SHARIAsource

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

The parties were married on 29 May 1994. The plaintiff submitted, however, that, since May 2008, the parties' marriage had been disharmonious, primarily because the defendant had had an extra-martial affair. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant deliberately had another woman collect him from their home, where the plaintiff and the parties' children were, and take him to the airport for a flight to Israel. When the defendant returned from Israel on 31 May 2008, rather than returning home, the defendant went to the other woman's home. The defendant returned to the plaintiff's home on 2 June 2008. Problems escalated on 4 June 2008 when the defendant requested the plaintiff's permission to marry the other woman, since which time he had also failed to execute his duties as a husband or head of the household. The plaintiff submitted that she did not believe the defendant's temperament would have a positive influence on their children.

The defendant refuted these submissions, claiming that the cause of disharmony originated in 2004 when the defendant discovered that the plaintiff was still in contact with her ex-boyfriend. Moreover, that the woman with whom he was accused of having an extra-marital affair was merely a colleague, and that the two had never conducted themselves in an inappropriate manner. In December 2009, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had told their children she had a new boyfriend and that she would introduce him to the children, before divorcing the defendant and taking the children to Jakarta to be with her new boyfriend. Furthermore, on 9 March 2010, the plaintiff left for Bali saying she had a business meeting there for one day. While in Bali she switched her mobile phone off and never provided the defendant or their children with any information as to her well-being or whereabouts. The defendant also claimed that on 14 March 2010, the plaintiff surreptitiously left for Bali again, where a friend of the defendant's saw her and her boyfriend in a hotel room. The plaintiff returned four days later, again having provided the defendant with no information as to her well-being or whereabouts. Since returning from Bali, the defendant claimed the plaintiff did not want her to touch him anymore, while admitting she had been involved with her boyfriend while in Bali. She had not even returned to the matrimonial home since then, leaving the defendant to take care of their children. The defendant told the court that the plaintiff had even changed her Facebook account status in March 2010 to 'not married'.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the applicant an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in sughra). It declined, however, to rule on the custody of the two children.

The parties were married on 25 August 2008 (NB: the court's findings state they were married on 21 August 2008) and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that eight months into her first pregnancy the parties had quarrelled and the defendant had grabbed and pushed her to the floor with utter disregard. At the time, the plaintiff reported the defendant to the authorities for acts of domestic violence, however, the defendant fled for Bombana in search of gold and his parents. The plaintiff's parents advised her to reconcile with the defendant and to withdraw her police report, which the plaintiff did for the sake of the parties' marriage.

In 2011, the parties appeared to have reconciled their differences, already having had their first child. The defendant then proceeded to have an extra-marital affair with another woman, while choosing to spend all his income on this other woman and none on the plaintiff. The plaintiff also submitted that during an encounter with the other woman, she had learned that the defendant had been carrying on this extra-marital affair while the plaintiff was pregnant.

The defendant had also been incarcerated for transporting petroleum. Upon his release from prison, the plaintiff began working at Kredit Colombus (a credit company) to make ends meet. When the defendant, however, forbid her from working the parties had begun to quarrel again. The plaintiff submitted that their disputes were also the result of the defendant:

1. demanding that the plaintiff return to him the spending money with which he had provided her, if he himself had run out of money;
2. forbidding, and becoming angry with, the plaintiff from working to pay for domestic household needs;
3. damaging the plaintiff's belongings and that of the household when he became angry;
4. physically assaulting the plaintiff when he became jealous for no established reason;
5. often threatening the plaintiff, causing her great fear and trauma;
6. regularly instructing the plaintiff to divorce him; and
7. controlling the parties' finances and only providing the plaintiff with money when she needed/requested it.

While the parties' families had endeavoured to make the parties reconcile, following Eid Mubarak in 2014, the plaintiff left the defendant and returned to her parents' home, where she had remained until the time of the court proceeding. During that time, the defendant continued to terrorise and threaten the plaintiff, leaving the plaintiff with no other option but to seek an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra). The plaintiff also sought custody of the parties' two young children, as well as IDR 1.5 million per month in child maintenance until the children were adult and independent.

The court deferred to expert Islamic legal opinion in Kitab Ia'natul Thalibin Juz III, which dictates that a court is to grant a wife a divorce if she is no longer happy with her husband. Moreover, citing art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 65 of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, and art 5 of Law No. 23 of 2004 on the Abolition of Domestic Violence, the court acceded to the plaintiff's request. In its findings, however, it did not explicitly accede to the plaintiff's request for child maintenance payments.

The plaintiff submitted that, on 5 February 2011, a cooperative agreement had been executed between the plaintiff and the company CV. Barito Putera Mandiri (the company), represented by the first defendant as its administrator. The agreement financed the purchase of motorcycles and, in principle, regulated the relationship of the plaintiff as creditor of customers seeking to purchase motorcycles, and the company as the retail provider of those motorcycles. For a year, pursuant to a financing request submitted by the company, represented by the first defendant, the plaintiff had already approved the murabahah financing for the purchase of 136 motorcycles for its customers, for a total of IDR 1,738,165,000.

Initially, the financing of these motorcycles had gone smoothly, the company successfully executing its obligation to transfer proof of owernship to every customer. This was not the case for the 15th-136th customers, however, as the company, acting in bad faith, had only provided the customers with photocopies of their proof of ownership. It subsequently became known that the defendants, through the company, had already collected financial instalment repayments from the customers, but had not deposited those instalments with the plaintiff, contrary to art 6(8) of the murabahah agreement. Even after employees of the plaintiff contacted the customers who had obtained financial facilities from the plaintiff through the first defendant, the customers continued to transfer their money to the defendants because they had received proof of ownership of their motorcycles.

On numerous occasions, the plaintiff requested, orally, and in writing on 11 May 2012, that the defendants adhere to the murabahah agreement and fulfil their obligations pursuant to art 6(4) thereof. Since 5 February 2011, the first defendant had only deposited IDR 433,165,000 from a total of IDR 1,738,165,000 with the plaintiff, was therefore in contravention of art 6(4) and (8) of the agreement, and had incurred a loss of IDR 1,305,000,000. In order to rectify the cessation of payments, the plaintiff had sent a letter to the defendants, through the company, which was responded to by the first defendant as director of the company on 29 February 2012. Principally, the first defendant's response stated that the company was responsible for all financial payment instalments from the customers until customers had repaid their debts entirely. When this commitment was not met, the plaintiff sent another letter of confirmation and clarification to the defendants, dated 11 May 2012, which received a response confirming the transfer of all customer financing.

The parties agreed to draft six murabahah agreements for the purchase of motorcycles, valued at IDR 1,305,000,000, operating as a transfer of the financial customer agreements for the purpose of repaying the remainder of the arrears from the 136 motorcycles from the company. Each defendant executed one of the new murabahah agreements. These new agreements were executed assuming that, until May 2012, the motorcycle financing would be reduced by one year from three years, meaning that the 136 motorcycles, in principle, belonged to the plaintiff, making the conversion of the sale agreements from the plaintiff to the defendants lawful. Despite new agreements and reminder notices from the plaintiff, the defendants continued to default on their repayment obligations.

Initially, the plaintiff requested that the Court order the defendants to pay damages for failure to meet their contractual obligations, and to declare lawful the plaintiff's seizure of collateral properties and vehicles leveraged by the defendants. After receiving counsel from the Court, however, the plaintiff chose to withdraw its application. The defendants were absent from court, while the plaintiff was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 701,000).

The cassation applicant and cassation respondent had been married for 14 years and had four children. The parties, however, had begun to quarrel because, as the cassation respondent had submitted, the cassation applicant was disrespectful to the cassation respondent as the husband and head of the household. The cassation applicant was stubborn and difficult to deal with, and not afraid of rebutting or opposing the cassation respondent's words and wishes.

The cassation applicant submitted that the cassation respondent had failed to meet certain legislative requirements associated with filing for divorce, namely, that as a public servant, the cassation respondent had not yet first obtained the permission of his work superior before filing for divorce.

The Supreme Court held that the Samarinda High Religious Court's decision could not be overturned because it had not applied the law incorrectly, nor had there been a contravention of applicable law, or a failure to meet any other legislative requirements that would render a decision null and void.

In its preambular statement, this regional regulation states that Diniyah Takmiliyah is a form of non-formal Islamic religious education that teaches religious values and Islamic morals to primary and middle school students. According to art 3, Diniyah Takmiliyah functions to meet societal needs for Islamic religious education for primary and middle school students, and to provide guidance in practising and implementing Islamic teachings. At a minimum, Diniyah Takmiliyah curriculum comprises studies of the Qur'an, creed (aqidah), morals (akhlak), legal understanding (fiqih), Islamic cultural history, Arabic language, and worship practice (praktek ibadah) (art 11(3)). All Muslim primary and middle school students are obliged to undertake Diniyah Takmiliyah education (art 12), Diniyah Takmiliyah Awaliyah for primary school students, which lasts for four years, and Diniyah Takmiliyah Wustha for middle school students, which lasts for two years (art 5).

This fatwa acknowledges the principal distinctions between Sunni and Shi'a Islam:

1. Shi'a Islam rejects hadith not narrated by the Prophet's family (Ahlu Bait), while Sunni Islam (Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'ah) does not differentiate between hadith provided that those hadith meet the criteria of the classification of hadith (mustalah hadis);
2. Shi'a Islam perceives imams as infallible (ma 'sum), while Sunni Islam does not;
3. Shi'a Islam does not acknowledge consensus (ijma') without the presence of an imam, while Sunni Islam does;
4. Shi'a Islam believes that political leadership/government is included in the pillars of religion, while Sunni Islam believes in general welfare with the aim of religious, spiritual, political leadership being to guarantee and protect the proselytisation and interests of the Islamic people (umat); and
5. Shi'a Islam, in general, does not acknowledge the succession of Abu Bakar as-Siddiq, Umar Ibnul Khatab, and Usman bin Affan, while Sunni Islam does.

Acknowledging these principal differences, especially with regard to government (imamah), the Indonesian Council of Ulama implores Indonesian Muslims to understand Sunni Islam in order to increase their own vigilence towards the flow of interpretations based on Shi'a Islam.

The applicant requested that the court grant his son (aged 17) dispensation to marry his girlfriend (aged 18), with whom he had been been romantically involved for approximately eight months, and with whom he had been physically intimate on at least three occasions resulting in her falling pregnant. The applicant submitted that his application to the Office of Religious Affairs for his son to marry had been dismissed because his son was under the age of 19 and, therefore, did not meet the minimum age requirements contained in art 7(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 15(1) and (2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and the Minister of Religion Regulation No. 11 of 2007 on Marriage Registration.

The court, pursuant to art 7(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, acceded to the application. It did so on the grounds that the applicant's son and his girlfriend had already been romantically involved for a significant period of time and loved each other, evidenced by the fact that they had already agreed to marry in the future. Moreover, granting them dispensation to marry would preclude them from continuing to conduct themselves in a detrimental (mafsadat) way.

The Plaintiffs, three Muslim individuals (Hamid Raza, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia), two mosques (Masjid Al-Ansar, Masjid at-Taqwa), and a non-profit Muslim organization (Muslims Giving Back), alleged that the NYPD violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through unlawful, "suspicionless" surveillance and sought an injunction to prevent further surveillance. The Plaintiffs sought to prove discriminatory intent in one or two of the ways identified in Brown: (1) an express classification theory—by showing that "the NYPD expressly classified Muslims by adopting a policy of singling them out for heightened policy scrutiny"; or (2) a discriminatory application theory—"to the extent that Respondents claim they had a legitimate law enforcement interest in  Plaintiffs, . . . by showing that [Plaintiffs] were subject to NYPD investigations of unequal and unwarranted scope, duration, and invasiveness as a result of their religious beliefs and activities." Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999). The Respondent, the City of New York, filed for bifurcated discovery, and the Plaintiffs responded with a move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the necessary standard for justifying expedited discovery. The District Court granted the expedited motion in part, but set up a two-stage schedule for discovery.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Viet Nam), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Vietnam's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

In this panel titled “Crypto Conundrum in Islamic Finance: Digital Assets and Shariah Compliance,” Dr. Mohamed Ali El Gari and  Dr. Mohd Daud Bakar consider the question whether cryptocurrency is permissible from an Islamic legal perspective. Dr. Bakar opines that cryptocurrency is an asset and not considered currency because it does not fulfill three conditions: use as a valid medium of exchange, stable stock value, and known unit of measurement. Although he acknowledges that cryptocurrency is in use as a medium of exchange, the electronic product currently lacks a stable stock value and known unit of measurement. However, he adds that if cryptocurrency comes to be backed by gold or silver, it could be deemed to be a rival to traditional currency and thus be understood as valid currency. Dr. El Gary opines that cryptocuruency can be permissible only if it is possible to establish that that it qualifies as wealth (māl) or as an asset according to the Islamic law (sharī'a). Doing so requires determining the presence of three conditions: the currency must be in use with a societal desire to normalize its usage, its use must be permissible under normal circumstances, and its must have a value assigned to it in habitual and customary practice. Applying these criteria to cryptocurrency, he concludes that it does meet all three conditions and thus determines that, while it is permissible to use because it is fungible, all the rules restricting the use of money under the rules of excessive interest (ribā) must apply. He further notes that one must be cautious in its use due to cryptocurrency’s speculative nature, which could border on gambling, but that this is not sufficient to say that it religiously impermissible (ḥarām) at presence. Collectively, the panel advises that those who are not very knowledgeable on the cryptocurrency and its attendant issues are to avoid it.  

The reconsideration (peninjauan kembali) applicant, previously the plaintiff/appellant/cassation applicant, herein referred to as the plaintiff, submitted a request for reconsideration in its claim against the reconsideration respondents and reconsideration co-respondents, previously the cassation respondents/defendants/respondents and co-cassation respondents/co-defendants/co-respondents, herein referred to as the defendants and co-defendants. The plaintiff submitted that he had purchased from a Bapak (Mr) Munasan a 250m² property on 29 August 1975, and that the village head was aware of the purchase. The property had been transferred into the plaintiff's name in 1979 for the purposes of property tax and regional building fees. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, however, on 29 July 2000, the property was bequeathed to another party, the fifth defendant, pursuant to a deed drafted by the first co-defendant. Furthermore, the fifth defendant requested that the first co-defendant have the second co-defendant issue the transfer of title in the name of the fifth defendant, with the second, third and fourth defendants serving as trustees (nadzir). On 12 May 2001, the plaintiff submitted that he was invited by the first defendant to discuss the matter of the land endowment. There he was shown a draft statement requiring his signature. Then, on 17 November 2010, the defendants, believing the statement was erroneous, drafted an invalidation of land endowment deed for the second co-defendant. On 29 July 2011 at the local office of religious affairs, the defendants prepared an invalidation report and invalidation declaration and deed of land endowment in relation to the property. The plaintiff submitted that, therefore, the defendants' conduct was evidence the plaintiff was the lawful owner of the property and that the defendants sought legal certainty over the matter in the form of a decision from the Bandung Religious Court. Moreover, that the plaintiff was entitled to IDR 500,000 per day for every day the court's decision was not implemented.

In dismissing this final appeal, the court found that the reason for reconsideration submitted by the plaintiff, that being that new evidence in the form of a relevant document had been discovered that had not been considered in the previous proceeding, failed to meet the prescribed requirement for new and admissible evidence in art 67(b) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court.

Prior to marrying on 21 December 2010, the parties had agreed that the plaintiff would move to South Aceh once she had completed her degree at the Indonesian Higher Education Management Institute (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Manajemen Indonesia), Meulaboh, in a year's time. The plaintiff submitted, however, that after the parties had married and begun building a home together, the defendant had said he wanted to divorce the plaintiff. In April 2011, it became apparent that the defendant had misled the plaintiff and her family about where he had been living prior to marrying the plaintiff. On 17 April 2011, at 8:30pm, the defendant sent the plaintiff a text message stating that the plaintiff was no longer his wife and that she was welcome to file for a divorce with the shari'a court in Meulaboh. The plaintiff also submitted that, while the parties were married, the defendant had failed to provide her with any financial support, while denigrating her and her family.

After having not returned home for two months, the defendant returned to apologise, vowing to mend his ways. The parties attended the local office of religious affairs on 4 July 2011, the parties executing a promissory document, the contents of which stated that the defendant agreed to meet all the financial and emotional needs of the plaintiff, vowing not to treat the plaintiff in an appropriate manner again. The defendant, however, failed to abide by the contents of the document. Moreover, he then sent the plaintiff and plaintiff's father a text message saying he would file for a divorce with the local shari'a court. This caused the plaintiff great emotional suffering and moved her to file for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

Despite the defendant's absence from court, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 establishes the fatwā legalization process in the state of Selangor, Malaysia. It also establishes and outlines the role of the mufti as the chairman of Selangor’s state fatwā committee. It is the main piece of legislation governing Selangor's syariah courts, Islamic finance guidelines, individual conversion to Islam, as well as other Islamic regulations the state has determined to regulate. 

The applicants claimed that, since 2003, the first applicant had been a customer of the first respondent, via its shari'a Bukittinggi branch (PT. Bank Bukopin Cabang Syari'ah Bukittinggi). Prior to becoming a customer of the first respondent, the first applicant had been a debtor of PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) Cabang Bukittinggi, to which it owed IDR 483,2333,530 as at June 2003. At that time, the first applicant's business was experiencing financial difficulties, leading the first applicant to apply to the first respondent for a financial loan for financial support, as well as to pay his debts with PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. After examining the relevant securities documents, the first respondent agreed to enter into an Al-Murabahah (sale-purchase) agreement with the first applicant. Once the relevant documentation was executed, the first respondent provided to the first applicant IDR 500 million, with which it paid its debt to PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. The first respondent then took from PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi the deed of title of a property in the name of the second applicant (the second applicant was already an authorised guarantor pursuant to the agreement between the first applicant and first respondent).

In the Al-Murabahah agreement document the first respondent had agreed to make available items for the first applicant to the value of IDR 500 million, and the first respondent was to sell those items to the first applicant for IDR 794,816,460. (In an Al-Murabahah agreement there is an absolute requirement that there be items for sale subject of the agreement.) As there were no items purchased by the first applicant from the first respondent, the agreement had no legal authority. The agreement was further prohibited, according to the applicants, because it allowed the first applicant to borrow from the first respondent a sum of money, secured by a stationary object (the property) for a period of five years, with an additional payment for the first respondent which, according to Islam, constituted riba (usur or interest).

The Supreme Court, in the first instance, declared that the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent was one based on borrowing a sum of money, secured against a stationary object. Furthermore, that profit instalments provided by the first applicant to the first respondent were to be treated as payment instalments against the debt it owed to the first repsondent, because providing additional payments outside the scope of the principal to the lender would be contrary to shari'a. The other relevant documents, including the debt notice, the applicants claimed, were also null and void.

In addition, another Al-Murabahah agreement had been made by, and before, the first co-respondent, tying the first applicant and first respondent to the sale and purchase of items valued at IDR 581,230,044, with a sale price of IDR 350 million, and a murabahah profit for the first respondent of IDR 231,230,044. This was to be paid in instalments over 60 months, tied to a debt notice and mortgage deed, both of which were prepared by, and before, the first co-respondent, secured by the same property. Similarly, however, this agreement had no object for sale or purchase.

The total of both agreements resulted in the first applicant being in IDR 850 million debt to the first respondent. After the first applicant had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240, the remainder owing, it claimed, was IDR 486,388,760. However, while the first applicant had originally owed PT BRI Cabang Bukittinggi no more than IDR 500 million, it now claimed the first applicant owed IDR 1,376,046,504 (this was the principal debt combined with interest). The first applicant maintained, however, that he had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240 in instalments up until March 2006.

The Bukittinggi State Court had already issued a notice stating that the property held as a security would be auctioned on 16 August 2006. The first applicant, upon becoming aware of the fact that the two Al-Murabahah agreements were null and void, sought to prevent the first respondent from auctioning the property. Despite being made aware of, and reading, the notice, the second respondent went ahead with the auction. Accordingly, the applicants claimed that the auction should have no legal authority, and pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006 on the Religious Judiciary, the civil courts were precluded from resolving shari'a economy-related matters anyway.

The applicants also objected to the conduct of the third respondent, the purchaser of the property and a staff member of the legal team of the first respondent. The applicants alleged that the third respondent knew the auction reserve price and therefore only had to pay a little bit over the reserve to secure the property.

The applicants sought damages for actual loss, as well as pain and suffering. They claimed that the land was worth IDR 2.5 billion, and yet the third respondent had only paid IDR 993,600,000 as the purchase price. Moreover, they sought IDR 500 million in damages for the stress and emotional strain incurred from the entire ordeal.

The Bukittinggi Religious Court (lower court) had declared the two Al-Murabahah agreements null and void, and declared the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent a financial loan (Al-Qardh). The IDR 850 million debt owed by the first applicant to the first respondent was reduced to IDR 486,388,760, taking into account the instalments paid by the first applicant totalling IDR 363,611,240. The first respondent had also been ordered to transfer to the applicants the profit from the auction, minus the remaining debt of IDR 486,388,760, leaving the respondents owing the applicants IDR 447,595,240.

On appeal to the Padang Religious High Court, the decision of the lower court was overturned. The Padang Religious High Court found that the lower court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the first instance, rejected the applicants' cassation appeal, upholding the decision of the Padang Religious High Court.

The applicants used their last avenue of appeal before the Supreme Court (reconsideration or peninjauan kembali) claiming that the Supreme Court's judgment, at cassation level, was erroneous. The applicants asserted that the Al-Murabahah agreements contained an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to resolve any legal disputes before the Indonesian Islamic Civil and Commercial Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Muamalat Indonesia), designating the Bukittinggi State Court registrar's office as the appropriate venue. Whereas, in actual fact, the respondents had submitted their request to seize the property to the Bukittinggi State Court. Moreover, the applicants claimed that the Al-Murabahah agreements failed to meet the following shari'a requirements:

1. interest (riba)-free;
2. the sale-purchase items may not be forbidden (haram);
3. the bank is to finance some or all of the items, pursuant to the agreed-upon classification;
4. the bank is to purchase the items in its own name;
5. if the bank makes representations to the customer that it is purchasing the items, the agreement is executed once the items the bank is purchasing become the property of the bank; and
6. the bank provides all information relating to the items, including cash or credit purchases.

The Supreme Court found that the two reasons submitted by the applicants did not fall under any of the reasons for review (peninjauan kembali) contemplated by art 67 of Law No. 14 of 1985, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.