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The Act replaced the Iranian Family Protection Act 1975 and modified other family law provisions as embodied in the Civil Code and the Divorce Act 1992. It contains procedural matters (Family Courts, Family Consultation Centers) as well as substantial ones (marriage, divorce, custody, nafaqa, alimony and pensions) and the criminal sanctions. Major changes introduced generally are:

A) The Family Court now involves a female consultant judge who is to give her opinion in each case, which the sitting judge (a man as in other courts) has to consider, but not to follow, in deciding the case;

B) The jurisdiction of the Family Court is now extended to additional matters, including child adoption, embryo donation, and sex change;

C) The process for divorce by mutual consent is facilitated;

D) The value of the Mahr (or the portion of the Mahr) for collecting which the debtor imprisonment provisions can be invoked is now limited to a specified amount (equal to 110 gold coin);

E) Temporary marriage needs not be registered now save in specific situations;

The appellant and his children (respondents) disputed the owernship and distribution of the estate of the deceased (wife/mother). The Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court) had stipulated the beneficiaries of the deceased's will as being the parties to the dispute, and distinguished between property that constituted the joint assets of the appellant and deceased, from property that was solely that of the deceased and therefore suitable to be distributed between the beneficiaries.

The lower court had granted half of the latter property to the appellant, and divided the remaining half into fifths between the respondents (the male respondent receiving two-fifths, while the female respondents received one-fifth).

On the whole, the Court accepted the judgment of the lower court. It found, however, that the lower court had erred in applying an Acehnese custom whereby the owner of a parcel of land and the builder of the shop and home complex on the land were to split the proceeds of any sale of the land and home/shop 50/50, because the builder had made no such request, and no such agreement was in place. The Court also criticised the haphazard nature of the lower court's decision, which made it difficult to decipher between the joint assets of the appellant and deceased, and other items/property. Accordingly, the Court provided a new decision to replace that of the lower court, attending to those deficiencies.

Dahlan Sani Bin M. Zen passed away in 1971. His wife, Nurdencis Binti Atim, one of his beneficiaries under his will, passed away in 2006, leaving their son Masrizal Sani (respondent) as sole beneficiary.

The Sinabang Shari'a Court (lower court) stipulated as joint assets of the two deceased six separate parcels of land. Half of that estate became the property of Nurdencis Binti Atim, and the other half that of the respondent. The respondent was also bequeathed seven-eighths of Dahlan Sani Bin M. Zen's remaining property (tirkah), while Nurdencis Binti Atim was bequeathed one-eighth.

After Dahlan Sani Bin M. Zen's passing, Nurdencis Binti Atim married Khairuddin Den Bin Zinuddin Joyo (first appellant), with whom she had a house. Upon her passing, half of that house was devised to her beneficiaries: the respondent and second-sixth appellants. So too were half of her joint assets with Dahlan Sani Bin M. Zen, and one-eighth of Dahlan Sani Bin M. Zen's remaining property. Accordingly, the Court stipulated that the respondent was to receive two-ninths of his deceased mother's property, while the second-sixth appellants received one-ninth if they were female, and two-ninths if they were male.

The Court upheld the decision of the lower court.

T bin I, his wife Z binti Y, and two of their children, M (son) and R (daughter), all perished in the tsunami of 26 December 2004. T bin I had stipulated as his beneficiaries his daughters R binti T (first respondent), S binti T (second respondent), and his sister SA binti T (respondent). T bin I's estate comprised four parcels of land. The Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court) found that two-thirds of T bin I's estate was to be devised to the appellants, while the respondent was to receive the remainder. The lower court also declared the securities over the four parcels of land to be valid.

The Court did not concur with the judgment of the lower court, stating that while there are children (either male or female), the entitlement of any siblings to the estate of the deceased is precluded. The Court also declared the securities over the parcels of land to be invalid.

A female Muslim police officer, Kimberlie Webb, sued the City of Philadelphia under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, alleging religion- and gender-based discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the City barring her from wearing a headscarf (ḥijāb) with her police uniform, and argued that the prohibition amounted to a failure to accommodate her right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. The City argued that the bar was consistent with Philadelphia Police Directive 78 and that allowing her to wear religious garb would cause an undue burden on the City and the Police Department, in that it would compromise a look of cohesiveness and uniformity among officers. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to exhaust internal remedies regarding her claim of gender discrimination and found the bar on the headscarf to be a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the Court upheld the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, granting the City’s motion for summary judgment.

A Muslim female teacher sued her former employer, the Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia, as well as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. The defendant school board argued that it suspended and ultimately fired the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania Garb Statue (Public Law No. 282) when she refused to remove her headscarf while teaching. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found in favor of the defendant Commonwealth, but against the School Board. The Third Circuit affirmed the decision against the Commonwealth but reversed the decision against the School Board, holding that, while the statute may present conflicts with the First Amendment, to bring a claim under Title VII, as the plaintiff did, requires proving that the accommodation would not be an undue burden for the employer. The Court further held that allowing teachers to wear religious garb would be an example of an undue burden, as it threatens the religious neutrality of the public school system. The Court upheld the conclusion of the District Court that “the Commonwealth was not [plaintiff’s] employer within the meaning of Title VII."

The applicant submitted that he had married a woman by the name of L binti M on 11 June 2013, with whom he had two children. One of his children was already married, while the other was aged 15 years and 4 months (born on 2 February 1998). The applicant's second child had requested the applicant's permission to marry her fiance, and the applicant had granted his permission because he considered his child already an adult and in love with her fiance, who was 25 years and 10 months of age (born on 26 August 1988). Moreover, the applicant's child and her fiance had known each other for three months, and the applicant was concerned his daughter and her fiance would soon consummate their relationship regardless. The applicant had already requested the permission of the head of his local Office of Religious Affairs, but the application had been dismissed on 11 June 2013.

The applicant, therefore, filed an application with the court for a judicial determination granting his daughter permission to marry as a minor. In acceding to the application, the court, pursuant to art 7(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, acknowledged that the applicant's daughter was not the required 16 years of age a female must be before she can marry. On the facts, however, the court acknowledged that the applicant's daughter and her fiance were already emotionally dependent on one another, were engaged, and that there were no other bars to their marriage. The requirements for marriage dispensation contained in arts 7(2), 8 and 9 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 15(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and the elucidation of art 49(2) and (3) of Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006 and Law No. 50 of 2009, had, therefore, been met.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Djibouti (Republique de Djibouti/Jumhuriyat Jibuti), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Djibouti's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status. 

The plaintiffs stated that Amaq Sidin and Inaq Sidin (husband and wife) had passed away in 1983 and 1986 respectively, and were survived by their five children and beneficiaries (three sons and two daughters):

1. Sidin bin Amaq Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi), who passed away in 1980, was married to Inaq Kidi, who also passed away in 1985. They were survived by three children:

• Kidi, who passed away in 2008, and was survived by three of her own children (14th, 15th and 16th plaintiffs);
• Mendur bin Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi) (first plaintiff);
• Sriti binti Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi) (second defendant);
• Nawati binti Amaq Mundri, who passed away in 1990, and was survived by her three children (eighth-tenth plaintiffs);
• Idaniati binti Amaq mundri (11th plaintiff);
• Ayuni binti Amaq Mundri (12th plaintiff); and
• Ariantini binti Amaq Mundri (13th plaintiff).

1. Cili (alias Inaq Saidi binti Amaq Sidin), who passed away in 2003, was married to Amaq Saidi, and was survived by seven children, two of whom had passed away (third-seventh plaintiffs);
2. Amaq Rusdi bin Amaq Sidin (first defendant);
3. Amaq Mugasih bin Amaq Sidin (second defendant);
4. Marike (alias Inaq Mundri binti Amaq Sidin), who passed away in 1982, having married Amaq Mundri in 1980, who had also passed away, was survived by:

• Nawati binti Amaq Mundri, who passed away in 1990, and was survived by her three children (eighth-tenth plaintiffs);
• Idaniati binti Amaq mundri (11th plaintiff);
• Ayuni binti Amaq Mundri (12th plaintiff); and
• Ariantini binti Amaq Mundri (13th plaintiff).

Amaq Sidin and Inaq Sidin left to their beneficiaries three plantations, two rice padis, and one coil made of pure gold with an estimated worth of IDR 1 billion. The plaintiffs claimed that, following the passing of Amaq and Inaq Sidin, the land and gold coil had remained in the possesion of the defendants as the deceaseds' sons, without being distributed among the other worthy beneficiaries. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants had sold several portions of the bequeathed land to the co-defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiffs requested that the court distribute the assets of the deceased pursuant to Islamic inheritance law (hukum faraidl), that those portions of the aforementioned land already sold be included as part of the assets of the deceased, that a caveat be placed on that land not yet transferred to any third party, and that the plaintiffs' case be prioritised over any other related proceedings already on foot.

In enforcing the rights of the children of those beneficiaries who had passed away prior to Amaq and Inaq Sidin, the court cited arts 74(1) and 85(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which permits the children of a deceased beneficiary to assume their entitlement. Moreover, the court noted that male children were entitled to twice the share of female children, per art 176 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court stipulated as beneficiaries the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs their share of the assets of Amaq and Inaq Sidin, as it had outlined and quantified, and ordered the defendants to auction parts or all of the properties if such a transfer was not physically feasible. It also ordered the defendants to pay court costs (IDR 2,371,000).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the State of Qatar (Dawlat Qatar), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Qatar's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is a primary source of legislation. 

Ibn Ḥārith al-Khushanī recorded the following case as a ḥikāya, an anonymous report: A Christian appeared before the judge Aslam b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, petitioning to be executed. The anecdote offers insight into the historical role of judges during a period of religious dissent in the Umayyad Caliphate, while the author's narrative voice demonstrates past judicial approaches to rationality, humor, and violent penalization. 

This text is part of Maribel Fierro, The Judges of al-Andalus, forthcoming.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.