SHARIAsource

University of Washington, School of Law

University of Kansas School of Law

Examines the history, doctrine, texts, and role of Islamic law throughout the world. The course focuses on the background and birth of the Arab-Islamic Empire, the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad, the development of Islam, the Moghul and Ottoman Empires, the Qurʾān and Sunna and other sacred texts, the principal schools of Islamic law, the status of women and religious minorities, and basic principles of some of the substantive areas of law, including criminal, family, inheritance, contract, business, and banking law.

University of Pennsylvania

This ordinance gives effect to certain recommendations of the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws.

As part of their sharīʿa implementation programs, a number of sharīʿa states established new official Councils of Ulama or Sharia Commissions, sometimes with advisory and sometimes with administrative or regulatory functions. Other states established Ministries of Religious Affairs or Offices of Special Advisors to the Governors on Religious Matters, with similar functions. These new bodies were added to older ones, such as the Religious Preaching Boards established in many states in the 1970s and 1980s to regulate Islamic religious preaching in particular. The materials gathered here document all these bodies and their work, including the older Preaching Boards. The materials include all relevant statutes, plus official reports where available, and reports of interviews conducted during fieldwork over a number of years.

These materials are a part of The Nigeria Papers – a SHARIAsource Special Collection, compiled and edited by Independent Scholar Philip Ostien and others. 

A legislative act produced under British India that consolidates and amends the law relating to the solemnization of the marriages of Christians. Broken into nine sections, it also includes legal forms related to marriage, such as a marriage certificate and notice of marriage.

An excerpt from the book al-Maqsad al-Mahmūd fī Talhīs al-'Uqūd, this section details the legality on issues pertaining to marriage, paternity, and children. 

This Supreme Court jurisprudence pertains to inheritance law. It states that a dispute over the estate of a deceased person between beneficiaries (ahli waris) with a familial connection to the deceased cannot also include an ownership dispute, and, when strengthened by information provided by witnesses, must be dismissed.

This fatwa supports the implementation of family planning (keluarga berencana) methods and programs for the sake of maternal and infant health, but does not condone vasectomies, unless pressing circumstances prevail. The fatwa asks the government to prohibit vasectomies, tubectomies and abortions for all Muslims, and to increase surveillance of the misuse of contraception for immoral purposes.

The fatwa also acknowledges the significant impact family planning can have on the environment and how it can facilitate national development.

This article provides an overview of the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of appeal in the British Empire regarding Islamic Endowments (awqāf). The cases originated from all over the Muslim-populated areas of the British Empire. The first judgment was delivered in 1840 and the last in 1968. An analysis of the judgments shows that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council made significant developments in Islamic law of Endowments (awqāf), though its decision to declare family endowments invalid was controversial.

For the full text of the judgments mentioned on page 2, please click here. 

An excerpt from the book al-Muqni' fī 'ilm al-Shurūt, this section details the legality on issues of marriage, paternity, and children. 

A child born out of wedlock is typically not entitled to paternity recognition in Morocco. In an unprecedented move, the First Instance Family Court in Tangiers recognized the familial relationship connecting a father to his biological daughter. The Court also required the man to pay 100,000 MAD (10,500 USD) to the child through her mother for the material and moral harms caused to the child from denial of paternity or familial relations. The defendant appealed the judgment. On October 9, 2017, the Tangiers Court of Appeals overturned the First Instance Court decision, rejecting the DNA tests and any recognition of familial relation. The Court also invalidated the lower court’s use of international conventions, explaining that the child is so foreign to her father that the possibility of their future marriage would not be overruled.

In Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India (the “Court”) considers whether the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Act, 1986 (“the Act”) abrogates its ruling in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Others (“Shah Bano”).[1] In Shah Bano, the Court held that divorced Muslim women unable to support themselves have a right to lifetime maintenance under Section 127 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not conflict with Muslim Personal Law[2] ostensibly limiting rights to mahr[3] and maintenance during the period of iddat.[4] [5] In Danial Latifi, the Court holds that the Act did not overturn Shah Bano, but instead that divorced Muslim women who are unable to maintain themselves are entitled to receive a one-time lump sum payment during the period of iddat sufficient for lifetime maintenance. The Court chiefly justifies this ruling by arguing that abrogating Shah Bano, would violate various constitutional rights of Muslim women. The Court also makes prudential arguments concerning the impact of abrogating Shah Bano on divorced Muslim women’s economic circumstances, and moreover holds that abrogation would be contrary to Islamic law.

[1] Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 (India).

[2] India has a uniform criminal code, but different personal codes addressing family law for various religious communities. This dual system is very controversial in India.

[3] A sum agreed upon prior to marriage to be given to a wife in two parts (one deferred and one immediate).

[4] The roughly three-month period where re-marriage is forbidden to divorced women.

[5] Shah Bano produced political backlash resulting in the passage of the Act referenced above, with the intention of overturning the ruling. See supra note 1.

In Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.,[1] the Supreme Court of India (the “Court”) considers whether a non-retroactive state law barring elected members of various local governments from having more than two children is violative of various articles of the Indian Constitution (the “Constitution”). The law was challenged by disqualified candidates who argued that the law was discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable, that it violated fundamental rights per Article 21, and interfered with religious freedom guarantees in Article 25.[2] The Court holds that the law is reasonable and not arbitrary or discriminatory given India’s overpopulation problem and the perception of a clear nexus between reducing population and encouraging local leaders to be role models.[3] The Court also holds that contesting and holding elected office are not fundamental rights, and even if they were, the public health limitation would mean that the law does not encroach on such rights.[4] But the focus of this paper is on the Court’s analysis with respect to religious freedom, where the Court in effect holds that the public health and welfare limitation must govern and that regardless, polygamy, and having more than two children is not an “integral part” of Islam and there is no conflict with the Muslim personal law.[5]

[1] Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 369 (India).

[2] Supra note 2 (Article 25 of the Indian Constitution is analogous to the American 1^st amendment’s religious freedom protections, but with an explicit public health limitation).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] See id. (India has separate personal codes addressing matters such as marriage for different religious communities..

Holding: The Court granted the adult petitioner leave to change her name from Eloise McCloud Wing to Zakiyyah Ashraf after her conversion to Islam, but denied leave to change petitioner’s eleven-year-old daughter’s name from Cheryl Ann Wing to Hafsah Ashraf. The Court held that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have a foreign-sounding Muslim name that would “set her apart and seem strange.”

Procedural Posture: Petitioner applied to the City Court of the City of New York for leave to change her and her daughter’s names. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the petitioner wished to change her and her daughter’s names to names from what she understood to be the Islamic tradition.

Judgment: Petitioner was granted leave to change her name, but not her daughter’s name, in an opinion authored by Justice Baer.

Facts: Eloise McCloud Wing converted from Christianity to Islam. Her eleven-year-old daughter, Cheryl Ann Wing, lived with Eloise following Eloise’s separation from her husband two years before the name-change petition. After Eloise’s conversion, Cheryl attended religious classes at a mosque and played with Muslim friends, and her mother said Cheryl wanted to be a Muslim and have a Muslim name. Eloise petitioned the court to change her and her daughter’s names to Zakiyyah Ashraf and Hafsah Ashraf, respectively. The Court stated that while an adult’s name change should be approved, a child’s name change should be approved only if it is in the child’s best interest. The Court found no compelling need for Cheryl’s name change, and noted that such a change might actually have an “adverse effect”: the proposed name would “set her apart and seem strange and foreign to her schoolmates and others.” The Court stated that the petition for Cheryl’s name change could be renewed when Cheryl turned 16, and was therefore old enough to make a mature decision about it on her own.

“Held, where the plaintiff sued for the custody of her minor sister, as her legal guardian under Muhammadan law, that the fact of the plaintiff being a prostitute was, although she was legally entitled to the custody of a minor, a sufficient reason for dismissing the suit in the interests of such a minor.”