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The parties were married on 25 January 2010 and had one child aged 5 years. They had lived with the plaintiff's parents for two years until January 2012 before separating. The marriage deteriorated, the plaintiff submitted, because the defendant:

1. had not provided for his family, forcing the plaintiff's family to cover their daily expenses; and
2. showed no interest or desire to care for the plaintiff and their child.

The parties had been separated for a total of four years and one month at the time of the proceeding, during which time they had not been physically intimate. The plaintiff submitted that she could not remain married to the defendant as he had proven himself to be an irresponsible husband. The defendant was also absent from court. Accordingly, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

After corroborating the plaintiff's submissions with evidence provided by the plaintiff's two witnesses, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's application on the grounds of ongoing conflict between the parties.

The parties were married on 13 November 2015. At the time of their marriage the plaintiff was virginal and the defendant a widower. The parties had lived with the defendant's parents until they separated on 25 March 2016. The plaintiff submitted that they had separated after frequent quarrelling caused by the defendant's:

1. unwarranted jealousy and accusations that the plaintiff was having an extra-marital affair;
2. profane language directed at the plaintiff;
3. violent tendencies towards the plaintiff when they argued;
4. refusal to take the plaintiff to see her ill father; and
5. prohibition on the plaintiff communicating with her parents and family.

The plaintiff produced two witnesses who provided information that corroborated with her submissions. Despite the defendant's absence, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 3 April 2013 and had one child aged 2, who was under the care of the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted that, by May 2013, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the defendant had only spent his income on himself. Furthermore, the defendant had emotionally and physically abused the plaintiff, and would use profane language with the plaintiff's parents. The parties separated in 2015 and had remained separated for a total of one year and five months. Pursuant to art 19(d) and (f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(d) and (f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughro) on the grounds that the defendant's conduct had threatened her well-being, and ongoing conflict.

Despite the defendant's absence from court, the court acceded to the plaintiff's application, noting that the information provided by the two witnesses produced by the plaintiff corroborated with the plaintiff's submissions.

The parties were married on 28 October 2011 and had one child aged three years. The applicant submitted that the parties' marriage had always been disharmonious because the respondent:

1. had always been dissatisfied with what he had provided her financially;
2. would not deliberate with the applicant;
3. was unwarrantedly suspicious of the applicant;
4. was aggressive and harsh towards the applicant;
5. would prioritise her family's needs over his; and
6. would frequently request a divorce.

Problems escalated in November 2013 resulting in the respondent leaving the applicant and returning to her parents' home in Langsa. The parties had remained separated since and the applicant submitted that he believed a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) was the only feasible option available to the parties.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict. It also acknowledged that revocable divorce is regulated in art 118 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 14 May 2012 and had one child aged 3 years, who was in the care of the plaintiff at the time of the proceeding. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious for the first five months. Since October 2012, however, it had become quarrelsome because the defendant was:

1. envious, even of his older brother; and
2. frequently angry for no apparent reason, which made the parties' home life unpleasant and disharmonious.

Problems escalated in November 2012 resulting in the defendant leaving the plaintiff. As familial intervention had failed to reconcile the parties' differences, the plaintiff submitted that divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) was the only feasible option.

The court, pursuant to art 19(b) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds that the parties had been separated for two consecutive years or more.

The parties were married on 18 December 1994. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious for the first nine years. Since April 2003, however, it had become quarrelsome because the defendant:

1. frequently gambled;
2. was frequently angry for no apparent reason;
3. had not secured any form of employment;
4. frequently went out at night;
5. was excessively jealous;
6. failed to provide for the plaintiff; and
7. had not been a leader of the parties' household.

Problems escalated in September 2015 when the defendant again accused the plaintiff of having an extra-marital affair with another woman. No longer able to tolerate the defendant's treatment of her, the plaintiff left the defendant and the parties had remained separated ever since. The plaintiff submitted that the most feasible option available to the parties was an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in sughra).

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 7 September 2010 and had one child who was currently under the care of the respondent. The parties had not been living together because the applicant's work commitments meant he was rarely able to return home. Moreover, the respondent needed to live with, and care for, her aged parents. The applicant submitted that given his high libido, and that because he could not be with the respondent, it would be preferable for him to take a second wife instead of committing adultery (zina). The respondent, the applicant submitted, had no objections to his request. The applicant also claimed that he would be able to care for both his wives and child given his monthly salary of IDR 4,650,000.

In acceding to the applicant's request, the court, pursuant to the elucidation of art 49(2)(i) of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, noted that it had absolute authority to adjudicate the case. Furthermore, as the respondent had acceded to the applicant's request, all prescriptive requirements, as contained in art 5(1)(a) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 41(b) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 58(1)(a) and (2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, had been met.

The applicant submitted that he and the respondent were married on 19 March 2010 and had one child, who was in the care of the respondent. The first the years of the parties' marriage had been harmonious, but since then they had become quarrelsome because the respondent was not prepared to be the wife of an Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) soldier. In June 2013, the respondent left the parties' home and the applicant's unit without the applicant's permission as her husband, or in an official capacity through the applicant's unit. The parties had remained separated since and the applicant had received dispensation as a member of the military to divorce the respondent.

The court was satisfied that the applicant had met the evidentiary burden contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the applicant's request for a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court also permitted the respondent to retain custody of the parties' child.

The parties were married on 30 March 2002 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome in 2013 because the defendant:

1. was unnecessarily suspicious of the plaintiff, even once trying to burn the plaintiff; and
2. had not provided the plaintiff with financial and emotional support since 2011.

The parties had been separated since 2014, after the defendant left the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted that she had lost hope that the parties would reunite, and that the parties' child was in the care of the plaintiff. Accordingly, she requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

Despite the defendant's absence, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court, pursuant to arts 105(a) and 156(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, also granted the plaintiff custody of the parties' child on the grounds that the child was still below the age of 12 (belum mumayyiz).

The parties were married on 30 March 2002 and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome in 2010 because the defendant:

1. had been aggressive towards the plaintiff and the parties' children;
2. had never provided the plaintiff with any attention and affection; and
3. would always drive the plaintiff out of the parties' home when they would argue.

The parties had been separated since June 2014, after the defendant left the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted that she had lost hope that the parties would reunite, and that the parties' children were in the care of the plaintiff. Accordingly, she requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court, pursuant to arts 105(a) and 156(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, also granted the plaintiff custody of the parties' child on the grounds that the child was still below the age of 12 (belum mumayyiz).

The parties were married on 16 June 1997 and had three children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome in 2014 when she discovered that the defendant was carrying on an extra-marital affair with another woman.

The parties had been separated since May 2015, after the defendant banished the plaintiff from the parties' home. The plaintiff submitted that she had lost hope that the parties would reunite, and that the parties' children were in the care of the plaintiff. Accordingly, she requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and citing Surah ar-Rum verse 21 of the Qur'an, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court, pursuant to arts 2(b) and (c) and 14 of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, and 105 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, also granted the plaintiff custody of the parties' children on the grounds that one of the children was still below the age of 12 (belum mumayyiz), and that it was in the best interests of the other children to remain in the plaintiff's care.

Two accused persons, both previously married to other persons, were charged with the crime of committing zinā (fornication), which is prohibited in the Islamic Penal Code of Sokoto State, Nigeria. The man denied the charge and declared his innocence in court. The woman admitted to having sexual intercourse with the accused man and to being pregnant as a result. The Court held that the crime of zinā (fornication) is proved by a valid confession, the evidence of four witnesses, or by pregnancy outside of marriage. Because the first accused person denied that he had made an earlier confession, a confession could only be verified by the testimony of four witnesses. Because only two witnesses had given such testimony, the confession was not valid. The Court also held that retraction of a confession is permissible. Therefore, even if the first accused, the man, had earlier confessed, his denial of the charge in court amounted to a valid retraction of the confession. The Court convicted the second accused person, the woman, on the basis of her in-court confession and sentenced her to death by stoning after childbirth and weaning. The woman successfully appealed her conviction.

This case is an appeal of a zinā (fornication) conviction by the Upper Sharīʿa Court of Gwadabawa, Nigeria, on several grounds, including: the trial court's lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the Sharīʿa Penal Code upon which the appellant's trial and conviction was based came into existence after the alleged commission of the offense, and the failure of the trial court to explain the nature of the crime to the accused person. During the proceedings, the Appellant's counsel retracted the confession that the appellant had made to the trial court. The Court held that a person cannot be punished for an offense not known to law at the time of commission. The Court further determined that, because the Sharīʿa Penal Law of Sokoto State had not been enacted at the time the offense was committed, the conviction was invalid. Furthermore, it determined that the confession of the Appellant before the trial court was invalid due to the defects in the charge and the failure to explain the offense to the Appellant. Even if the confession had been valid, its retraction upon appeal was valid because retraction of confession is valid at any time before judgment. Pregnancy by a divorced or widowed woman is not conclusive proof of zinā where such pregnancy occurs within 5-6 years of the previous marriage. It is an overriding principle (according to the doubt canon) that where doubt exists, fixed criminal penalties (ḥadd penalties) should be avoided. The Court quashed the conviction.

Amina Lawal appealed the decision of the Upper Sharīʿa Court, Funtua, upholding her conviction of the capital crime of zinā (fornication) by the Sharīʿa Court of Bakori. As she had done in the appeals court, the Appellant retracted the confession made before the trial court. The Court held that a single confession is not a sufficient ground for a zinā conviction. Therefore, it determined that the Appellant's confession before the trial court was not a sufficient basis for conviction. Further, it determined that retraction of a confession for an offense that impinged on the “rights of God” [ḥuqūq Allāh] (such as zinā or alcohol consumption) is permissible and valid even after judgment, if made before the execution of a sentence. The Court also held that a child born by an unmarried woman within seven years of a former marriage is affiliated with the former husband [following the paternity canon in Islamic law], and under such circumstances, childbirth does not constitute proof of zinā. The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

In this indictment, MS and MA were found sitting together in a shack in Keudah Station, Banda Aceh. Both of them were planning to go to a concert together but decided to stop by Keudah Station before heading to the concert. Suspicious of their act, the witness named Efriyadi approached MS and MA asking the nature of their gathering. MS and MA insisted that they were only sitting around without any intention to do more than that. Failing to show their marriage certificate on the scene, Efriyadi called the sharīʿa police.

After investigating the case, the prosecutor indicted them for committing khalwat (close proximity between an unmarried man and woman) which violates Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 article 23 (1). Pursuant to this law, the prosecutor demanded both MS and MA to be punished with eight public lashes.

Evidence presented by the prosecutor:

• One pair of jeans
• One blouse
• A pillow
• Blue tarpaulin

MS and MA were found sitting together in a shack in Keudah Station, Banda Aceh. Both of them were planning to go to a concert together but decided to stop by Keudah Station before heading to the concert. Suspicious of their act, the witness named Efriyadi approached Marzuki and Marlina asking the nature of their gathering. MA and MA insisted that they were only sitting around without any intention to do more than that. Failing to show their marriage certificate on the scene, Efriyadi called the sharīʿa police.

In response to the indictment of the prosecutor on the case of MS and MA, the judge ruled against the defendants and pronounced both of them guilty of khalwat (close proximity between an unmarried man and woman). For this, both defendants are to be punished with seven public lashes.

Evidence used in the court:

• One pair of jeans
• One blouse
• A pillow
• Blue tarpaulin

The parties were married on 14 August 1987 and had two children (born 1988 and 1990). Initially, the marriage was harmonious, but, on 2 October 1995, the cassation applicant filed for divorce in the Surabaya Religious Court (lower court) (950/Pdt. G/1995/PA. Sby). During the divorce proceedings, on 18 and 23 September 1996, the cassation respondent reported the cassation applicant to the police for domestic abuse. During the proceeding, the cassation respondent successfully requested the lower court's permission for herself and the parties' children to live separately from the cassation applicant.

On 15 October 1996, the lower court dismissed the cassation applicant's request for a divorce, citing the interests of the parties' young children as its primary reason. This decision was later upheld by the East Java High Religious Court (No. 189/Pdt.G/1996/PTA.Sby), as well as the Indonesian Supreme Court (No. 157 K/AG/1998) on 5 February 1999.

While the parties remained under one roof, pursuant to court orders, they had not communciated nor been physically intimate with one another for 17 years. After the cassation applicant refused to act as his daughter's marriage guardian, the cassation respondent asserted that the family could no longer depend on the cassation applicant as a husband or father, and requested that the Surabaya Religious Court (lower court) grant her a divorce. The lower court (No. 355/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Sby), on 5 June 2013, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra) and ordered her to pay court costs (IDR 316,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal in the Surabaya High Religious Court. The Surabaya High Religious Court (No. 304/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Sby), on 29 October 2013, upheld the decision of the lower court, in favour of the cassation respondent.

On 19 December 2013, the cassation applicant submitted a cassation application to the Indoneisan Supreme Court, submitting that the decision of the lower court should be overturned because:

1. The cassation respondent had failed to fulfil the formalities required for the trial, and that the lower court should not have accepted the cassation respondent’s submissions if they did not satisfy the formal requirements;
2. The cassation respondent, as a civil servant, had failed to obtain permission from her superior officer to file for a divorce, pursuant to Indonesian Government Regulation No. 10 of 1983 on Permission to Marry and Divorce for Civil Servants, in conjunction with Indonesian Government Regulation No. 45 of 1990.

The Supreme Court held that these matters were non-justiciable at cassation level, found that the Surabaya High Religious Court had not erred at law, and dismissed the cassation applicant's reasons for cassation, ordering him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The parties were married on 28 July 2001 and had two children. At the beginning of their marriage, they had agreed to live in a home owned by the applicant in Bogor. When the respondent was seven-months pregnant with their first child, however, the parties agreed to move to the respondent's parents' home in Bekasi. Initially, when the parties would have a disagreement, the applicant thought it was fleeting and merely part and parcel of domestic life. The applicant preferred to concede defeat, rather than perpetuate further disagreement and quarrelling. Since their third year of marriage, however, the applicant submitted that the parties quarrelled regularly and were no longer compatible. The applicant submitted that this was due to:

1. a difference of opinion between the parties;
2. the respondent not being able to adopt the lifestyle of the applicant, as required in order for the applicant to earn a living;
3. the respondent not fulfilling the applicant's requests to meet his physical needs while their first child was between the age of 4-18 months;
4. the respondent not fulfilling the applicant's requests to meet his physical needs for 12 months after she was four-months pregnant with their second child;
5. after a while, the applicant himself no longer wanting to be physically intimate with the respondent because he no longer loved her;
6. the applicant having suggested to the respondent after the birth of their first child that they no longer live with the respondent's parents so that they could become more independent, and so that the applicant could feel more comfortable and free to do as he pleased without the respondent's parents present;
7. the applicant finally being able to convince the respondent that they should purchase their own home not too far from her parents' home; and
8. having their own home meant the applicant could invite family and relatives to their home whenever he chose.

The applicant conceded that as the parties' children were under the age of 12 (not yet mumayyiz), they should remain in the custody of the respondent, but that he would provide financial support for their schooling and living expenses. The applicant was also prepared to provide the respondent with IDR 6 million for iddah (100-day period after divorce has been granted) and IDR 1 million in mut'ah (divorce compensation). The applicant also specified as joint assets of the parties a house in Bekasi and a 2010 Proton Exora vehicle.

The respondent conceded many of the points of the applicant's claim, but submitted that the applicant had been duplicitous, by engaging commercial sex workers and other women for sex (zina), since 2003. The respondent also submitted that one month into her first pregnancy she had been ordered by her obstetrician to stay in bed for two weeks after she had experienced some bleeding associated with the pregnancy. This had caused her to want to avoid being physically intimate with the applicant, rather than any desire not to value her husband. At the time of giving birth to their first child, the respondent had also experienced trauma and further bleeding, which had continued to haunt her. When the respondent had begun to overcome this physical and psychological trauma, the applicant was no longer interested in being physically intimate with the respondent. Moreover, at the time, the respondent would never have guessed that the applicant was being duplicitous.

The court found that ongoing conflict between the parties satisfied the sufficient reason requirement to grant the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i), per art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 25 August 2008 (NB: the court's findings state they were married on 21 August 2008) and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that eight months into her first pregnancy the parties had quarrelled and the defendant had grabbed and pushed her to the floor with utter disregard. At the time, the plaintiff reported the defendant to the authorities for acts of domestic violence, however, the defendant fled for Bombana in search of gold and his parents. The plaintiff's parents advised her to reconcile with the defendant and to withdraw her police report, which the plaintiff did for the sake of the parties' marriage.

In 2011, the parties appeared to have reconciled their differences, already having had their first child. The defendant then proceeded to have an extra-marital affair with another woman, while choosing to spend all his income on this other woman and none on the plaintiff. The plaintiff also submitted that during an encounter with the other woman, she had learned that the defendant had been carrying on this extra-marital affair while the plaintiff was pregnant.

The defendant had also been incarcerated for transporting petroleum. Upon his release from prison, the plaintiff began working at Kredit Colombus (a credit company) to make ends meet. When the defendant, however, forbid her from working the parties had begun to quarrel again. The plaintiff submitted that their disputes were also the result of the defendant:

1. demanding that the plaintiff return to him the spending money with which he had provided her, if he himself had run out of money;
2. forbidding, and becoming angry with, the plaintiff from working to pay for domestic household needs;
3. damaging the plaintiff's belongings and that of the household when he became angry;
4. physically assaulting the plaintiff when he became jealous for no established reason;
5. often threatening the plaintiff, causing her great fear and trauma;
6. regularly instructing the plaintiff to divorce him; and
7. controlling the parties' finances and only providing the plaintiff with money when she needed/requested it.

While the parties' families had endeavoured to make the parties reconcile, following Eid Mubarak in 2014, the plaintiff left the defendant and returned to her parents' home, where she had remained until the time of the court proceeding. During that time, the defendant continued to terrorise and threaten the plaintiff, leaving the plaintiff with no other option but to seek an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra). The plaintiff also sought custody of the parties' two young children, as well as IDR 1.5 million per month in child maintenance until the children were adult and independent.

The court deferred to expert Islamic legal opinion in Kitab Ia'natul Thalibin Juz III, which dictates that a court is to grant a wife a divorce if she is no longer happy with her husband. Moreover, citing art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 65 of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, and art 5 of Law No. 23 of 2004 on the Abolition of Domestic Violence, the court acceded to the plaintiff's request. In its findings, however, it did not explicitly accede to the plaintiff's request for child maintenance payments.

The parties were married on 11 June 2006 and had one child. The applicant submitted that the marriage was initially harmonious. Since 2009, however, it had become quarrelsome because of the respondent's frequent and unwarranted jealously and threats to divorce the applicant. In February 2011, the applicant left the matrimonial home, taking with him his clothes and possessions. He had remained separated from the respondent for the two months leading up to the proceeding.

In her counterclaim, the respondent submitted that the applicant had never provided her with suitable financial support, and that she was always too afraid to ask him. Moreover, since February 2011, the applicant had not provided her with basic financial support, which she calculated to be IDR 2 million per month over five months (IDR 10 million). Pursuant to arts 152, 158, and 156 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws respectively, the respondent claimed she was entitled to IDR 6 million for iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), IDR 50 million in mut'ah (divorce compensation), as well as child maintenance payments (IDR 2 million per month) until the parties' child reached 21 years of age.

Due to the parties' ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Goverment Regulation No. 9 of 1975, as well as art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). In regards to the respondent's counterclaim, the court ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent:

1. IDR 5 million in financial support for five months;
2. IDR 3 million for iddah;
3. IDR 4 million for mut'ah; and
4. IDR 1 million per month in child maintenance until the child reaches 21 years of age.