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Amendments to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961

In December 2021, the National Assembly in Pakistan introduced two amendments in sections 4 and 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. Both these amendments relate to Shia school (Fiqh-e-Jafaria). Under the first amendment a childless widow of a Shia husband is given inheritance right in immovable property. The second amendment clarifies the Shia law on talaq (divorce) by providing that the husband must pronounce Arabic words (seegha) in presence of two witnesses to make divorce effective. It further provides that the pronouncement of talaq (divorce) shall not be effective if it is done “jokingly or under anger, intoxication, insanity, duress or coercion of any kind”.

Both amendments provide that in case of dispute, the parties may have a recourse to “a court of competent jurisdiction or by approaching the Mujtahid-e-Alam from the panel maintained by the Council of Islamic Ideology.” Mujtahid-e-Alam is defined as “a juris-consult, religious scholar or doctor of Shia school of thought well versed with Shariah having international repute and of such recognition.” The decision of Mujtahid-e-Alam shall have a status of an award under the Arbitration Act 1940.

Contributed by Zubair Abbasi.

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Lucknow, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges are authorized to bar Muslim women from wearing it. The Board states that the High Court’s verdict contradicted Article 15 of the Indian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, caste, class, or place of birth, and guarantees individual liberty to all citizens, as well as the right to identity. They thus conclude that this decision is an injustice against the constitutional freedoms of Indian citizens. The Board also expresses concern with secular state courts making decisions on what is or is not essential religious practice, stating that “it is not in the jurisdiction of the courts to decide this but that of the ulemas [sic] and scholars.” They further note that the Indian Constitution accords every individual the right to determine what is essential in their religion. On a related matter, they add that the establishment of a common Uniform Civil Code—as has been further proposed—in a multi-religious country will interfere in the fundamental rights of religious freedom, and further negatively impact the religious and individual rights and freedoms of Muslim citizens in Indian. 

In its judgment dated December 15, 2023, a majority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld various provisions of the Supreme Court Act of 2023 as constitutional. The majority rejected arguments that the Act sought to interfere with the Court's independence and exclusive jurisdiction over its own affairs and internal organization. Certain provisions of the Act constrain the power of the Chief Justice and provide certain guarantees that some cases need to be heard by a committee of justices as opposed to a single justice or only a few of them. Most importantly, the Court, in upholding the Act, rejected the Chief Justice's power as the so-called "Master of the Roster." Previously, under that power, the Chief Justice had the ability to constitute benches, that is, appoint individual justices of his choosing, who then heard specific cases. Rejecting that power, the Court ruled that the "Master of the Roster" power was alien to the Constitution of Pakistan. Further, the Court noted that the word "master" was offensive and un-Islamic, writing that "Islam establishes the principle of equality . . . ."

The first respondent, the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional – Basyarnas), had made a decision on 16 September 2009 between the second respondent (PT. Atriumasta Sakti) and the applicant (PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri), ordering the applicant to return to the second respondent IDR 878,791,366. This figure comprised a banking provision cost payment of IDR 350 million, or one per cent of the value of the financing facility worth IDR 35 billion, because the Murabahah agreement between the two parties had been declared invalid by the first respondent; IDR 45,027,000 in project insurance monies; IDR 5,962,700 in upfront employee social security payments; IDR 298,135,000 to the DKI Jakarta Government Construction Structuring and Supervision Services; and instalment repayments of IDR 179,666,666. The applicant was also ordered to return to the respondent any other costs associated, provided those costs could be verified by the Public Accountants' Office. Basyarnas also decided that if the applicant failed to abide by its decision, the respondent could lodge an application with Bank Indonesia (the Indonesian central bank) to hand the applicant an administrative sanction, and reduce the applicant's credit rating.

The court noted that, pursuant to art 70 of Law No. 30 of 1999, as well as the Elucidation of Chapter VII of Law 30, in conjunction with Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006, and Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008, a party to such a dispute may request that a religious court declare a Basyarnas decision null and void. Article 70, however, only applies if: a. the decision was based on the submission of a false document; b. a relevant document was concealed by the opposing party; or c. the decision was based on misleading information. In this instance, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had failed to consider material legal facts to its case, therefore invoking art 70(c). Based on a submission made by the second respondent that the applicant had failed to carry out the second and subsequent stages of liquidation deriving from the Murabahah financing facility, the first respondent had determined that the applicant had defaulted on its agreement with the second respondent. The applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that it was actually the second respondent who had defaulted by:

1. failing to produce the original building permit and then failing to the applicant with a copy, pursuant to art 3(1) of the Murabahah agreement;
2. failing to pay the notary, pursuant to art 3(4) of the agreement; and
3. failing to transfer its own self-financing monies, pursuant to art 3(23) of the agreement.

While the second respondent had already shown the applicant a building permit management services contract between it and H. Jayadi Kusumah, as well as proof of payment of a quote for 1 March 2005 for IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah as a buliding permit enactment management fee, as well as permission for other construction for the Ruko Soho Carbella Square project, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that the reliability of this quote had not been established. Moreover, the applicant had even requested to see the quote via the Basyarnas secretary, pursuant to trial procedures, but had been denied. This, the applicant claimed, precluded it from carrying out its end of the bargain. In short, the applicant claimed the second respondent had failed to hand over to the applicant its building permit, whereas the second respondent had claimed it had paid IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah to arrange the building permit and other necessary construction permits.

The applicant also claimed that there was a material disparity between the final draft of the Basyarnas decision and the decision provided to the Central Jakarta Religious Court insofar as the Religious Court had been told that Basyarnas would not accede to claims for damages until their reliability had been verified by the Public Accountant. While the Religious Court declared the Basyarnas decision null and void, the Supreme Court found that the Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, thereby reinstating the Basyarnas decision.

Pursuant to art 67(c) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, in conjunction with Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the applicant requested the court reconsider (peninjauan kembali) its decision on the grounds that the court had granted more than that sought by the respondents. It alleged that:

1. the court had unnecessarily found that the Central Jakarta Religious Court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case;
2. that the Basyarnas decision ordered it to return to the applicant other costs not related to the transaction in question; and
3. it had unnecessarily authorised the second respondent to ask Bank Indonesia to sanction the applicant if it failed to comply with its decision.

The applicant also claimed that Basyarnas had made a legal error by directing the secretary to register an official copy of the decision with the Central Jakarta Religious Court registrar, when Law No. 30 of 1999 requires that such decisions be registered with the State Court (Pengadilan Negeri). The applicant also claimed that the Supreme Court, in the first instance, had cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, stating that as the dispute was a shari'a banking dispute, the religious courts had jurisdiction, only to then declare the religious courts did not have jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the applicant's review (peninjauan kembali) appeal, ordering it to pay costs of IDR 2.5 million. In doing so, it held that no legal error had been made by the court in the first instance. Rather, that the parties to the dispute had already clearly stated that the dispute would be resolved via arbitration, thereby invoking art 2 of Law No. 30 of 1999, and precluding the state courts and religious courts from having jurisdiction (art 3 of Law No. 30 of 1999). The court also noted that Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008 conflicted with art 59(3) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, and had accordingly already been rendered null and void by Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2010. Moreover, while the applicant had sought to invoke art 70(c) of Law No. 30 of 1999, it had failed to prove upon what misleading information its opponents' case had rested.

The parties were married on 17 January 2005 but had no children. After marrying in Bau-Bau, the parties had returned to Ambon and lived in a rental property from 2005-2006, before moving to their own home in December 2006. The plaintiff submitted that, since 2008, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the defendant had had an extra-marital affair in Ambon and Jakarta. The plaintiff had learned of the affair when she called the defendant and the other woman in question answered his phone, resulting in the plaintiff and other woman arguing over the phone.

The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant had failed to disclose to her that, after the parties had agreed to rent out their property for one year, the defendant had rented it out for two years, spending the proceeds from rent payments on the other woman. The defendant had also confessed to having a daughter with a non-Muslim woman, the child now being in the care of the defendant's older sister, as well as marrying another woman, with whom he had a four-year old daughter.

Problems escalated on 13 Feburary 2011 when the defendant extended the term of the rental agreement for their property without first consulting the plaintiff. The defendant then spent the rent proceeds on the other woman, the plaintiff submitted.

The defendant submitted that he did not live in Ambon, but rather in Central Jakarta, and therefore the Ambon Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Moreover, he rejected the plaintiff's submission that he had used proceeds from renting their home to fraternise with another woman. Rather, the defendant submitted that he had used that money to cover the plaintiff's university fees (the plaintif was attending university in Makassar and the defendant did not have sufficient finances to cover the costs). The defendant also rejected the plaintiff's submission that he had married another woman with whom he had a four-year old daughter.

The defendant also submitted that from the IDR 17 million per annum he made from renting the parties' home, he had spent IDR 4 million on plumbing, IDR 5 million on the issuance of a certificate from the National Land Body, provided the plaintiff with IDR 4 million to discharge a debt she owed to a colleague, and IDR 2 million to pay an instalment to the landowner as the land had not yet been paid-off in full.

Dismissing the defendant's claim that the court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, the court found that, based on both parties' submissions, it was evident that the parties were no longer compatible and had already been separated since February 2011. Pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the Court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The appellants sought to challenge the decision of the Medan Religious Court (lower court), which had declared the first appellant's auctioning of the respondents' property invalid, on the grounds that the lower court did not have the jurisdiction to make such judgment.

The court placed great emphasis on the actual transaction (akad) agreed to by the parties, stating that for a dispute between a creditor and debtor to be completely resolved, adherence to the relevant terms of the agreement was of paramount importance. Article 17(3) of the parties' Murabahah agreement provided that, in the event of a dispute, and if deliberative measures had failed, the parties would seek to resolve the dispute before the National Shari'a Arbitration Board (Basyarnas). Article 17(4) then compelled the parties to treat any decision from Basyarnas as first and final.

The court, pursuant to art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Perdata), found art 17 to be legally binding on the parties. Moreover, it cited a fatwa of the National Shari'a Council (Dewan Syari'ah Nasional), which cited verse 1 of Surat Al-Maidah from the Qur'an, which asks believers to abide by, and implement, the agreements they make. Accordingly, the court found that the lower court was precluded from serving as a forum to resolve the parties' dispute. Indeed, the court noted that it was common knowledge in the judiciary, especially in the religious judiciary, that when investigating shari'a economy-related disputes, deference to contractual terms relating to dispute resolution was unequivocal.

This statute replaced Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Administration, arguably, as a way of regaining some of the power the central government had relinquished to regional governments, via Law No. 22 of 1999. The primary way it does this is by granting the provinces (propinsi) superiority over the regencies (kabupaten), municipalities (kota) and villages (desa), defining provincial governors as representatives of the central government (wakil Pemerintah).

The statute stipulates the process by which the different levels of regional government may legislate and execute laws peculiar to their own region, as well as the mechanism and process by which such laws can be invalidated by higher-level government in the event such laws contravene a hierarchically-superior law. The Law also allows higher-level government to devolve legislative power to lower-level governments if it deems necessary and appropriate.

While now replaced by Law No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Administration, the statute is of particular significance given the content of art 10(3), the efficacy of which is crucial to any analysis of the validity of Islamising regional regulations in Indonesia. Article 10(3) maintains the central government’s exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defence, security, judicial matters, national monetary and fiscal matters and religion (emphasis added).

One school of thought argues that art 10(3) renders any Islamising regulation drafted by a provincial or sub-provincial government ultra vires or invalid. Conversely, Islamising regional regulations may Islamise public life but can circumvent the purview of art 10(3) by being couched in terms specific to social order and morality.

In December 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the question whether Muslim citizens who lived in the Greek province of Thrace could be required to submit to the jurisdiction of Islamic law, as detailed by local experts called muftīs. In Greek law, Islamic law usually governed matters of family law—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—in cases involving the Muslims in Thrace. This arrangement was a legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. When the ECHR considered whether this arrangement should persist, it considered a case in which a Muslim man had died, leaving everything to his wife in his will. His sisters contested the will, arguing that it improperly circumvented the authority of the muftīs. Greece’s highest court agreed with the sisters. With the will invalidated, the muftī distributed one-fourth of the estate to the widow, and the rest to the sisters, in accord with Islamic inheritance law. The widow appealed to the ECHR. This Court determined that the Greek government had misinterpreted the treaties, which did not require a separate legal framework for Muslims. It further noted that Greek case law was inconsistent about “whether the application of Sharia law [sic] is compatible with the principle of equal treatment and with international human rights standards.” In addition, the Court emphasized a right to "free self-identification”: people should be free to opt out of differential treatment from the government on the basis of belonging to a minority group, and the government should not force minorities into a special legal category in the name of protecting them. The Court held that Greece, by compelling the Muslim minority of Thrace to follow Islamic law, had violated Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

The fifth/eleventh al-Aḥkām al-Kubra, represents a new and unique legal genre for Islamic criminal justice. The treatise serves as an early example of nawāzil literature composed in al-Andalus made up of a combination of reports on legal cases coupled with the opinions and judgements of jurists and magistrates associated with it. These nawāzil also include criminal cases under the jurisdiction of the shurṭa. Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), a jurist living in Cordoba under the Jahwarids (r. 422– 461/1031–1069) and author of al-Aḥkām al-Kubra discusses actual crimes cases which occurred in Cordoba, and portrays the shurṭa working with jurists to arrive at a judgment. This detailed portrayal of jurists being involved in the realities of criminal justice is a distinctive element of this text. The case presented in this text is a murder of a man, allegedly perpetrated by his family, and the complex social-legal challenges of prosecuting such a case. 

The source is edited by Yaḥya Murād in Abū al-Aṣbagh ʿĪsā b. Sahl, Kitab al-Nawāzil al-aʻlām al-musamma Dīwān al-aḥkām al-kubrál. Cairo: Dār al-Hadith, 2007. Scans of this case have been made available.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Holy See/Vatican City-State (La Santa Sede/Stato della Citta del Vaticano), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the Vatican City-State's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Kenya (Jamhuri ya Kenya), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Kenya's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status. 

The first defendant (Neima Mohamed, herein Neima), as the plaintiff in the court of first instance, had submitted that:

1. On 4 April 2004, she and the plaintiff (Mostafa Mohamed, herein Mostafa) were married;
2. On 28 February 2005, the parties had executed a pre-nuptial financial agreement that would regulate their financial affairs during and after their marriage;
3. The agreement stated that Mostafa should pay to Neima $50,000.00 if he initiated separation or divorce proceedings against her; and
4. On 11 September 2008, Mostafa Islamically divorced Neima.

Mostafa denied marrying Neima, did not admit points 2 and 3, and denied Islamically divorcing her. Moreover, Mostafa submitted that any separation of the parties had been initiated by Neima.

Before the court of first instance, Mostafa denied having been married to Neima under Islamic law. Her Honour Magistrate Trad did not answer that question, but rather found that the parties had been in a 'domestic relationship'. Regardless, the parties could not agree who initiated the separation and on which date the separation occurred. Mostafa claimed that Neima had initiated the separation on 11 September 2008 by taking his key to their Rockdale unit, while Neima claimed that Mostafa, on 11 April 2007, had asked her to leave their home, and alternatively, on 11 September 2008, had Islamically divorced her.

On the facts, Magistrate Trad found that Mostafa had initiated the divorce on 11 April 2007, further evidenced by him sending his daughter to tell Neima to leave by a certain date, with directions as to the division of their property. Therefore, her Honour found that sufficient evidence existed to activate cl 11 of the parties' agreement, compelling Mostafa to pay to Neima the agreed-upon sum of $50,000.00 (Moackar Sadak or dowry).

On appeal, Harrison AsJ found that Mostafa could appeal the initial decision pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, which granted the Court jurisdiction to quash the decision of a lower court if based on an error of law. Mostafa sought to dispute the findings of Magistrate Trad in their entirety on the following grounds:

1. that her Honour had made errors of fact and law;
2. that the decision suffered from jurisdictional error;
3. that her Honour had failed to acknowledge that the agreement had not been executed in accordance with the law;
4. that her Honour had failed to find that the agreement was unenforceable because it conflicted with public policy; and
5. that her Honour had erred by failing to find that the separation, for the purposes of the agreement, did not have to accord with shari'a law.

With regards to appeal ground 4, Mostafa submitted that her Honour had failed to recognise that the agreement was one of servitude in that it compelled Mostafa to remain in a relationship with Neima, lest he pay her $50,000.00. Moreover, it was contrary to public policy for her Honour to determine which party had left the relationship, and cl 11 was void for illegality as it was a penalty clause. The Court found the precedent cited in support of its submission by Mostafa's counsel to be somewhat irrelevant. It found the precedent cited by Neima's counsel, which stated that the court would, where possible, hold parties seeking separation or divorce to their agreement, relevant. The Court also acknowledged the issue of the payment of Moackar Sadak, noting that the lack of any precedent regarding such payment in Australia may necessitate seeing how other common law countries have approached such agreements. The Court also provided a brief discussion on mahr, based on Ann Black and Kerrie Sadiq's, 'Good and Bad Sharia: Australia's Mixed Response to Islamic Law' (2011) 17 UNSW Law Journal 82, noting that mahr appeared to be what the parties meant by Moackar Sadak. The Court found that cases dealing with mahr from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom all found such agreements enforceable, provided they could not be invalidated for other reasons. Counsel for Neima submitted that, while some customs might be contrary to public policy, what is of utmost importance in enforcing such an agreement is that the parties to the agreement knowingly and voluntarily adhered to those customs.

Harrison AsJ found that, in enforcing such agreements, courts of common law countries have applied common law or the relevant legislation (if any), rather than sharīʿa law. Moreover, that none of these courts found that agreements such as that made by the parties in this instance contradict public policy. Harrison AsJ also dismissed Mostafa's argument that it was not for the Court to decide who left the relationship, stating that '[c]ourts are often called upon, especially in family matters, to determine sensitive factual matters such as when a relationship has ended, or whether it was indeed a de facto relationship...'.

With regards to Mostafa's submission that cl 11 was a penalty clause, Harrison AsJ disagreed. Her Honour found that the Property (Relationships) Act and the Family Law Act allowed parties to enter into financial agreements. Moreover, that cl 11 formed part of the 'greater bargain' between the parties.

Harrison AsJ also dismissed Mostafa's submissions that the court of first instance did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the agreement, or to determine whether or not the parties' separation had to accord with sharīʿa law. The Court found that as the agreement had neither specified an appropriate dispute resolution forum or jurisdiction (common law or sharīʿa law), nothing precluded the court of first instance from adjudicating the case. Secondly, that Magistrate Trad had not considered the meaning of 'divorce' under sharīʿa law, instead determining when the separation had occurred on the facts. The Court also noted that Mostafa had not relied on any expert evidence relating to sharīʿa law, and that Magistrate Trad was in no way required to apply sharīʿa law to interpret the parties' agreement.

Mostafa's counsel conceded the inapplicability of the Property (Relationships) Act but argued that Magistrate Trad had applied it regardless. The Court found it irrelevant whether or not the agreement satisfied the requirements of the Property (Relationships) Act, stating that Magistrate Trad had correctly applied the laws of contract to the agreement.

Mostafa also submitted that as the parties had not been married under Australian law, the agreement was unenforceable because the terms 'separation' and 'divorce', per cl 11 of the agreement, are inapplicable to de facto relationships. The Court agreed to consider whether or not marriage under Australian law was a condition precedent to the enforceability of the agreement, but concurred with Neima's counsel that, among other submissions, the agreement did not specify marriage under Australian law as a condition precedent to the enforceability of the agreement, or to cl 11 specifically. Moreover, that the word 'separation' is distinct from 'divorce' and is applicable to the cessation of a de facto relationship. The Court also noted that the agreement was to secure the parties' individual assets, as both parties had been previously married and had significant assets individually.

With regards to which party initiated the separation and on what date, Harrsion AsJ noted Magistrate Trad's deliberations and that her Honour was unable to rely on any 'so-called independent witnesses' because all the evidence provided by witnesses had been informed by what the parties had told them. Magistrate Trad had, therefore, relied on Neima's evidence that, on 11 April 2007, the parties had argued and Mostafa had waved a knife in front of Neima. That evening Mostafa's daughter, accompanied by a police officer, had come to collect some of Mostafa's belongings and to give her a list separating the parties' belongings. On 13 April 2007, Neima moved out of the parties' unit. While the parties had attempted to reconcile, in September 2008, following another argument, Mostafa said the words 'you are divorced' to Neima. Mostafa denied this, stating that Neima had initiated the separation in September 2008 by asking him to leave their Lakemba unit. Mostafa also denied saying the words 'I divorce you'.

All other submissions made by Mostafa on appeal were dismissed on the grounds that they were not covered in Mostafa's submissions. Harrison AsJ also found that Magistrate Trad had made her findings pursuant to ample evidence. Harrison AsJ noted that this appeal raised religious and cultural issues not previously dealt with by the Australian courts, and that the question of how such agreements should be dealt with would be referred to the Australian Law Reform Commission and NSW Law Reform Commission for their consideration.

One of the core functions of the courts in the Ottoman Empire was to allow the government to keep its officials in check, and to allow subjects to challenge abuses of power. In this court case from Cairo in 1672, the commander of Muwaylīḥ fortress on the Hijaz coast, in what is now northern Saudi Arabia, is accused of aiding a pirate attack on a boat belonging to an Upper Egyptian merchant.

The merchant brought the lawsuit in al-Dīwān al-ʿĀlī, the council of the Ottoman governor of Egypt, which functioned as a sharīʿa court as well as an administrative council. When operating as a court, a qāḍī presided over the proceedings, as in any other sharīʿa court, but in many cases, such as this one, the governor attended as well.[1] The reason that the lawsuit was brought in Cairo is not only that the plaintiff was Egyptian. While the Ottoman Hijaz was governed by a semi-autonomous dynasty, its military administration was the responsibility of the governor of Egypt. Muḥammad Āghā, the fortress commander, was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of governor Ibrāhīm Pasha.

The military status of the defendant also helps explain the frustrating lack of a clear conclusion to this case. After the plaintiff provides evidence, the qāḍī finds Muḥammad Āghā guilty of aiding the pirate attack, but specifies no punishment or compensation. Instead, according to the document, he simply imposes “what the sharīʿa deems necessary.” As the defendant was a military officer, the qāḍī’s role in this case was simply to determine the facts and assign liability. Any penalties were likely decided by the military authorities, possibly by Ibrāhīm Pasha himself.

No registers of the Dīwān al-ʿĀlī survive from this period; the earliest extant register is from 1741. This case has survived in the form of a ḥujja, the certificate issued by the court to litigants at the conclusion of a case, a copy of which was made in the register. To be precise, the document is a certified copy of the ḥujja. It is now held at the Başbakanlık, the central Ottoman archives in Istanbul, which suggests that the case was sufficiently important to have been reported to the central government.

[1] On the function of the Dīwān al-ʿĀlī, see James E. Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 37-9, 63-71.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Armenia (Hayastani Hanrapetut'yun), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Armenia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Commonwealth of Australia, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Australia’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Belgium (Royaume de Belgique [French]/Koninkrijk Belgie [Dutch]/Koenigreich Belgien [German]), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Belgium’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Bermuda, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bermuda’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Bolivia (República de Bolivia), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bolivia’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Bulgaria (Republika Bulgaria), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bulgaria’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Guatemala (República de Guatemala), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Guatemala's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.