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This regional regulation prohibits promiscuity, vagrancy, and begging, stating that such behaviour is contrary to religion, customary norms, and societal culture, as well as constituting a threat to health through the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Specifically, it prohibits any act that facilitates prostitution (art 2). Contravention thereof may result in a fine of up to IDR 10 million, however, fines are issued based on the number of times the person in question has committed such an offence (art 5).

This regional regulation makes provision for the prohibition on prostitution in Lampung Utara (North Lampung), Lampung. Its preambular statement declares that prostitution constitutes behaviour that contravenes religious norms, morality, customs and traditions, and the values of the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology), which act as the foundation for national development. Possible penalties for contravention of this regulation include:

1. a maximum prison sentence of six months;
2. a maximum fine of IDR 5 million;
3. enforced closure of business premises; and
4. distruction of certain items (art 9(1)).

The cassation applicant sought to challenge the decision of the Medan High Religious Court Decision No. 127 of 2015 on the grounds that the Medan High Religious Court had incorrectly applied the law and that its reasoning was not based on legitimate and sufficient grounds. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the non-issuance of a building permit (Izin Mendirikan Bangunan) did not constitute a force majeure that could thereby release the cassation applicant from his obligations pursuant to the agreement.

Discriminatory treatment to African-American Muslim inmates in a Californian correctional facility was deemed lawful under the laws and Constitution of the State of California. The Californian Supreme Court, while taking note of the correctional officials' acknowledgement of discriminatory treatment by refusing to grant Muslim inmates the same privileges to worship, nevertheless deemed this lawful and not violative of petitioners' freedom of religion, as the requests by Muslim inmates were found to be assertive in nature and against the well-functioning of the correctional institution.

The parties were previously married and had sought a ruling from the Lhokseumawe Shari'a Court in regards to what constituted joint assets as acquired during the time of their marriage.

The Lhoksemawe Shari'a Court had determined which assets were joint assets, and these included two vehicles (one for which money was still owed), several plots of land, a house, and credit card debt owed to Bank Rakyat Indonesia.

Despite restipulating many of the same joint assets as the lower court, the Court rendered the ruling of the lower court null and void and adjudicated on its own. It found that some evidence provided did not constitute a sworn statement, rendering an allegation that the respondent had a debt of IDR 15 million to be inadmissible. The Court also found that the lower court had erred in not declaring a home a joint asset, despite the appellant stating as much.

In preambular statement (c), this regional regulation states that begging constitutes a mental illness or laziness not in accordance with religious teachings, while sexual promiscuity constitutes conduct that is contrary to social and religious norms, that endangers young lives, and increases the spread of HIV/AIDS. Accordingly, the regulation prohibits vagrancy and begging en masse or alone, with the intent to engender pity in others (art 2(1)). Moreover, it prohibits the equipping of other persons, including babies and infants, to beg (art 2(2)). It also prohibits prostitution and sexual promiscuity (arts 5, 6 and 8). Violation of arts 5, 6 or 8 carries a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment or IDR 1 million (art 11(1)).

This fatwa states that Islam shariatises medical treatment as it constitutes a part of disease prevention. Medical treatment may not contravene shari'a, while medicine used for the purposes of medical treatment must use holy and halal ingredients. The fatwa requests that the government ensure such halal medicine is readily available, and implores business operators to have regard for halal components in medicine and not to assume that using medicine implies the patient's condition is an emergency. It also requests that authorities not certify as halal medicine containing forbidden (haram) or unclean (najis) ingredients, and implores people to always use holy and halal medicine.

In its preambular statement, this regional regulation states that prostitution constitutes behaviour that is contrary to religious norms, legal norms, and morality, which has a negative impact on the pillars of society. Moreover, that prostitution countermeasures require efforts to prevent, surveil, rehabilitate, and control perpetrators, as well as efforts to restore societal cultural noble values that are orderly, secure, religious, and dynamic. Accordingly, all persons in the regency are prohibited from soliciting prostitution or operating a brothel (art 2(1) and (2)). Similarly, all persons are prohibited from encouraging or coercing another person into soliciting prostitution (art 3(1)). All persons are also prohibited from making any public display of affection (art 3(3)). Contravention of any of the provisions contained in this regulation carries a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment or a fine of IDR 50 million (art 9(1)).

In preambular statement (b), this regional regulation states that Qur'anic literacy education constitutes a Muslim societal life activity in North Penajam Paser regency (Penajam Paser Utara), making it necessary to standardise the licensing of Qur'anic literacy teachers. The aim of this regulation is to improve Qur'anic comprehension and competency in all Muslims, starting from the age of pre-school (arts 3 and 4). Accordingly, it makes it compulsory for all primary, middle, and high school students to possess Qur'anic literacy skills (art 8(1)). Every middle school and high school is obliged to make intra-curricular efforts to improve the Qur'anic literacy of those of its students who are not yet literate in the Qur'an (art 8(2)).

This fatwa states that, in Islam, a child is born in a holy state, free from sin, even if born of adultery. The fatwa acknowledges Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No. 46 of 2010 that granted children born out of wedlock the same status as that of children born of parents in wedlock.

The fatwa states, however, that a child born of adultery does not have a relationship with its father or father's family, but does with its mother and mother's family. The child does not bear the sin of its parents, who are to be punished (hadd) by the authorised parties. The government is authorised to hand down a ta'zir punishment to compel the male adulterer to cover the child's needs and provide the child with some form of inheritance in his will (wasiat wajibah). This ta'zir punishment is designed to afford the child some protection; not to legitimise the relationship between the father and child.

The fatwa also recommends that the People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and government legislate to ensure severe punishments for adultery as a deterrent, as well as to ensure that children born of adultery are afforded the necessary protections a father should provide his child. The fatwa requests that the government facilitate with ease the provision of birth certificates to children born of adultery, but not to legitimise the relationship between the father and child. The fatwa also obliges the government to educate society so as children born of adultery are not discriminated against, but are treated like any other child.

The preamble of this regional regulation acknowledges the constitutional guarantee to freedom of religion, states that the realisation and implementation of Islamic teachings are reflected in the clothes people wear in everyday life, that covering one's aurat (genitals and other parts of the body Islam requires to be covered) is obligatory in Islam, and that communal life that reflects Islam, and efforts to realise a faithful and God-fearing society, requires the implementation of this Regulation.

The regulation mandates that people must wear Muslim dress in government and private-sector offices, state and private schools, universities, educational and non-educational institutions, and at official events. The general public is also encouraged to wear Muslim dress in everyday life, including at general entertainment events.

Men are required to wear long trousers, with either a long- or short-sleeve shirt, while women are required to wear a long-sleeve shirt covering their hips, a skirt or long trousers that reaches the top of their feet, as well as a headscarf that covers their hair, ears, neck, and chest. None of these clothes are to be tight-fitting.

For Muslim students, boys are to wear long trousers, with either a long- or short-sleeve shirt. Girls are to wear a long-sleeve shirt that covers their hips and chest and reaches their knees, a skirt or long trousers that reaches the top of their feet, as well as a headscarf that covers their hair, ears, neck, and chest. Again, none of these clothes are to be tight-fitting.

This challenge to the validity of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 on the Surveillance and Control of Alcoholic Beverages was submitted by Front Pembela Islam (FPI - the Islamic Defenders' Front), represented by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, the founder and chairperson of FPI, and KH. Ahmad Sabri Lubis, the secterary-general of FPI.

The applicant cited several teachings from the Qur'an and Hadith, the Holy Bible, and Buddhism that prohibit the consumption of alcohol, as well as Hinduism, which discourages excessive consumption of alcohol. As a state based on the principle of One Almighty God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa), the applicant submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 should, therefore, be invalidated for contradicting the religious values contained in Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution because not one religion in Indonesia permitted or deemed halal the consumption of any alcoholic beverage. The applicant also cited the physical effects alcohol consumption can have on people, as well as other people who may fall victim to alcohol-induced theft, battery, abuse, rape, and even murder.

The applicant also submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 was contrary to several national statutes, including arts 46 and 47 of Law No. 36 of 2009 on Health. This was because the decree only categorised alcohol rather than prohibiting it, while the detrimental effect alcohol can have on health repudiates the aim of arts 46 and 47, which is to improve the health of Indonesian citizens.

The court questioned whether the applicant believed its rights and/or authority had suffered because of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997. It also questioned whether the applicant believed it had suffered any specific and actual loss or could potentially suffer any loss, and whether or not there was a causal relationship between that loss and the decree it was seeking to impugn. The court found in the applicant's favour in this regard, granting it the requisite legal standing. It then acceded to the application but did so on the grounds that several of the statutes that constituted the legal basis for Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 were no longer valid laws themselves.

This document is the first draft of Criminal Procedure Bill prepared and adopted by the parliament and sent to the Guardian Council for review.

The plaintiff’s legal counsel asserted that, on 24 August 2011, the plaintiff (deceased) and defendant (Bank BRI Syari’ah Cabang Surabaya) entered into a financing agreement (Al Qardh) to enable the plaintiff to purchase precious metals. Articles 1 and 2 of the agreement stated that the defendant would lend to the plaintiff IDR 95.4 million to be used to purchase 200 grams of gold from the precious metals company Antam. The gold was valued at IDR 106 million, and required a down payment of IDR 10.6 million. Pursuant to art 3 of the agreement, the plaintiff was required to repay the defendant in instalments of IDR 1,590,000, over a period of 60 months (until 24 August 2016). Upon repayment of two instalments, the plaintiff was then entitled to a cash back incentive, notably after repaying the first three instalments, as well as the twelfth instalment. Article 5(1) of the agreement also specified that to guarantee the return of the monies loaned, the plaintiff was to use the 200 grams of gold as collateral. To ensure the gold was cared for and stored for the period of the loan, the plaintiff paid to the defendant a monthly fee of IDR 1,033,500, making his total monthly repayments IDR 2,623,500.

The plaintiff successfully made these repayments for 29 months (until January 2014), while the defendant upheld its end of the bargain by paying to the plaintiff the cash back incentives up until November 2013, after which it defaulted. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to act in good faith, providing a variety of reasons to postpone the payment of the cash back incentives. The plaintiff paid to the defendant the remainder of his debt owing (IDR 49,290,000 as of 7 February 2014), hoping that the defendant would then repay to the plaintiff all its cash back incentives. The defendant, however, continued to provide the plaintiff with reasons as to why it could not uphold its end of the bargain. Finally, on 23 May 2014, the defendant paid to the plaintiff the cash back for January 2014 (IDR 912,925) and March 2014 (IDR 981,825) totalling IDR 1,894,750.  The plaintiff told the court he had instigated proceedings to recoup the unpaid cash back incentives totalling IDR 21,893,175. The plaintiff also objected to the defendant unlawfully debiting the plaintiff’s bank account for IDR 3,100,500 when the principal debt had been repaid. The defendant claimed that this debit was to cover the plaintiff’s ijarah (fee) for February 2014, in addition to a fine equal to two months’ ijarah, resulting from the plaintiff repaying the entire principal. The plaintiff, however, claimed that the debit was clearly unlawful and in contravention of arts 2(3) and 4(1)(c) of the ijarah agreement, which stated that the ijarah period concluded when the gold/items being stored and cared for by the defendant no longer constituted a surety and had been returned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought actual damages to the value of IDR 52,044,637, as well as compensatory damages to the value of IDR 1 billion for pain and suffering. For every day the defendant failed to pay after the seven day deadline he sought the court to enforce, the plaintiff requested that the defendant pay a one per cent fine. Moreover, if the defendant was unable to pay the damages sought by the plaintiff, the plaintiff recommended that the court order it to sell a property it owned and pay the damages from the proceeds of the sale. The plaintiff also recommended the court hand down judgment, the implementation of which could not be delayed if the defendant sought to appeal the decision.

The defendant lodged an exception to the plaintiff’s case, stating that the court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. The defendant argued that art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking permits parties to specify in an agreement their preferred mode of dispute resolution, which does not have to be a religious court, that being a state court or arbitration body. It argued that the parties’ express desire, as stated in art 12 of the agreement, was to resolve any disputes relating to the agreement before the National Shari’a Arbitration Board (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional – Basyarnas), if initial discussions and deliberation (musyawarah) were unsuccessful. Moreover, that any decision made by Basyarnas was first and final. The defendant also cited art 59 of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, which acknowledges arbitration as a final and binding form of civil dispute resolution, based on a written agreement by the parties to the dispute. In the event one of the parties to a dispute does not abide by the ruling of the arbiter, art 59(3) enables the other party to lodge an application with the Chief Justice of the state court (Pengadilan Negeri) to compel the non-abiding party to do so. The defendant also noted that the elucidation of art 59(1) defines 'arbitration' as including shari’a arbitration.

In regards to the plaintiff’s principal claim, the defendant retorted that the plaintiff’s calculations in regards to the cash back payments were excessive. It also argued that the monthly instalments owed by the plaintiff were IDR 2,623,500 (this figure comprised IDR 1,590,000 based on the Al-Qard agreement, and IDR 1,033,500 per the ijarah agreement). The defendant asserted that the cash back arrangement derived from the Al-Qard agreement, because it would otherwise have been a violation of the current law and the agreement itself, meaning that it must be calculated based on the ijarah agreement, on the condition the plaintiff paid all repayments for the entire 60 months, without defaulting. For the plaintiff to repay the entire contract price, and then to expect to receive all cash back payments at once, was not what the parties had agreed to in the ijarah agreement. The defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had overpaid the defendant by IDR 2,067,100 when paying out the contract price, and was happy to return the excess monies. In regards to the actual damages sought by the plaintiff, the defendant struggled to understand the plaintiff’s reasoning and calculations. More fascinating, however, was its summation of the IDR 1 billion sought in compensatory damages, which it described as a "fantastic number that fell from the sky" (nilai yang fantastis yang jatuh dari langit) that had no basis.

The court acknowledged that the parties had, in art 12 of the agreement, agreed to resolve any disputes via arbitration. It cited Surat Al-Maidah, verse 1, which encourages Muslims to uphold the agreements they make, as well as art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), which requires parties to an agreement to treat that agreement as law, and art 4(1) and (2) of Law No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, which permits parties to agree to arbitration as their preferred mode of dispute resolution. In regards to the Constitutional Court’s (No. 93/PUU-X/2012) decision regarding the elucidation of art 55(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008, and vesting in the religious judiciary absolute jurisdiction over shari’a banking cases, the court said it needed to consider the opinion of Prof Dr Laica Marzuki, former Supreme Court and Constitutional Court Justice, that Constitutional Court judgments have no retroactive application, but are prospectively binding. As the parties had reached their agreement on 21 August 2011, the court found that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was inapplicable and, therefore, the parties were bound by the contents of the agreement.

The parties were married on 15 March 2008 and had two children. Initially, the marriage had been harmonious. The plaintiff submitted, however, that, since January 2011, it had become quarrelsome because the defendant:

1. had a gambling addiction and would return home in the middle of the night;
2. had confessed to the plaintiff that he had had extra-marital affairs with other women; and
3. rarely provided for the plaintiff and their children.

In January 2011, the plaintiff left the matrimonial home and returned to her parents' home, remaining there for the time leading up to the proceeding. During this time the parties rarely communicated, leading the plaintiff to file for divorce.

The defendant conceded that the majority of the plaintiff's submissions were true. He qualified, however, that he had had an extra-marital affair upon becoming very emotional seeing the plaintiff being picked up by another man driving an Avanza. The plaintiff acknowledged this but stated the other man was only a friend.

The court, pursuant to s 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and s 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra) and, accordingly, acceded to the plaintiff's application.

The parties were married on 21 May 2010 and had one child. The applicant submitted that after two months, on 14 July 2010, the parties had quarrelled but were still living together. After the birth of the parties' child in January 2011, the parties had begun to quarrel frequently. By February 2011 the parties had begun to argue on a daily basis, prompting the applicant to leave the parties' home. Accordingly, the applicant sought the court's permission to divorce the respondent (talak satu raj'i).

The court acknolwedged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 15 January 1998 and had one adopted child. They had also lived with the plaintiff's parents for approximately 20 years. Not long after they were married the parties began to quarrel regularly. The plaintiff submitted that this was because of the defendant's alcoholic tendencies, as well as the fact that she had to bear all financial responsibilities, including those associated with the parties' adopted child. Problems escalated in 2008 when the defendant forced the plaintiff's adopted child out of the plaintiff's parents' home, causing the plaintiff great emotional suffering. The defendant then left the plaintiff, the parties remaining separated up until the time of the proceeding. The plaintiff had subsequently searched Bau-Bau in an attempt to ascertain the defendant's whereabouts but had been unsuccessful. In 2008, the plaintiff also moved to Ambon to live with her aunt.

The plaintiff filed for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) with the court. Despite the defendant's absence from court, the court acknowledged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The plaintiff submitted that he had obtained a working capital borrowing facility from the first defendant, but that he had never received a copy of the agreement, despite making repeated requests to the first defendant. The conduct of the first defendant was therefore, the plaintiff submitted, in contravention of art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), and constituted a default on the parties' agreement. As a result, the plaintiff did not know when the agreement concluded nor the details of the repayments he was required to make in favour of the first defendant. Accordingly, the plaintiff submitted that he could not be held solely responsible if he failed to make a repayment pursuant to the agreement because the defendant had deliberately concealed the agreement from the plaintiff, contrary to art 1320 of the Civil Code.

When the plaintiff fell into arrears, the first defendant sought to auction the security property leveraged by the plaintiff to secure the loan. The plaintiff submitted, however, that the first defendant had failed to issue him with a warning before auctioning the property.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application due to several formulaic errors contained therein. First, the plaintiff had failed to identify a legal or legislative basis to establish a legal relationship between the parties. Secondly, the plaintiff's provisional prayer for relief (petitum provisi), prayer for relief (petitum), and outline of claim (posita) differed insofar as the outline of claim defined the defendant's conduct as a default, while the provisional prayer for relief sought the suspension of the auction of the property, and the prayer for relief declared the property lawful and of value. More importantly, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to include in its claim the Office of State Assets and Auction Services (Kantor Pelayanan Kekayaan Negara dan Lelang) as a co-defendant.

The parties were married on 9 September 1996 and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome early on for reasons unbeknownst to the plaintiff. The defendant would often become intoxicated and physically beat the plaintiff, as well as leave the parties' home for days on end. In February 2006, the defendant finally left the plaintiff and their two children. As a result, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The defendant responded to the plaintiff's submissions, submitting that the plaintiff had already married another man in July 2010, and questioning whether or not Islamic law permitted a woman to marry another man before her husband had first divorced her. The defendant conceded that the parties quarrelled frequently but reasoned that it was common for married couples to do so. Moreover, that the reason the parties quarrelled as frequently as they did was that the plaintiff would often leave the parties' home, leaving behind their two children for days on end. The defendant also conceded that he had physically beaten the plaintiff when in an intoxicated state but justified it on the grounds that the plaintiff would frequently leave the parties' home to fraternise with other men.

In response to the plaintiff's submission that the defendant had left the plaintiff and their children in mid-February 2006, the defendant responded that he had commenced work in West Seram regency on 1 February 2000, and that every time he had returned home on a weekend the plaintiff was never there. In actual fact, the defendant submitted, it was the plaintiff who had left the parties' home from mid-2008 until 31 January 2011, evidenced by the fact the plaintiff had been renting a room in Ambon with the man she subsequently married. Moreover, the parties' children had been living with the defendant's parents. The defendant submitted that he was surprised to learn, when he returned home on 1 Feburary 2011, that the plaintiff had filed for divorce. He also submitted that it was unfeasible for the plaintiff to expect the defendant to maintain his spousal obligations to the plaintiff when she had been carrying on extra-marital affairs with other men before re-marrying.

The court acknowledged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(b) and (f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) and (f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds that the parties had been separated for more than two consecutive years, and ongoing conflict.

The deceased, who passed away on 18 January 2007, was survived by his second wife (respondent), as well as his first wife and children (first-eighth appellants). One of the primary issues of the dispute concerned the marriage status of the respondent to the deceased.

In overturning the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), the Court found that, pursuant to art 38 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, if the deceased had wanted to repudiate his marriage to the respondent, he needed to have filed for divorce prior to his passing. Moreover, a marriage is formally repudiated by filing for repudiation with the Religious Court/Shari'a Court, pursuant to art 25 of Law No. 1 of 1974, arts 37 and 38 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 74(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The deceased had never followed such procedure to repudiate his marriage to the respondent.

Even if he had successfully repudiated his marriage to the respondent, the Court noted that the deceased's legal relationship to the respondent and their children (all three of whom were underage) would not cease, as per arts 75 and 76 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and art 28 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' argument that the decision of the Banda Aceh State Court regarding the falsification of the respondent's marriage certificate was grounds for repudiation of her marriage to the deceased.

The Court found that for the first appellant, with whom the deceased had acquired property before he married the respondent, one-half of that property became the first appellant's, as well as one-third of the property the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent. The same could be said of what constituted the property of the deceased, viz. one-half of what the deceased had acquired while married to the first appellant, and one-third of what the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent.