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Dr. Ali al-Qaradaghi considers the question whether cryptocurrency is a legitimate currency (ʿumla). Traditional Islamic law rulings define currency to reflect instruments with intrinsic value, such as gold or silver, or with credit value, which requires state backing. In his view, cryptocurrency has no inherent value [in the Middle East]. Rather, in his estimation, cryptocurrency’s value is in transactions. But even when it is used as credit, it has no state behind it or agreed-upon recognition [again, specifically with respect to the Middle East]. Thus, he concludes, it is not actually ḥaqq mālī (a property claim). Rather, it is a program or algorithm. He concludes on those grounds that investment in it is religiously prohibited (muḥarram) but only by means of the concept of “prohibition of the means" (taḥrīm al-wasāʾil). This is the lightest of prohibition types, because it is not prohibition for excessive interest (ribā) but to protect property (ḥifāza ʿala māl).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the State of Israel (Medinat Yisra'el), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Israel's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This regional regulation makes provision for the eradication of social ills. It defines social ills as:

1. prostitution (both homosexual and heterosexual in nature);
2. drinking and selling alcohol and/or traditional alcoholic beverages;
3. opening a food and beverage stall during Ramadhan;
4. cock-fighting gambling activities;
5. lending money at a particular interest rate, with or without a guarantee, or with unofficial instalments;
6. vigilantism;
7. posting indecent images in public that contravene traditional and religious norms and mores;
8. women or men showing their aurat (parts of the body required to be clothed in public according to Islam);
9. toto gelap (number-predicting gaming); and
10. being intoxicated in a public place (art 2(1)).

The regulation states that the regent or an appointed officer is authorised to order the cessation of all social ill-related activities, purusant to current regulations and customary/religious norms (art 5(b)). Penalties for such conduct range from IDR 15-50 million and/or three months' imprisonment (art 11).

Plaintiff Shawn Sharp, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this civil rights action pursuant to the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA, claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group. The plaintiff claimed that the Sunni Muslim services offered at the DOC did not allow him free exercise of his religion, since he is a member of the so-called Habashi sect of Islam, which has ideological differences from the prison’s recognized Sunni group. The prison’s Muslim chaplain disagreed, stating that if Sharp was a Sunni Muslim, as he claimed to be, then there was no reason why Sharp could not attend the already-provided services of Sunni Muslims. The Court decided in favor of the Defendants, determining that the DOC successfully presented a qualified immunity defense, and that the plaintiff’s request had no rational connection to any legitimate penological interest.

The plaintiffs submitted that they had entered into a shari'a credit loan agreement with the first defendant for IDR 2 billion, leveraging six properties in their names as a shari'a credit guarantee. The plaintiffs maintained that they had met their financial repayment obligations to the first defendant, and had always acted in good faith towards the first defendant. The plaintiffs referred to this good faith because they sought to novate the terms of the shari'a credit loan agreement through the Magelang Religious Court, and were concerned that the first defendant would auction the properties, or several thereof, in response, without first going through the court. Indeed, the plaintiffs submitted, the first defendant, through the second defendant, had unilaterally auctioned the plaintiffs' properties, contrary to law, justice and humanity, especially in terms of the shari'a economy. Moreover, that in order for the conduct of the first and second defendant to be legal, they first needed to obtain the recommendation of the interested co-defendant. The plaintiffs submitted that as the first and second defendant had failed to do so, they should be ordered to pay to the plaintiffs IDR 7 million per day for every day they failed to carry out the orders of the Mageland Religious Court. The novation of terms of a contract, the plaintiffs submitted, was regulated in art 180 of the Herziene Inlandsch/Indonesisch Reglement (HIR).

The defendants submitted that a clause in the original agreement stated that any dispute arising would be settled before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional), pursuant to art 59(1) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, and arts 2 and (4)(1) and (2) of Law No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution. The court noted that, pursuant to art 49(i) of Law No. 3 of 2006 on the Religious Judiciary, and art 55(1) and (2) of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, the religious courts have the absolute competence to resolve shari'a banking disputes, provided the agreement in dispute does not specify otherwise. As the parties had specified otherwise, the court found that art 1338(1) of the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), which states that all contractual agreements are to be treated as statutes for the parties that make them, applied. In shari'a law, the court stated, this concept in muamalah (commercial and civil law) is known as asas al-sufiah, al-muamalah al-ibahah. Accordingly, the court found that it was precluded from adjudicating the dispute.

The parties were married on 9 December 1996 and had five children. They had lived with the plaintiff's parents for one month, before moving around Bukittinggi and Riau for approximately eight years, finally settling in Agam. The plaintiff submitted that, by the beginning of 2004, the marriage had become quarrelsome because the defendant:

1. rather than providing for his family, would frequently preach with Jamaah Tabligh, incurring many debts along the way, forcing the plaintiff to have to work as a street vendor to make ends meet; and
2. had failed to care for and protect the plaintiff as his wife, showing little interest in any concerns she might have.

Problems escalated in August 2015 when the defendant fell from his motorcycle. When the plaintiff inquired with the defendant as to the cause of his fall, the defendant responded that he had been having negative thoughts about the plaintiff, which had caused him to fall. The plaintiff responded by saying that she could no longer live like this. The defendant's refusal to apologise left the plaintiff feeling offended. When the defendant then prepared a document stating that he divorced the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed for divorce with the court.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court also acknowledged that the parties' marriage no longer represented a joyful and everlasting union, as envisaged by art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) family, as envisaged art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Singapore, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Singapore's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status.  

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of The Gambia, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Gambia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

The plaintiffs submitted that they had entered into a murabahah financing agreement with the first defendant on 19 September 2011 for IDR 175 million. The money was to be used to finance a shop, and the plaintiffs agreed to repay the money to the first defendant within 60 months, leveraging their 224m² family property in Jabon village, Mojokerto. The plaintiffs submitted that they had chosen to borrow from a shari'a bank because they were both Muslims and wished to conduct business in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah.

Between October 2011-August 2012, the plaintiffs adhered to the repayment structure, and made 11 repayments (IDR 47,500,000). By September 2012, however, the plaintiffs' business had become less profitable as the number of market competitors increased. The plaintiffs still made their monthly repayment on 29 September 2012, but submitted that they had requested a restructuring of the agreement to accommodate their recent financial hardship. Moreover, they also submitted that the first defendant should have provided the plaintiffs with an opportunity to sell the property on their own to enable them to make future repayments. Instead, on 24 April 2013, the first defendant sent to the plaintiffs a letter stating its intentions to auction the leveraged property the following morning (25 April 2013).

The plaintiffs learned that the third defendant, who had successfully bid at auction for the property, had already visited the property before auction with an employee of the first defendant, expressing an interest to purchase it for IDR 225 million. The plaintiffs had rejected the offer, wishing instead to resolve the dispute through legal channels. The plaintiffs submitted that the first and third defendants had clearly colluded to acquire the plaintiffs' family property. Moreover, that the property should have been able to attract IDR 400 million at auction.

The plaintiffs requested that the court:

1. invalidate the auctioning of their property;
2. afford them the opportunity to sell their property on their own; and
3. prohibit the second defendant from dealing with the property.

The court found, however, that it was precluded from adjudicating the case as the parties had agreed to resolve any disputes before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional).

The applicants claimed that, since 2003, the first applicant had been a customer of the first respondent, via its shari'a Bukittinggi branch (PT. Bank Bukopin Cabang Syari'ah Bukittinggi). Prior to becoming a customer of the first respondent, the first applicant had been a debtor of PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) Cabang Bukittinggi, to which it owed IDR 483,2333,530 as at June 2003. At that time, the first applicant's business was experiencing financial difficulties, leading the first applicant to apply to the first respondent for a financial loan for financial support, as well as to pay his debts with PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. After examining the relevant securities documents, the first respondent agreed to enter into an Al-Murabahah (sale-purchase) agreement with the first applicant. Once the relevant documentation was executed, the first respondent provided to the first applicant IDR 500 million, with which it paid its debt to PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. The first respondent then took from PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi the deed of title of a property in the name of the second applicant (the second applicant was already an authorised guarantor pursuant to the agreement between the first applicant and first respondent).

In the Al-Murabahah agreement document the first respondent had agreed to make available items for the first applicant to the value of IDR 500 million, and the first respondent was to sell those items to the first applicant for IDR 794,816,460. (In an Al-Murabahah agreement there is an absolute requirement that there be items for sale subject of the agreement.) As there were no items purchased by the first applicant from the first respondent, the agreement had no legal authority. The agreement was further prohibited, according to the applicants, because it allowed the first applicant to borrow from the first respondent a sum of money, secured by a stationary object (the property) for a period of five years, with an additional payment for the first respondent which, according to Islam, constituted riba (usur or interest).

The Supreme Court, in the first instance, declared that the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent was one based on borrowing a sum of money, secured against a stationary object. Furthermore, that profit instalments provided by the first applicant to the first respondent were to be treated as payment instalments against the debt it owed to the first repsondent, because providing additional payments outside the scope of the principal to the lender would be contrary to shari'a. The other relevant documents, including the debt notice, the applicants claimed, were also null and void.

In addition, another Al-Murabahah agreement had been made by, and before, the first co-respondent, tying the first applicant and first respondent to the sale and purchase of items valued at IDR 581,230,044, with a sale price of IDR 350 million, and a murabahah profit for the first respondent of IDR 231,230,044. This was to be paid in instalments over 60 months, tied to a debt notice and mortgage deed, both of which were prepared by, and before, the first co-respondent, secured by the same property. Similarly, however, this agreement had no object for sale or purchase.

The total of both agreements resulted in the first applicant being in IDR 850 million debt to the first respondent. After the first applicant had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240, the remainder owing, it claimed, was IDR 486,388,760. However, while the first applicant had originally owed PT BRI Cabang Bukittinggi no more than IDR 500 million, it now claimed the first applicant owed IDR 1,376,046,504 (this was the principal debt combined with interest). The first applicant maintained, however, that he had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240 in instalments up until March 2006.

The Bukittinggi State Court had already issued a notice stating that the property held as a security would be auctioned on 16 August 2006. The first applicant, upon becoming aware of the fact that the two Al-Murabahah agreements were null and void, sought to prevent the first respondent from auctioning the property. Despite being made aware of, and reading, the notice, the second respondent went ahead with the auction. Accordingly, the applicants claimed that the auction should have no legal authority, and pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006 on the Religious Judiciary, the civil courts were precluded from resolving shari'a economy-related matters anyway.

The applicants also objected to the conduct of the third respondent, the purchaser of the property and a staff member of the legal team of the first respondent. The applicants alleged that the third respondent knew the auction reserve price and therefore only had to pay a little bit over the reserve to secure the property.

The applicants sought damages for actual loss, as well as pain and suffering. They claimed that the land was worth IDR 2.5 billion, and yet the third respondent had only paid IDR 993,600,000 as the purchase price. Moreover, they sought IDR 500 million in damages for the stress and emotional strain incurred from the entire ordeal.

The Bukittinggi Religious Court (lower court) had declared the two Al-Murabahah agreements null and void, and declared the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent a financial loan (Al-Qardh). The IDR 850 million debt owed by the first applicant to the first respondent was reduced to IDR 486,388,760, taking into account the instalments paid by the first applicant totalling IDR 363,611,240. The first respondent had also been ordered to transfer to the applicants the profit from the auction, minus the remaining debt of IDR 486,388,760, leaving the respondents owing the applicants IDR 447,595,240.

On appeal to the Padang Religious High Court, the decision of the lower court was overturned. The Padang Religious High Court found that the lower court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the first instance, rejected the applicants' cassation appeal, upholding the decision of the Padang Religious High Court.

The applicants used their last avenue of appeal before the Supreme Court (reconsideration or peninjauan kembali) claiming that the Supreme Court's judgment, at cassation level, was erroneous. The applicants asserted that the Al-Murabahah agreements contained an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to resolve any legal disputes before the Indonesian Islamic Civil and Commercial Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Muamalat Indonesia), designating the Bukittinggi State Court registrar's office as the appropriate venue. Whereas, in actual fact, the respondents had submitted their request to seize the property to the Bukittinggi State Court. Moreover, the applicants claimed that the Al-Murabahah agreements failed to meet the following shari'a requirements:

1. interest (riba)-free;
2. the sale-purchase items may not be forbidden (haram);
3. the bank is to finance some or all of the items, pursuant to the agreed-upon classification;
4. the bank is to purchase the items in its own name;
5. if the bank makes representations to the customer that it is purchasing the items, the agreement is executed once the items the bank is purchasing become the property of the bank; and
6. the bank provides all information relating to the items, including cash or credit purchases.

The Supreme Court found that the two reasons submitted by the applicants did not fall under any of the reasons for review (peninjauan kembali) contemplated by art 67 of Law No. 14 of 1985, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

On 30 July 2008, the first plaintiff and his wife, the second plaintiff, entered into a cooperative agreement with the second defendant, the agent of which was the third defendant. Pursuant to the agreement, the term of which was 36 months, the plaintiffs leveraged the deed of title to their property. The parties also agreed that the second defendant would provide monthly income portions from the agreement of IDR 1,616,800 to the plaintiffs. The second defendant agreed to:

1. ensure the security of the plaintiffs' property;
2. not allow the deed of title (original or photocopy) to change hands;
3. not use the deed of title, except for purposes relating to the provision of income portions; and
4. return to the plaintiffs the deed of title if the agreement came to an end.

The plaintiffs agreed to:

1. accept a portion of the profits, as agreed to by both sides;
2. be provided with a security guarantee for the deed of title provided to the second defendant; and
3. have the deed of title returned if the agreement came to an end.

The plaintiffs submitted that the second defendant had fulfilled its obligations to the plaintiffs by providing them with IDR 1,616,800 per month until April 2010, when the second defendant defaulted on this part of the agreement. The plaintiffs then filed a civil claim against the second, third and fourth defendants (as first, second and third defendants), and first defendant (as fourth defendant) with the Sleman State Court on 28 January 2011, with the decision being handed down on 16 August 2011.

Initially, the security guarantee over the second plaintiff's property had been with the first defendant pursuant to a Mudharabah agreement between the second defendant as debtor and the first defendant as creditor (dated: 27 December 2007), with an arrears of IDR 1.5 billion, with security in the form of several other deeds of title. The plaintiffs submitted that, as a result of subterfuge on the part of the first and second defendants, the security over the deed of title of a property belonging to a Prof. Dr Kuswandi was removed by the second defendant, working together with the first defendant, and replaced by the deed of title belonging to the property of the second plaintiff. Moreover, that the first and second defendants then coerced the plaintiffs into assenting to the inclusion of an addendum to the initial agreement, the contents of which were the inclusion of the second plaintiff's property, by threatening that the plaintiffs would not receive any dividends. In actual fact, the plaintiffs never received any dividends, regardless.

On 20 September 2010, the first defendant wrote to the second defendant instructing the second defendant to pay to the first defendant arrears owed pursuant to their original agreement. Failure to make payment would result in the auctioning of the property. The first defendant made an application to auction the property, but a lack of interest from prospective bidders prevented the property from being auctioned. Regardless, the plaintiffs submitted that such conduct on the part of the first plaintiff was illegal.

The Sleman State Court had, on 16 August 2011, ordered the second, third and fourth defendants to pay to the plaintiffs IDR 450 million in damages. The plaintiffs, however, filed an application with the Bantul Religious Court for, what it perceived to be, breaches of shari'a law (muamalat law) on the part of the defendants. The plaintiffs sought orders from the court that:

1. the defendants not auction the second plaintiff's property;
2. declare the Sleman State Court's decision to be legally binding;
3. declare the Mudharabah agreement between the first and second defendants contrary to shari'a law principles and, therefore, null and void;
4. declare the addendum null and void;
5. the defendants pay damages, pursuant to the decision of the Sleman State Court; and
6. declare the first defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the deed of title of the second plaintiff's property unlawful.

The court declined to pass judgment, however, acceding to the first defendant's objection that the parties to the dispute had agreed to resolve all disputes before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body.

On 1 August 1988, the applicants were married. While they had no children of their own, they had raised and cared for a child named Muh. Ilham, now aged 21 years. Muh. Ilham's parents had given him to the applicants to care for because they had two other children for whom providing financially was already a struggle (at the time Muh. Ilham's father was unemployed, only working as a farmer). The applicants had been prepared to raise Muh. Ilham as their own and were able to bear the costs associated with caring for and educating Muh. Ilham because the first applicant had a steady salary with the Indonesian National Military's ground forces (Tenaga Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Darat). The applicants requested that they be stipulated as Muh. Ilham's legal adoptive parents.

The court cited art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which states that an adopted child is a child for whom the responsibility to cover their educational costs and the like is transferred from their biological parents to their adoptive parents, pursuant to a court judgment. Moreover, pursuant to art 49(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989, for the sake of legal certainty, an adoption based on Islamic law requires a religious court determination.

The court found that, pursuant to Islamic legal provisions, child adoption is legal if the following conditions are met:

1. the child's welfare is prioritised;
2. the child's educational expenses and the like are covered, per art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws;
3. the child's adoption does not sever the bloodline between the child and his/her parents;
4. the child's adoption does not result in the child being deemed to share bloodline, inheritance or any other legal relationship with his/her adoptive parents, except for the responsibilities mentioned above in point 2;
5. the child is to inherit one-third of their parents' estate, pursuant to art 209 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws;
6. the child's adoption requires an agreement between the adoptive parents and the representative or person/legal entity facilitating the adoption;
7. the adoption must adhere to current laws vis-a-vis the prospective adoptive parents;
8. the adoption must adhere to current laws for the sake of the child;
9. the adoption of a Muslim child is to adhere to the fatwa of the Indonesian Council of Ulama, No: U-335/MUI 182 of 10 June 1982; and
10. in the interests of legal certainty, child adoption, pursuant to Islamic law and art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, be ratified by a religious court decision.

Acceding to the applicants' request, the court acknowledged that, even though Muh. Ilham was 21 years of age and adoption was no longer appropriate, the history and nature of the applicants' relationship with Muh. Ilham was such that he could be declared their adopted child.

This document is the first draft of Criminal Procedure Bill prepared and adopted by the parliament and sent to the Guardian Council for review.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.