SHARIAsource

Lawmakers in Brunei passed the Syariah Penal Code Order of 2013 in October of that year, and implemented the law in two stages: sections regulating minor crimes and misdemeanors took effect on May 1, 2014, and the remainder—including serious crimes and felonies that entail classical Islamic criminal law’s fixed crimes and punishments—took effect on April 3, 2019. This Islamic criminal code exists in parallel to Brunei’s “civil” (or secular) criminal laws, which borrow from British law. Among other provisions, Brunei’s new code criminalizes failures to perform various religious obligations, sexual relations out of wedlock, and gay or lesbian sexual relations. It includes punishments of whipping, amputation of hands and feet, and stoning. Notably, the most severe punishments accompany very high evidentiary standards as laid out within the Code, and in the related Syariah Courts Criminal Procedure Code Order, the SCCPCO of 2018.

Lawmakers in Brunei passed the Syariah Penal Code Order of 2013 in October of that year, and implemented the law in two stages: sections regulating minor crimes and misdemeanors took effect on May 1, 2014, and the remainder—including serious crimes and felonies that entail classical Islamic criminal law’s fixed crimes and punishments—took effect on April 3, 2019. This Islamic criminal code exists in parallel to Brunei’s “civil” (or secular) criminal laws, which borrow from British law. Among other provisions, Brunei’s new code criminalizes failures to perform various religious obligations, sexual relations out of wedlock, and gay or lesbian sexual relations. It includes punishments of whipping, amputation of hands and feet, and stoning. Notably, the most severe punishments accompany very high evidentiary standards as laid out within the Code, and in the related Syariah Courts Criminal Procedure Code Order, the SCCPCO of 2018.

In Civil Petition No.1289 of 2020, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a wife has a right to be maintained by her husband and that this right is absolute under Islamic law “so long as she remains faithful to him and discharges, or is willing to discharge, her own matrimonial obligations” and that a Muslim husband is bound to maintaining his wife even if she can maintain herself out of her own resources. They ordered that the petitioner, Haseen Ullah, has been “evading his legal as well as moral obligation“ to pay the agreed upon dower and maintenance to his wife, Naheed Begum, and their five minor children. For these reasons, the Supreme Court found the petition to be baseless and dismissed it with costs throughout. 

In its preambular statement, this regional regulation states that in order to create a safe and orderly Jembrana regency, efforts are necessary to prevent and eradicate lewd behaviour and prostitution, which constitutes amoral conduct. In its elucidation, the regulation states that prostitution, and the facilitation thereof, is contrary to religious laws, state laws, morality, and the morals of the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology). Accordingly, pursuant to art 3, all persons and bodies/organisations, are not permitted to conduct themselves in a lewd manner or to solicit prostitution. Contravention of this prohibition carries a maximum penalty of three months' impriosnment or a fine of IDR 50 million (art 6).

The broader significance of this regional regulation is that, while it states that prostitution is contrary to religious laws, rather than Islamic laws, Jembrana is a predominantly Hindu regency, with a minority Muslim population of 79,857 people from a total population of 311,995, according to official figures (http://www.jembranakab.go.id/?module=kependudukan). Therefore, this is a regulation that, arguably, seeks to Islamise public life, but also invokes state laws and the Pancasila, thereby legitimising it for a Hindu majority (224,618 people).

The applicant submitted that he had married a woman by the name of M binti S on 25 November 1996, with whom he had a child aged 15 years and 8 months (born on 29 September 1997). The child had requested the applicant's permission to marry, and the applicant had granted his permission because he considered his child already an adult and in love with her fiance, who was 20 years and 3 months of age (born on 21 March 1993). Moreover, the applicant's child and her fiance had known each other for a year and had been engaged since March 2013. The applicant had already requested the permission of the head of his local Office of Religious Affairs, but the application had been dismissed.

The applicant had, therefore, filed an application with the court for a judicial determination granting his daughter permission to marry as a minor. After receiving the counsel of the court, however, the applicant withdrew his application and agreed to postpone his child's wedding until she was of age.

The UAE government issued Federal Decree Law no. 31 of 2021 amending the country’s criminal law code, with major amendments to the prior code, Federal Law no. 3 of 1987. The new law amended three major provisions of the existing Code. First, it expands the scope of the laws of rape and sexual assault by raising the age limit for statutory rape from 14 to 18, in which anyone under the age of 18 is now considered a minor, and introducing a penalty of life imprisonment for rape that may increase to capital punishment if the case matches any of the conditions outlined by the law. Second, the law partially decriminalizes out-of-wedlock sexual relationships, by reducing the penalty from one year to six months if a complaint is filed by a relative or woman’s guardian. Third, the law introduces provisions for out-of-wedlock parenting in which anyone who has a child out-of-wedlock can avoid the default minimum sentence of two years’ imprisonment if they marry, acknowledge parenthood of the child (either jointly or separately), and provide formal issuance of the baby's identification documents.

The parties were married on 4 May 2009. The plaintiff submitted that since the parties married, she had been invited to live at the defendant's parents' home in Jakarta. While pregnant she was verbally abused and threatened with divorce by the defendant, and, then in December 2009, while heavily pregnant, returned to her parents' home to give birth. After the birth of the child, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to return to the defendant's parents' home with their child and the plaintiff's parents. In August 2012, due to economic concerns, the parties returned to Padang to live with the plaintiff's parents, while the defendant searched for employment (albeit unsuccessfully). In October 2012, following a minor problem, the defendant left the plaintiff and their child and, since then, had not returned to see the plaintiff and their child or to provide financial support for the child.

The court, pursuant to art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, found that because the defendant had contravened figures 2 and 4 of the parties' marriage contract by not providing the plaintiff with any financial support for three months, and not caring for the plaintiff for more than six months (it had already been nine months), the evidentiary burden for divorce contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage had been met. The court granted the plaintiff a divorce and custody of the parties' child based on the plaintiff paying to the defendant IDR 10,000 (talak satu khul'i).

The parties were married on 25 September 2011 and had one child, who was in the plaintiff's care. Initially, their marriage was harmonious, but after the birth of their child, it had become quarrelsome. The plaintiff submitted this was because the defendant:

1. had not provided her with any financial support, rather, giving his entire income to his parents; and
2. was frequently emotionally and physically abusive towards the plaintiff, even over minor matters.

Problems escalated and, in April 2013, when the parties' child passed away, the defendant left the plaintiff for Kalimantan and cut all ties with her. As the defendant's whereabouts were unknown, nothing could be done by the parties' families to orchestrate a reunion. Accordingly, the plaintiff believed that divorce was the only feasible option available.

Based on the evidence before it, including that provided by witnesses, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the Court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. In further support of its decision it cited surat ar-rum verse 21, Kitab al-Qawaid al-Fiqhiyyah li al-Syaikh Muhammad Halim al-Utsaimin, as well as art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, emphasising that the purpose of marriage had long ago been repudiated by the parties.

The parties were married on 7 January 2007 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted that the marriage had been harmonious for the first five years, after which time it had become quarrelsome. This was because the defendant would become unnecessarily jealous and accuse the plaintiff of having an extra-marital affair, and, in the event of any minor problem, hit the plaintiff. On one occasion in May 2011, the defendant returned home from work and asked the plaintiff why she was being so quiet. For no apparent reason, the defendant then grabbed the plaintiff by the throat so badly that she struggled to eat for the next week.

The plaintiff returned to her parents' home for three days following the choking incident, before returning to the parties' home, only to find that the defendant had left. In June 2011, the parties reconciled with the help of communal efforts, but this proved to be temporary. Accordingly, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra), allow the parties' child to remain in her care, and, owing to her own impecuniosity, exempt her from any court fees.

The court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict. It also granted her custody of the parties' child, and ordered the state to bear her court costs.

The applicant submitted that he had married a woman by the name of L binti M on 11 June 2013, with whom he had two children. One of his children was already married, while the other was aged 15 years and 4 months (born on 2 February 1998). The applicant's second child had requested the applicant's permission to marry her fiance, and the applicant had granted his permission because he considered his child already an adult and in love with her fiance, who was 25 years and 10 months of age (born on 26 August 1988). Moreover, the applicant's child and her fiance had known each other for three months, and the applicant was concerned his daughter and her fiance would soon consummate their relationship regardless. The applicant had already requested the permission of the head of his local Office of Religious Affairs, but the application had been dismissed on 11 June 2013.

The applicant, therefore, filed an application with the court for a judicial determination granting his daughter permission to marry as a minor. In acceding to the application, the court, pursuant to art 7(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, acknowledged that the applicant's daughter was not the required 16 years of age a female must be before she can marry. On the facts, however, the court acknowledged that the applicant's daughter and her fiance were already emotionally dependent on one another, were engaged, and that there were no other bars to their marriage. The requirements for marriage dispensation contained in arts 7(2), 8 and 9 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 15(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and the elucidation of art 49(2) and (3) of Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006 and Law No. 50 of 2009, had, therefore, been met.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the State of Israel (Medinat Yisra'el), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Israel's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under China's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The parties were married on 19 May 2003, after which they lived with the plaintiff's parents in Banda Aceh for two years, until the end of 2005. In 2006 they moved, and had lived in Banda Aceh until 2015, during which time they had had two children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties had lived harmoniously until 2008, after which time they had begun to quarrel regularly, because the defendant:

1. frequently left the matrimonial home, only to return the next morning, if at all, without showing any regard for the plaintiff and their children, and if the defendant did return home, he would often be angry with the plaintiff for no apparent reason;
2. frequently physically assaulted the plaintiff, and would even, oven minor matters, resort to physical violence, hitting and kicking the plaintiff;
3. showed no care for the plaintiff and their children whatsoever, rather, prioritising himself over domestic needs such as costs associated with the parties' children.

The plaintiff informed the court that she had previously filed an application for a judicial divorce with the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court on 3 October 2011, however, had withdrawn that application after reconciling with the defendant. Moreover, that between the parties they had reached a reconciliation agreement (perjanjian damai) on 11 July 2002 before Chief Justice Drs. H. Idris Budiman. As the defendant had failed to maintain his end of the bargain, the plaintiff submitted that she had legal grounds to file an application for judicial divorce. The plaintiff also sought IDR 2 million per month in child maintenance.

In the defendant's absence, the court acceded to the plaintiff's application for an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra), acknowledging that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and surat Al-rum verse 21, being a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) homelife was no longer feasible. Moreover, that ongoing conflict between the parties was sufficient reason to grant a divorce, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

In regards to their children, the court found that while they remained the joint responsibility of the parties, the plaintiff would be better placed to rear and educate them given their still being pre-pubescent (belum mumayyiz). This also accorded with the requirement contained in art 105(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court emphasised its belief that a mother would be more patient and meticulous in raising the children, and that to separate them from the plaintiff would be incredibly problematic given their age. The court also cited art 59(2) of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, which acknowledges the rights and needs of children to maintain a personal relationship with their father. Accordingly, it granted the defendant visitation rights, as well as the right to be consulted regarding his children's education and development, as contained in art 26(1) of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection. The court did not accede to the plaintiff's request for IDR 2 million per month in child maintenance, but instead ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff IDR 1 million per month in child maintenance.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Hellenic Republic/Greece (Elliniki Dimokratia), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Greece’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Iraq (Jumhuriyat al Iraq/Komar-i Eraq), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Iraq's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is a principle source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Mongolia (Mongol Uls), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Mongolia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar/Burma (Pyidaungzu Thammada Myanma Naingngandaw), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Myanmar's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Bulgaria (Republika Bulgaria), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bulgaria’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Liberia, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Liberia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of South Sudan, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under South Sudan's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.