wilson, Roger Hunt, Amira Salem, Tom Traini, Patricia L. Caruso, Dave Burnett, and Michael Martin, alleged that the Defendants, various MDOC employees, violated their rights under federal and state constitutional provisions and RLUIPA by unlawfully restricting their religious practices. Specifically, the Plaintiffs challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate certain religious practices which they claimed must be observed during particular days and times each week. The Muslim Plaintiffs specifically challenged that the inability to attend Friday (jumuʿa) prayer services without obtaining permission to exercise a “call-out”—permission which is often denied—violated their federal and state constitutional rights. The Muslim Plaintiffs also challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate their religious dietary restrictions and their observance of the Eid al-Fīṭr and Eid al-Aḍḥā feasts. In response to the first allegation, the Respondents claim that there is a legitimate governmental interest in prison security that would be compromised if inmates were allowed to attend prayer services. The District Court determined, however, that while a legitimate governmental interest existed, the restriction of prayer services was not the least restrictive means of protecting this compelling interest in prison security. Accordingly, the District Court did not grant summary judgment in response to the Plaintiffs’ Friday prayer claim. In response to the second allegation, the Court determined that failure to provide Muslim inmates with a ḥalāl diet substantially burdens a religious exercise, but found that a question of fact exists as to whether the Plaintiffs received such a diet.

Plaintiff Peter McDaniels sued various prison officials, alleging that they intentionally failed to provide him with pre-sunrise meals during Ramadan and with an Eid al-Fitr meal at the conclusion of Ramadan, in violation of his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The Plaintiff also contended that the lack of provision of ḥalāl meat and deprivation of an Arabic Qurʾān for nine months were discriminatory violations of his rights. The Respondents moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Respondents' request for summary judgment on the Ramadan meals issue, stating that the Plaintiff failed to show that such failures to provide a meal on isolated incidents imposed a significant restriction on his religious practice. However, the District Court decided that the Respondents did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the religious diet policy furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the Respondents deprived the Plaintiff of his rights by not allowing him access to a Qurʾān, finding that the Respondents were not required to provide the Plaintiff with an Arabic Qurʾān or dates to be used in his devotional practice, given the absence of any showing that Respondents prevented him from obtaining such items. The Plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief, but the Court found that the individual Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, so they could not be held liable for personal damages under RLUIPA.

The parties were married on 19 November 2011 and had one child. Initially, the marriage was harmonious. Entering their third year as husband and wife, however, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. The plaintiff submitted that this was because the defendant would often leave their home without informing the plaintiff, not return until the middle of the night, without any legitimate excuse, and sometimes return enraged, sometimes even physically harming the plaintiff and their child.

Following Eid al-Fitr (Idul Fitri) in 2014, the parties had begun to sleep in separate beds. On several occasions, the plaintiff had reminded and counselled the defendant to treat his family well. Her advice fell on deaf ears, however, as the defendant's behaviour worsened, resulting in him leaving the plaintiff, and returning to his own parents' home. The plaintiff submitted that, in order to protect the welfare of the parties' child, as well as that of her own, and taking into account that the child was under the age of 12 (mumayyiz), she should, pursuant to art 150 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, be granted custody of the child. Moreover, that the defendant should be ordered to pay to the plaintiff IDR 5 million per month in child maintenance until the child had either reached adulthood or was independent. The plaintiff also submitted that a judicial divorce (talak satu bain sughra) was the only feasible option.

Following deliberations between the court and the plaintiff's legal representation, the plaintiff agreed to temporarily withdraw her application for divorce on the grounds that she was heavily pregnant. Accordingly, despite the defendant's absence from court, the parties remained married. The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay court costs (IDR 261,000).

The parties were married on 30 March 2001, after having divorced in 1999. They had two children. Several years after remarrying, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly due to differences of opinion. The plaintiff submitted that this problem had not been insurmountable, however, as evidenced by the parties remarrying in 2001 for the sake of their children. Regardless, the parties would often quarrel, the plaintiff submitted, because the defendant had failed to appreciate her as his wife, and because the defendant would exacerbate trivial issues in order to start an argument with the plaintiff. The plaintiff also conceded that she would go quiet when the defendant would start arguing with her because she was embarrassed to be seen arguing with the defendant by the parties' children, their neighbours, and family.

For the past six years the parties had been sleeping in separate beds, after the defendant had chosen to sleep in another room. This had gravely affected the plaintiff. Problems escalated during Eid al-Fitr (Idul Fitri) in 2014 when the defendant confessed to having married another woman without the plaintiff's permission. The plaintiff learned from the defendant that his other wife lived in East Java, and that they had been married for the past two years. When given an ultimatum by the plaintiff, the defendant had chosen to maintain both marriages. As a result, the plaintiff felt there was no other course available but to divorce.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Burundi (Republique du Burundi/Republika y'u Burundi), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Burundi's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The parties were married on 5 November 2005 and had one child. The applicant submitted that, since 2006, he and the respondent had quarrelled regularly because the respondent:

1. did not want to join the applicant at the applicant's place of residence; and
2. often became angry/emotional and would mention divorce, as well as ordering the applicant to marry someone else.

The respondent had left the matrimonial home and returned to her parents' home on 11 August 2010, where she had remained for the four months leading up to the proceeding. During this time the parties had not communicated.

The respondent admitted to often being angry and mentioning divorce. She justified this, however, on the grounds that every time the parties were physically intimate the applicant would say he felt like the respondent was raping him. Accordingly, the respondent told the applicant that if he was not happy with the respondent, he should divorce her and remarry. The respondent also objected to the applicant's claim that the respondent had left the matrimonial home in August 2010, stating that she had left the matrimonial home then to spend Lebaran (Eid al-Fitr) with her parents in Bulukumba. Moreover, that the applicant even accompanied the respondent to Bulukumba and stayed for a week before returning to Makassar. The respondent further alleged that the applicant was yet to return to Bulukumba because he had already married another woman, and that the parties remained in contact via telephone because of their children.

Given the parties' evident ongoing conflict, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). It also ordered the applicant, pursuant to arts 149 and 160 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, to pay to the respondent IDR 300,000 per month in child maintenance, as well as IDR 1 million in mut'ah (divorce compensation) and IDR 1 million in iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted).