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The applicants submitted that they were married in 2000 in accordance with Islamic shari'a before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 grams of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. They had never divorced, no one had objected to their marriage, and there were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had two children. The parties had never registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs, as evidenced by a notice of rejection they had received, dated 11 January 2016, issued by the same office. The parties submitted that they required a court determination ratifying their marriage in order that they could then obtain passports before undertaking the umrah.

The court, pursuant to provision (a) of the elucidation to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006, and art 7(4) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, noted that a marriage ratification request can be submitted by the husband or wife. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

The applicants submitted that they were married on 9 September 2009 in accordance with Islamic shari'a before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 grams of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. They had never divorced, no one had objected to their marriage, and there were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had one child. The parties had never registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs, as evidenced by a notice of rejection they had received, dated 22 January 2016, issued by the same office. The parties submitted that they required a court determination ratifying their marriage before they could obtain a birth certificate for their child.

The court, pursuant to provision (a) of the elucidation to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006, and art 7(4) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, noted that a marriage ratification request can be submitted by the husband or wife. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

The applicants submitted that they were married on 15 October 1999 in accordance with Islamic shari'a before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 grams of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. They had never divorced, no one had objected to their marriage, and there were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had three children. The parties had submitted the necessary documentation for the registration of their marriage to local village authorities but the documentation was never forwarded on to the Office of Religious Affairs. The parties submitted that they required a court determination ratifying their marriage in order to obtain birth certificates for their children.

The court, pursuant to art 14 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants. The court also cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, as an example of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties.

The applicants submitted that they were married on 20 October 1983 in accordance with Islamic shari'a before two witnesses. The second applicant's older brother had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 grams of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a widower and the second applicant a widow. They had never divorced, no one had objected to their marriage, and there were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had no children. The parties had never registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs but required a court determination ratifying their marriage before they could embark on the hajj.

The court, pursuant to provision (a) of the elucidation to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006, and art 7(4) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, noted that a marriage ratification request can be submitted by the husband or wife. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

This case is an appeal of a zinā (fornication) conviction by the Upper Sharīʿa Court of Gwadabawa, Nigeria, on several grounds, including: the trial court's lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the Sharīʿa Penal Code upon which the appellant's trial and conviction was based came into existence after the alleged commission of the offense, and the failure of the trial court to explain the nature of the crime to the accused person. During the proceedings, the Appellant's counsel retracted the confession that the appellant had made to the trial court. The Court held that a person cannot be punished for an offense not known to law at the time of commission. The Court further determined that, because the Sharīʿa Penal Law of Sokoto State had not been enacted at the time the offense was committed, the conviction was invalid. Furthermore, it determined that the confession of the Appellant before the trial court was invalid due to the defects in the charge and the failure to explain the offense to the Appellant. Even if the confession had been valid, its retraction upon appeal was valid because retraction of confession is valid at any time before judgment. Pregnancy by a divorced or widowed woman is not conclusive proof of zinā where such pregnancy occurs within 5-6 years of the previous marriage. It is an overriding principle (according to the doubt canon) that where doubt exists, fixed criminal penalties (ḥadd penalties) should be avoided. The Court quashed the conviction.

Amina Lawal appealed her zinā (fornication) conviction by the lower court on several grounds, including: the inconclusive proof of zinā by the appellant's pregnancy because she had been married within the previous five years; the improper constitution of the Court as the kadi (qāḍī) had sat alone, without two other members, as required by law; and the invalidity of the appellant's confession by the failure of the Court to explain the meaning of zinā. Along with the grounds of appeal, the appellant’s counsel tendered a retraction of the confession that was made before the lower court. All grounds of the appeal failed. The Court held that the appellant’s confession before the lower court was valid as her testimony there indicated that she understood the meaning of zinā. This valid confession coupled with her failure to assert that her divorced husband fathered the child constituted proof of commission of zinā. The Court determined that sharīʿa (based on its understanding of Qurʾān, ḥadīth [prophetic reports], ijmāʿ [consensus], ijtihād [interpretation], and ʿurf [custom]) is supreme and overrides legislative enactments on the composition of the court. Therefore, the failure of the trial court to be constituted as required by legislation does not invalidate the decision, because the decision was issued in compliance with the dictates of sharīʿa. Amina Lawal successfully appealed this decision to the Sharia Court of Appeal.

On August 3, 2022, the Sharia Court of Appeal of Kwara State in Nigeria at Ilorin decided in Mohammed v. Mohammed that a deceased man’s second and third wives were not entitled to inheritance under Islamic estate laws because he married his first wife under the secular Marriage Act. The man’s second and third wives were suing upon his death for inheritance claims under sharīʿa, but the Court held that, for those marriages to have been valid under sharīʿa, the man would have had to divorce his first wife, whom he had married under the Marriage Act and not according to norms of Islamic law. By contrast, because the deceased had married his first wife under the Marriage Act, the Court held that the law governing the distribution of his estate was the law of Kwara State, not Islamic law, or sharīʿa.

The parties were married on 12 March 2011 and lived together in the cassation respondent’s parents’ home. They had three children (aged 12, 11 and 7). Initially, the marriage had been harmonious, but by 2003 it had become quarrelsome. The cassation respondent alleged that the cassation applicant would regularly beat and kick her leaving her bruised and swollen, sometimes in front of her parents. The parties eventually separated.

The cassation respondent had successfully requested that the Bireuen Shari'a Court (Decision: 11/Pdt.G/2013/MS-Bir) grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra), claiming that the marriage could no longer fulfil the purposes of marriage as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974, in conjunction with art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

On 17 December 2014, the cassation respondent successfully sought an affirmation of the decision from the Aceh Shari'a Court (Decision: 95/Pdt.G/2013/MS-Aceh).

On 28 January 2014, the cassation applicant lodged a request for cassation, claiming that the lower courts had incorrectly applied the law, that the evidence of the cassation respondent was inadequate, and that the court had not taken into consideration the facts of the case.

The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation applicant’s claim, ruling in favour of the cassation respondent, and ordered the cassation applicant to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The parties were married on 17 July 2010, after which they had lived with the plaintiff's parents for one month, before the plaintiff followed the defendant to Soe in Nusa Tenggara for two years, and then to Belu in 2012, when the defendant was transferred to work for the Police there. The plaintiff submitted that the parties had been happily married for three and a half years but had no children. Since January 2014, however, the parties had frequently quarrelled because the defendant had had an extra-marital affair with a woman called Hasni from Fatubenao. As a result, the parties had been separated since 19 January 2014, and the plaintiff had suffered emotionally. She requested that the Court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The Court found that, as one of the witnesses produced by the plaintiff had not known about the dire state of the parties' marriage, the plaintiff had only produced one witness. The plaintiff had circumvented this problem, however, by providing her own sworn statement that the parties' marriage was no longer everlasting and joyful, or peaceful, hoping and loving (sakinah, mawaddah wa rahmah), as envisaged by art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, respectively. Accordingly, the Court acceded to the plaintiff's request, finding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence of ongoing conflict between the parties, as required pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 15 June 2006 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as the second applicant's marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been three mayam worth of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. The parties had never divorced nor had they left Islam (murtad). There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had no children. They had not yet registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs because, at the time of their marriage, the Office of Religious Affairs was inactive due to post-tsunami reconstruction. The parties, therefore, requested that the court ratify their marriage for hajj administration purposes and other administrative requirements.

The court cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, Bughyatul mustarsyidin, page 298, and kitab Tuhfah, volume 4, page 132, as examples of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties. In acceding to the parties' request, the court found that, pursuant to arts 2(1) and 6 of Law No. 1 of 1974, and art 7(2) and (3)(b) of the Compilation Islamic law, the parties' marriage constituted an Islamic marriage agreement (aqad nikah).

In December 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the question whether Muslim citizens who lived in the Greek province of Thrace could be required to submit to the jurisdiction of Islamic law, as detailed by local experts called muftīs. In Greek law, Islamic law usually governed matters of family law—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—in cases involving the Muslims in Thrace. This arrangement was a legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. When the ECHR considered whether this arrangement should persist, it considered a case in which a Muslim man had died, leaving everything to his wife in his will. His sisters contested the will, arguing that it improperly circumvented the authority of the muftīs. Greece’s highest court agreed with the sisters. With the will invalidated, the muftī distributed one-fourth of the estate to the widow, and the rest to the sisters, in accord with Islamic inheritance law. The widow appealed to the ECHR. This Court determined that the Greek government had misinterpreted the treaties, which did not require a separate legal framework for Muslims. It further noted that Greek case law was inconsistent about “whether the application of Sharia law [sic] is compatible with the principle of equal treatment and with international human rights standards.” In addition, the Court emphasized a right to "free self-identification”: people should be free to opt out of differential treatment from the government on the basis of belonging to a minority group, and the government should not force minorities into a special legal category in the name of protecting them. The Court held that Greece, by compelling the Muslim minority of Thrace to follow Islamic law, had violated Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

The deceased, who passed away on 18 January 2007, was survived by his second wife (respondent), as well as his first wife and children (first-eighth appellants). One of the primary issues of the dispute concerned the marriage status of the respondent to the deceased.

In overturning the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), the Court found that, pursuant to art 38 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, if the deceased had wanted to repudiate his marriage to the respondent, he needed to have filed for divorce prior to his passing. Moreover, a marriage is formally repudiated by filing for repudiation with the Religious Court/Shari'a Court, pursuant to art 25 of Law No. 1 of 1974, arts 37 and 38 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 74(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The deceased had never followed such procedure to repudiate his marriage to the respondent.

Even if he had successfully repudiated his marriage to the respondent, the Court noted that the deceased's legal relationship to the respondent and their children (all three of whom were underage) would not cease, as per arts 75 and 76 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and art 28 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' argument that the decision of the Banda Aceh State Court regarding the falsification of the respondent's marriage certificate was grounds for repudiation of her marriage to the deceased.

The Court found that for the first appellant, with whom the deceased had acquired property before he married the respondent, one-half of that property became the first appellant's, as well as one-third of the property the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent. The same could be said of what constituted the property of the deceased, viz. one-half of what the deceased had acquired while married to the first appellant, and one-third of what the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent.

This fatwa states that the Islam Jama'ah sect commenced in Indonesia in the 1970s. As its teachings were misled and misleading, and led to disquiet among Indonesian society, its interpretation of Islam was prohibited by the government in 1971. Islam Jama'ah, however, continued to operate under different names, which continued to change until 1977-78. The philosophy of Islam Jama'ah was that there were 72 categories of Muslims who were not part of Islam Jama'ah and would, therefore, be directed to hell.

The sect believed it had to appoint a Leader of Believers (Amirul Mukminin) as its central leadership; a leader who must be obeyed. Adherents had to pledge allegiance to this Leader in order to be guaranteed passage to heaven, and the only rightful and permissible Islamic teachings came from ther Leader. Adherents of the sect also had to cut off ties with persons from these other categories, even if those people were their parents; they were not allowed to pray behind people who were not adherents of Islam Jama'ah; they were not allowed to wear clothing for prayers that had been touched by people who were not adherents unless it had been cleansed; husbands even had to endeavour to make their wives join the sect, and if their wives refused, they would have to divorce them. A legitimate marriage was one officiated by the sect's leader, and for a sermon to be legitimate it would have to be conducted in Arabic.

This fatwa states that Islam Jama'ah, Darul Hadits (or whatever other pseudonym the sect may have adopted), is contrary to the teachings of Islam, and that its dissemination is designed to destablise the state. It implores Muslims to avoid its teachings and to return to the pure teachings of Islam with the intent and desire to similarly save those who have already chosen Islam as their religion from the wrath of Allah. It also implores people to report to their local public prosecutor any evidence of activities conducted by Islam Jama'ah.

The two co-accused sought to appeal the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court, which had found them guilty of being together in close proximity out of wedlock (khalwat). In their submissions they stated that they had already informed the village head (kepala dusun) that they would be living together as husband and wife, and that they would be joined by the three-year old son of the second co-accused. When both co-accused told the village head that they were unable to provide photocopies of their family card, both their identity cards, their wedding certificate (buku nikah), and relocation notice, because they were still being processed, however, the village head requested that the village official attend the home of the co-accused. It then came to light that the second co-accused was actually in the process of divorcing her ex-husband, which made the fact that the two co-accused were in close proximity with one another illegal, as contained in art 23(1) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law.

The court overturned the decision of the lower court on several grounds:

1. The lower court had not granted what was sought by the prosecution;
2. According to art 23(1) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law, the appropriate punishment for repudiation of the prohibition contained therein is either ten strokes of the cane, a fine of 100 grams of pure gold, or a maximum ten month prison sentence;
3. The punishment contained in art 23(1) provides alternative punishments, one of which may be requested by the prosecution, to be determined by the court;
4. The lower court was not authorised to sentence the co-accused to be caned when the prosecution had requested that they be imprisoned; and
5. The lower court was only authorised to either accede to, or deny, the prosecution's demands.

Accordingly, the court sentenced both co-accused to five months and 20 days in prison, taking into account time already served on remand.

The plaintiff submitted a claim for child maintenance from the defendant (her biological father), who was previously married to her biological mother from 1995-2001. Since September 2000, four months before her parents divorced, until the time of the proceeding, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not provided her with any financial support, either via her biological mother or directly. The plaintiff submitted that, from the age of 4-19 years, the defendant had neglected his financial obligations to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff quantified at IDR 1.5 million per month, or IDR 264 million in total for the past 14 years and eight months. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant was obligated to provide her with IDR 2 million per month in financial support until she reached 21 years of age, and that as a university lecturer with a PhD, he earned sufficient income to afford these payments.

The defendant submitted an objection to the plaintiff's case on the grounds that the plaintiff's biological mother had unilaterally changed the plaintiff's name and altered her birth certificate, the new certificate having been issued on 11 January 2007. Meanwhile, the birth certificate the defendant had in his possession was a copy of the original (dated 8 February 1996). The defendant submitted that the effect of this alteration was that it was no longer clear who the plaintiff's actual biological father was.

As part of the defendant's primary defence, he submitted that, following his divorce from the plaintiff's mother, he had finalised all financial issues through deliberatons with the plaintiff's great-aunt (now deceased), as well as the matter of the custody of the plaintiff. At the time, the defendant had abided by the plaintiff's mother's wishes and allowed the plaintiff to remain in her mother's care until she was of an age where she could knowingly choose which parent she wished to follow.

The defendant also suggested to the court that it was more likely that the plaintiff's mother had instigated the claim, given that there had been no tension in the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, as well as the fact that the parties had only recently reunited in September 2014 after more than 13 years apart. Moreover, the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff's mother had been fractured at best, meaning that the defendant had not known of the plaintiff's specific whereabouts, other than that she had been living with her mother and grandmother in Makassar. In short, the lack of communication between the defendant and the plaintiff's mother made providing the plaintiff with financial assistance logistically unfeasible. Indeed, when the plaintiff visited the defendant with her aunt at his residence for the first time in 13 years, the defendant happily provided the plaintiff with IDR 1 million, while the defendant's father (the plaintiff's grandfather) gave her IDR 500,000. The defendant informed the court that the plaintiff later requested IDR 8 million from the defendant to cover certain educational costs. As the defendant had only recently returned from completing postgraduate study in Yogyakarta at the time of the request, however, the defendant and his wife could only afford to provide the plaintiff with IDR 4 million, which the plaintiff had refused.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection on the grounds that the plaintiff's original birth certificate had never been declared null and void by the authorised agency, and, therefore, its legal authority remained intact.

In regards to the plaintiff's claim, the court noted the conflicting laws as to the legal age of an adult: while art 47(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 47(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, define an adult as someone who is 18 years of age, art 98 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws defines an adult as a person of 21 years of age. Meanwhile, customary law (hukum adat) stipulates 15 as the relevant age. In choosing to follow that legislation that defined the legal age as 18, the court thereby found that the plaintiff was already an adult as she was 19 years of age. In reaching its decision, the court considered that the plaintiff and defendant had been separated for 13 years, that the defendant and defendant's father had offered the plaintiff IDR 1.5 million collectively on their first meeting in 13 years, and that the plaintiff had refused to accept IDR 4 million from the defendant to cover educational costs. The court also cited Indonesian Supreme Court Decision No. 608 K/AG/203 (23 March 2005), where the Supreme Court declared that the obligations of a father to provide financially for his child were Lil Intifa rather than Lil Tamlik, that is, the obligation to meet a child's needs is shared by the child's parents, and therefore, does not rest solely on the father (art 77(3) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws; art 45(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage). Accordingly, back payments were not necessary as the child's past needs were assumed to have already been met. Pursuant to the defendant's concession that he was happy to provide the plaintiff with financial assistance, provided it was within his own means, as well as surat Al Baqarah verse 233, the court ordered the defendant to pay to the defendant IDR 2 million per month until she reaches 21 years of age.