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The appellants successfully challenged Giri Menang Religious Court Decision No. 220 of 2013. The court found that, pursuant to art 1795 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), among other provisions, the respondents' legal representation in the original case was not authorised to act on behalf of the respondents. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the initial proceeding (IDR 1,706,000) originally paid by the appellants, as well as costs for this case (IDR 150,000).

H had passed away in October 1993, and the Meulaboh Shari'a Court (lower court) had stipulated as his beneficiaries his wife and children. The lower court had also stipulated H's estate and the portions to which each beneficiary was entitled. M bin N (son and appellant) had been ordered by the lower court to transfer to the beneficiaries their share of what was under his control.

The appellant's appeal, however, was dismissed. The Court sided with A bin H (son and respondent representing the other beneficiaries), finding that the decision of the lower court was sound and accurate.

Aminsyah passed away in 1993. He was survived by his two wives, Hahine binti H. Mundut (first wife and co-respondent), Satumi/Tumi (second wife and first respondent), as well as Ahmad Sopian bin Aminsyah (son/fifth respondent), Adinah binti Aminsyah (daughter/second respondent), Satinah binti Aminsyah (daughter/third respondent), Samsidar binti Aminsyah (daughter/fourth respondent), and Hanime binti Aminsyah (daughter/appellant).

The Kutacane Shari'a Court (lower court) enforced the distribution of the deceased's estate between the beneficiaries, as had already been carried out deliberatively in 1993 in the village of Pancar Iman.

The Court concurred with the lower court's decision regarding the manner in which the estate was distributed. In terms of the appellant's initial claim, however, the considerations of the lower court often conflicted with one another. Accordingly, the Court chose to provide its own judgment.

It found that of the four parcels of land devised by the deceased, two were under the control of the appellant, and two were under the control of the respondents. This had been conducted correctly pursuant to a familial arrangement, and was affirmed by information provided to the Court by witnesses.

Amiruddin bin Mahmud had perished in the tsunami of 26 December 2004 in the village of Paya Tieng. He was survived by his four beneficiaries, Arba'iyah binti Amiruddin (daughter and first appellant), Husniati binti Amiruddin (daughter second appellant), Nurhayati binti Mahmud (sister and first respondent), and Jauhari binti Mahmud (sister and second respondent). The Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court) stipulated that to his beneficiaries the deceased had devised two properties and four parcels of land, with the appellants each receiving a two-sixths share, and the respondents one-sixth each.

The appellants, in their response and appeal, noted that the deceased's wife, Mardhiah, had also perished in the 2004 tsunami, and that she had been survived by beneficiaries such as her sister and niece. The respondents, however, had failed to include those beneficiaries in their initial claim, rendering their application null and void. Moreover, they had failed to specify whether or not the objects of their claim were the personal assets of the deceased, or the joint assets of the deceased and his wife. Pursuant to Supreme Court Jurisprudence No. 621/K/Sip/1975, the Court overturned the decision of the lower court, finding the respondents' initial claim to be null and void.

Syarifah binti Abdurrahman perished in the tsunami of 26 December 2004. The Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court) stipulated as the deceased's beneficiaries: Nurhayati binti Abdurrahman (sister and first appellant); Nurjannah binti Abdurrahman (sister, deceased); Jumiati binti Abdul Wahab (daughter and co-first appellant); M. Amin bin Abdul Wahab (daughter and co-second appellant); Maisarah binti Abdul Wahab (daughter and co-third appellant); Hazmin bin Abdan (nephew and first respondent); and M. Ali bin Abdan (nephew and second respondent).

The lower court stipulated as the deceased's estate three shops and three parcels of land, and divided the estate among the parties as follows: the first appellant (one-quarter); Nurjannah binti Abdurrahman (one-quarter, transferred to the second-eighth appellants and fourth co-appellant); the co-first, co-second and co-third appellants (one-quarter); and the first and second respondents (one-quarter).

The appellants appealed the decision on the grounds that the respondents' initial claim lacked clarity. The Court, however, found that it was sufficiently clear both in terms of identifying the then-defendants (now appellants), as well as the property subject of their claim as the deceased's estate.

The Court found fault with the way in which the lower court had distributed the estate among the beneficiaries. It noted that two or more sisters were only entitled to a two-thirds share, in accordance with surat An-Nisa, verse 176 from the Qur'an. As one of the deceased's siblings (Ansari binti Ibrahim) had passed away before her, art 185 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws dictated that Ansari's inheritance claims devolved to her heirs. Accordingly, Nurjannah binti Ibrahim's share became that of her heirs as well, as she had passed away in 2007 after the deceased.

In accordance with the Qur'an and art 182 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, sisters that pass away are only entitled to a two-thirds share, and are not entitled unless there are no ashabah beneficiaries (beneficiaries from the father's side, not specifically bequeathed any part of the deceased's estate), per art 193 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Based on the hierarchy of ashabah beneficiaries, the Court found that the respondents as nephews of the deceased were indeed ashabah beneficiaries in this instance, as no closer male relative existed.

Accordingly, the Court distributed the deceased's estate as follows: the first appellant (two-ninths); Nurjannah binti Abdurrahman (two-ninths, transferred to the second-eighth appellants and fourth co-appellant); the co-first, co-second and co-third appellants (two-ninths); and the first and second respondents (three-ninths).

Nizar Bin Syaf'i passed away due to illness on 17 September 2013. He was survived by his wife (second applicant), mother (first applicant), and siblings (third-seventh applicants), all of whom were beneficiaries under his will.

The applicants successfully sought a stipulation from the court that the deceased, Nizar Bin Syafi'i, had indeed passed away, that the applicants were legitimate beneficiaries under the deceased's will, and that the fourth applicant had power of attorney to transfer the deed of title to the land of the deceased to the National Land Body (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) of Lhokseumawe. The court ordered the applicants to pay court costs (IDR 141,000).

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Makassar Religious Court (lower court), which had granted her one-half of the assets she had owned jointly with the deceased. The appellant had married the deceased on 1 November 1990, and they had remained married until the deceased passed away on 22 May 2008. The lower court had stipulated as the deceased's beneficiaries his mother and four siblings (the respondents), and two properties and IDR 50 million in life insurance as the joint assets of the appellant and deceased.

The lower court had ordered the appellant to transfer to the beneficiaries the other half of those joint assets, which constituted the estate of the deceased. In dismissing the appeal, the court cited arts 96 and 97 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws as a legal basis for the division of the assets, as well as the fact that, as the deceased was Muslim, his assets were to be distributed pursuant to Islamic law, despite one of the parties to the dispute being a Christian/non-Muslim. The appellant was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 86,000).

The applicants submitted that their sister, Hj. Halakatani, A. Ma, had passed away on 2 June 2011, as evidenced by the issuance of her death certificate, dated 30 June. The deceased had never married and both her parents had passed away. The applicants requested that the court stipulate them as the beneficiaries of the deceased in order to access her funds.

The court acceded to the applicants' request on the grounds that they were the siblings of the deceased and were, therefore, eligible to be her beneficiaries.

On 18 May 2006, the applicant's husband passed away. He was survived by the applicant and their four children. The deceased had a plot of land in Gampong Gampa, which the applicant and one of the applicant's children wished to use to leverage a bank loan. The notary they had engaged required a stipulation from a shari'a court that the applicant and her children (the children were underage) were indeed beneficiaries under the will of the deceased.

As the applicant had met all the formulaic requirements of the application, and information provided by witnesses had corroborated with that of the applicant, the court acceded to the applicant's request.

The applicant was an only child from the deceased's first marriage. The deceased had remarried and had three other children. The deceased also left behind a property in East Jakarta, as well as a pension, having been a state high school teacher. The applicant requested that the court stipulate the passing of her father, and that she was the only beneficiary under her father's will. The applicant, however, in court, requested that the claim be withdrawn as she had neglected to include the names of the other beneficiaries under the will of the deceased. The court acceded to the applicant's request.

On 26 March 2014, the applicants' mother passed away due to illness. The applicants' father had already passed away in 2002. The applicants requested from the Court a stipulation that the deceased had passed away and that they were indeed the beneficiaries under her will. Such a stipulation would enable the applicants to deal with the estate of the deceased, which included her financial savings stored with Bank Mandiri Syari'ah.

Pursuant to arts 171(9)(c) and 174(1)(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the Court acceded to the applicants' request on the grounds that they were indeed the biological children of the deceased, as corroborated by their own evidence and that provided by witnesses.

Sujak and Nuryani were married on 3 August 1982 and had two children (Tugik Dini Rike Nur Anggrainingsih (23) and Almaiciko Bawita Firnanda (13)). They also owned a property they had purchased with Nuryani's inheritance and Sujak's pension funds. The property had been placed in the name of their first child, Tugik, but was tenanted by Nuryani's mother (Wartini) and another family member (Rumini). On 5 February 2005, Nuryani passed away due to illness. On 12 February 2012, Nuryani's father, Joyo Suwito, passed away, also due to illness. On 23 December 2014, Tugik relocated to East Kalimantan with her husband. Then, on 8 December 2015, Sujak passed away. Since Sujak's passing, Almaiciko had been cared for by her uncle (Nuryani's younger brother), the applicant (Mutaal). As Almaiciko was still under the legal age of consent, the applicant sought from the court a stipulation that he was Almaiciko's legal guardian.

The court acceded to the application for guardianship, pursuant to arts 50(1) and 51(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 107(4) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, on the grounds that Almaiciko was under the age of consent (and not yet married) and that the applicant was a family member and, therefore, a legitimate applicant for guardianship.

The first applicant was the wife of the deceased, while the second to eighth applicants were the children of the applicant and decased. The applicants were all stipulated in the will of the deceased as beneficiaries (ahli waris). The deceased's savings were held with PT. Bank BPD Aceh (IDR 22,133,633), an additional deposit of IDR 6 million having been made on 4 December 1998. When the applicants sought to withdraw the savings of the deceased, however, the bank told them they needed to first obtain a court-issued stipulation declaring that they were indeed the beneficiaries under the deceased's will. The applicants' request was then dismissed by the court when they failed to attend the proceeding.

Decided by the Supreme Court of India, Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India decreed that fatwās issued by sharīʿa courts hold no legal leverage. 

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