SHARIAsource

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the State of Qatar (Dawlat Qatar), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Qatar's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is a primary source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Lebanon Republic (Al Jumhuriyah al Lubnaniyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Lebanon's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Holy See/Vatican City-State (La Santa Sede/Stato della Citta del Vaticano), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the Vatican City-State's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under China's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the United Arab Emirates (Al Imarat al Arabiyah al Muttahidah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the UAE's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has primary legal status. 

The Plaintiff, the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, challenged the Pittsfield Charter Township, the Township Board, Township Supervisor Mandy Grewal, and six Township Board of Trustees Members for their refusal to re-zone the area surrounding the Plaintiff so that the Plaintiff could expand and build a school. Although an independent outside planner endorsed the rezoning, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondents denied rezoning due to concerns from community members, stemming largely from an animus to the Islamic faith. By denying the rezoning proposal on this basis, the Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents discriminated against the organization in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and "state law claims" in the Michigan state constitution. The Respondents filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the Township Board of Trustees' individual liability under Section 1983. However, the District Court dismissed the other claims alleging violations of RLUIPA, the US Constitution, and the Michigan Constitution.

This document is a beyānnāme, or declaration, sent by the Ottoman reʾīsül-kuttāb (chief scribe) to Britain's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, justifying the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia by explaining Russia's violation of treaty obligations. The document gives insight into eighteenth-century Ottoman attitudes to international law and its relationship with Islamic law. Its use of the phrase naḳż-ı ʿahd (breaking the treaty), which has its origins in a specifically Qurʾānic context illustrates one way in which war was legitimized within the Ottoman Empire. Other phrases used in the beyānnāme demonstrate how Ottoman legal plurality functioned within a martial context. 

The parties were married on 23 December 2007 and had one child, born on 4 March 2008. They had lived with the respondent's parents for approximately three years. The applicant submitted, however, that, since September 2009, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the respondent:

1. had never shown her appreciation for the applicant as the head of the household;
2. was not content with what she had, including the applicant's salary, which she found inadequate;
3. would often become jealous if the applicant returned home late; and
4. when angry, would use inappropriate language with the applicant.

As a result, the applicant had left the matrimonial home and returned to his family's home on 23 September 2009, where he had remained for the 11 months leading up to the proceeding.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). Moreover, the court ordered the parties to abide by the terms of their post-marital agreement, which the court held to be binding at law. The agreement pertained to the matrimonial home, use of the proceeds if the home were to be sold, and child maintenance (calculated in accordance with the applicant's salary).

In this text, the Cordoban Ibn Abī Zamanīn (d. 399/1009) discusses the legal predicament in which a man denies his paternity of a child still in embryo after having already (either implicitly or explicitly) conceded it. Ibn Abī Zamanīn’s opinion is that such a denial is possible only if the man claims to have seen his wife in flagrante delicto with his own eyes (ruʾya) and if the resulting child is born more than six months after the accusation. In her chapter on imprecatory oaths in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Delfina Serrano uses this source to contrasts Ibn Abī Zamanīn’s opinion with that of Ibn Mughīth, who believed that rejecting a previously acknowledged child under any circumstances would constitute slander.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book

This entry provides a definition and analysis of the term ḥadīth, drawing on works by SHARIAsource Senior Scholar, Joseph Lowry, Associate Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Pennsylvania.

This fatwa acknowledges that society and shari'a financial institutions would benefit from an explanation on the transfer of murabahah financing (customer debts or accounts payable) between shari'a financial institutions. The fatwa outlines three contractual options for transferring murabahah financing debts:

1. Akad Hawalah bil Ujrah: a promissory note with a financial incentive for the party assuming the debt;
2. Akad Ijarah Muntahiyah bi Al-Tamlik: financing that uses a rental agreement accompanied by an undertaking to transfer ownership of a rental item to the party renting at the conclusion of the term of the rental agreement;
3. Akad Musyarakah Muntanaqishah: where the capital of one investor in a musyarakah financing agreement is inadequate because their portion has been purchased by another party incrementally.

In regards to a party seeking to transfer accounts payable pursuant to a murabahah agreement, a party may do so in exchange for an item of good value (tsaman), but not a good sum of money (tsaman) because this constitutes bai' al-dain al-mu'ajjal li ghair al-madin bi tsaman hall (selling accounts payable that are not yet due to someone other than the debtor for a cash price).

The Karnataka High Court ruled that the ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam and upheld a Government Order dated 05.02.2022, issued under sections 7 & 133 of the Karnataka Education Act of 1983. That order directs the College Development Committees all over the State to prescribe the ‘Student Uniform,’ presumably in terms of Rule 11 of Karnataka Educational Institutions Rules of 1995 (Classification, Regulation & Prescription of Curricula, etc.), which bans headscarves in classrooms. A full bench of Justices on the High Court sat to hear several petitions filed by Muslim students who attend government pre-university colleges in the region and who were alleged prejudice from the ban. The Court issued this order, restricting girls from wearing headscarves, or ḥijāb, deeming it as not “essential” in Islam arguing that “what is not religiously made obligatory therefore cannot be made a quintessential aspect of the religion through public agitations or by the passionate arguments in court,'' and as a use of religious symbols by students in governmental educational institutions that have established dress codes noting that Muslim women’s  ḥijāb goes against their “constitutional spirit of ‘equal opportunity’ of ‘public participation’ and ‘positive secularism’.”

This document is the first draft of Criminal Procedure Bill prepared and adopted by the parliament and sent to the Guardian Council for review.

The plaintiff married her husband on 31 December 1945, upon which her husband gave her a 20-acre plot of land as a dowry (mahar). The plot of land had been controlled by the plaintiff's husband's younger sibling since 1983 until the present. When the plaintiff's husband passed away, her mother-in-law asked to use the land until she passed away herself. When her mother-in-law passed away, the plaintiff requested of the defendant that the land be returned to her, but the defendant refused to do so. The plaintiff had also sought to resolve this dispute in a familial manner through deliberation and by making polite requests, but the defendant had not responded in a favourable manner himself, compelling the plaintiff to instigate proceedings.

In response to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant submitted that, when the plaintiff married her husband, the defendant himself was not yet an adult and, therefore, could not have known that the land constituted the plaintiff's dowry. Moreover, that he had sold the land in order that he have some money when he married his wife. Two years later he re-purchased the land, but he did not want to return it to the plaintiff because he believed it to be his inheritance from his parents. The plaintiff asserted that, as the land the defendant believed to have previously belonged to his parents was 35 acres, and the dowry land was 20 acres, only 15 of those acres actually belonged to the defendant.

The court found that the evidence submitted by the defendant did not support his case, whereas evidence submitted by the plaintiff showed that the 20 acres in question had indeed been given by the plaintiff's husband to the plaintiff as a dowry on the day of their marriage. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff the 20 acres of land.

The plaintiff’s legal counsel asserted that, on 24 August 2011, the plaintiff (deceased) and defendant (Bank BRI Syari’ah Cabang Surabaya) entered into a financing agreement (Al Qardh) to enable the plaintiff to purchase precious metals. Articles 1 and 2 of the agreement stated that the defendant would lend to the plaintiff IDR 95.4 million to be used to purchase 200 grams of gold from the precious metals company Antam. The gold was valued at IDR 106 million, and required a down payment of IDR 10.6 million. Pursuant to art 3 of the agreement, the plaintiff was required to repay the defendant in instalments of IDR 1,590,000, over a period of 60 months (until 24 August 2016). Upon repayment of two instalments, the plaintiff was then entitled to a cash back incentive, notably after repaying the first three instalments, as well as the twelfth instalment. Article 5(1) of the agreement also specified that to guarantee the return of the monies loaned, the plaintiff was to use the 200 grams of gold as collateral. To ensure the gold was cared for and stored for the period of the loan, the plaintiff paid to the defendant a monthly fee of IDR 1,033,500, making his total monthly repayments IDR 2,623,500.

The plaintiff successfully made these repayments for 29 months (until January 2014), while the defendant upheld its end of the bargain by paying to the plaintiff the cash back incentives up until November 2013, after which it defaulted. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to act in good faith, providing a variety of reasons to postpone the payment of the cash back incentives. The plaintiff paid to the defendant the remainder of his debt owing (IDR 49,290,000 as of 7 February 2014), hoping that the defendant would then repay to the plaintiff all its cash back incentives. The defendant, however, continued to provide the plaintiff with reasons as to why it could not uphold its end of the bargain. Finally, on 23 May 2014, the defendant paid to the plaintiff the cash back for January 2014 (IDR 912,925) and March 2014 (IDR 981,825) totalling IDR 1,894,750.  The plaintiff told the court he had instigated proceedings to recoup the unpaid cash back incentives totalling IDR 21,893,175. The plaintiff also objected to the defendant unlawfully debiting the plaintiff’s bank account for IDR 3,100,500 when the principal debt had been repaid. The defendant claimed that this debit was to cover the plaintiff’s ijarah (fee) for February 2014, in addition to a fine equal to two months’ ijarah, resulting from the plaintiff repaying the entire principal. The plaintiff, however, claimed that the debit was clearly unlawful and in contravention of arts 2(3) and 4(1)(c) of the ijarah agreement, which stated that the ijarah period concluded when the gold/items being stored and cared for by the defendant no longer constituted a surety and had been returned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought actual damages to the value of IDR 52,044,637, as well as compensatory damages to the value of IDR 1 billion for pain and suffering. For every day the defendant failed to pay after the seven day deadline he sought the court to enforce, the plaintiff requested that the defendant pay a one per cent fine. Moreover, if the defendant was unable to pay the damages sought by the plaintiff, the plaintiff recommended that the court order it to sell a property it owned and pay the damages from the proceeds of the sale. The plaintiff also recommended the court hand down judgment, the implementation of which could not be delayed if the defendant sought to appeal the decision.

The defendant lodged an exception to the plaintiff’s case, stating that the court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. The defendant argued that art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking permits parties to specify in an agreement their preferred mode of dispute resolution, which does not have to be a religious court, that being a state court or arbitration body. It argued that the parties’ express desire, as stated in art 12 of the agreement, was to resolve any disputes relating to the agreement before the National Shari’a Arbitration Board (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional – Basyarnas), if initial discussions and deliberation (musyawarah) were unsuccessful. Moreover, that any decision made by Basyarnas was first and final. The defendant also cited art 59 of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, which acknowledges arbitration as a final and binding form of civil dispute resolution, based on a written agreement by the parties to the dispute. In the event one of the parties to a dispute does not abide by the ruling of the arbiter, art 59(3) enables the other party to lodge an application with the Chief Justice of the state court (Pengadilan Negeri) to compel the non-abiding party to do so. The defendant also noted that the elucidation of art 59(1) defines 'arbitration' as including shari’a arbitration.

In regards to the plaintiff’s principal claim, the defendant retorted that the plaintiff’s calculations in regards to the cash back payments were excessive. It also argued that the monthly instalments owed by the plaintiff were IDR 2,623,500 (this figure comprised IDR 1,590,000 based on the Al-Qard agreement, and IDR 1,033,500 per the ijarah agreement). The defendant asserted that the cash back arrangement derived from the Al-Qard agreement, because it would otherwise have been a violation of the current law and the agreement itself, meaning that it must be calculated based on the ijarah agreement, on the condition the plaintiff paid all repayments for the entire 60 months, without defaulting. For the plaintiff to repay the entire contract price, and then to expect to receive all cash back payments at once, was not what the parties had agreed to in the ijarah agreement. The defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had overpaid the defendant by IDR 2,067,100 when paying out the contract price, and was happy to return the excess monies. In regards to the actual damages sought by the plaintiff, the defendant struggled to understand the plaintiff’s reasoning and calculations. More fascinating, however, was its summation of the IDR 1 billion sought in compensatory damages, which it described as a "fantastic number that fell from the sky" (nilai yang fantastis yang jatuh dari langit) that had no basis.

The court acknowledged that the parties had, in art 12 of the agreement, agreed to resolve any disputes via arbitration. It cited Surat Al-Maidah, verse 1, which encourages Muslims to uphold the agreements they make, as well as art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), which requires parties to an agreement to treat that agreement as law, and art 4(1) and (2) of Law No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, which permits parties to agree to arbitration as their preferred mode of dispute resolution. In regards to the Constitutional Court’s (No. 93/PUU-X/2012) decision regarding the elucidation of art 55(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008, and vesting in the religious judiciary absolute jurisdiction over shari’a banking cases, the court said it needed to consider the opinion of Prof Dr Laica Marzuki, former Supreme Court and Constitutional Court Justice, that Constitutional Court judgments have no retroactive application, but are prospectively binding. As the parties had reached their agreement on 21 August 2011, the court found that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was inapplicable and, therefore, the parties were bound by the contents of the agreement.

The parties were married on 15 May 1990 and had two children (aged 19 and 14), both of whom were in the care of the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious until 1992, after which time the plaintiff learned from the defendant's sibling visiting from Tual, Southeast Maluku, that the defendant already had a wife in Tual. While the defendant had denied the allegation, he had also become visibly upset and angry. The plaintiff submitted that she had felt deceived by the defendant, who had maintained at the time the parties married that he was unmarried. The plaintiff had hoped the defendant could be open and honest with her and accountable for his conduct. In 1995, however, when the plaintiff became pregnant with the parties' second child, another woman came to the parties' home. When the plaintiff inquired with the defendant as to who this other woman was, the defendant refused to respond, instead taking all his clothes and leaving the plaintiff and the parties' home. It turned out, the plaintiff submitted, that the woman was the defendant's third wife, who the defendant had recently married, unbeknownst to the plaintiff.

A month later the defendant returned to the parties' home. At that time the parties were living in a rental property. Not long after the defendant returned, however, in 1999, another woman came to the parties' home. This time, when the plaintiff asked the defendant who the woman was, the defendant chased the plaintiff and the parties' children out of the rental property. It later turned out that the woman was the defendant's fourth wife, who he had also recently married, again, unbeknownst to the plaintiff.

Three months later the defendant summoned the plaintiff to return to the rental property. The plaintiff obliged. In 2004, however, the defendant left the home for four months. When the plaintiff telephoned the defendant to ask why he had not yet returned, he replied that he was hiring a car from someone and then planned to live with his sibling in Ambon. When the plaintiff went to the Governor's Office in Ambon to attend to some administrative matters, she met with the defendant's sibling. She asked him whether or not the defendant had been living with him, as the defendant had claimed. The defendant's sibling told the plaintiff that the defendant had never lived with him.

On 24 April 2004, the plaintiff telephoned the defendant, telling him to come home. When the defendant came home, the plaintiff asked him what he wanted. It was then that the defendant told the plaintiff he would later provide her with divorce papers, before taking all his clothes and leaving.

The plaintiff submitted that whenever one of the defendant's wives would come to the parties' home, the defendant would become verbally aggressive and use inappropriate language with the plaintiff. Having suffered emotionally for an extended period of time, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The court acknolwedged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

The applicants claimed that, since 2003, the first applicant had been a customer of the first respondent, via its shari'a Bukittinggi branch (PT. Bank Bukopin Cabang Syari'ah Bukittinggi). Prior to becoming a customer of the first respondent, the first applicant had been a debtor of PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) Cabang Bukittinggi, to which it owed IDR 483,2333,530 as at June 2003. At that time, the first applicant's business was experiencing financial difficulties, leading the first applicant to apply to the first respondent for a financial loan for financial support, as well as to pay his debts with PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. After examining the relevant securities documents, the first respondent agreed to enter into an Al-Murabahah (sale-purchase) agreement with the first applicant. Once the relevant documentation was executed, the first respondent provided to the first applicant IDR 500 million, with which it paid its debt to PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. The first respondent then took from PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi the deed of title of a property in the name of the second applicant (the second applicant was already an authorised guarantor pursuant to the agreement between the first applicant and first respondent).

In the Al-Murabahah agreement document the first respondent had agreed to make available items for the first applicant to the value of IDR 500 million, and the first respondent was to sell those items to the first applicant for IDR 794,816,460. (In an Al-Murabahah agreement there is an absolute requirement that there be items for sale subject of the agreement.) As there were no items purchased by the first applicant from the first respondent, the agreement had no legal authority. The agreement was further prohibited, according to the applicants, because it allowed the first applicant to borrow from the first respondent a sum of money, secured by a stationary object (the property) for a period of five years, with an additional payment for the first respondent which, according to Islam, constituted riba (usur or interest).

The Supreme Court, in the first instance, declared that the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent was one based on borrowing a sum of money, secured against a stationary object. Furthermore, that profit instalments provided by the first applicant to the first respondent were to be treated as payment instalments against the debt it owed to the first repsondent, because providing additional payments outside the scope of the principal to the lender would be contrary to shari'a. The other relevant documents, including the debt notice, the applicants claimed, were also null and void.

In addition, another Al-Murabahah agreement had been made by, and before, the first co-respondent, tying the first applicant and first respondent to the sale and purchase of items valued at IDR 581,230,044, with a sale price of IDR 350 million, and a murabahah profit for the first respondent of IDR 231,230,044. This was to be paid in instalments over 60 months, tied to a debt notice and mortgage deed, both of which were prepared by, and before, the first co-respondent, secured by the same property. Similarly, however, this agreement had no object for sale or purchase.

The total of both agreements resulted in the first applicant being in IDR 850 million debt to the first respondent. After the first applicant had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240, the remainder owing, it claimed, was IDR 486,388,760. However, while the first applicant had originally owed PT BRI Cabang Bukittinggi no more than IDR 500 million, it now claimed the first applicant owed IDR 1,376,046,504 (this was the principal debt combined with interest). The first applicant maintained, however, that he had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240 in instalments up until March 2006.

The Bukittinggi State Court had already issued a notice stating that the property held as a security would be auctioned on 16 August 2006. The first applicant, upon becoming aware of the fact that the two Al-Murabahah agreements were null and void, sought to prevent the first respondent from auctioning the property. Despite being made aware of, and reading, the notice, the second respondent went ahead with the auction. Accordingly, the applicants claimed that the auction should have no legal authority, and pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006 on the Religious Judiciary, the civil courts were precluded from resolving shari'a economy-related matters anyway.

The applicants also objected to the conduct of the third respondent, the purchaser of the property and a staff member of the legal team of the first respondent. The applicants alleged that the third respondent knew the auction reserve price and therefore only had to pay a little bit over the reserve to secure the property.

The applicants sought damages for actual loss, as well as pain and suffering. They claimed that the land was worth IDR 2.5 billion, and yet the third respondent had only paid IDR 993,600,000 as the purchase price. Moreover, they sought IDR 500 million in damages for the stress and emotional strain incurred from the entire ordeal.

The Bukittinggi Religious Court (lower court) had declared the two Al-Murabahah agreements null and void, and declared the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent a financial loan (Al-Qardh). The IDR 850 million debt owed by the first applicant to the first respondent was reduced to IDR 486,388,760, taking into account the instalments paid by the first applicant totalling IDR 363,611,240. The first respondent had also been ordered to transfer to the applicants the profit from the auction, minus the remaining debt of IDR 486,388,760, leaving the respondents owing the applicants IDR 447,595,240.

On appeal to the Padang Religious High Court, the decision of the lower court was overturned. The Padang Religious High Court found that the lower court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the first instance, rejected the applicants' cassation appeal, upholding the decision of the Padang Religious High Court.

The applicants used their last avenue of appeal before the Supreme Court (reconsideration or peninjauan kembali) claiming that the Supreme Court's judgment, at cassation level, was erroneous. The applicants asserted that the Al-Murabahah agreements contained an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to resolve any legal disputes before the Indonesian Islamic Civil and Commercial Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Muamalat Indonesia), designating the Bukittinggi State Court registrar's office as the appropriate venue. Whereas, in actual fact, the respondents had submitted their request to seize the property to the Bukittinggi State Court. Moreover, the applicants claimed that the Al-Murabahah agreements failed to meet the following shari'a requirements:

1. interest (riba)-free;
2. the sale-purchase items may not be forbidden (haram);
3. the bank is to finance some or all of the items, pursuant to the agreed-upon classification;
4. the bank is to purchase the items in its own name;
5. if the bank makes representations to the customer that it is purchasing the items, the agreement is executed once the items the bank is purchasing become the property of the bank; and
6. the bank provides all information relating to the items, including cash or credit purchases.

The Supreme Court found that the two reasons submitted by the applicants did not fall under any of the reasons for review (peninjauan kembali) contemplated by art 67 of Law No. 14 of 1985, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.