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Amaq Soekalam din Daiman passed away circa-1970. His mother and father (Daiman and Sekrasip) had pre-deceased him, and his wife, Rakisah, passed away circa-1975. Amaq Soekalam and Rakisah had five children:

1. Nurisam bin Soekalam (passed away circa-1971);
2. Nuriasip bin Soekalam (first defendant);
3. Nuriadim bin Soekalam (first plaintiff);
4. Sukardip bin Soekalam (second plaintiff);
5. Nuriadip bin Soekalam (passed away circa-2003), married to Inaq Nuriadip, had five children:
6. Sadli bin Nuriadip (third plaintiff);
7. Lux bin Nuriadip (fourth plaintiff);
8. Heli bin Nuriadip (fifth plaintiff);
9. Herul bin Nuriadip (sixth plaintiff);
10. Purni bin Nuriadip (seventh plaintiff).

Amaq Soekalam left behind a plot of land (500m²) upon which was situated a semi-permanent structure (2 x 7m²), as well as a plantation (21,000m²). In 1965, he gave the plantation to Amaq Juni to develop, pursuant to an agreement that they would share the spoils. In 1982, however, a request was made that the plantation be registered by Badan Pertanahan Nasional - Lombok Barat (National Land Body - West Lombok) via the government asset legalisation process PRONA (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria - National Agrarian Operations Project), in order that a deed of title for the plantation could be issued. That deed of title was incorrectly issued in Amaq Juni's name, rather than Amaq Soekalam's, leading the plaintiffs to argue that it had no legal effect.

Circa-2006, Amaq Juni passed away and the land came into the possession of his wife (Inaq Uni) and children (second-sixth defendants). The plaintiffs claimed that, while Amaq Soekalam was alive, he both worked on the plantation and maintained possession of it. After he passed away, however, Amaq Juni came into possession of the plantation and had a deed of title issued in his name. After Amaq Juni's passing, the plantation came into the possession of the second-sixth defendants. The plaintiffs sought from the court an order that the plantation be divided between Amaq Soekalam's worthy beneficiaries, and that a caveat be placed on the plantation to preclude the defendants from dealing with the plantation in a manner adverse to the plaintiffs' interests. In addition, they requested that the other property be divided in accordance with Islamic inheritance laws (hukum faraid).

The court acceded to the plaintiffs' request insofar as it ordered the second-sixth defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs the plantation. The court ordered that it be divided between the plaintiffs pursuant to hukum faraid, specifically stipulating the share to which each beneficiary was entitled.

This Supreme Court pronouncement states that while a non-Muslim wife who survives her Muslim husband cannot be considered a beneficiary (ahli waris), she remains entitled to inherit her portion of his estate as his wife, pursuant to a wasiat wajibah (obligatory will).

In this case, the cassation applicant had challenged the decision of the Makassar High Religious Court (59/Pdt.G/2009/PTA). As the lawful wife of the deceased, who had passed away on 22 May 2008 (they were married on 1 November 1990), the Court stated that as the deceased and cassation applicant had been married for 18 years, and as the defendant had devoted herself to the deceased while he was alive, it was immaterial that she was a non-Muslim. Moreover, that she was entitled to receive a portion of the estate of the deceased, as well as a portion of their joint assets as husband and wife.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Makassar Religious Court (lower court), which had granted her one-half of the assets she had owned jointly with the deceased. The appellant had married the deceased on 1 November 1990, and they had remained married until the deceased passed away on 22 May 2008. The lower court had stipulated as the deceased's beneficiaries his mother and four siblings (the respondents), and two properties and IDR 50 million in life insurance as the joint assets of the appellant and deceased.

The lower court had ordered the appellant to transfer to the beneficiaries the other half of those joint assets, which constituted the estate of the deceased. In dismissing the appeal, the court cited arts 96 and 97 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws as a legal basis for the division of the assets, as well as the fact that, as the deceased was Muslim, his assets were to be distributed pursuant to Islamic law, despite one of the parties to the dispute being a Christian/non-Muslim. The appellant was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 86,000).

This fatwa recommends that inherited plots of land that are not particularly expansive remain as one plot, rather than being divided between the relevant beneficiaries. This should be achieved by the beneficiaries working together in a cooperative fashion. If this is not feasible because one or more of the beneficiaries needs the financial proceeds that would be obtained through the sale of such land, it is preferable that one of the other financially-secure beneficiares purchase from any beneficiary in financial need their interest in the land. If this is not feasible, the fatwa preferences sale of the inherited land to the owner of one of the neighbouring plots of land. If this is not feasible, efforts should be made to sell the land to another Muslim who lives in the same kampung or village so that the plot of land may one day become the object of infaq/sadaqah or zakat, thereby furthering the general well-being of other Muslims, as per Islamic teachings.

The six applicants withdrew their inheritance-related application. The court acceded to the withdrawal and ordered them to pay costs (IDR 91,000).

The first applicant was the wife of the deceased, while the second to eighth applicants were the children of the applicant and decased. The applicants were all stipulated in the will of the deceased as beneficiaries (ahli waris). The deceased's savings were held with PT. Bank BPD Aceh (IDR 22,133,633), an additional deposit of IDR 6 million having been made on 4 December 1998. When the applicants sought to withdraw the savings of the deceased, however, the bank told them they needed to first obtain a court-issued stipulation declaring that they were indeed the beneficiaries under the deceased's will. The applicants' request was then dismissed by the court when they failed to attend the proceeding.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that religious courts outside Java-Madura are authorised to make stipulations regarding Muslim inheritance and the beneficiaries thereof. With regards to the ownership of the house in dispute, however, it was determined that that was a matter for the state courts.

A plot of land (a rice field) had been bequeathed to two brothers, Abdul Halim and Fatchul Isya'i. When the two brothers passed away, the land became the property of Abdul Halim's children (the first and second defendants), who gave Fatchul Isya'i's adopted son (the plaintiff) a portion of the land. The plaintiff submitted that, as he was also a Muslim, he was therefore entitled to half the plot of land, in accordance with provisions of Islamic law. The plaintiff also submitted that, assuming the court acceded to his request, he was entitled to IDR 10 million per day for every day the defendants failed to transfer to him control of half the plot of land.

The majority of the court referred to the definition of an adopted child (anak angkat) in art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which requires parenting responsibilities to be transferred from the child's biological parents to its adoptive parents, pursuant to a court decision. As the plaintiff had only been adopted by his adoptive parents pursuant to local custom (adat), however, the majority found that he did not have the required legal standing. Second, the plaintiff had failed to state clearly on what grounds he was suing the defendants. Third, if the plaintiff sought to establish that he was an adopted child, and that he was entitled to certain inheritance, these two applications would need to be made separately.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ahmad Zaenal Fanani found the defendants' acknowledgment that the plaintiff was the adoptive child of Fatchul Isya'i to be a relevant consideration. Moreover, that according to Islamic inheritance law and the concept of wasiat wajibah, adopted children, pursuant to art 209(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and Indonesian Supreme Court Jurisprudence 312K/AG/2008, were entitled to a maximum of one-third of the estate of a deceased adoptive parent.

The appellant sought to challenge Malang Religious Court Decision No. 915 of 2015. The court, however, dismissed the appeal on the same grounds as the majority in the decision of the court of first instance. It also found that the issue pertaining to wasiat wajibah and inheritance for adopted children, as expressed in the dissenting opinion in the initial decision, to be irrelevant.

The cassation applicant sought to challenge Malang Religious Court Decision No. 915 of 2015, as well as Surabaya High Religious Court Decision No. 243 of 2015, on the grounds that the preceding courts had incorrectly applied the law or contravened the law, as provided in art 30(1)(b) of Law No. 14 of 1985, Law No. 5 of 2004, Law No. 3 of 2009 on the Indonesian Supreme Court.

In granting the cassation applicant's appeal, the Supreme Court found that the preceding courts had both erred in determining that the cassation applicant was not the adopted child of Fatchul Isya'i at law. The Supreme Court held that the acknowledgment from the cassation respondents that the cassation applicant was indeed the adopted child of Fatchul Isya'i was a relevant and conclusive consideration. Moreover, because Fatchul Isya'i had adopted the cassation applicant in 1982, prior to the enactment of the Compilation of Islamic Laws in 1991, art 171 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws was inapplicable to the facts of the case.

The plaintiffs were the biological children of the deceased, who had died on 10 April 1979. The wife of the deceased had also passed away on 25 June 2012. The deceased was his parents' only son, and his parents, the plaintiffs' grandparents, had passed away in 1980 and 1992. The deceased had left behind eight parcels of land, including:

1. a house;
2. four rice paddies, upon one of which was a shophouse, built by the second co-defendant and purchased by the first co-defendant, and a restaurant;
3. two durian plantations; and
4. another parcel of land.

The defendant, who was the plaintiffs' great uncle (younger brother of their deceased grandmother), controlled all eight parcels of land because, at the time of the death of the deceased, the plaintiffs were still in primary school (sekolah dasar). The plaintiffs submitted that the defendant was not a legitimate beneficiary because the deceased was the sole son of the original owner of all eight parcels of land, and they were his children. Furthermore, the first and second co-defendants enjoyed no right of inheritance over the rice paddy with the shophouse and restaurant as the plaintiffs had never sold to either of them the land or any part thereof. Moreover, the first co-defendant knew the right owner of the land, and knew that the plaintiffs were the children of the deceased.

The plaintiffs, therefore, sought a determination from the court that they were the true owners of the eight parcels of land. The defendant and two co-defendants refuted the plaintiffs' submissions, submitting that the house had actually belonged to the defendant's father, and that the the rice paddy on which the shophouse and restaurant were situated had been inherited by the defendant and first co-defendant, who had lawfully sold a part thereof to the second co-defendant. The defendant and two co-defendants also submitted that they had no connection whatsoever to the other parcels of land.

In dismissing the plaintiffs' application, the court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish their claim to the relevant parcels of land. The court also ordered the court bailiff to lift the caveat over the relevant parcels of land.

The deceased (IB) died on 27 November 2016, and was survived by his two beneficiaries, his wife (the first applicant) and daughter (the second applicant). The deceased left savings in a bank account with Bank BRI, Lamno. The applicants requested that the court stipulate them as beneficiaries of in order that they may administer the bank account of the deceased.

In acceding to the applicants' request, the court, pursuant to art 174(1)(a) of the Compilation of Laws, acknowledged that the evidence provided by the two witnesses corroborated with that provided by the applicants.

On August 3, 2022, the Sharia Court of Appeal of Kwara State in Nigeria at Ilorin decided in Mohammed v. Mohammed that a deceased man’s second and third wives were not entitled to inheritance under Islamic estate laws because he married his first wife under the secular Marriage Act. The man’s second and third wives were suing upon his death for inheritance claims under sharīʿa, but the Court held that, for those marriages to have been valid under sharīʿa, the man would have had to divorce his first wife, whom he had married under the Marriage Act and not according to norms of Islamic law. By contrast, because the deceased had married his first wife under the Marriage Act, the Court held that the law governing the distribution of his estate was the law of Kwara State, not Islamic law, or sharīʿa.

The appellants successfully challenged Giri Menang Religious Court Decision No. 220 of 2013. The court found that, pursuant to art 1795 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), among other provisions, the respondents' legal representation in the original case was not authorised to act on behalf of the respondents. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the initial proceeding (IDR 1,706,000) originally paid by the appellants, as well as costs for this case (IDR 150,000).

This fatwa states that an only daughter is entitled to one-half of her deceased parents' estate if she has no brothers. Male relatives are entitled to the remains of the estate of the deceased after the only daughter has received her share (one-half).

In this case, the California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's determination that Iran was the appropriate forum of adjudication according to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, ruling that Iranian law lacked some of the core procedural safeguards accorded to parties under the laws of the United States.

The Court overturned the decision of the Takengon Shari'a Court for several reasons. It noted that the lower court had erred in declaring the case to have failed because several of the plaintiffs had passed away. It also noted that because one of the beneficiaries was not included in the original complaint and, similarly, not all objects subject of the inheritance were included in the complaint, the decision should be overturned. The Court then specified how the items subject of the inheritance were to be distributed.

This fatwa permits IVF conception, provided the subsequent pregnancy does not involve surrogacy (e.g. the ovum comes from the husband's first wife, but the child is carried by his second wife). This is to avoid subsequent inheritance-related complications.

The fatwa also forbids:

1. a woman using the frozen sperm of her deceased husband to become pregnant because of potential future complications related to paternity and inheritance; and
2. a child being conceived through IVF using the sperm and ovum of a couple out of wedlock (zina).

This regional regulation makes provision for the management of zakat (alms), infaq, shadaqah, hibah (bequests), wasiat (wills), waris (inheritance) and kafarat (expiation), via the Badan Amil Zakat (Alms Administration Body).

This Supreme Court jurisprudence pertains to inheritance law. It states that a dispute over the estate of a deceased person between beneficiaries (ahli waris) with a familial connection to the deceased cannot also include an ownership dispute, and, when strengthened by information provided by witnesses, must be dismissed.