Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts

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Chapter Six

The Judge and the judge: The Heavenly and Earthly Court of Justice in Early Islam

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M. M. Bravmann once noted that in Qurʾānic descriptions of the divine judgment at the end of time, God is conceived in terms akin to a pre-Islamic Arab king, enjoying absolute liberty to punish or forgive.[1] The aim of the following investigation is to test the hypothesis that the Sunnī exegetes of the early centuries of Islam (second–sixth/eighth–twelfth centuries) sought to contain this issue by framing the imagery of the heavenly court in ways that made it look like an orderly courtroom on earth. That is, the early exegetes seem to have entertained, and at times even stressed, certain commonalities in the spatial and procedural protocol followed in both the heavenly and the earthly court. This, ultimately, served the dual purpose of checking the latent threat inherent in conceptualizations of both the heavenly and the earthly judge as unaccountable institutions of judicial power.

Scholars of Islamic law in the West often emphasize that Muslim thinkers of all periods were keenly aware of the fundamental incommensurability of the two systems of justice, earthly and otherworldly. Thus, in the widely cited *Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān*, one reads in the entry on "Justice and Injustice" that Islamic law "largely" maintains "a separation between divine and human justice." The entry further explains that "the Islamic judge was only to render justice on the basis of the apparent evidence, and was not responsible for the actual truth of a case, since ultimately the plaintiffs were responsible to God."[2] By contrast,

1 M. M. Bravmann, "Allah's Liberty to Punish or Forgive," *Der Islam* 47 (1971): 236–37.

2 Jonathan Brockopp, "Justice and Injustice," in *EQ,* 3:73a. For a summary of this position, see Baber Johansen, "The Muslim *Fiqh* as a Sacred Law," in *Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 1–76, esp. 23–24.

God, the ultimate Judge, renders justice on the basis of His encompassing knowledge, which ensues from from His cognizance of people's thoughts and intentions. According to the Qurʾānic verse, God is "the knower of what is hidden and what is apparent: *ʿālimu al-ghaybi waʾl-shahāda*" (Q. 59:23). The knowledge available to judges on earth, by contrast, is essentially deficient and of uncertain epistemological status. As Mathieu Tillier, in the most searching study to date of the relationship between the earthly and heavenly courtroom in early Islam, aptly puts it:

> The divine courtroom is not the mere reproduction of an earthly one. Beyond the theological reasons which could explain the absence of God's physical representation in these reports, procedures followed at the divine court are ontologically different to those prescribed by earthly courts. Whereas a Muslim judge must rely on external evidence such as testimonies and oaths that can be misleading, God's all-embracing knowledge allows him to judge rightly and immediately, without need for any further evidence.[3]

To quote a topical passage from an early Muslim source,

> the [earthly] judge judges on the basis of what he thinks and what the witnesses testify. The judge is a human being who either errs or hits the right mark (*yakhṭiʾu wa-yuṣīb*). Know that the case (*khuṣūma*) of the one who was judged wrongly remains unresolved until God brings both [litigants] together on the Day of Judgment and judges in favor of the one who is right, against the one who is wrong, giving the former a bigger compensation than that received by the latter on earth.[4]

It is not difficult to list more features that distinguish the Judge from the judge. For example, the article on "Justice and Injustice" in the *Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān* asserts that "court punishments in Islam are not in lieu of eternal punishment."[5] The idea that human justice is fundamentally contingent, while divine justice is transcendent and perfect, also explains why the Judge is free to disregard evidence when He deems it appropriate, and why restrictions in this regard are imposed on the judge. God's mercy as a judge of humankind is a paramount motif in Muslim eschatological literature.

3 Mathieu Tillier, "The Qāḍī before the Judge: The Social Use of Eschatology in Muslim Courts," in *The Divine Courtroom in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Ari Mermelstein et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 266.

4 Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān*, ed. ʿAlī ʿĀshūr (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2011), 2:221 (*ad* Q. 2:188: *wa-lā taʾkulū amwālahum baynakum bil-bāṭil* [from Qatāda]).

5 Brockopp, "Justice and Injustice," 73b.

According to the famous divine saying (*ḥadīth qudsī*), God's mercy precedes His wrath. By contrast, mercy (and for that matter, wrath), ostensibly have no place in the earthly court; the normative literature regulating the judge's etiquette (*adab*) stipulates that the *qāḍī* must show *apatheia* and keep his cool at all times.[6] One might also note that the heavenly court officials are beyond reproach. The angels who act as witnesses (*shuhūd*) in the heavenly court, as well as the two angels who write down a person's actions, clearly fulfill the condition of honesty (*ʿadāla*), and therefore God-the-judge, unlike judges on earth, does not need to make inquiries into their trustworthiness.

In sum, the differences between the Judge and the judge, and between the heavenly and the mundane court, seem abundantly clear and in fact, categorical. This does not mean, however, that it is pointless to study the commonalities and overlaps between the two courts. No attempt is made here to cast doubt on, let alone refute, scholarly assessments that highlight the heterogeneity of the divine and the earthly courtroom. What is suggested, rather, is that these differences should be considered as being generally affirmed, but not always experienced as such in people's minds or indeed acted upon in practice. This invites a certain shift of perspective. While it is no doubt true that, as Tillier affirms, "the divine courtroom is not the mere reproduction of an earthly one," it is equally correct to state that the divine courtroom is *not only and not exclusively* conceived as a transcendent institution of justice with no connection to the social imagery and judicial mores of judicial courts on earth. As this paper aims to show, in the exegetes' imagination, there was a continuum from earthly to otherworldly justice, in the sense that God did not judge in the manner of an autocratic, unaccountable absolute king, but rather followed, like the judge on earth, certain procedures and rules.

The exegetes of the period under study in this article do not make this continuum the object of their explicit deliberations. It can often appear that, if they feel at all challenged by the Qurʾānic imagery of the heavenly court, it is because of the anthropomorphism with which this imagery is replete (the "theological reasons" alluded to in Tillier's above-quoted statement). Here we face a paradox. For, while the anti-anthropomorphism prevalent in much of Muslim theology militated against descriptions of the heavenly court in terms of the earthly court, a certain conceptual and imaginary overlap between the heavenly and the earthly court, as will be shown in the following text, is in fact observable in the exegetical literature up to the sixth/twelfth century, and, as can safely be surmised, in later

6 See the examples discussed in Maribel Fierro's contribution to the present volume, Chapter 8. Cf. Irene Schneider, *Das Bild des Richters in der "adab al-qāḍī"-Literatur* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1990), 138 and passim.

centuries as well.

In order to substantiate this claim, first we need a good description of the heavenly court on the Day of Judgment as it emerges from a number of sources from the second/eighth to the sixth/twelfth centuries. Although the events surrounding the resurrection (*qiyāma*), gathering (*ḥashr*), and reckoning (*ḥisāb*) constitute important chapters in works of Muslim eschatology (*ʿulūm al-ākhira*), occupying the place right between the apocalypse on the one hand and paradise and hell on the other hand, they have only been studied in perfunctory fashion by scholars of Islamic religious history.[7] Dedicated studies of the form and function of the eschatological court of justice appear altogether to be lacking. Aspects of this court that deserve study concern its spatial organization (its publicness, the position of the Judge, and other spatial coordinates), its procedural law (the questioning of the accused, the use of written evidence, as well as of witness testimony), and its personnel (the heavenly court enforcers, scribes, certified witnesses, as well as the Judge Himself).

In what follows, these elements of the heavenly court scene shall be described. The panoramic view that results from this exercise is based on two kinds of textual sources: (1) exegetical works (*tafsīr*s), written by scholars who were, for the most part, jurists as well as Qurʾān commentators, such as Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), Samarqandī (d. 373/983), Thaʿlabī (d. 427/1035), Māwardī (d. 450/1058), and Baghawī (d. 516/1122);[8] and (2) compilations of eschatological *ḥadīth*s and hortatory works that include relevant sections on the events of the resurrection by the likes of Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), Samarqandī, and Qurṭubī (d. 671/1272).[9] Next to unfolding a phenomenology of the heavenly court in early Sunnī literature, the following discussion also serves to identify salient overlaps with the representations

7 Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad provide one of the most thorough overviews. See their *The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 76–78.

8 See generally Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*; Abū al-Layth Naṣr b. Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, *Baḥr al-ʿulūm*, ed. Maḥmūd Maṭrajī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.); Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Thaʿlabī, *al-Kashf waʾl-bayān ʿan tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, ed. Abū Muḥammad b. ʿĀshūr (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2002); Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *al-Nukat waʾl-ʿuyūn*, ed. Ibn ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1992); and al-Ḥusayn b. Masʿūd al-Baghawī, *Maʿālim al-tanzīl*, ed. Muḥammd ʿAbdallāh al-Nimr et al. (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṭība, 1997).

9 See generally al-Ḥārith b. Asad al-Muḥāsibī, *al-Baʿth waʾl-nushūr*, ed. Muḥammad ʿĪd Riḍwān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406/1987); Muḥāsibī, *Kitāb al-Tawahhum*, ed. and trans. André Roman (Paris: Librairie Klincksieck, 1978); Abū al-Layth Naṣr b. Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn*, ed. Haytham Khalīfa al-Ṭuʿaymī (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1427/2006); and Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, *al-Tadhkira fī aḥwāl al-mawtā wa-umūr al-ākhira*, ed. Yūsuf ʿAlī Badīwī (Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1999). Gavin Picken has cast doubt on Muḥāsibī's authorship of *al-Baʿth waʾl-nushūr*, but Josef van Ess has disagreed, leaning in the direction of attributing the work to Muḥāṣibī. See van Ess, "Review Picken, *Spiritual Purification*," *Ilahiyat Studies* 2, no. 1 (2011): 126–32, esp. 131.

of earthly courts in the chronicles and legal literature of early Islam.

SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE HEAVENLY COURT

After their resurrection, people are ushered to the "open grounds of the resurrection" (*ʿaraṣāt al-qiyāma*). The word *ʿaraṣa* designates any kind of publicly accessible, unroofed space used for gathering (as in a public square in the middle of a *sūq*). On the *ʿaraṣāt al-qiyāma* the first vision of God-the-judge takes place, as God manifests Himself (*yatajallā*), and the *ʿaraṣāt* "are enlightened by His light."[10] God, in other words, is fully public. The exegetical passages that detail the *ʿaraṣāt al-qiyāma* revolve around a number of verses, especially the one that states that "God will come to them in canopies of clouds (*fī ẓulalin min al-ghamām*), together with the angels" (Q. 2:210). What kind of *ẓulla* (sg. of *ẓulal*) is meant here? Ṭabarī notes the opinion that the clouds are like arches (*ṭāqāt*), and that God is "in" (*fī*) them, while being surrounded (*maḥfūf*) by angels.[11] In this view, the *ẓulla* is a kind of "canopy" or "awning." The issue here is whether God is visible or not. Anti-anthropomorphic interpretations deny this. Thus, Thaʿlabī reports the opinion that *fī ẓulal*^{in} *min al-ghamām* means that God is "inside a cover (*fī sutra*) of clouds, so that the people of the earth do not look at Him"[12]—the idea being that God is shrouded in clouds, in "something like white fog."[13] Others suggest that *ẓulal* means "shadows," which serves the same idea, that is, making God invisible or barely visible. This, however, does not seem to have been the dominant position. Baghawī, the latest of the exegetes studied here, is clear in his insistence that *ẓulal* means "canopies, awnings," not "shrouds" or "shadows,"[14] and his view finds support in the classical dictionaries, which generally hold that *ẓulal* is the plural of *ẓulla* ("a thing that covers one, overhead") not of *ẓill* ("shadow," pl. *ẓilāl*).[15]

The Qurʾān announces that on the Day of Judgment, when the heaven splits asunder, "the angels will be on its borders (*ʿalā arjāʾihā*) and above them eight will carry the throne of your Lord" (Q. 69:19). The commentators elaborate that God orders the angels of the lower heaven to

10 Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 8:287 (and Q. 39:69: *ashraqati ʾl-arḍa bi-nūri rabbihā*). See also Baghawī, *Maʿālim*, *Tafsīr*, 7:132. See further Qurṭubī, *Tadhkira*, 1:384, in an explanation of the expression *yawm al-talāqī* ("Day of Meeting").

11 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 2:397 (from Ibn ʿAbbās).

12 Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 2:128 (from Ḥasan al-Baṣrī).

13 Baghawī, *Maʿālim*, 1:241: *ka-hayʾat al-ḍabāb*, *abyaḍ*.

14 Ibid.

15 See Edward William Lane, *Arabic-English Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1863), 1:1916b.

descend to the earth and surround it and all those on it, then the angels of the other heavens follow, thus creating concentric rings (*ṣaff dūna ṣaff*). "Then the Sublime King (*al-malik al-aʿlā*) descends. On his left flank is Jahannam. When the people of the earth see it, they cry out."[16] It is also related that the resurrected, terrorized by the appearance of the hell-monster Jahannam, try to flee the scene, but are repelled by the rows of angels surrounding them. Samarqandī reports that the angels of the lowest heaven surround the earth, then the angels of each successive heaven descend and form concentric rings around them, "until there are seven rows (*ṣufūf*) of angels, enclosing one another in their midst (*baʿḍuhum fī jawf baʿḍ*)."[17]

As noted above, commentators, with the exception of the literalists, are concerned with softening the anthropomorphic impression created by Qurʾānic expressions such as the one that states that God "comes to them" (Q. 2:210). By the third/ninth century, Muslim theology by and large came to settle on the position that the categories of time and space do not apply to God, who is beyond both.[18] Ṭabarī therefore raises the question whether one should understand the expression, "He comes to them," to mean that God appears in the heavenly courtroom in the same way in which an earthly judge appears to the accused. As Ṭabarī explains, this is not the case, but rather, it is as when people say: "We are afraid that the Umayyads will come to us"—that is, people do not expect the Umayyads to come in a literal sense, but only that the Umayyads' command, or judgment (*ḥukm*), will catch up with them. Another parallel, according to Ṭabarī, is "when it is said: 'The ruler (*wālī*) maimed or beat the thief,' but in reality his helpers (*aʿwānuh*) maimed him."[19] Ṭabarī thus underlines the difference between heavenly and earthly justice; however, intriguingly, he also playfully invokes an analogy between the adjudication of mundane rulers and that of the divine king.

As for the spatial organization of the earthly counterpart of the heavenly court, relatively little seems to be known about the early centuries of Islam. The *qāḍī* court, then, was an "undetermined place (*un lieu indéterminé*)."[20] Other than that the judge used to sit, and that he was encouraged to do so in an open, publicly accessible space, little can be

16 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 29:69 (from Ḍaḥḥāk).

17 Samarqandī, *Tanbīh*, 30.

18 For a summary of the development of this position in early Muslim theology, see Baber Johansen, "The Muslim *Fiqh* as a Sacred Law," 7–9; cf. Josef van Ess, *Theologie und Geschichte im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im Islam* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991-1997), 4:410. The issue of God's "aboveness" (*fawqiyya*), dear to Ḥanbalī traditionists, is discussed in a forthcoming article by Livnat Holtzman and Miriam Ovadia.

19 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 2:398. See also, for an extended version of this argument, Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 2:130.

20 Mathieu Tillier, "Un espace judiciaire entre public et privé. Audience de cadis à l'époque ʿabbāside," *Annales islamologiques* 38 (2004): 491–512, esp. 492.

gleaned from the chronicles. In the early centuries, mosques seem to have been used regularly for the séances of judges, even though the Shāfiʿīs came to condemn judges who took their seat in the mosque (out of scruples meant to avoid jeopardizing the sacredness of the space);[21] all schools of law seem to have agreed that the judge can, if he wishes, hold court even in the street. Ibn Ḥajar relates that Ibn Jabr, judge of Egypt at the beginning of the fourth/tenth century, used to convert street corners into judicial courts by simply laying out a carpet and forming a *majlis* (gathering) around it.[22] Such minimal requirements accord with the pithy data about the spatial coordinates of the heavenly court, where no more than a "canopy" (*ẓulla*) demarcates the spot where the Judge is seated. By contrast, descriptions of the audience with God in paradise, on the "Day of Surplus" (*yawm al-mazīd*), are richly detailed.[23] One may infer from this that God-the-king, in the imagination of early Muslim exegetes, is encountered on the *yawm al-mazīd*; however, on the Day of Judgment, he is first and foremost God-the-judge.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE HEAVENLY COURT

Based on the Qurʾānic prophecy that "on that day you will be exposed (*tuʿraḍūna*); no secret of yours will be concealed" (Q. 69:18), the commentators enumerate three different instances of "exposures" or "showings" (ʿ*araḍāt*) of humankind in the heavenly court of justice. Ṭabarī relates from the Companion, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Masʿūd (d. 32/652-3), that these three instances are (1) excuses (*maʿādhīr*), (2) arguments (*khuṣūmāt*), and (3) the flying around of the scrolls (*taṭāyur al-ṣuḥuf*). By contrast, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) is said to have spoken of (1) disputation (*jidāl*), (2) excuses, and (3) the flying around of the scrolls. Finally, from Ḍaḥḥāk (d. 117/735) a combined model is reported, according to which the three ʿ*araḍāt* are (1) arguments and excuses, (2) disputation, and (3) the flying around of the scrolls.[24] The terms *jidāl, khuṣūmāt*, and *maʿādhīr* clearly refer to the litigation between God and the resurrected, describing the trading of arguments between the plaintiff and the accused, in fact, an interrogation, such as one would habitually encounter in a judge's court on

21 Schneider, *Das Bild des Richters*, 50–60.

22 Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Rafʿ al-ʿiṣr ʿan quḍāt Miṣr*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1998), 178. See Tillier, "Espace judiciaire," 493–94; Émile Tyan, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 277.

23 Christian Lange, *Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 152.

24 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 29:71–72.

earth.[25] Samarqandī relates that the resurrected will stand before the Judge, "and you will be asked about what you did letter by letter: *tusʾalūna ʿammā faʿaltum ḥarfan ḥarfan*."[26] The names (*asmāʾ*) of the Day of Resurrection reported by Samarqandī also drive home the point that a detailed verbal confrontation takes places between God-the-judge and the resurrected: Samarqandī names "The Day of Discussion" (*yawm al-munāqasha*), "The Day of Reckoning" (*yawm al-muḥāsaba*), and "The Day of Interrogation" (*yawm al-musāʾala*), among others.[27]

Again, the anthropomorphic implications of this scene motivated a number of exegetical rejoinders. Exegetes sought to soften the impression that what people will be dealing with on the Day of Judgment is some kind of accurate bookkeeper, a pedestrian judge in an ordinary court.[28] Instead, they stressed that the Judge is the almighty God, capable of forgiveness based on His encompassing knowledge. Rather worryingly, the Qurʾān states that not only those who are hell-bound but also the believers will undergo a "reckoning" (*ḥisāb*), although it will be "light" (*yasīr*) and result in the blessed's happy reunion with their families in paradise (Q. 84:7–9). A prophetic *ḥadīth* helped to alleviate any anxiety there may have been. As the Prophet supposedly explained: "This is not a reckoning, it's a [simple] exposure (*ʿarḍ*)." The blessed do not suffer interrogation because, as the *ḥadīth* continues, "[all] those who are interrogated on the Day of Resurrection will be punished."[29] Similarly, Qurṭubī comments that "the disputation (*jidāl*) [only] concerns the enemies [of God]. They dispute because they do not know their Lord. They think that they will be saved if they dispute and put up arguments."[30] The believers, by contrast, do not argue, they only plead for mercy: "The excuses (*maʿādhīr*) are [directed] to God. The Generous One forgives Adam and his progeny…."[31]

At the last exposure, written evidence comes into play, during the "flying back and forth of the scrolls" (*taṭāyur al-ṣuḥuf*). This flying of the scrolls of deeds is not a Qurʾānic motif. The Qurʾān only tells us that

25 Usually, the *khuṣūma* is the "argument" or "lawsuit" of two litigants in front of the judge. See Baber Johansen, "Wahrheit und Geltungsanspruch: Zur Begründung und Begrenzung der Autorität des Qadi-Urteils im islamischen Recht," in *La Giustizia nell'Alto Medieoevo (Secoli IX-XI)*, ed. Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo (Spoleto: Presso la Sede del Centro, 1997), 975–1065, at 1013–15.

26 Samarqandī, *Tanbīh*, 33.

27 Ibid.

28 Cf. Wim Raven, "Reward and Punishment," in *EQ*, 4:451b–461a, at 457b.

29 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 30:143, with variants; and Qurṭubī, *Tadhkira*, 2:37: *laysa dhālika al-ḥisāb, innamā dhālika al-ʿarḍ, wa-lākin man nūqisha al-ḥisāb yawm al-qiyāma ʿudhdhiba.*

30 Qurṭubī, *Tadhkira*, 2:38.

31 Ibid.

those destined for paradise receive their scroll in the right hand, and hence are called the Companions of the Right (*aṣḥāb al-maymana*), while those destined for hell receive their scroll in the left hand, and are therefore called the Companions of the Left (*aṣḥāb al-mashʾama*, see Q. 56:41-56, 69:19, and 69:25). Like the idea of the "scrolls of deeds" (*ṣuḥuf*) itself, the flying of the scrolls is likely to have a Rabbinic background.[32] But how is one to picture the scrolls' fluttering through the air? "All the scrolls," it is explained in a tradition reported by Qurṭubī, "are [stored] under the Throne. At Judgment, God sends wind, and so they are all scattered right and left."[33] The idea here is that, underneath the Judge's seat, there is a cache in which court documents are kept, much in the manner of the *qimṭar* of a *qāḍī*, the box, or satchel, in which he archived relevant pieces of writing.

Once the scrolls are produced from underneath the Judge's throne, they are put to use as evidence. Samarqandī reports a tradition according to which God says to the resurrected: "I have given you advice (*nasaḥtu lakum*). However, [here] in your registers (*ṣuḥuf*) are [recorded] your actions. Whosoever finds a good action (*khayran*) [recorded in it], let him praise God; whosoever finds something else, let him blame noone but himself."[34] One of the most forceful illustrations of the interrogation before God-the-judge comes from Muḥāsibī:

> There you come to stand in front of a mighty, exalted, immense, and noble Lord, with a palpitating heart… in your hand a written record that leaves out no calamity you instigated, and no secret deed that you sought to hide. You read what is written in it with a weary tongue, citing pointless arguments (*ḥujja dāḥiḍa*)….[35]

Also Thaʿlabī states that God consults the scrolls and decides on the basis of what He finds in them.[36] That is to say, the eschatological judgment is the result of a forensic process in which evidence is consulted and duly weighed. God-the-judge relies on written evidence, despite His encompassing knowledge of things past and present, hidden and apparent—an obvious paradox. In sum, in Qurʾānic exegesis, written evidence, in form of the scrolls, is commonplace in the heavenly court of justice. It is interesting

32 Rabbinic literature, elaborating on Daniel 7 (which describes God sitting on His throne and judging based on books that are brought to Him), enumerates a variety of heavenly books. Cf. 2 Enoch, which includes a fully forensic scene. See Paul Volz, *Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1903), 89–95.

33 Qurṭubī, *Tadhkira*, 2:38 (from ʿUqaylī, *K. al-Ḍuʿafāʾ al-kabīr*).

34 Samarqandī, *Tanbīh*, 33.

35 Muḥāsibī, *Tawahhum*, § 61 (tr. 48).

36 Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 9:99.

to note that, even though written evidence was likely used from early on in mundane courts, it took some time before jurists came to agree that written documents were fully admissible evidence, and they never did so in criminal law (that is, *ḥadd* and *qiṣāṣ*).[37]

Another important procedural element that the heavenly court has in common with earthly courts is the testimony of witnesses. To begin with, there are the two angels responsible for writing up the scrolls. The exegetes connect them to two verses in particular, Q. 50:17–18 ("When the two Receivers [*al-mutalaqqiyān*] receive him, one sitting on the right, one sitting on the left. Not a word does he utter but a ready watcher is by him.") and Q. 82:11 ("Over you are guardians, noble, recording [*kātibīna*]."). These are no ordinary scribes. Ṭabarī reports that "they write down what you say and what you intend: *mā taqūlūna wa-mā taʿnūna*,"[38] a comment that makes it clear that eschatological judgment, unlike the judgment of judges on earth, takes people's intentions into account. Māwardī lists various reasons why these angels are "noble," including the view that this is so because "they do not part ways with a person except on two occasions: defecation and sexual intercourse (*ʿinda al-ghāʾiṭ wa-ʿinda al-jimāʿ*); then they withdraw. They write down what is talked about. This is why talking during defecation and sexual intercourse is abhorred." Another view holds that they are "noble" because they take punctilious notes, that is, they do not add anything or leave anything out.[39] The exegetes provide more colorful details about the two recording angels, too many to recount here.[40]

Strictly speaking, these two angels do not belong in the court scene on the Day of Judgment, as they are operative during a person's lifetime, not after death. Occasionally, however, the two recording angels accompany the dead person not only to the grave but onwards, to the Final Judgment. Thaʿlabī reports a Prophetic tradition according to which, after the death of a person, the two angels reside in the vicinity of the grave of the deceased. Then, at Judgment, God consults the person's scrolls, and if He finds a good deed at the beginning and the end of the scroll, He tells the assembly of angels to testify that He has forgiven the person.[41] This story recalls the practice of letting professional witnesses (*ʿudūl*) confirm the validity of written proof, a practice that was common in *qāḍī* courts from the late

37 Baber Johansen, "Zum Prozessrecht der *ʿuqūbāt*," *ZDMG*, Supplement III,1, XIX. Deutscher Orientalistentag (1977): 429 (on *kitāb al-qāḍī ilā al-qāḍī*).

38 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 30:111 (*ad* Q. 82:11, from Ayyūb). Cf. Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 10:148; and Baghawī, *Maʿālim*, 8:357.

39 Māwardī, *Nukat*, 6:223.

40 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 26:185; Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 9:99.

41 Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 9:99.

second/eighth century onward.[42]

COURT OFFICIALS IN THE HEAVENLY COURT OF JUSTICE

A number of court officials of the heavenly court of justice have already been mentioned, such as the "rows" (*ṣufūf*) of angels surrounding the Judgment scene, or the hell-monster Jahannam, which takes a seat at the left foot of God's throne, in a manner reminiscent of the executioner (*sayyāf*) standing to the left of the ruler's throne in representations of the royal court of the Islamic Middle Period.[43] Another Qur'ānic verse used by the exegetes to populate the heavenly court is Q. 50:21: "Every soul shall come, and with it a driver (*sā'iq*) and a witness (*shahīd*)." Rather concrete, and again reminding one of mundane judicial procedure, are a number of exegetical glosses reported by Ṭabarī, specifying that the *sā'iq* drives people to the reckoning (*ḥisāb*)[44]—which is reminiscent of the way a court sheriff, a *jilwāz*, might coerce recalcitrant litigants to appear before the judge,[45] or a judge's doorkeeper (*ḥājib*) might usher people into the presence of the judge.[46] Ṭabarī also reports the view that the *sā'iq* is a court scribe (*kātib*),[47] a functionary who, like the *jilwāz*, was an established adjunct of the judge from as early as the end of the first century.[48]

There are also less concrete, more abstract interpretations. However, according to Baghawī, the interpretation as "scribe" and "witness" is the majority position.[49] This motivates the obvious question, raised several

42 Johansen, "Wahrheit und Geltungsanspruch," 1003. On the development of legal views of written evidence, see Baber Johansen, "Formes de langage et fonctions publiques: stéréotypes, témoins et offices dans la preuve par écrit en droit musulman," *Arabica* 44, 3 (1997): 333–76.

43 Muḥāsibī, *Baʿth*, 22. On the *sayyāf*, see Katharina Otto-Dorn, "Das seldschukische Thronbild," in *Die islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit: Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Ulrich Haarmann et al. (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979), 168.

44 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 26:187 (from Qatāda).

45 Wael Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 60, states that the *jilwāz* appears to have become "an established functionary" as early as the middle of the first century, referring to Muḥammad b. Khalaf Wakīʿ, *Akhbār al-quḍāt* (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1980), 2:417. Cf. Emile Tyan, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1960 [orig. publ. 1938]), 286. On court enforcers (*aʿwān*, *jalāwiza*), see Schneider, *Das Bild des Richters*, 41, 45.

46 While Shāfiʿī still held the opinion that the judge should not employ a *ḥājib*, lest he become inaccessible, later Shāfiʿī authors (Māwardī, Ibn Abī al-Dam) allow this, particularly in times "when people are bad." See Schneider, *Das Bild des Richters*, 32–40.

47 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 26:187 (from Mujāhid).

48 Hallaq, *Origins*, 60–61. Kindī first mentions a *kātib* for the year 724. See Kindī, *Akhbār quḍāt Miṣr*, ed. Richard J. H. Gottheil (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1908), 35, quoted in Johansen, "Wahrheit und Geltungsanspruch," 987 n. 22.

49 Baghawī, *Maʿālim*, 7:360.

times already in the course of this study, as to why the all-knowing Judge should need witnesses at all, angelic or otherwise, to establish a person's guilt or fidelity. Māwardī reports two alternative interpretations that appear to resolve the issue. He states that the *shahīd* is none other than the resurrected themselves, who confess their sins, presumably to exculpate themselves and thus incline the Judge toward mercy. Alternatively, the sinners' own hands and feet act as witnesses, acquiring the miraculous ability to testify against their owners.[50] Thaʿlabī reports the opinion that the *shahīd* is simply the resurrected's actions (*aʿmāl*).[51] Thus, concrete, embodied representations (reminiscent of an earthly court scene) are found next to abstract, more unreal ones; here, in the case of Q. 50:21, on balance, the latter seem to be more common than the former.[52] In addition to the figurative interpretation of *shahīd* as "actions" or "limbs of the body," it was taught that the angel drives people not toward God, but toward His command (*amr*),[53] or that the *sāʾiq* is none other than God's command itself.[54]

No description of the Islamic eschatological court of justice is complete without a mention of the pivotal role played by the Prophet Muḥammad, who acts as intercessor on behalf of Muslims. Stories about his heroic efforts to ensure the salvation of his followers abound in the eschatological literature.[55] Noteworthy is a gradual broadening over the course of the early Islamic centuries of the category of people granted the power to intercede, next to the Prophet.[56] To illustrate what *shafāʿa* meant in the early third/ninth century—a moment in Islamic religious history when intercession was still largely restricted to the Prophet—a translation of a passage from Muḥāsibī's *Kitāb al-Baʿth waʾl-nushūr* will suffice:

> A call issues from the direction of God [eulogy]: "O assembly of the Friends [of God] and of the Prophets! Make haste [towards Me] with Muḥammad [eulogy]!" And so they set out with him, he leads the way and they are behind

50 Māwardī, *Nukat*, 5:348–49.

51 Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 9:100 (from Abū Hurayra).

52 *Pace* Radscheit, who states that "Islamic exegesis usually takes the 'driver' to be a kind of heavenly court usher; while the 'witness' is generally understood as the angels who record the human deeds." See Radscheit, "Witnessing and Testifying," in *EQ*, 5:492a–506b, at 492b.

53 Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ*, 26:187 (from Mujāhid).

54 Māwardī, *Nukat*, 5:348–49 (from Ḍaḥḥāk).

55 The scholarly literature on intercession (*shafāʿa*) is not very rich. The most comprehensive study still seems to be Taede Huitema, *De voorspraak (shafaʿa) in den Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1936). For a recent discussion, see Valerie Hofmann, "Intercession," in *EQ*, 2:551a–555b (with further bibliographical information).

56 For example, in Shīʿī sources, ʿAlī comes to play a role that is as important as that of Muḥammad in Sunnī sources.

> him, until they reach the Throne. He prostrates, and those who are behind him prostrate, too. God says: "Raise your head Muḥammad! Ask [Me a favor], and you will be given [what you ask for]! Intercede, and your intercession will be granted! Here is not a place for prayer or prostration (*sujūd*); here is a place of happiness and being (*wujūd*)!" So the Messenger says to God: "O Lord! My community! My community! Did you not promise me that You would not sadden me in regard to my community?" God [eulogy] says: "Muḥammad, these are people whom I commanded to do good, but they transgressed against Me. I forbade [certain things to] them, but they disobeyed Me. While still on earth, they did not turn towards Me to repent of [their] sins and the forbidden things [they did]. However, today I grant you the power to intercede on their behalf. Gabriel, go with Muḥammad to the keeper of hell, and say to him: 'Mālik! Let all those who have a speck of faith in their heart exit the Fire!'"[57]

Finally arriving at the figure of the heavenly Judge Himself, let us return to Bravmann's article that was mentioned at the beginning of this article. Bravmann speaks of "the early Arab idea… according to which the earthly, human ruler is conceded the choice to punish or to forgive," and he finds this idea in the Qurʾān "not applied to an earthly, human ruler, but to God himself, the king of the universe."[58] This assessment is based on a number of Qurʾānic verses, in particular Q. 5:18: "He forgives those whom He wishes, and He punishes those whom He wishes. God has sovereignty (*mulk*) over the heavens and the earth and what is between them."

As stated above, it is conceivable that early, legally trained exegetes had an interest in softening this image, by making God look more like a reasonable, accountable judge, rather than an unaccountable, almighty ruler-judge. In the examples adduced so far, fitting God-the-judge into the controlled environment of an orderly courtroom is exactly what appears to be going on. In this context, it is also relevant to note that God is not once referred to as *qāḍī* in the Qurʾān. To be precise, the verbform *qaḍā/yaqḍī* is used repeatedly: God "decides a matter" (*qaḍā/yaqḍī amr*^{an}, e.g. Q. 2:117, 3:47, 8:42, 19:45, 40:68, and passim), He "ordains a person's moment of death" (*qaḍā ajal*^{an}, e.g., Q. 6:2, *qaḍā al-mawt*, Q. 39:42), and He "passes judgment between people" on the Day of Judgment (*qaḍā baynahum bi-ḥukmih*, Q. 27:78). But God as *qāḍī* (in the nominal, not the participal sense), as the holder of *qaḍāʾ* understood as a judicial office, does not figure into the Qurʾān—which of course is not surprising, seeing that the office did

57 Muḥāsibī, *Baʿth*, 32–33.

58 Bravmann, "Allah's Liberty," 237.

not exist at the time of the Qurʾān's enunciation. In sum, in the Qurʾān, God judges, but He is no judge.

In the *tafsīr*s, by contrast, God is identified as a *qāḍī* with increasing regularity. Ṭabarī notes that certain descriptions and epithets of God in the Qurʾān, such as *al-fattāḥ* (Q. 34:27–28; see also Q. 2:117, 7:89), refer to His act of judging, and to His being a judge. Thaʿlabī repeats this information and adds further examples. As Thaʿlabī notes, the Qurʾānic epithet of God, *al-muhaymin*, is interpreted by some to mean "the judge" (*al-qāḍī*).[59] Thaʿlabī also mentions that some count *al-qāḍī* among the beautiful names of God.[60] Samarqandī, Thaʿlabī, and Baghawī paraphase the expression "Master of the Day of Judgment" (*māliki yawmi al-dīn*, Q. 1:4) plainly as "Judge on the Day of Reckoning" (*qāḍī yawm al-ḥisāb*).[61] Both Baghawī and Māwardī seem to have no scruples designating God as a judge, which may indicate that over the course of time, the appellation became rather common.



Figure 2: The heavenly court of justice on the Day of Judgment according to early Sunnī Muslim exegesis

Figure 2 attempts to visualize all the elements of the heavenly court discussed so far. It should be noted that further distinctions could be

59 See Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 9:287 (from Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, d. *ca.* 94/712-3); and Baghawī, *Maʿālim*, 8:87.

60 Thaʿlabī, *Kashf*, 9:92 (from Muḥammad b. Kaʿb al-Quraẓī [Medina, middle 2nd/8th century]). This does not seem to have become standard, however, even if lists of the 99 names often include terms such as *al-fattāḥ, al-ḥakam,* or *al-muqṣit.*

61 Samarqandī, *Baḥr*, 1:42 (from Ibn ʿAbbās, Muqātil, and Suddī).

made, and more details added. For example, next to the two groups of the "companions of the right" and the "companions of the left," the Qurʾān (see Q. 56:10-11) speaks of special groups of the blessed, "those who precede" (*sābiqūn*) and "those who are brought near" (*muqarrabūn*) at the end of time. In the *ḥadīth*, these labels are identified with various groups, including the prophets, martyrs, and the underage children of Muslims, who are then declared to enter paradise without reckoning.[62] Likewise unaccounted for are the "people on *al-aʿrāf*" (see Q. 7:46-50), whom the exegetes declare to be Muslims with as many good as evil works on their account, who therefore remain in limbo, on a wall that separates paradise from hell.[63]

DIVINE JUSTICE IN HEAVEN—AND ON EARTH?

As has become clear, to imagine God as a judge, and the heavenly court in terms of an earthly court—that is, to project the mundane court onto the divine one—was a contentious exegetical move even though, from a historian's point of view, it is not particularly surprising. This concluding section asks whether the analogy could also be reversed, that is, whether the imagined overlaps between the two courts made people conceive of the court of the earthly judge as an institution that metes out otherworldly, ultimate justice.

Reading through the chronicles of early Islam, it does in fact appear that judges thought that their adjudication was divinely sanctioned and analogous to eschatological judgment, against all statements to the contrary in the theoretical literature. I suggest that this can be shown by the example of punitive immolation in early Islam, a capital punishment saturated with eschatological overtones. The Umayyad caliphs are known to have implemented the punishment, though they were probably preceded in this by the first four caliphs, the *rāshidūn*.[64] The caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 105–25/724–43), among other Umayyad caliphs, is on record for having burned enemies publicly at the stake. It seems likely that in response to the practice, and to heap criticism on the Umayyads, a prophetic *ḥadīth* was put into circulation that stated that "only the Lord of the Fire punishes with fire: *lā yuʿadhdhib biʾl-nār illā rabb al-nār*."[65] Punishment on earth, in this view,

62 For details, see Lange, *Paradise and Hell*, 124, 195.

63 Ibid., 59–60, 199.

64 For an overview of the history of punitive burning in Islam, see now Christian Lange, "Immolation," *EI-THREE*, with further bibliographical references. In the following two paragraphs, I reproduce some of the findings of this article.

65 See Arent Jan Wensinck, *Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 4:164a-b (s.v. *ʿ-dh-b*). Cf. G. H. A. Juynboll, *Encyclopedia of Canonical Ḥadīth* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 280.

is unlike punishment in the hereafter, and earthly penalties, meted out by the ruler or by the judge, ought not mimic the penalties meted out by God in hell, the realm of fire.

It is not, however, as if the ʿAbbāsids put an end to punitive immolation. The crucified corpse of Ḥallāj, in 309/922, was burned in a terrible parody of what in his *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn* he had described, longingly evoking the "annihilation" (*fanāʾ*) of the mystic in God, as the burning of the moth after circling the candle.[66] It is really in the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries in Iraq and Persia, however, that punitive burning hits a high, and the involvement of judges in several cases is beyond question. Many of the victims were Ismāʿīlīs, who were burned both alive and dead. This included a mass *auto-da-fé* at Isfahan in 494/1101, for which trenches were dug and filled with burning naphta, while an official, nicknamed Mālik (in reference to the angel that guards the entry to hell) oversaw proceedings. The eminent local jurist, the Shāfiʿī Abū Shujāʾ al-Iṣfahānī, explicitly encouraged this brutal course of action.[67] A striking story is related in Ibn al-Jawzī's Baghdad chronicle, according to which, in the year 530/1135-6, a woman was condemned to burning in the central mosque.[68] Such incidents seem to follow logically from the precedent set by Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119), the Ḥanbalī judge in Baghdad, who compared his sentencing to death of an Ismāʿīlī to God's sentencing sinners to hell.[69]

As some have suggested, by the end of the fifth/eleventh century, and spearheaded by figures such as Ibn ʿAqīl, "punishments formerly reserved for the hereafter were transposed into the present."[70] The notion that judges enjoyed divine authority, however, had been around much longer. According to a *ḥadīth* related on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās, two angels descend to sit next to every judge when he adjudicates,[71] just as God is surrounded by angels when judging humankind on the Day of Judgment.

66 Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1975), 70, 142.

67 ʿIzz al-Dīn b. al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-taʾrīkh*, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1417/1997), 8:450.

68 Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Jawzī, *al-Muntaẓam fī tāʾrīkh al-umam waʾl-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā et al. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1412/1992), 17:310. Cf. Christian Lange, *Justice, Punishment and the Medieval Muslim Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 68.

69 Frank Griffel, *Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam: Die Entwicklung zu al-Ġazālī's Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 282–83, referring to an incident in Shaʿbān 490/July 1097 reported in Ibn al-Jawzī, *Muntaẓam*.

70 Griffel, *Apostasie*, 283.

71 Muḥammad b. Khalaf Wakīʿ, *Akhbār al-quḍāt*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, 1947-50), 1:36. As Tillier notes, this tradition did not make it into the canonical collections. See Tillier, "Espace judiciaire," 499.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has sought to demonstrate that the imagery of the earthly and the divine court of justice in early Islam overlaps in significant respects, despite the great number of theological and legal scruples, voiced by exegetes and jurists alike, that militated against the confluence of these two imageries. Further, this study has suggested that there was not only an overlap, but a reciprocal influence between the two courts. This shaped how their constitutive elements were conceived and how, in the case of the earthly court, justice was meted out. Of course, it is a lot easier to claim that such a reciprocal relationship existed than to produce evidence to prove it. It appears altogether more straightforward to assume that in the early Islamic centuries, as well as in later centuries, this-worldly and otherworldly justice were two autonomous systems developing separately, with no connection whatsoever, as they reacted to different sets of challenges, such as the theological imperative to avoid anthropomorphisn in the case of the heavenly court. Yet, on the whole, it is more plausible that the two systems were in meaningful conversation. In other words, they may have been separate, but they were not independent. Their interdependency was not simply mimetic, in the sense that otherworldly justice was modeled upon earthly realities (or vice-versa); it could also be antithetic, in the sense that otherworldly justice was imagined as the exact opposite of earthly justice.

Here, a sketch has been provided of the heavenly court in some early *tafsīr*s and eschatological works, roughly from the third to the sixth century of the Islamic era. This, it is hoped, has been in itself a worthwhile exercise. One may legitimately question whether the heavenly court properly belongs to the history of the earthly court. However, it is worthwhile to remind ourselves that "a history without the imagination is an mutilated, disembodied history."[72] And, while there are significant studies of Sunnī and Shīʿī apocalypticism, the *barzakh*, as well as studies of the Muslim paradise and hell, the Day of Resurrection or Final Judgment has been written about far less frequently. The topic, and the literature in which it is given form, still await further analysis.

The analogy between the heavenly and the earthly court fulfilled a dual function in early Islam. On the one hand, in the exegetical literature, God's court of justice on the Day of Judgment is in many respects characterized in terms of an ordinary judge's court, with a certain spatial organization, procedure, and court personnel. While such characterizations may derive in part from pre-Islamic (especially Rabbinic) anthropomorphic conceptions of God-as-judge, their rise to prominence, and their persistence, in works of

72 Jacques Le Goff, "Introduction," in *The Medieval Imagination*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 1–17, esp. 5.

tafsīr indicates the exegetes' attempt to rein in the Qur'ānic notion of God as an unaccountable judge presiding over the end of time.

On the other hand, the analogy between the Judge and the judge made it possible that judges were on occasion thought to preenact God's justice on the Day of Judgment. It bears mentioning in this context that, against Brockopp's assertion that "court punishments in Islam are not in lieu of eternal punishment," *ḥadd* punishments, according to the Shāfiʿīs, are an expiation for sins (*kaffāra*), so that divine justice *is* in fact preenacted—and eschatological punishment thereby forestalled.[73] And is the mercy of the judge really something that only behooves the divine Judge, but not His earthly counterpart? "It is better to err in forgiveness than in punishment," runs a famous legal maxim.[74]

The brooding metaphysical context of the earthly court no doubt served to enhance the prestige and authority of judges. For the judges, to appear as "partners with God-the-judge, invoking God's court was a first step toward eventual judicial autonomy from the political authorities."[75] It was also, however, a step toward exposing the judicial profession to the "temptation of divinity"[76] and, as in the case of judges committing enemies of the faith to the fire, toward imagining oneself to enact ultimate, heavenly justice.

73 See the references in Lange, *Justice*, 185 n. 26.

74 See on this maxim, Intisar A. Rabb, *Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

75 See Arie Mermelstein and Shalom E. Holtz, "Introduction," to *The Divine Courtroom in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Ari Mermelstein et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1–5, at 5.

76 I borrow this expression from Josef van Ess, *Chiliastische Erwartungen und die Versuchung der Göttlichkeit: Der Kalif al-Ḥākim (386-411 H.)* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1977).