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This fatwa states that marriage, according to Islam, is something noble and sacred, intended as a sign of devotion to Allah. A lawful marriage according to Islamic teachings requires there be a bride and bridegroom, two witnesses, a guardian, consent, and a dowry. The fatwa appeals to all Indonesian Muslims, but especially to the younger generation, in order that they marry pursuant to the conditions contained therein.

The fatwa states that:

1. Islam acknowledges that legitimate offspring is a child born from parents in wedlock;
2. adopting a child with the understanding that s/he then becomes divorced from his/her biological parents is contrary to Islam;
3. child adoption is permissible under Islam for the purposes of raising, caring for, and educating a child, but does not change the child's biological or religious status; and
4. adoption of an Indonesian child by a non-Indonesian citizen is contrary to art 34 of the 1945 Constitution, and diminishes national pride.

MWNUK published this report to inform Muslim women in Britain about their rights regarding marriage and divorce. It includes case studies and answers questions they commonly receive. Written to also assist academics, policymakers, religious authorities, and other relevant organizations, the report provides a comprehensive overview of the secular and religious legal problems Muslim women may face in obtaining a divorce.

This fatwa prohibits a Muslim woman from marrying a non-Muslim man. It also states that a Muslim man is forbidden from marrying a non-Muslim woman. While the fatwa acknowledges that there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not a Muslim man may marry a woman of the Book (Ahlu Kitab), it determines that such an arrangement is forbidden (haram).

The parties were married on 26 October 1988 and had three children. After 22 years, however, their marriage had become quarrelsome because, the plaintiff submitted, the defendant frequently:

1. owed others money, unbeknownst to the plaintiff;
2. sold the parties' personal property, unbeknownst to the plaintiff;
3. stole money from the plaintiff; and
4. left the parties' home in the afternoon without saying anything, only to return in the middle of the night.

On 30 December 2010, when the plaintiff inquired with the defendant as to the parties' personal property that the defendant had sold, the defendant had become enraged. As a result, the parties had slept in separate beds for the past five years and three months, during which time they had not been physically intimate, nor had the defendant provided the plaintiff with any financial support. He had, however, provided the parties' children with spending money. The parties attempts to reconcile through consultation and deliberation had been unsuccessful.

The court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) and of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 8 January 2006 and had two children. After their marriage, they lived in a rental property in Medan for a year. They then moved to the defendant's parents' home for a year, before living in another rental property. The plaintiff submitted that the parties had quarrelled since the beginning of 2007 because the defendant had not worked to meet the parties' domestic financial needs.

In July 2013, problems escalated after the defendant had an extra-marital affair with another woman. This caused the plaintiff to return to her parents' home. The defendant followed suit and returned to his own parents' home as well. The parties had remained separate for the past two years and seven months. Around January 2015, the defendant and his parents attended the plaintiff's parents' home in order for the defendant to orally divorce the plaintiff and draft a statement of divorce.

In acceding to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra), the court noted that the parties had breached the mandate contained in arts 33 and 34 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and verse 21 of Al-Rum (The Byzantines) of the Qur'an. Moreover, the plaintiff had proven that the parties' marriage was irreparable, making divorce the only feasible course. The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 31 March 2011, after which they had lived with the respondent's parents for almost two and a half years. In August 2013, however, the parties separated after their marriage had become quarrelsome. The applicant submitted that this was because the respondent had no apparent reason for not wanting to live with the applicant's parents at a time when the applicant had to take care of his elderly parents. The applicant submitted that the parties' marriage was no longer joyful, peaceful, hopeful and loving (bahagia, sakinah, mawadah dan rohmah) based on one almighty God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa). The parties' disagreement and subsequent quarrelling had also prevented them from conceiving a child. Accordingly, the applicant requested that the court grant him a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, arts 19(f) and 22 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court handed down its verdict despite the respondent's absence from court.

The parties were married on 13 October 2014. They lived with the plaintiff's parents for nine months, the first seven of which, the plaintiff submitted, had been harmonious. Since May 2015, however, their marriage had become quarrelsome. The plaintiff submitted that this was because the defendant's wage was insufficient to provide for his family meaning that the parties would have to rely on the plaintiff's parents to meet their daily needs. Moreover, that the defendant refused to look for additional employment to supplement his income. In July 2015, after problems between the parties escalated, the defendant left the plaintiff to live with his own parents. The parties had remained separated for the six months leading up to the proceeding.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's application, acknowledging that the parties' marriage was beyond repair. Pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic tradition on 18 October 2010 before two witnesses at the second applicant's home in Simpang Mamplam, Bireuen. The second applicant's older brother served as the marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) was seven mayam of gold. Moreover, there were no reasons according to Islam to prohibit the applicants from marrying. The applicants, who already had a child, requested that the court ratify their marriage.

The court acceded to their request on the grounds that the applicants' marriage met the requirements stipulated in arts 2(1) and 64 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 7(3)(e) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court also directed the applicants to register their marriage with the Marriage Registry.

The first applicant submitted that she had married a man by the name of Drs. Moerdiono on 20 December 1993, pursuant to Islamic norms. According to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, a marriage is lawful if performed in accordance with the respective religion and beliefs of the persons wishing to marry. The first applicant's marriage, however, had not been recorded with the Office of Religious Affairs, as required by art 2(2) of the Law No. 1 of 1974. As a result, the legal status of the first applicant's child (the second applicant) was that the second applicant had been born out of wedlock, per art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and therefore only had a civil relationship with his mother and his mother's family. According to Islam, however, the first applicant's child was legitimate (sah) because the applicant was married to the second applicant's father when the second applicant was born meaning the second applicant's lineage with his father must be acknowledged.

The applicant submitted that her constitutional rights and those of the second applicant, as guaranteed by arts 28B(1) and (2), and 28D(1) of the 1945 Constitution, had been repudiated by virtue of art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974.

The court acceded to the applicant's submission regarding art 43(1) stating that the article was to be read down as meaning that a child's civil relationship with its father and its father's family depended on scientific proof that the child was a blood relation of the father.

The first defendant (Neima Mohamed, herein Neima), as the plaintiff in the court of first instance, had submitted that:

1. On 4 April 2004, she and the plaintiff (Mostafa Mohamed, herein Mostafa) were married;
2. On 28 February 2005, the parties had executed a pre-nuptial financial agreement that would regulate their financial affairs during and after their marriage;
3. The agreement stated that Mostafa should pay to Neima $50,000.00 if he initiated separation or divorce proceedings against her; and
4. On 11 September 2008, Mostafa Islamically divorced Neima.

Mostafa denied marrying Neima, did not admit points 2 and 3, and denied Islamically divorcing her. Moreover, Mostafa submitted that any separation of the parties had been initiated by Neima.

Before the court of first instance, Mostafa denied having been married to Neima under Islamic law. Her Honour Magistrate Trad did not answer that question, but rather found that the parties had been in a 'domestic relationship'. Regardless, the parties could not agree who initiated the separation and on which date the separation occurred. Mostafa claimed that Neima had initiated the separation on 11 September 2008 by taking his key to their Rockdale unit, while Neima claimed that Mostafa, on 11 April 2007, had asked her to leave their home, and alternatively, on 11 September 2008, had Islamically divorced her.

On the facts, Magistrate Trad found that Mostafa had initiated the divorce on 11 April 2007, further evidenced by him sending his daughter to tell Neima to leave by a certain date, with directions as to the division of their property. Therefore, her Honour found that sufficient evidence existed to activate cl 11 of the parties' agreement, compelling Mostafa to pay to Neima the agreed-upon sum of $50,000.00 (Moackar Sadak or dowry).

On appeal, Harrison AsJ found that Mostafa could appeal the initial decision pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, which granted the Court jurisdiction to quash the decision of a lower court if based on an error of law. Mostafa sought to dispute the findings of Magistrate Trad in their entirety on the following grounds:

1. that her Honour had made errors of fact and law;
2. that the decision suffered from jurisdictional error;
3. that her Honour had failed to acknowledge that the agreement had not been executed in accordance with the law;
4. that her Honour had failed to find that the agreement was unenforceable because it conflicted with public policy; and
5. that her Honour had erred by failing to find that the separation, for the purposes of the agreement, did not have to accord with shari'a law.

With regards to appeal ground 4, Mostafa submitted that her Honour had failed to recognise that the agreement was one of servitude in that it compelled Mostafa to remain in a relationship with Neima, lest he pay her $50,000.00. Moreover, it was contrary to public policy for her Honour to determine which party had left the relationship, and cl 11 was void for illegality as it was a penalty clause. The Court found the precedent cited in support of its submission by Mostafa's counsel to be somewhat irrelevant. It found the precedent cited by Neima's counsel, which stated that the court would, where possible, hold parties seeking separation or divorce to their agreement, relevant. The Court also acknowledged the issue of the payment of Moackar Sadak, noting that the lack of any precedent regarding such payment in Australia may necessitate seeing how other common law countries have approached such agreements. The Court also provided a brief discussion on mahr, based on Ann Black and Kerrie Sadiq's, 'Good and Bad Sharia: Australia's Mixed Response to Islamic Law' (2011) 17 UNSW Law Journal 82, noting that mahr appeared to be what the parties meant by Moackar Sadak. The Court found that cases dealing with mahr from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom all found such agreements enforceable, provided they could not be invalidated for other reasons. Counsel for Neima submitted that, while some customs might be contrary to public policy, what is of utmost importance in enforcing such an agreement is that the parties to the agreement knowingly and voluntarily adhered to those customs.

Harrison AsJ found that, in enforcing such agreements, courts of common law countries have applied common law or the relevant legislation (if any), rather than sharīʿa law. Moreover, that none of these courts found that agreements such as that made by the parties in this instance contradict public policy. Harrison AsJ also dismissed Mostafa's argument that it was not for the Court to decide who left the relationship, stating that '[c]ourts are often called upon, especially in family matters, to determine sensitive factual matters such as when a relationship has ended, or whether it was indeed a de facto relationship...'.

With regards to Mostafa's submission that cl 11 was a penalty clause, Harrison AsJ disagreed. Her Honour found that the Property (Relationships) Act and the Family Law Act allowed parties to enter into financial agreements. Moreover, that cl 11 formed part of the 'greater bargain' between the parties.

Harrison AsJ also dismissed Mostafa's submissions that the court of first instance did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the agreement, or to determine whether or not the parties' separation had to accord with sharīʿa law. The Court found that as the agreement had neither specified an appropriate dispute resolution forum or jurisdiction (common law or sharīʿa law), nothing precluded the court of first instance from adjudicating the case. Secondly, that Magistrate Trad had not considered the meaning of 'divorce' under sharīʿa law, instead determining when the separation had occurred on the facts. The Court also noted that Mostafa had not relied on any expert evidence relating to sharīʿa law, and that Magistrate Trad was in no way required to apply sharīʿa law to interpret the parties' agreement.

Mostafa's counsel conceded the inapplicability of the Property (Relationships) Act but argued that Magistrate Trad had applied it regardless. The Court found it irrelevant whether or not the agreement satisfied the requirements of the Property (Relationships) Act, stating that Magistrate Trad had correctly applied the laws of contract to the agreement.

Mostafa also submitted that as the parties had not been married under Australian law, the agreement was unenforceable because the terms 'separation' and 'divorce', per cl 11 of the agreement, are inapplicable to de facto relationships. The Court agreed to consider whether or not marriage under Australian law was a condition precedent to the enforceability of the agreement, but concurred with Neima's counsel that, among other submissions, the agreement did not specify marriage under Australian law as a condition precedent to the enforceability of the agreement, or to cl 11 specifically. Moreover, that the word 'separation' is distinct from 'divorce' and is applicable to the cessation of a de facto relationship. The Court also noted that the agreement was to secure the parties' individual assets, as both parties had been previously married and had significant assets individually.

With regards to which party initiated the separation and on what date, Harrsion AsJ noted Magistrate Trad's deliberations and that her Honour was unable to rely on any 'so-called independent witnesses' because all the evidence provided by witnesses had been informed by what the parties had told them. Magistrate Trad had, therefore, relied on Neima's evidence that, on 11 April 2007, the parties had argued and Mostafa had waved a knife in front of Neima. That evening Mostafa's daughter, accompanied by a police officer, had come to collect some of Mostafa's belongings and to give her a list separating the parties' belongings. On 13 April 2007, Neima moved out of the parties' unit. While the parties had attempted to reconcile, in September 2008, following another argument, Mostafa said the words 'you are divorced' to Neima. Mostafa denied this, stating that Neima had initiated the separation in September 2008 by asking him to leave their Lakemba unit. Mostafa also denied saying the words 'I divorce you'.

All other submissions made by Mostafa on appeal were dismissed on the grounds that they were not covered in Mostafa's submissions. Harrison AsJ also found that Magistrate Trad had made her findings pursuant to ample evidence. Harrison AsJ noted that this appeal raised religious and cultural issues not previously dealt with by the Australian courts, and that the question of how such agreements should be dealt with would be referred to the Australian Law Reform Commission and NSW Law Reform Commission for their consideration.

The applicant sought dispensation to have his daughter (15 years, 4 months) marry her fiance. The applicant submitted that their relationship had been close-knit for the past eight months and that he was concerned they may contravene Islamic law provisions if not married immediately. The applicant also submitted that his daughter was virginal, pubescent (akil baliq) and ready to become a wife.

The court noted that it had unsuccessfully advised the applicant to wait until his daughter was of age. Moreover, that as the applicant's daughter was under the age of 16 years, his request accorded with art 7 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage. The court acknowledged that despite the applicant's daughter's age, physically and mentally she appeared suitable for marriage, and her relationship with her fiance appeared close-knit and gave cause for concern that they might become physically intimate soon. Therefore, pursuant to art 7(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, the court granted the applicant dispensation for his daughter to marry. This also accorded with the Qur'an, Surat An-Nur, verse 32.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's decision to withdraw her application for divorce as the parties had reconciled their differences.

The parties were married on 6 August 2013. The applicant submitted that after one month living with the respondent's parents, the parties were still yet to consummate their marriage. The applicant submitted that the marriage had been arranged and that the parties did not love one another. Consequently, in September 2013, the applicant had left the respondent, returning to his parents' home. He had remained with his parents for the past two years and four months.

Acknowledging that the parties' marriage was irreparable, for the purposes of art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the applicant's request. It granted him a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and arts 116(f) and 118 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 30 April 2014. They had lived at the plaintiff's home for one year and four months but had no children. The plaintiff submitted an application for divorce on the grounds that:

1. since August 2015 the parties had frequently quarrelled; and
2. the cause of their quarrelling was that the defendant had neglected his duty to provide the plaintiff with financial support.

As a result, in August 2015, the defendant had returned to his parents' home and the parties had remained separated for five months.

Acknowledging that the parties' marriage was irreparable, for the purposes of art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the plaintiff's request. Despite the defendant's absence, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain shughro) pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) and of the Compilation of Islamic Laws on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 3 December 2002 and had one child. They had lived with the defendant's parents for seven years and three months. The plaintiff submitted an application for divorce on the grounds that:

1. since March 2010 the parties had begun to quarrel frequently; and
2. the cause of their quarrelling was that the defendant had turned to gambling, drinking and playing billiards, neglecting his spousal responsibilities in the process.

As a result of the parties' quarrelling, the plaintiff had left the defendant for her parents' home in March 2010 and the parties had remained separated for five years and nine months.

Acknowledging that the parties' marriage was irreparable, for the purposes of art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the plaintiff's request. Despite the defendant's absence, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain shughro) pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) and of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The applicant submitted that she and her husband were married on 31 May 1973 and had had four children. On 27 January 2016, however, the applicant's husband passed away. The applicant discovered that, according to her marriage certificate, her deceased husband's place of birth was Kediri, whereas his actual place of birth was Ambon. In order to access her husband's pension the applicant needed her marriage certificate to be amended accordingly.

The court, pursuant to art 34(2) of Regulation of the Minister of Religion No. 11 of 2007 on Marriage Registration, and arts 34 and 35 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds that the applicant had produced documentary evidence (her husband's identification card) establishing her deceased husband's actual place of birth.

The applicants submitted an application for child adoption to the court stating that:

1. they were married on 3 January 2001;
2. they wished to adopt their neighbour's child, Muhammad Hashif Hasbullah;
3. they had already cared for the child since 10 January 2016;
4. their primary motivation for wanting to adopt the child was that the child was still their neighbour, and that they also wanted the child to maintain a connection with his mother;
5. the child's biological parents had already transferred temporary custody of the child to the applicants; and
6. their other motivation being that the child was their nephew.

The court cited art 39 of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, stating that:

1. child adoption can only be carried out if it serves the child's best interests, and meets local customs and norms and current legislative regulations;
2. child adoption does not sever the child's blood connection with its biological parents; and
3. the prospective adoptive parents must be of the same religion as the child.

The court also acknowledged that these legislative requirements accorded with the Qur'an, Surat An-Nisa', verse 144, and a fatwa issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (U-335/MUI/VI/1982).

The court acceded to the applicants' request, finding that the applicants had met the legislative requirements to adopt the child in question.

The parties were married on 23 June 2006, after which time they had lived in Malang until 2011. From there they had moved to the defendant's parents' home in Sidomulyo, Wonoasri, where they had stayed until 2012, before moving to the plaintiff's parents' home in Banyukambang, Wonoasri until April 2015. The parties had one child (aged 6).

The plaintiff submitted that, since January 2015, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. More specifically, the plaintiff submitted that on one occasion the defendant had returned home from Malang to find that the plaintiff herself had not yet returned home from work. The defendant telephoned the plaintiff to inquire as to her whereabouts, however, the plaintiff's mobile phone was out of battery. When the plaintiff returned home the defendant became angry and hit the plaintiff in front of the parties' child. In April 2015 the defendant left the matrimonial home where he had remained for the nine months leading up to the proceeding. During those nine months the parties had attempted to reconcile their differences but to no avail.

Acknowledging that the parties' marriage was irreparable, for the purposes of art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the plaintiff's request. Despite the defendant's absence, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) and of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 21 May 2015. They had lived with the plaintiff's parents for the duration of their marriage. Despite having already consummated the marriage the parties had no children. The plaintiff submitted that, since June 2015, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome. This was a result of the defendant:

1. not wanting to work to meet their financial needs, forcing the plaintiff to work; and
2. tricking the plaintiff into providing him with money to purchase a car in order to start up his own car rental business, only to then leave the plaintiff after she had provided him with money.

The parties had remained separated for the past seven months leading up to the proceeding.

Acknowledging that the parties' marriage was irreparable, for the purposes of art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the Court acceded to the plaintiff's request. Despite the defendant's absence, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) and of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.