SHARIAsource

This fatwa states that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights accords with the aims and values of Islamic teachings, which protect the rights of every person to life and dignity. It qualifies, however, that the following articles of the Declaration are contrary to Islam:

1. art 16(1) and (2) on the freedom to marry without limitation due to nationality, race or religion;
2. art 18 on the freedom to change religion; and
3. art 23 on work.

The fatwa obliges Muslims to accept, respect and uphold universal human rights with the following conditions:

1. to value and respect differences of understanding, interpretations and implementation of human rights based on differences of culture, morality and laws in each country; and
2. an understanding and implementation of human rights must show a balance between individual rights and individual obligations, individual rights and communal rights, and freedoms and responsibilities.

The fatwa also states that, in relation to arts 16(1) and (2) and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Muslims are to adhere to Islamic teachings as freedom of religion is a human right.

This fatwa acknowledges the recent development of a stream of Islamic leadership established by Ahmad Moshaddeq which teaches a creed (syahadat) that differs from traditional Islamic teachings. The fatwa finds that, contrary to Islamic teachings, this new stream of Islam:

1. states: "Asyhadu alla ilaha illa Allah wa asyhadu anna masih al-Mau'ud Rasul Allah" ("I bear witness that there is no God except Allah, and I bear witness that the promised Messiah is the Messenger of God");
2. teaches that there is a new prophet/messenger (nabi/rasul) who came after the Prophet Muhammad SAW; and
3. does not oblige its followers to pray (shalat), fast (puasa) or perform the hajj (haji).

The fatwa declares that followers of this particular stream of Islam are apostates (murtad). It also urges the government to prohibit the dissemination of this interpretation of Islam, to close all places associated with it, and to silence its leadership, pursuant to current legislative provisions.

Amina Lawal appealed her zinā (fornication) conviction by the lower court on several grounds, including: the inconclusive proof of zinā by the appellant's pregnancy because she had been married within the previous five years; the improper constitution of the Court as the kadi (qāḍī) had sat alone, without two other members, as required by law; and the invalidity of the appellant's confession by the failure of the Court to explain the meaning of zinā. Along with the grounds of appeal, the appellant’s counsel tendered a retraction of the confession that was made before the lower court. All grounds of the appeal failed. The Court held that the appellant’s confession before the lower court was valid as her testimony there indicated that she understood the meaning of zinā. This valid confession coupled with her failure to assert that her divorced husband fathered the child constituted proof of commission of zinā. The Court determined that sharīʿa (based on its understanding of Qurʾān, ḥadīth [prophetic reports], ijmāʿ [consensus], ijtihād [interpretation], and ʿurf [custom]) is supreme and overrides legislative enactments on the composition of the court. Therefore, the failure of the trial court to be constituted as required by legislation does not invalidate the decision, because the decision was issued in compliance with the dictates of sharīʿa. Amina Lawal successfully appealed this decision to the Sharia Court of Appeal.

In this excerpt of his compendium of law-related ḥadīth reports, al-Ṣanʿānī (d.211/827) relays prophetic sources on various topics, among them an ambiguous ḥadīth on the criterion for witness eligibility, which states that, “No community may testify against another, except the community of Muḥammad.” Ahmed El Shamsy notes in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts that this verse is legally ambiguous. Later authorities debate its correct interpretation. While it is widely agreed that non-Muslims are ineligible to serve as witnesses against Muslims, some argue that in certain circumstances a scripturalist (generally defined as Jews and Christians) might testify against another scripturalist. Notably, Ṣanʿānī is the only source which transmits this ḥadīth, and it is not included in the work of his contemporary Ibn Abī Shayba.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this excerpt from his work of Quranic exegesis, Baghawī claims, on the authority of Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab and Ḍaḥḥāk, that God’s epithet al-muhayminis interpreted by some to mean “the judge” (al-qāḍī), and he reports that some even consider al-qāḍīone of the beautiful names of God. In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses this source to argue that although God is not referred to as qāḍīin the Quran, medieval exegetes regularly identified Him as such in their exegetical works. Lange notes, however, that the inclusion of al-qāḍīamong the divine names did not become standard.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt from his biographical dictionary of Egyptian judges, Kindī mentions a scribe (kātib) in describing an event that took place in the year 105–6/724. In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses this report in the context of a discussion of Q. 50:21 (“Every soul shall come, and with it a driver [sāʾiq] and a witness [shahīd]”). He reports that the term sāʾiqwas interpreted by some as kātib, and he points out that Kindī’s account shows that the kātibwas already an established functionary of the court by the end of the first century of Islam.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt from his book of admonitions, Qurṭubī deploys a Prophetic ḥadīth, “This is not a reckoning, it’s a [simple] exposure (ʿarḍ),” to explain Q. 84:7–9 (“As for one who is given his book in his right hand, he will be reckoned with an easy reckoning and will return to his people joyful”). In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses this source to highlight the ways in which medieval exegetes sought to avoid anthropomorphic interpretations of the Quran. He also points to Qurṭubī’s efforts to alleviate the concern that even true believers will undergo a reckoning (ḥisāb) as indicated inQ. 84:7–9 by arguing that it is only enemies of God who attempt to engage in disputation (jidāl) in order to evade divine judgment.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In his work entitled al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir, Ibn Nujaym (d. 969/1563), examines similar historical legal cases and fatwas through collecting substantive legal canons and interpretive legal canons that “distinguish, explain, and guide varied outcomes in cases with seemingly similar facts.” As a principal work authored early in the Ottoman Era collecting legal canons in Ḥanafī law, Muslim jurists of many schools frequently reference his work. For example, drafters of the Ottoman Code of 1869, also known as the Mecelle, primarily relied on this work to select 99 legal canons to preface a new commercial code based on Ḥanafī law that would both modernize and reform Ottoman law based on traditional or classical Islamic legal norms, through reference to legal canons.

For more, view the full print edition or see Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) and “Experiments in Tracking Canons across the Mecelle” (Islamic Law Blog, March 16, 2022).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Bhutan (Druk Gyalkhap), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bhutan's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea/North Korea (Choson-minjujuui-inmin-konghwaguk), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under North Korea's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (Al Jumhuriyah al Islamiyah al Muritaniyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Mauritania's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status and is the primary source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Morocco (Al Mamlakah al Maghribiyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Morocco's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status. 

This fatwa was issued in response to the following questions from the Attorney-General of the Republic of Indonesia:

1. Jamaah Muslimin Hizbullah is of the opinion that pledging an allegiance (berbai'at) to the Imam of Jamaah Muslimin Hizbullah is obligatory (wajib). What is the opinion of the Council?
2. Can the Council provide to the Attorney-General Qur'anic verses or Hadith regarding Islamic government/Caliphate (Jama'at Imamah/Khalifah) and swearing an oath (Bai'at) apart from that produced by Jemaat Muslimin Hizbullah?
3. What is the Council's opinion on the formation of Jamaat Muslimin Hizbullah under the leadership of Syeh Wall Al Fatah in 1953 which, until now, has continued under the leadersihp of Imam Haji Muhyiddin Hamdi?
4. Can the Council provide any further information in relation to Jamaah Muslimin Hizbullah?

In the fatwa, the Council provided, among other information, the following in response:

1. Jama'ah means more than two people, which, in this case, means at least two people who pray five times a day. Regular prayers are encouraged but are not obligatory (sunat mu' akkad), however, Friday prayers (shalat Juma'at) are considered a pillar of a Muslim's Friday (rukun Jum'at). There are even those who believe that congregating to pray fives times a day is obligatory for some Muslims (fardhu kifayah); that praying together reaps twice the rewards of praying on one's own, and is advocated by Islam. The Council also states that jama'ah in a societal context means working together for good against evil (amar ma'ruf nahi munkar), helping one another socially, and avoiding disunity.
2. Khalifah means representative (wakil), meaning the person elected by the jama'ah to become their leader. Historically, khalifah referred to the head of Islamic government at the time of the companions of the Prophet (sahabat).
3. Bai'at literally implies a handshake as a sign of an agreement. More specifically, however, it is an acknowledgment by the people of their leader's authority.
4. Jama'ah Muslimin Hizbullah is an Islamic people's organisation with its own interpretation of Islam. The Council acknowledges that there exist groups among Indonesia's Muslim population with differing views and beliefs on Islam, some of which diverge from the Qur'an and Hadith. Usually such divergent followings are limited in numbers and, over time, struggle to acquire more followers. That said, proselytisation (da'wah) efforts are indeed necessary to correct these incorrect interpretations of Islam.

The parties were married on 11 February 2001 and had one child. The applicant submitted, however, that around September-October 2013, he and the respondent had begun to quarrel regularly. This was the result of:

1. the respondent's distrust of the applicant, whereas the applicant provided the respondent space and time for her own activities;
2. an increasing incompatibility and difference of opinion between the two parties;
3. the respondent requesting the applicant return her to her family, which the applicant interpreted as the respondent wanting to separate from the applicant, despite the respondent returning to the applicant after being counselled by her older sibling; and
4. the above incidents leaving the applicant feeling uncomfortable in the respondent's presence and his feelings towards the respondent somewhat dissipated.

Indeed, the applicant and respondent had not been physically intimate since 2008.

The respondent refuted many of the applicant's submissions, primarily that the applicant's own sexual dysfunction caused by a blood condition, as well as his constantly playing golf, had caused the aforementioned rift.

After judicial mediation proved unsuccessful, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court also ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent maintenance costs of IDR 30 million backdated six months, as well as IDR 15 million for iddah (100-day period after divorce has been granted), and IDR 25 million for mut'ah (divorce compensation).

A UK family court considered whether and how UK law recognizes a marriage conducted according to Islamic law that had not been accompanied by a civil law marriage. The husband contended that the couple was never married, and the wife—petitioning for divorce—insisted that they were. The two had signed an Islamic marriage contract (nikāḥ) accompanied by a ceremony abroad, lived together and had children together, and held themselves out as married for years both abroad and in the UK. The court concluded that, on those facts and considering the UK laws on marriage—as interpreted, for the first time, through the Human Rights Act 1998 and the best interests of the child—that the marriage was “void” or “voidable.” This determination meant that the couple was not validly married under UK law but that their union was also not considered a non-marriage. Instead, as a void marriage, their union was something akin to what Islamic law would label a “defective marriage.” The court had essentially concluded that, although a marriage was not properly concluded or registered according to the law, the steps taken toward one would in some measure be recognized by the law and entitle the wife to certain legal protections upon dissolution of the union. In this case, this meant that the wife was entitled to a decree of nullity from the court, and that the wife could take advantage of certain UK civil law remedies for maintenance and child custody upon dissolution.

In these excerpts, the exegete Thaʿlabī provides interpretations of several Quranic verses pertaining to the heavenly court on the Day of Resurrection. In his commentary on Q. 39:69 (“The earth will shine with the light of its Lord. . . .”), Thaʿlabī presents reports explaining that God will manifest Himself (yatajallā) and illuminate the “open grounds of resurrection” (ʿaraṣāt al-qiyāma) with His light. In explaining Q. 2:210 (“God will come to them in canopies of clouds [fī ẓulalin min al-ghamām]”), Thaʿlabī cites al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s view that God is “inside a cover (fī sutra) of clouds, so that the people of the earth do not look at Him.” As for the expression “God will come to them,” Thaʿlabī notes that God’s “coming” (ityān)refers to “recompense” (al-jazāʾ). Recompense is referred to as “coming” just as how “frightening” (takhwīf) and “punishment” (taʿdhīb) are also referred to as “coming” in the story of Nimrod in Q. 16:26 (“Then God came upon their building from the foundations, and the roof fell down upon them from above, and the punishment came upon them when they were not aware”). In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses these reports to illustrate Muslim exegetes’ conceptions of the heavenly court and the ways in which they sought to explain away potentially anthropomorphic imagery in the Quran.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In Ayub Masih v. State (23 Aug 2022), Justice Qazi Faez Isa and Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah granted bail on an interim petition, pending trial, to the plaintiff Salamat Mansha Masih, who was arrested for “preaching and making blasphemous remarks” in April 2021. Masih was denied bail by the Sessions Judge and the Judge of the High Court, who relied on the First Information Report (FIR), which alleges that the petitioner was a preacher, and the statements of the four witnesses. Upon review, the Supreme Court declared that an “examination of the charge reveals material deficiencies ... [and] does not contain a number of prescribed requirements with regard to the framing of the charge,” casting doubt on the reliablity of the FIR and testimony from the four witnesses. Namely, the Court pointed to the misidentification of the petitioner as a preacher, and the lack of corroborating evidence for the witness testimony. Remanding the case without deciding on the merits, the Court charged the lower courts with observing the constitutional requirements for fair trials in blasphemy and other criminal law cases. Constitutional requirements of applying shari'a, alongside its fundamental rights and fair trial provisions, include consideration of the Islamic law doubt canon instructing judges to ”avoid criminal punishments in cases of doubt”), and thereby requiring heightened procedures, a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for criminal convictions. For further studies of the doubt canon, together with the heightened procedures, standards of proof, and interpretive norms requiring lenity in Islamic criminal law, see Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2015).

The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 established the legal grounds on which Muslim women in British India could obtain a judicial divorce without their husband's consent.

Section 2 permits a woman to seek divorce on nine grounds:
1. Her husband's whereabouts have been unknown for four years.
2. He has failed to provide maintenance for two years.
3. He has been sentenced to imprisonment for at least seven years.
4. He has failed to fulfill his marital obligations for three years without reasonable cause.
5. He was impotent at marriage and remains so.
6. He has been mentally ill for two years or suffers from a serious venereal disease.
7. She was married before age fifteen and repudiates the unconsummated marriage before eighteen.
8. He treats her cruelly, including through physical or psychological abuse, interference with her property or religious practice, or unequal treatment in a polygamous marriage.
9. Any other ground recognized under Muslim law.

Sections 3–5 provide additional rules.

Section 3: When a husband has disappeared, his prospective heirs must be notified of the divorce proceedings.
Section 4: A Muslim woman's renunciation of Islam or conversion to another religion does not automatically dissolve her marriage, subject to an exception for women returning to their former religion.
Section 5: Divorce under the Act does not extinguish a woman's existing rights to her mahr (dower).

Significance: The Act expanded Muslim women's ability to obtain divorce by codifying grounds for judicial dissolution, drawing partly on more permissive interpretations within Islamic jurisprudence. It also eliminated religious conversion as a general means of automatically terminating marriage, directing women toward judicial remedies instead.

This fatwa states that the Islam Jama'ah sect commenced in Indonesia in the 1970s. As its teachings were misled and misleading, and led to disquiet among Indonesian society, its interpretation of Islam was prohibited by the government in 1971. Islam Jama'ah, however, continued to operate under different names, which continued to change until 1977-78. The philosophy of Islam Jama'ah was that there were 72 categories of Muslims who were not part of Islam Jama'ah and would, therefore, be directed to hell.

The sect believed it had to appoint a Leader of Believers (Amirul Mukminin) as its central leadership; a leader who must be obeyed. Adherents had to pledge allegiance to this Leader in order to be guaranteed passage to heaven, and the only rightful and permissible Islamic teachings came from ther Leader. Adherents of the sect also had to cut off ties with persons from these other categories, even if those people were their parents; they were not allowed to pray behind people who were not adherents of Islam Jama'ah; they were not allowed to wear clothing for prayers that had been touched by people who were not adherents unless it had been cleansed; husbands even had to endeavour to make their wives join the sect, and if their wives refused, they would have to divorce them. A legitimate marriage was one officiated by the sect's leader, and for a sermon to be legitimate it would have to be conducted in Arabic.

This fatwa states that Islam Jama'ah, Darul Hadits (or whatever other pseudonym the sect may have adopted), is contrary to the teachings of Islam, and that its dissemination is designed to destablise the state. It implores Muslims to avoid its teachings and to return to the pure teachings of Islam with the intent and desire to similarly save those who have already chosen Islam as their religion from the wrath of Allah. It also implores people to report to their local public prosecutor any evidence of activities conducted by Islam Jama'ah.

(Translation by Seyed Bahman Khodadadi)

Islamic Republic of Iran
Judiciary
Supreme Court of the Country
General Administration of Uniformity of Judicial Decisions and Publication of Deliberations and Opinions of the General Board

Subject: Decision of the Unity of Procedure of the General Board of the Supreme Court
Opinion Number: 835

With the enactment of the Islamic Penal Law (1375) and the subsequent dissolution of public and revolutionary courts from [Iran's] judicial system, the responsibility for conducting preliminary investigations was assigned to the courts. Consequently, the reference to the "Prosecutor's Office" in Article 650 of the aforementioned law concerning perjury has become obsolete.

Following the re-establishment of the Prosecutor's Offices, Article 322 of the Criminal Procedure Law, approved in 1392, along with Article 209 of the same law, explicitly addresses the punishment for perjury, establishing a legal obligation for investigators regarding witness testimony. This provision emphasizes the necessity of enforcing penalties for violations committed by witnesses, thereby underscoring the duty of investigators to interpret the law with the intent of uncovering the legislative purpose.

Accordingly, the punishment prescribed for perjury occurring during the preliminary investigation phase, prior to the involvement of the Prosecutor's Office, remains subject to Article 650 of the Islamic Penal Code (Penalties). Therefore, the decision rendered by the 13th Branch of the Alborz Court of Appeal, which aligns with this opinion, is recognized as correct and lawful by the majority of votes. This decision is binding for the branches of the Supreme Court, as well as all other judicial and non-judicial authorities, pursuant to Article 471 of the Criminal Procedure Law, approved in 1392, along with subsequent amendments and additions in similar cases.