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This excerpt is from Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-ʿAlāʾī's (d. 761/1359) al-Majmūʿ al-Mudhhab fī Qawāʿid al-Madhhab, which is a two-volume collection of substantive legal canons and interpretive legal canons, and the third-oldest known Shāfiʿī canons collection from the Mamlūk era. Substantive legal canons (qawāʿid fiqhiyya) are short formulas expressing fundamental principles and doctrines of Islamic law, while interpretive legal canons (qawāʿid uṣūliyya) are principles for interpreting textual sources. This excerpt provides the first few pages excerpted from the author's Introduction. 

For more, view the full print edition and read the commentary by Mariam Sheibani on the Islamic Law Blog.

This is the first volume of al-Timurtāshī's commentary of his compendium of Ḥanafī law, Tanwīr al-Abṣār wa-Jāmiʻ al-Biḥār.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Singapore, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Singapore's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status.  

Suyūṭī’s (d. 911/1505) al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir is a treatise collecting Shāfiʿī legal canons. It examines the similarities and differences between legal and interpretive outcomes in Islamic law in ways that show how and why one judgment or outcome is distinguished from another, and in the process highlights the substantive and interpretive legal canons that guide those legal outcomes. 

For more, view the full print edition and see The Legal Thought of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti: Authority and Legacy (Oxford, 2017) by Rebecca Hernandez.

This qanun regulates the shari'a courts (Mahkamah Syar'iyah) of Aceh, as well as the personnel and hierarchy therein. It also defines the areas of law over which the courts have jurisdiction, those being al-syakhshiyah (family law), mu'amalah (civil and commercial law), and jinayat (criminal law). The elucidation of the qanun defines jinayat as including offences such as zina (extra-marital sex), accusation of zina, murder, physical abuse, alcohol consumption, gambling, and failure to abide by prayer and fasting requirements.

Ethiopian law allows personal and family law matters to be adjudicated in sharīʿa courts as long as all parties voluntarily submit to the courts’ jurisdiction. This Proclamation spells out three levels of sharīʿa courts: (1) the Federal First-Instance Court of Sharia, (2) the Federal High Court of Sharia (which hears appeals and cases above a certain monetary threshold), and (3) the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia. The courts apply Islamic law but follow civil rules of procedure. The Federal Courts of Sharia are the country’s only official courts that apply religious law.

This enactment "consolidate[s] the law relating to the Religious Council and State Custom, the Kathis Courts, the constitution and organization of religious authorities and the regulation of religious affairs." It was enacted by the Sultan in Council and during the Residency of J.O. Gilbert, to take effect on February 1, 1956. It establishes a Religious Council (Majlis) and defines its composition, powers and responsibilities. It also establishes the jurisdiction and procedure of the Religious Courts in Brunei, and has sections on family law, criminal law, and laws of religious observance. Its provisions are divided into ten parts and 204 sections.

The two co-accused sought to appeal the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court, which had found them guilty of being together in close proximity out of wedlock (khalwat). In their submissions they stated that they had already informed the village head (kepala dusun) that they would be living together as husband and wife, and that they would be joined by the three-year old son of the second co-accused. When both co-accused told the village head that they were unable to provide photocopies of their family card, both their identity cards, their wedding certificate (buku nikah), and relocation notice, because they were still being processed, however, the village head requested that the village official attend the home of the co-accused. It then came to light that the second co-accused was actually in the process of divorcing her ex-husband, which made the fact that the two co-accused were in close proximity with one another illegal, as contained in art 23(1) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law.

The court overturned the decision of the lower court on several grounds:

1. The lower court had not granted what was sought by the prosecution;
2. According to art 23(1) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law, the appropriate punishment for repudiation of the prohibition contained therein is either ten strokes of the cane, a fine of 100 grams of pure gold, or a maximum ten month prison sentence;
3. The punishment contained in art 23(1) provides alternative punishments, one of which may be requested by the prosecution, to be determined by the court;
4. The lower court was not authorised to sentence the co-accused to be caned when the prosecution had requested that they be imprisoned; and
5. The lower court was only authorised to either accede to, or deny, the prosecution's demands.

Accordingly, the court sentenced both co-accused to five months and 20 days in prison, taking into account time already served on remand.

The fatwa is a unanimous decision by forty Muslim muftis, affiliated with the Sunni Ittehad Council in Pakistan, declaring honor killing of women as “un-Islamic” or heresy (kuffur) and an “unpardonable sin” (gunah-e-qabir). The decree explicitly states that burning a woman alive, in the name of honor, for marrying a person of their choosing, is heresy and against the commands of Islam. The fatwa quotes a Quranic verse, verse number 232 of Surat al-Baqarah: [translated from the Urdu translation of the verse – as used in the fatwa – into English] “Oh woman’s family, do not say no to women for wanting to marry the husband [of their choice] if the two of them have consented to the marriage.” The fatwa states that Islam is the true guardian of rights of women and that it is imperative upon the leaders of an Islamic nation/government (hukumat) to ensure protection of women’s rights. For that purpose, the government should pass and implement laws that make burning and killing of women an unpardonable crime. The oppression and torture unleashed upon women has no relation to Islam. The fatwa then refers to an example (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad, as narrated in Sahih-Bukhari: The Prophet (s.a.w.) terminated the marriage contract (nikkah) of a woman who complained to him (s.a.w.) that she did not like the man her father had married her off to. The fatwa condemns the act of burning alive or killing one’s child for marrying someone of their choice and then “appeals” to the parents to focus on the ethical education and upbringing of their children in line with the teachings of Islam; and that the upcoming month of Ramadan will be devoted to raise awareness about women’s rights. Finally, the fatwa states that those who burn women and girls alive should be hanged to death.

The particular newspaper reporting (in Roznama Dunya) on this fatwa includes the names of twenty four clerics who signed the fatwa (the total number of clerics who joined in issuing the fatwa were forty but the newspaper article explicitly mentions just twenty four names).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Brunei Darussalam (Negara Brunei Darussalam), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Brunei's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

Two sons, without consulting their sister, arranged for their mother to sign an Islamic will, with a two thirds share to be distributed to males in the family. The sister disputed the will, stating that the mother was effectively tricked into it. The court bypassed the issue, declaring that the mother died intestate and that consequently, the estate would be distributed by the public trustee in accordance with Australian law. This ensured an equal split. 

This is a reference to the early legal schools of the Ḥijāz and Iraq. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference to argue that the legal legacy of the Family of the Prophet differed in its sources and approaches from these schools.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to the recognized status of ʿAlī as a major authority on the Prophet's Sunna. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference to argue that ʿAlī was "the father" of the legal legacy of the Family of the Prophet.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to ʿAlī's description of the Sunna of the Prophet. Hossein Modarressi argues that in the legal legacy of the Family of the Prophet, the Prophet's Sunna was next to the Qurʾān in importance.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This fatwa acknowledges the principal distinctions between Sunni and Shi'a Islam:

1. Shi'a Islam rejects hadith not narrated by the Prophet's family (Ahlu Bait), while Sunni Islam (Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'ah) does not differentiate between hadith provided that those hadith meet the criteria of the classification of hadith (mustalah hadis);
2. Shi'a Islam perceives imams as infallible (ma 'sum), while Sunni Islam does not;
3. Shi'a Islam does not acknowledge consensus (ijma') without the presence of an imam, while Sunni Islam does;
4. Shi'a Islam believes that political leadership/government is included in the pillars of religion, while Sunni Islam believes in general welfare with the aim of religious, spiritual, political leadership being to guarantee and protect the proselytisation and interests of the Islamic people (umat); and
5. Shi'a Islam, in general, does not acknowledge the succession of Abu Bakar as-Siddiq, Umar Ibnul Khatab, and Usman bin Affan, while Sunni Islam does.

Acknowledging these principal differences, especially with regard to government (imamah), the Indonesian Council of Ulama implores Indonesian Muslims to understand Sunni Islam in order to increase their own vigilence towards the flow of interpretations based on Shi'a Islam.

The defendants, A. Gani bin Syik, Hanafiah bin Usman, Syarbaini bin Kaoy, and Saifa bin A. Gani, were found guilty of gambling (maisir), pursuant to art 18 of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law (Hukum Jinayat). Seeking a mitigated sentence, the defendants (who appeared in court without legal representation) submitted that they regretted their conduct, promised not to re-offend, and that they had families to support.

In its judgment, the court cited the following Qur'anic passages:

1. Al-Baqarah: 219, which states that there is great sin in intoxicants and gambling, as well as some benefit. The sin (dosa) associated with both, however, outweights the benefit.
2. Al-Maidah: 90-91, which states that intoxicants and gambling are repugnant acts and Satan's doing, and that Satan only seeks to incite enmity and hatred among those who indulge in both.

The court ordered that:

1. the defendants receive four strokes of the cane each (the initial six-stroke sentence was mitigated for time already served on remand);
2. the cash float the defendants had been gambling with be seized and deposited with the North Aceh Baitul Mal (Islamic treasury);
3. the two domino sets with which the defendants had been gambling be seized and destroyed; and
4. the defendants pay their own court costs (IDR 2,000 each).

Injured survivors of a suicide bombing attack in Israel, allegedly by Hamas, and the family members of the deceased, sued Iran, its Ministry of Information and Security, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for compensatory damages for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of prospective income, and solatium (appropriate “when extreme and outrageous conduct has caused grief and anguish to plaintiffs closely related to a victim of terrorism”), as well as punitive damages. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them  compensatory damages in the amount of $111,963,607.87 for physical damages and economic and emotional loss, as well as punitive damages in the amount of $300,000,000 against the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

This regional regulation makes provision for the obligation on all Muslim high school students and workers in Bulukumba, South Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan) to wear Muslim dress (arts 5 and 6). In preambular statement (c), the regulation states that covering one's aurat (modesty) in Islam is obligatory during ibadah (worship). The regulation states that the meaning of Muslim dress is to show that one is God-mindful and pious, and that they are putting Islam into practice (art 2). Meanwhile, the aim of Muslim dress standards is to form Muslim attitudes that are good and noble (art 3(1)), to make Muslim dress in daily life the norm, both in family life and public life (art 3(2)), and to create a society that observes and carries out its religion (art 3(3)).

Specifically, male workers must wear trousers or shorts that reach their knees, as well as a short- or long-sleeved shirt, while female workers must wear a long-sleeved shirt that covers their hips, a skirt or trousers that reaches their ankles, and a headscarf (kerundung) that covers their hair, ears, neck, nape, and chest (art 7(1)). Male students are to wear shorts and either a short- or long-sleeved shirt, while female students are to wear a shirt that covers their hips and chest, a skirt or trousers that covers their ankles, and a headscarf (kerundung) that covers their hair, ears, neck, nape, and chest (art 8(1)).

The case concerned a couple married in the United States according to Islamic law, who had a child custody dispute. The mother, among other things, contended that she should have custody as East Jerusalem, where the husband resided, had become dangerous.  The father filed a claim for custody in the Sharia Court of Israel. The Massachusetts Appeals Court remanded the case to the probate court for further consideration, including the issue of whether it had jurisdiction in the matter, thus not engaging any substantive issues related to Islamic family law.

The plaintiff (KH. Moch. Yusman Roy) was the caretaker of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf, an i'tikaf (seclusion in a mosque) study group venue in Malang, East Java, where Qur'anic study and recitation activities were held, and the production of prayer carpets (sajadah), pillows, and bolsters was conducted. The defendant, the Regent (Bupati) of Malang, had issued a decree declaring the cessation of the activities of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf. The plaintiff submitted that he had received the decree, dated 7 May 2005, through a family member. On 6 May 2005 at 8.00pm, however, the plaintiff submitted that he had been arrested and interrogated by the Malang Regional Police. Therefore, the legal process had been implemented prematurely and without authority. Moreover, that in issuing the decree, the defendant had acted unilaterally, without considering all the relevant concerns. Therefore, pursuant to art 53(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of Law No. 9 of 2004 on Amendments to Law No. 5 of 1989 on the State Administration of the Judiciary, as the plaintiff had suffered loss as the result of a state administrative decree, he was entitled to submit a written application to the authorised court seeking that the decree be declared null and void, and seeking damages as an additional remedy. The plaintiff also requested that the court suspend the implementation of the defendant's decree, pursuant to art 67(2) of Law No. 5 of 1986, and that the investigation of the case be conducted as quickly as possible, pursuant to art 98 of Law No. 5 of 1986.

In its exceptions, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff's submissions were incorrect and inaccurate because the plaintiff had already submitted a request for protection, dated 6 May 2005, to the Malang Regional Police, expressing concern and fear for the consequences of his having taught sholat and do'a (prayers) in both Arabic and Indonesian. The plaintiff's conduct had allegedly generated a negative reaction from the community towards the plaintiff. It was in accordance with the plaintiff's request that the Malang Police conducted its investigation and arrest on 7 May 2005. The legal consequences that followed had, therefore, resulted from the plaintiff's request, rather than the issuance of the regental decree. The regental decree had been issued in consideration of Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion, meaning that both an administrative action and criminal conduct had occurred, for the purposes of art 10 of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Administration. Moreover, purusant to art 27(1)(c) of Law No. 32 of 2014, the regental decree had been issued in accordance with the obligations of a regional head to maintain peace and order. More specifically, it was issued in anticipation of anarchic reactions from other parties who did not share the religious opinions of the plaintiff that it was acceptable to conduct sholat in Indonesian, as well as the original Arabic.

The defendant also submitted that the state administrative court was precluded from adjudicating the case pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 5 of 1986, because it had issued the regental decree during a time when the public interest dictated it do so. In addition to adhering to Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965, the regental decree also accorded with art 156(a) of the Criminal Code because it acknowledged that the plaintiff's conduct was defamatory towards a religion.

The court dismissed the defendant's exceptions in their entirety. It reiterated the constitutioanlly-guaranteed freedom to practise one's religion and beliefs in accordance with their own conscience, as found in art 28E(1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution, as well as Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. The court noted that these guarantees derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which identifies basic human rights and freedoms which are naturally connected to, and inseparable from, humans from the moment they are born. The court also noted, however, that as the defendant had deemed the activities of Pondok Iktikaf Jamaah Njagi Lelaku to have the potential to disturb the peace and order of the community, it was of the opinion that the cessation of these activities constituted a preventative measure to protect the human rights of others, and that maintaining the peace was in the public interest, per art 73 of Law No. 39 of 1999, which states that rights and freedoms can only be limited by, and pursuant to, statute. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's request that the regental decree issued by the defendant be revoked on the grounds that it was not contrary to any statute. Moreover, it dismissed the plaintiff's request that the defendant reinstate the good name of the plaintiff on the same grounds.