

that the open adoption of such a policy must inevitably create a sense of inferiority, as well as feelings of jealousy, among members of the Uniform Branch, including its senior officers.

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

131. In addition to factors which had the effect of lowering the morale of the Force, there are some features which we think tended to reduce its efficiency. Of these the most important is, perhaps, the composition. The difficulties and danger of attempting to police a cosmopolitan and predominantly Chinese town like Singapore by means of a police force composed almost entirely of members of one religion and race (i.e. Mohamedan Malays), differing so greatly from the bulk of the population is obvious. Both the Government and senior police officers realize this, but have apparently been unable, in recent years, to find an alternative. Before the 1939-45 war, it was possible to leave the Force with recruits from outside Singapore (e.g. Punjabi Mohamedans, Sikhs, Gurkhas and Ceylonese) but India, Pakistan and Ceylon are now closed as recruiting centres and, although a limited number of Gurkhas is still obtainable, other services such as the Army and the Federation of Malaya Police are competing for them.

132. It has, of course, always been realized that it is highly desirable that the predominant race in Singapore, the Chinese, should be strongly represented in the uniformed police, but it has up to the present proved impracticable to attract them to, or retain them in it. It is said (a) that the Chinese dislike serving in uniform, (b) that few of them are amenable to the discipline necessary in a police force and (c) that the pay of policemen is insufficient to attract them in any substantial number. It is significant that Chinese have enrolled in considerable numbers in the Special Constabulary, which is also uniformed, and it seems at least possible that the difficulties mentioned might be overcome if means could be found of making police service and conditions more attractive, financially and otherwise.

133. The Malays, who form the bulk of the uniformed side of the Force, though generally backward in education, are said to have many excellent qualities and, if sympathetically handled by officers who understand them and who keep in close touch with them, are capable of giving very good service, as they have done in the past. Their usefulness might be considerably increased if, by some means, such as monetary rewards or allowances, they could be induced to learn one or more languages, particularly Chinese and/or English.

EXAGGERATED EMPHASIS ON C.I.D. RADIO CARS AND RADIO CONTROL ROOM

134. No one could reasonably deny or seek to depreciate the value and usefulness to a police force of such adjuncts as an efficient Criminal Investigation Department or patrol cars or vans fitted with two-way wireless, and a well-equipped control centre. Indeed, no force could be regarded as fully efficient without them. We have no reason for thinking that the Criminal Investigation Department of the Singapore Police Force is not on the whole an efficient organization; and, except during the December riots, when subversive influences were at work on the crews, the radio cars have taken a prominent part in reducing violent crime since their introduction in 1946.

A very marked reduction in armed and unarmed robberies is disclosed by the figures on page 121 of the Colony of Singapore Annual Report, 1949, which are as follows:—

	1947	1948	1949
Armed Robberies ...	792	320	74
Unarmed Robberies ...	455	320	97

135. We think there may have been a tendency to forget, however, that radio cars should be regarded as no more than adjuncts to assist the main body of the Force, namely, the uniformed police, who still are, or should be, the backbone of a well organized and administered police force and who alone can maintain full touch with the public and inspire the public confidence which is so desirable. We received the impression that in the Singapore Police Force almost all the emphasis has been laid on the newer and more spectacular specialist branches of the Force to the detriment of the ordinary members of the uniformed police.

ABSENCE OF DAY PATROLS

136. An observant visitor to Singapore could hardly fail to be struck by the fact that he seldom sees policemen patrolling on foot in the day time. The reason is that patrol duty by day is left almost entirely to the cars of the Radio Division. Again, without wishing to deny the usefulness of these radio cars, we think it is obvious that their crews can have little contact with members of the public, since they leave the cars only to attend to some incident which they have encountered or to which they have been directed by Radio Control. This system of patrolling a town by radio-equipped cars should not be confused with what has come to be known as the "Aberdeen" team-policing system, in which a radio-equipped car is used to drop members of the team at convenient points and most of the patrolling is done on foot. In other words, the members of the team work from the car, not in it. We cannot but feel that the virtual segregation of the uniformed police from the public in Singapore is detrimental to efficiency, and that some uniformed police patrolling the town by day, either on foot or on cycles, would eventually, in spite of the language difficulties, secure closer contact between the Police and the public.

OVER-DEPARTMENTALISM AND FAULTY CHAIN OF COMMAND

137. In the course of our sittings we also gained the impression that there was excessive departmentalism in the Force which can only be detrimental to general efficiency and may also give rise to personal jealousies. We do not regard it as our concern to take sides in the controversy which has arisen as to whether there should be one or two Deputy Commissioners, but we do regard it as important that there should be an officer holding the rank of Deputy Commissioner and possessing a comprehensive knowledge of the current problems of the whole Force, who could take over, at a moment's notice if need be, the duties of the Commissioner of Police. We think it unlikely that a Deputy Commissioner, whose responsibilities are confined either to the Uniform Branch or to the Criminal Investigation Department, as at present, would have this advantage. We think that the rank of Assistant Commissioner may be justified for officers in charge of the more important specialist departments, but these officers should be expected and enabled to keep in general touch with the Force as a whole.

138. It is essential that there should be a full sense of personal responsibility among the officers in charge of the Divisions into which the Force is divided, and this is not encouraged by the limited responsibilities and the comparatively low rank (Assistant Superintendent) given to these officers. We think that the police officer in charge of a Division should hold the rank of Superintendent and should be responsible, in the fullest sense, for the police work in it, including the investigation of crime, with the assistance of the Criminal Investigation Department. If the existing Divisions are considered too small to justify this, they could be increased in size, which would, of course, mean reduction in number. Where necessary a Division could be divided into two or more Sub-Divisions, each under an Assistant Superintendent, responsible to the Divisional Superintendent. This would be a valuable means of fostering in younger officers a sense of personal responsibility.

139. We were informed that in present circumstances it takes an officer directly appointed to the rank of Assistant Superintendent 16 to 20, or even more, years to reach the rank of Superintendent. We feel that this must have a disheartening effect on these officers when they are in the prime of life. An increase in the number of Superintendent's posts would have the effect, which seems to us to be highly desirable, of stimulating promotion.

EQUIPMENT

140. The Singapore Police Force appears to be very well equipped in the material sense, but it has no section of mounted police. The usefulness of well trained mounted police in handling large crowds, whether peaceful or riotous, has been proved in a number of cities and large towns in many parts of the world, including the East. They have the great advantage over foot police of being able to see over the heads of a crowd, to observe any incipient trouble, to get to the scene of it quickly and to deal effectively with it. Their ability to get round or over obstacles gives them an advantage over police in motor vans or cars, with or without armour. Moreover, experience has shown that their mere presence often has a sobering effect on a crowd. The situation in front of the Supreme Court at Singapore on the morning of 11th December, 1950, was one for which mounted police would have been ideally suited, and we have little doubt that a dozen policemen on well trained horses could have dealt effectively with the whole situation in a few minutes, for the simple reason that they could have seen who the stone throwers were and could have quickly rounded them up. Moreover, they could have kept in touch with the riotous elements which moved towards the area of the Sultan Mosque and they would have been most effective in dealing with the "tip and run" tactics. The advisability of maintaining a mounted police contingent was not raised during the Inquiry but we mention the subject as we are of the opinion that it should be taken into consideration in connection with any reorganization of the Singapore Police Force.

PART XIV

INDONESIAN AND OTHER INFLUENCES

141. While there is no reliable indication that Indonesians living in Singapore were responsible for the outbreak of rioting, there is no doubt that Indonesians played a large part in the ferocious attacks which were made on Europeans and Eurasians on the night of the 11th and on the 12th December. The figures of those arrested in connection with the riots illustrate the extent of Indonesian participation. On the 23rd February, 1951, of 530 persons then under detention or convicted for their part in the riots, no less than 181 were Indonesians, and of that number 65 were Indonesians born outside the Colony. Large numbers of Indonesian labourers were brought to Singapore by the Japanese during their occupation of the Island and their feeling against the Dutch may well have been transferred to the British, whom they believed to have supported the Dutch Consul-General in the Hertogh case. Certainly the bitter anti-European racial hatred which manifested itself during the riots bears some resemblance to that which the Japanese succeeded in fostering in Indonesia; but it is an emotion entirely new to the Muslim people of Singapore.

142. There is no evidence of Communist inspiration behind the riots. It is possible that Malayan Communist Party elements may have taken the opportunity afforded by the disorders to stage a small number of arson incidents, but their part in the rioting generally was insignificant. In fact, it seems that the riots caught the Malayan Communist Party by surprise. It was not until the 13th December that they tried to exploit the situation to their advantage by the distribution through the post of pamphlets calling on all races to unite under Communist leadership and rise up against the British; but by that time law and order throughout the Colony had been restored.

143. Mr. Frew, the officer in charge of the Riot Investigation Unit which had been set up by the Singapore Police, gave evidence with regard to the activities in connection with the riots of a criminal organization known as the "108 Gang". It seems that some members of this gang had intended to cause mischief by setting fire to any military vehicles which they could find unattended on the occasion of an air display which was held in Singapore on 9th December, 1950, two days before the outbreak of rioting. However, on that occasion they found the military vehicles to be well guarded and were unable to carry out their plan. On the morning of the 11th December, 1950, the head of the "108 Gang" called together a number of Malays and Chinese who were members or adherents of this gang and, sometime between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. on that day, took them in a lorry to the Sultan Mosque. Some of this gang joined the procession which carried banners from the Mosque to the Supreme Court; some stayed in the Mosque and later took part in the rioting which occurred in that area; some went to the Thomson Road area, and some later went to join the rioters in the Geylang Road area. This evidence of the activities of the "108 Gang" which we were informed, is a purely criminal organization existing by "extortion and protection", is the only acceptable testimony we received of any organized rioting. It was said that groups of Malays and Indians had toured the riot areas in taxis encouraging the rioters and supplying them with food and that the taxi drivers had been paid off at the Muslim Publishing House, but in the absence of direct testimony we cannot place any reliance on these statements.

PART XV

OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY OFFICIALS AS TO THE CAUSES OF THE RIOTS

144. Before we pass on to our own conclusions on the matter, it may be of interest if we record various views as to the causes of the disorders which were put forward to us in the course of our Inquiry. Mr. Wiltshire gave it as his view that the rioting broke out as a result of the deep feeling that had been engendered among the Mohamedan population by the press treatment of the Hertogh case. These feelings had been further aroused by the placing of Maria in the convent. The shooting incident outside the Supreme Court had provided the spark which ignited an explosive situation. Rioting had been directed at first against the police because the mob "were under the misapprehension that the shots had been fired by a member of the Police Force", but violence was later directed indiscriminately against Europeans and Eurasians. Mr. Wiltshire considered that, if the shooting incident had not occurred, there would have been no outbreak of violence; but he agreed that any other provocative incident which might have occurred, might well have had the same explosive effect on the crowd, in the atmosphere existing outside the Supreme Court on the morning of the 11th December.

145. Mr. Morris, the Deputy Commissioner, C.I.D., gave the following considered opinions as to the reasons for the outbreak of rioting:—

- (a) Muslim passions had been aroused by the placing of the child in a Catholic convent and by the propaganda of the English and Malay press on this question.
- (b) Enormous interest had been taken by all communities in this case since April, 1950. This interest reached a climax on the 2nd December when judgment was given, handing the child over to the Dutch parents and declaring the Muslim marriage invalid. Muslims in general had not expected this result, and with the placing of the child in the convent and the press propaganda, an explosive situation existed.
- (c) The Malay police were ineffective because they were dealing with persons of their own nationality, their own religion, and with whom they live and work. They were, in addition, in full sympathy with the Malay parties in the court case.
- (d) The ineffectiveness of the Malay police was quickly seized on and exploited by the crowd, who were further aggravated by the shooting which occurred outside the Supreme Court. This aggravation was carried a step further when the fracas occurred outside the Mosque, and from then on, the hooligan elements of the Malay and Indonesian communities—aided and abetted by hooligan elements of the Chinese and Indian communities—exploited to the full the inability of the Police to take any effective measures to prevent them from attacking Europeans and Eurasians.

In Mr. Morris's view there were five impulses which could be detected underlying the riots or inspiring the rioters. These were; (a) the personal ambitions of Karim Ghani; (b) the Malay Nationalist aspirations of Dr.

Burhanuddin and Taha Kalu; (c) Indonesian nationalism and anti-Dutch feeling; (d) local Malay and Indonesian hooliganism; (e) misguided Muslim religious fervour.

146. Mr. Frew agreed with Mr. Morris's conclusions. Mr. Frew said that many of the rioters were gangsters, who intimidated Muslims into taking part by making them believe that it was a religious fight between Mohamedanism and Christianity, and that a very large percentage of the rioters were youths and hooligans who joined in the rioting for excitement. Mr. Frew's investigations had also revealed that many Indonesians had taken part in the riots.

147. Mr. Blythe, the Colonial Secretary, stressed the whipping up of public opinion against the decision given in the Supreme Court, which, he said, was largely the work of the Nadra Action Committee and of Karim Ghani. He considered that the activities of certain persons having a connection with the Muslim Publishing House at 123, Serangoon Road, who went round in taxis encouraging the rioters, had played an important part in the development of the riots on the 11th December.

PART XVI

THE EVIDENCE OF THE NADRA ACTION COMMITTEE

148. On the 8th March, 1951, we heard *in camera* on Blakang Mati Island the evidence of five members of the Nadra Action Committee, Dr. Burhanuddin, Mohamed Taha bin Kalu, Darus Shariff, Syed Ali Al-Attas and Mohamed Mustaza. In hearing the evidence of these persons we were naturally not concerned with the question whether the detention orders made against them were justified or not and we did not call into question evidence which had been given with regard to the attempts they had made to pacify the mob after rioting had actually broken out on the 11th December, 1950. We asked them only for such evidence as they might be able to give which would throw light on the causes of the disorders or on the measures taken to restore law and order.

149. All these witnesses cited the pictures and articles dealing with Maria's life in the convent which appeared in the *Singapore Standard* of the 5th December, as the main cause of the inflamed state of Muslim opinion before the riots, and they all stated that it was the shooting incident outside the Supreme Court on the morning of the 11th December which precipitated the riots and gave rise to the general attack by the mob on Europeans and Eurasians. They claimed that the issues of *Dawn* and *Melayu Raya* of the 9th and 11th December were intended to exert a soothing influence on Muslim opinion and to "clarify the position as regards the Nadra issue". This claim is a preposterous one.

150. Karim Ghani did not appear before us, but asked to be allowed to submit a written statement. We gave permission and received the statement just before we left Singapore. We have considered it, but have found it of no assistance to us in the preparation of the report. It is long and incoherent and deals with matters far outside the scope of our Inquiry.

PART XVII

CURFEWS AND RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT

151. At about 3.30 p.m. on the 11th December, 1950, Mr. Wiltshire issued orders that no vehicles containing Europeans and Eurasians should be allowed to enter the Beach Road area and at 8 p.m. on that day he ordered the Police to prohibit the movement of all Europeans absolutely. If it was essential for them to travel they were only to do so under police escort. The question of imposing a general curfew on the night of the 11th December was considered by the Police and Mr. Morris ordered 3,000 curfew notices to be printed in readiness; but no curfew was imposed that night.

152. Mr. Wiltshire stated in evidence that his reason for not imposing a general curfew on the 11th December was that there was not enough man-power available to him to enforce it. We are not convinced by this argument. It is our opinion that, even though a curfew order would not have been entirely effective, it would have at least ensured that the streets were clear of all law-abiding people and would have reduced the number of onlookers hindering the work of the Police and Military.

153. On the 12th December the movement of all vehicles was prohibited within an area bounded by Jalan Besar, Lavender Street, Crawford Street, Beach Road, Bras Basah Road and Bencoolen Street and a general curfew was imposed over the whole of the Island from 6 p.m. until 6 a.m. on the 13th December, except in the Geylang area where the curfew remained in force until 10.30 a.m. on the 13th December. On the 13th December a reduction was made in the area in which the movement of all vehicles was restricted, but the general curfew from 6 p.m. until 6 a.m. on the 14th December remained in force. On the 14th December all restrictions on movement of vehicles were removed and the curfew was imposed from 7 p.m. until 6 a.m. on the 15th December. On the 16th December the curfew was limited to the hours of 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. on the 17th December. On the 18th December the curfew was lifted from the western parts of the Island and on the 19th December the curfew was lifted completely.

154. On the night of the 15th December an incident occurred in connection with the enforcement of the curfew which, we understand, gave rise to some concern among members of the Volunteer Special Constabulary and among the public generally. Mr. C. O. L. Salvesen, Deputy Commandant of the Volunteer Special Constabulary, stated in evidence that, on the 15th December, two Europeans, a man and a woman, were arrested and brought to the Orchard Road Police Station for breaking the curfew and for failing to produce identity cards. Mr. Salvesen stated that these persons were subsequently released on the orders of Sir Charles Murray-Aynsley, the Chief Justice of Singapore, after a telephone conversation between Sir Charles Murray-Aynsley and Mr. Flynn, the officer in charge of the Police Station at the time. This telephone conversation, taking place as it did in the presence of a number of arrested persons and of several members of both the regular and the volunteer police, gave rise to an impression that the Government was not wholly behind the Police in their enforcement of the curfew and that discrimination was being shown in favour of European law breakers.

155. Sir Charles Murray-Aynsley gave evidence and stated that it was quite untrue that he had ordered or suggested that the persons referred to should be released. In reply to a telephone call from the Police Station, he had merely vouched for the identity of the arrested lady, who was known to him personally. He had been most careful to avoid suggesting that he wanted the lady to be released or that he was interfering with the work of the Police in any way.

156. Subsequently Mr. J. M. Mason, the Commandant of the Volunteer Special Constabulary, appeared before us to confirm Mr. Salvesen's evidence that the incident had caused dissatisfaction among the Volunteer Special Constabulary. Mr. Mason tendered in evidence the report of Mr. Flynn, the police officer in charge of the Orchard Road Police Station on the 15th December. This contained an entry to the effect that Sir Charles Murray-Aynsley had informed Mr. Flynn that the two persons arrested were friends of his and were to be released forthwith. Mr. Mason stated that Mr. Flynn's report had been generally believed to be correct by those who had read it and that Mr. Salvesen's evidence, which was based on Mr. Flynn's report, had been given in good faith.

157. In view of the publicity which has been given to this incident, we feel that some useful purpose may be served by setting out, as we have done, the evidence which was given to us. We do not, however, consider it necessary to reach a finding on this matter, which was brought to our notice at a late stage in our proceedings, when we had no opportunity of recalling Mr. Flynn to examine him on his report. Moreover, the incident had really no bearing on the measures which were taken to restore law and order, and it is possible that a telephone conversation under such circumstances as existed that night may have given rise to a misunderstanding.

PART XVIII

THE WORK OF THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BROADCASTING

158. The evidence of Mr. Dumeresque, the Director of Broadcasting, Malaya, and of Mr. Sutton, Chief News Editor of the Department of Broadcasting, drew our attention to the difficulty experienced by the Department of Broadcasting in obtaining information about the riots from official information sources and to the lack of direction from Government on the policy to be adopted by the Department of Broadcasting during the emergency which arose on the 11th December, 1950.

159. We understand that until the 11th December it had been the normal procedure for police news to be released to the public at press conferences which were held twice daily by the Criminal Investigation Department. Mr. Thomson, the Public Relations Secretary, stated in evidence that, in view of these twice daily press conferences, he was not normally responsible for channelling police news to the public and, even though on the 20th November, 1950, a directive had been issued by Government to the effect that press releases put out by the Police should be subject to the approval of the Public Relations Secretary, it seems that the only occasion on which the Public Relations Secretary was likely to use his powers of direction over police press releases was when questions of Public Relations propaganda policy arose.

160. On the afternoon of the 11th December, 1950, the normal Criminal Investigation Department press conference was cancelled and the Department of Broadcasting was unable to contact the Public Relations Secretary after 4.40 p.m. It was, therefore, not possible for Radio Malaya to broadcast any announcements about the riots when it first came on the air at 5 p.m., and at 7 p.m. it was possible to broadcast only a very short statement obtained from the Police saying that disorders had occurred in Singapore that day and that the Police advised all persons in the affected areas to remain indoors until the situation had improved. At 9.30 p.m. a further police statement was broadcast which was in effect an expanded version of that broadcast at 7 p.m., and at 8.15 p.m. a special announcement was received from the Colonial Secretary and broadcast to the effect that Maria Hertogh was being removed from the Convent of the Good Shepherd to another place in Singapore under police protection. Apparently these three broadcasts were the only official statements broadcast on the 11th December, 1950.

161. On the evening of the 11th December, Mr. Thomson, the Public Relations Secretary, secured the assistance of the Chief Kathi of Singapore and the Maulana Siddique, the two foremost religious leaders of the Muslim community in Singapore, in broadcasting appeals to the rioters to cease their work of violence. An appeal by Karim Ghani in his capacity as President of the Muslim League was also recorded and broadcast. We consider the action of Mr. Thomson in going into the heart of the danger areas to secure the services of these persons worthy of special mention.

162. There has been much criticism in the press and elsewhere of the work of the Government's Information Services on the 11th December and

particularly of the fact that no Government spokesman came to the microphone on that day to broadcast an overall picture of the position in Singapore and to assure the public that every possible step was being taken to secure their protection from mob violence. The main reason why so little information reached the public through official channels on the 11th December may be traced to the fact that nobody in the Singapore Government had a clear picture of the position in Singapore on that day, not even the Acting Commissioner of Police himself, until late into the night. The Public Relations Department cannot be blamed for failure to impart information when it was not available.

163. However, even when allowances are made for this root cause of the lack of information reaching the public, it seems that much more could have been done if the machinery for liaison between the Government, the Police, the Public Relations Department and the Department of Broadcasting had been adequate to the occasion. For example, we can see no reason why an early announcement that the assistance of the Military had been invoked could not have been broadcast, and we have no doubt that such an announcement would have had a most reassuring effect on public morale. The supply of official information improved slightly on the 12th December when Radio Malaya was able to broadcast announcements put out by the Police at frequent intervals, but these announcements contained no clear statement of the extent and intensity of the disorders and no clear guidance to the population. On the 12th December the public were told that if they wished to go to work "it will be entirely at your own discretion" but no direction was given to the heads of commercial firms and banks who, without adequate information, had themselves to shoulder the responsibility of instructing their staffs. A memorandum submitted to us by a Sub-Committee of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce understandably states that these announcements left "considerable doubt in the minds of both employees and employers regarding attendance at offices and places of business".

164. It was not until the 13th December that more adequate liaison was established between the Police, the Department of Broadcasting and the Public Relations Department by the attachment of a Secretariat officer to the Public Relations Department and his permanent stationing in the Police Radio Control Room to be responsible for the dissemination of all police news and announcements.

PART XIX

THE MOVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR ON THE 11th DECEMBER 1950

165. In view of the untrue rumours which were being spread after the riots regarding the whereabouts during the trouble of the Governor of Singapore, Sir Franklin Gimson, it is important that the facts should be made known. On the 6th December, 1950, the Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, The Right Honourable Malcolm Macdonald, had arranged an important series of conferences at his official residence, Bukit Serene in Johore Bahru, which is across the Causeway from Singapore Island and some 20 miles from the town of Singapore. These conferences were attended by several Governors, including the Governor of Singapore, and by the United Kingdom representatives in South-East Asia. Sessions were held daily, up to and including the 11th December. It is the usual practice when His Excellency goes away more than 20 miles from Singapore for the Colonial Secretary to carry out his duties in the Colony.

166. On the 11th December, between 1.30 and 1.45 p.m., the Governor, who had evidently heard of trouble outside the Supreme Court, telephoned to his Private Secretary and instructed him to telephone to the Commissioner of Police saying that, if the crowd was proving difficult, the Police might consider the possibility of getting out the fire hose and turning it on the crowd. At about 5.30 p.m. the Colonial Secretary telephoned to the Governor at Bukit Serene and gave him the latest reports which he had on the situation. He told him that Europeans were being assaulted and one or two police vans had been burnt, but that the Police were calling up reinforcements in order to make a drive and clear up the Beach Road area. About 6.30 p.m. the Colonial Secretary again telephoned and warned the Governor that, in the opinion of the Police, he ought not to return then, as certain roads were crowded with rioters and the Police were so hard pressed for the time being that they could not provide the necessary escort. Soon after 7 p.m. he told the Governor that the Military had been called in.

167. Shortly after 8 p.m. General Hedley, who had been attending the Bukit Serene Conference, returned to Major-General Dunlop's house and told him that his car had been heavily stoned on its way to Singapore. Major-General Dunlop at once telephoned to Bukit Serene hoping to be able to stop the Governor from making the journey, but found his car had just left. He then asked Mr. Wiltshire to get a message through by radio car and the Governor's car was stopped at the Woodlands Police Station, close to the Causeway. Later the Colonial Secretary received a message that a strong military escort had been provided for the Governor and that he would be arriving at Government House, Singapore, at about 11.30 p.m., which he did.

168. From the above narrative it will be clear that the Governor was away from Singapore on official duties when the rioting broke out, that he did what was possible to keep in touch with the situation, and that he returned to Government House, Singapore the moment those responsible for his safety would allow him to make the journey

PART XX

STEPS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT TOWARDS RESTORATION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

169. In the course of the Inquiry a paper was tendered to us on behalf of the Singapore Government setting out the steps taken by Government to restore public confidence after the riots. These steps may be summarized as follows:—

- (a) Sixty Auxiliary Police sergeants, whose contracts were due to expire on or before the 31st December, 1950, were re-engaged for a period of six months in the newly created rank of Police Lieutenant.
- (b) The permission of the Governor of Hongkong was obtained for a visit to Singapore of Mr. MacIntosh, the Commissioner of Police, Hongkong, who had served in Singapore both before and immediately after the Japanese occupation, to advise on any steps to effect an immediate improvement in police morale and organization. Mr. MacIntosh submitted his report to the Singapore Government on the 27th December, 1950.
- (c) The Finance Committee approved a total increase of 300 to the Police Gurkha Contingent. Arrangements for recruitment are now stated to be well in hand.
- (d) Mr. J. P. Pennefather-Evans, former Commissioner of Police, Hongkong, was appointed as Commissioner of Police, Singapore, for a period of one year. Mr. Pennefather-Evans arrived in Singapore on the 6th February, 1951.
- (e) The Finance Committee approved provision for an increase in Category 'A' of the Volunteer Special Constabulary from 500 to 1,000. As a result of a proposal made by the Singapore Chamber of Commerce immediately after the riots, a scheme was drawn up for the formation of Volunteer Special Constabulary Emergency Squads to be manned by employees of members of the Chamber of Commerce. Three squads had already been trained before we left Singapore.
- (f) As a result of Mr. MacIntosh's recommendations the purchase for the Singapore Police of the following items of anti-riot equipment was approved by the Finance Committee:—
- | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 800 smokesHELLS. | 200 vomit gas grenades. |
| 800 "spedeheat" tear gas shells. | 250 practice grenades. |
| 36 riot guns. | |

The Finance Committee also approved the purchase of additional transport for the use of the Gurkha Contingent.

- (g) Financial liability was noted by the Finance Committee for the erection of entirely new "lines" to house the whole of the Gurkha Contingent. The erection of these lines will free 70 quarters for allocation to other police rank and file. Further police housing requirements were stated to be under examination, along with other urgent public works, to decide the order of priority.

- (h) A Police Force Order was issued with the effect that riot drill is now practised once or twice a week. Several large scale mock operations have been carried out by the Police, some in conjunction with the Military, since the riots.
- (i) Plans have been drawn up for a Civil Government Control Room in direct communication by radio with the Police Control Room and adequately serviced by telephones. A combined Police and Military Operations Room has been set up and arrangements for passing information and instructions to the Public via the Public Relations Department, Radio Malaya and through Rediffusion have been improved.

PART XXI

MATTERS ARISING IN THE COURSE OF THE INQUIRY AND CALLING FOR COMMENT

170. Two matters which arose during our proceedings call for comment and it will be convenient to make it here. One of them relates to the permission given by the Colonial Government to Mr. Longden to proceed to England on sick leave without reference to the Commission, and the other arises out of evidence relating to Mr. Velge's connection with the Special Constabulary.

171. On the 14th February, 1951, we wrote to the Colonial Secretary saying that the absence from the Colony during the proceedings of any officers, whose evidence might have an important bearing on the matters which formed the subject of the Inquiry, would be strongly deprecated, unless it could be shown that the health of the officer would be seriously impaired by a further stay in Singapore. Mr. Longden was an important witness, not only with regard to the shooting incident outside the Supreme Court, but also with regard to the rioting which took place in the Mosque area on the afternoon of the 11th December. Mr. Longden was taken ill on the 3rd January, 1951, and a medical board recommended his return by air to the United Kingdom as soon as he had left hospital. Leave applications by police officers were dealt with by Mr. A. R. Anderson, Staff Officer I at Police Headquarters. On the 22nd February, Mr. Longden saw Mr. Anderson and asked him if arrangements could be made for an early passage by aeroplane and arrangements were made by which he left Singapore for London on the 27th February. Arrangements for passages are actually made by the Malayan Establishment Office in Kuala Lumpur, but Mr. Anderson was responsible for putting the machinery in motion. He did so knowing of our letter of the 14th February to the Colonial Secretary, as a copy had been seen by him on the 17th February. Mr. Longden had told him that he was not being called as a witness and, as other police officers on duty at the same time and place as Mr. Longden had been examined, Mr. Anderson presumed that Mr. Longden was not wanted as a witness.

172. We consider that Mr. Anderson was not justified in taking the action which he did without notifying the Commission beforehand and obtaining directions on the matter. Mr. Longden had been on duty in the streets during the rioting of the 11th December, and this in itself was sufficient to put Mr. Anderson on inquiry. It was apparent at a very early stage that Mr. Longden was an officer who could give material evidence. Mr. Johnson, who was examined as a witness during the second sitting, that is on the 15th February, 1951, referred to Mr. Longden, and he was also referred to in the evidence of Mr. Abrams on the 22nd February, when Mr. Abrams said that Mr. Longden gave an order to charge which was disobeyed by the Malay police. We made special arrangements for the examination of Mr. Livett to facilitate his early departure from the Colony on sick leave, and we could have made similar arrangements for the examination of Mr. Longden. We do not think that blame attaches to the Colonial Secretary in this matter as he could not be expected to scrutinize routine matters passing through his office in order to satisfy himself that his subordinates were obeying instructions. Blame does certainly attach to Mr. Anderson and it is very regrettable that he acted so thoughtlessly, especially with our letter in front of him.

173. A question had arisen in the early stages of this Inquiry whether Mr. Velge held a warrant as a special constable on the 11th December, 1950. On the 14th February, 1951, Mr. Livett said that Mr. Velge was a member of the Singapore Volunteer Corps, but he was not a member of the Special Constabulary. On the 20th February, Mr. Morris stated that Mr. Velge was a special constable on the 11th December, 1950; so did Mr. Linsell, but the latter said that he did not know this on the 11th December, 1950. On the 24th February, Mr. Wiltshire said that he did not know whether Mr. Velge was a special constable on the 11th December. On the 28th February, Mr. Frew said that from inquiries which he had made he did not think that Mr. Velge was a special constable on the 11th December. On the 1st March, evidence was given by Mr. John Grant-Watson, a Cadet Assistant Superintendent, who was the staff officer, Special Constabulary, at Police Headquarters. From a perusal of the Special Constabulary records, the witness deposed that Mr. Velge was a volunteer special constable from the 17th July, 1946, to the 29th September, 1947, when he was dismissed for disobedience of orders, and that he was not a special constable on the 11th December, 1950.

174. When Mr. Velge gave evidence on the 7th March, we got at the truth. On the 20th February, 1950, a warrant appointing him a special constable under Section 37 of the Police Force Ordinance, 1941, was issued to him by Mr. Foulger, the then Commissioner of Police, and this had never been revoked. Mr. Velge had this warrant and his revolver licence with him when he was arrested on the 11th December. We ascertained that the Police took these documents from him and they were only returned to him on the morning of the 7th March, the day on which he was to give evidence. The Police sent the papers relating to Mr. Velge to the Attorney-General (Mr. E. J. Davies) on the 20th December, 1950, and they were seen by him that day. The papers, including the warrant, were returned by the Attorney-General to the Criminal Investigation Department on the 19th February, 1951, and the warrant remained with that Department until its production in court. Admission to this effect was made by Mr. Morris when he was recalled by us on the 9th March. On the same day we recalled Mr. Watson who stated that he was instructed by Mr. Morris himself to give evidence and the instructions were given on the 28th February, the day before he was actually called. In other words, Mr. Morris had instructed this witness to give evidence to the effect that Mr. Velge was not a special constable according to the records on the 11th December, notwithstanding that Mr. Morris knew full well that Mr. Velge was, in fact, a special constable on that date.

175. We are at a loss to understand why an attempt should have been to mislead the Commission in this way, but whatever the reason may be, the attempt was made and we must express our astonishment and condemnation. It is deplorable that the head of the Criminal Investigation Department should have deputed a junior officer to give such evidence which, if it had been left uncontradicted, would have created a false impression in our minds. Even if Mr. Morris had not seen the warrant after it had been returned to his Department by the Attorney-General, as he seemed to suggest, he must have known of its existence. The Criminal Investigation Department was very much concerned with Mr. Velge's action in firing his revolver and, as we have already pointed out, Mr. Morris had stated in evidence on the 20th February, that Mr. Velge was a special constable.

PART XXII

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

176. We have dealt with all the matters of substance which were brought to our notice in the course of the Inquiry and we will now summarize our conclusions and make such recommendations as we deem to be desirable.

CONCLUSIONS

- (1) The intense feeling which the Hertogh case aroused in the Muslim population of Singapore was the basic cause of the disorders. In the mind of every Muslim, Maria was a Mohamedan and her marriage was valid. The Muslim population had no understanding of the real issues in the court proceedings, which came to be regarded as being an attack on the Mohamedan law of marriage.
- (2) The placing of Maria in a convent pending the decision by the Court on the application for a stay of execution of the orders embodied in Mr. Justice Brown's judgment of the 2nd December, was unfortunate in the first instance, but the failure to remove her to a neutral atmosphere when Muslims were convinced that steps were being taken to convert her to Christianity, was much more serious. It is to be regretted that the Colonial Secretary rejected the advice tendered to him by the Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department in Mr. Blades's letter of the 7th December. If he had been unable to persuade Mrs. Hertogh to consent to her daughter being placed elsewhere he could have asked for an order from the Court.
- (3) The campaign undertaken by the Nadra Action Committee which followed the regrettable publication of the newspaper photographs and articles to which we have referred in paragraphs 33 and 34 was unscrupulous. It was designed to arouse strong feeling among the Mohamedan population with regard to the proceedings then pending in Court, and it succeeded in so doing.
- (4) The factors referred to in the three preceding paragraphs created an explosive situation which resulted in the outbreak of disorder in front of the Supreme Court on the morning of the 11th December. This manifested itself in the first instance in sporadic throwing of stones and by the beating of passing motor cars with sticks. The defection of the Malay police and the failure to make effective use of the Gurkha Contingent resulted in the mob becoming bolder and in the stoning of Europeans on the verandah of the Cricket Club. By that time the mob had cause to realize that they had nothing to fear

from the Malay police and that the withdrawal of the Gurkha police left the rioters in control of the situation. As the result of the advice given to them by Mohamed Taha bin Kalu, they moved off to the Mosque area. By this time their tempers were thoroughly aroused and en route they burned several European-owned vehicles.

- (5) The mob in front of the Supreme Court should have been completely dispersed and should not have been allowed to re-assemble at the Mosque. In the Gurkha Contingent there was sufficient strength to ensure this. If the Gurkha police had been used properly at the first signs of disorder the savage outbreak of rioting which occurred later would have been prevented. Even if the Gurkha police had not been used in front of the Supreme Court, they could still have been used effectively if called upon for the first time when disorders occurred in the Mosque area. The mishandling here was the direct cause of the situation becoming completely out of hand and of the necessity for calling in military aid.
- (6) The responsibility for the mishandling of the situation in front of the Supreme Court rests with Mr. Johnson. The failure to use the Gurkha Contingent in the early stages of the disorders in the Mosque area must be shared by Mr. Livett and Mr. Parks. The responsibility for the failure to use the Gurkha Contingent in the drive to clear the Mosque area must be borne by the Acting Commissioner.
- (7) We reject the suggestion that the shots fired by Mr. Velge on the morning of the 11th December in front of the Supreme Court were responsible for the disorders which developed during the day, as we do the suggestion that the action of the Military Police at the Mosque that afternoon was responsible for their extension. The mob was in such a mood that there would have been serious rioting in any event unless the situation had been firmly handled, and the incidents referred to did not prevent the situation being firmly handled.
- (8) The Malay police on foot and in radio cars were ineffective throughout the crucial stages of the disorders.
- (9) The Malay police failed because the activities of the Nadra Action Committee and the press treatment of the Hertogh case had given them the erroneous idea that the court proceedings constituted an attack on their religion and that Maria was being forcibly converted to Christianity. In view of the splendid behaviour of the Malay troops, it is fair to assume that the Malay police would not have succumbed to subversive influences had their morale been higher.
- (10) The Acting Commissioner of Police did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation until a considerable time after it had got out of hand, although he should have done so. Even if we accept his explanation that he did not realize the failure of the rank and file until nightfall on the 11th December, we are of opinion that, here again, he was at fault. The information which he had should have led him to the conclusion much earlier.

- (11) The Acting Commissioner of Police should have accepted the offer of military assistance when it was first made by Major-General Dunlop at 3.40 p.m.
- (12) The Colonial Secretary was entitled, in the absence of information to the contrary, to rely on the assurances of the Acting Commissioner of Police that he had the situation in hand. There is no indication that other sources of information were open to him.
- (13) The situation, which constituted a grave threat to the whole of the Colony, was saved by the foresight of Major-General Dunlop in organizing two composite Internal Security Battalions when the two battalions of infantry were no longer available in Singapore, by his action in calling the Internal Security Battalions to a state of readiness early in the afternoon of the 11th December, and by the prompt deployment of the troops under his command, when military aid was sought.
- (14) Law and order were restored by the Military with the minimum use of force.
- (15) While the disorders in front of the Supreme Court may be ascribed to religious fanaticism, subsequent outbreaks were racial in character and directed indiscriminately against Europeans and Eurasians.
- (16) There is no evidence of Communist inspiration behind the riots and there is no acceptable testimony of any organization directing the rioters, apart from that given with regard to the criminal band known as the "108 Gang", the members of which took advantage of the situation which had arisen.
- (17) The rioters were mainly Malays, but they included many Indian Mohamedans and Indonesians. Some Chinese hooligans, apparently mostly youths, joined in later.
- (18) The Police did not expect any outbreak of violence on the 11th December but, if the Criminal Investigation Department had made a proper appreciation of the information available to them, they ought to have realized that there was a great possibility of serious trouble arising.
- (19) The Criminal Investigation Department erred in failing to make an early search of the Mosque which was the focal point of the rioting throughout.
- (20) The work of the Government Information Services was defective throughout the riots and this must be in some degree attributed to lack of liaison between the Police, the Public Relations Department and the Broadcasting Department. It is regrettable that the Government did not take the earliest opportunity of informing the public, through the Broadcasting Department, of the fact that the Military had been called in for the purpose of restoring law and order.
- (21) The Japanese occupation of Singapore, which resulted in so many officers being interned for over three and a half years, cannot have failed to leave its mark on some of them and this

may be the explanation of much of the lack of grasp and quick decision in the face of emergency which was noticeable on the 11th December.

- (22) While the Malay police failed lamentably on the 11th December, we do not consider that this failure should be given a significance beyond the context of the specific situation in which it occurred. They possess sterling qualities and are capable of fulfilling their duty in an emergency, provided that they are contented and are properly led, as their brothers in the Army have shown.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) It was not within the scope of this Inquiry to investigate and make recommendations with regard to the organization of the Police Force. The inability of the Force to control the rioting which broke out on the 11th December has greatly shaken the confidence of the public and this can only be restored by the knowledge that the Colony possesses a Police Force which is capable of dealing effectively with an emergency as well as carrying out its ordinary routine duties. We are aware that the Singapore Government is fully alive to this and has already taken some steps to improve the Force. In Part XIII we have drawn attention to matters which require consideration in this connection and we recommend that they be taken into consideration without delay.
- (2) The Singapore Government has made arrangements for closer liaison between all departments which are concerned in the maintenance of law and order and they appear to remedy the defects which we have pointed out in Part XVIII. All that we have to add is that in any future emergency the Public Relations Department should ensure that the people are quickly and properly instructed with regard to how they should act at the time. It is, of course, important that business firms should know whether they are expected to close or keep open their offices and what instructions they should give to their employees.

177. In conclusion, we should like to thank the Singapore Government for the arrangements which were made for our hearings in the Victoria Memorial Hall, and for all that was done to ensure that our stay in Singapore was a comfortable one. We thank Captain A. Pugsley, C.B., D.S.O., R.N., for allowing us to travel home in H.M.S. *Warrior* and for the great consideration which he and his officers extended to us throughout the voyage. We thank the large number of people who volunteered to give evidence before us, either orally or in written statements. We are indebted to our Secretary, Mr. J. R. Williams, who discharged to our complete satisfaction the very onerous duties which devolved upon him both in Singapore and in England. Our thanks are also due to Mr. C. E. MacCormack, our Liaison Officer with the Singapore Government, on whose energy and efficiency we relied without fail for an immediate answer to the many needs which arose, often without notice, during the course of our Inquiry; to Mr. Dhanwant Singh, our Registrar, and to Mr. Loke and his tireless staff of reporters, who produced a verbatim report of the evidence

each day; to Mr. George of the Government Survey Department and Mr. Buckle of the Singapore Police for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of maps; and to Mr. Horslin of the Printing Department for his ready co-operation in binding the many volumes of evidence and exhibits.

Signed :

LIONEL LEACH (*Chairman*)

H. STUDDY

J. H. WENHAM

Dated this 17th day of May, 1951.

APPENDIX A

THE INQUIRY COMMISSIONS ORDINANCE, 1941.
(No. 5 OF 1941).

(LS)

COMMISSION

GEORGE VI BY THE GRACE OF GOD OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, KING, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH.

BY HIS EXCELLENCY SIR FRANKLIN CHARLES GIMSON, KNIGHT COMMANDER OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED ORDER OF SAINT MICHAEL AND SAINT GEORGE, GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE COLONY OF SINGAPORE.

(Signed) F. C. GIMSON,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

WHEREAS it is provided by the Inquiry Commissions Ordinance, 1941, that it shall be lawful for the Governor whenever he shall deem it advisable to issue a Commission appointing one or more Commissioners to inquire *inter alia* into any matter in which an inquiry would in the opinion of the Governor in Council be for the public welfare :

AND WHEREAS the Governor in Council has deemed it expedient and in the interests of public welfare that a diligent and full inquiry should forthwith be made into the following matters, namely :

The disorders in Singapore on the 11th December, 1950, and on subsequent days, with special reference to the causes of those disorders and to the measures taken to protect life and property and to restore law and order.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SIR FRANKLIN CHARLES GIMSON, hereby appoint the following persons, namely,

The Right Honourable

Sir Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, P.C., K.C.

Captain Henry Studdy, C.B.E., and

John Henry Wenham, Esquire, J.P.,

to be Commissioners and hereby authorise the said Commissioners to inquire into the matters aforesaid as hereinafter directed :—

1. I direct that the Right Honourable Sir Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, P.C., K.C., shall be Chairman of this Commission of Inquiry.
2. I direct that the first sitting of the Commission shall take place in the Council Chamber of the Legislative Council on such date and at such hour as the Chairman may designate and that at any sitting of the Commission two members shall form a quorum.
3. I direct that the Commission shall normally hold its sittings in the Council Chamber of the Legislative Council but shall have power in its discretion to adjourn to any other suitable place to hear evidence or for any other purpose connected with its duties.
4. I direct that the Inquiry shall be held in public: Provided that the Chairman of the Commission may in his discretion direct that any evidence may be heard *in camera* or otherwise recorded without being made available to the public.
5. I appoint Mr. John Robert Williams to be Secretary to the Commission and to attend the sittings thereof and generally to exercise the powers conferred and to carry out the duties imposed upon such Secretary as are referred to in section 6 of the said Inquiry Commissions Ordinance, 1941, and I authorise the said Secretary to employ such

clerical or other assistance for the purposes of the Inquiry as the Commissioners may require. In case of necessity I also authorise the Chairman of the Commission to appoint any suitable person temporarily to act as Secretary to the Commission.

6. I direct the Commissioner of Police to detail Police Constables to attend upon the Commission for the purpose of preserving order during the proceedings, to serve summons on witnesses or to perform such ministerial duties as the Commissioners shall direct.
7. Finally I direct that the Commissioners after completing their inquiry render to me their report thereon and make such recommendations as they may think necessary.

Given at Singapore, this 5th day of February, 1951.

By His Excellency's Command,

(Signed) W. L. BLYTHE,
Colonial Secretary,
Singapore.

APPENDIX B

DIARY OF COMMISSION AND LIST OF WITNESSES
IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE

10th February, 1951

The Commission arrived in Singapore by air.

1ST SESSION

14th February, 1951

1. Mr. G. R. Livett, Deputy Commissioner of Police.
2. Dr. E. S. Monteiro.

2ND SESSION

15th February, 1951

3. *Mr. G. R. Livett, Deputy Commissioner of Police.
4. Mr. K. L. Johnson, Superintendent of Police.

16th February, 1951

The Commission made a tour of the main areas in which rioting had occurred

3RD SESSION

19th February, 1951

Mr. K. L. Johnson (*continued*).

5. Mr. N. G. Morris, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police, C.I.D.
6. Mr. W. J. Parks, Assistant Commissioner of Police.

4TH SESSION

20th February, 1951

7. *Mr. N. G. Morris, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police, C. I. D.
8. *Mr. W. J. Parks, Assistant Commissioner of Police.
9. Mr. E. J. Linsell, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
10. *Mr. W. J. Parks, Assistant Commissioner of Police.
11. Mr. R. W. Calderwood, Superintendent of Police.
12. Mr. W. R. M. Haxworth, Assistant Superintendent of Police.

5TH SESSION

21st February, 1951

Mr. W. R. M. Haxworth (*continued*), Assistant Superintendent of Police.

13. Mr. R. A. H. Cowan, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
14. Mr. A. T. Bevan, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
15. Mohamed Amin bin Haji Jamil, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
16. Mr. A. E. G. Blades, Acting Assistant Commissioner of Police.
17. Chief Inspector Ahmad Khan.
18. Chief Inspector Mohamed Yussof bin Ahmad.
19. Mr. J. H. Davies, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
20. Mr. E. M. Glossop, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.

* Indicates witness recalled.

6TH SESSION

22nd February, 1951

21. *Mr. W. J. Parks, Assistant Commissioner of Police.
22. *Mr. E. J. Linsell, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
23. *Mr. R. W. Calderwood, Superintendent of Police.
24. *Mr. W. R. M. Haxworth, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
25. *Mr. E. M. Glossop, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
26. Chief Inspector Ahmad bin Hussein.
27. Mr. M. L. Abrams, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
28. Inspector Ng Leng Hock.
29. Mr. W. A. P. Grose, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
30. Mr. G. M. Mathews, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
31. Inspector Niaz Mohamed Shah.
32. Police Sergeant Yar Mohamed.

7TH SESSION

23rd February, 1951

33. Mr. R. C. B. Wiltshire, Acting Commissioner of Police.

8TH SESSION

24th February, 1951

Mr. R. C. B. Wiltshire (*continued*), Acting Commissioner of Police.

9TH SESSION

26th February, 1951

Mr. R. C. B. Wiltshire (*continued*), Acting Commissioner of Police.

34. Mr. R. E. Foulger, C.M.G., Formerly Commissioner of Police, Singapore.
35. Police Sergeant Abu Hussain bin Yacob.

10TH SESSION

27th February, 1951

Police Sergeant Abu Hussain bin Yacob (*continued*).

36. *Mr. R. E. Foulger, C.M.G., Formerly Commissioner of Police, Singapore.
37. *Police Sergeant Abu Hussain bin Yacob.
38. Mr. W. S. Hoseason.
39. Police Staff Sergeant Baharom bin Abu.
40. Police Corporal Mohamed Pilus.
41. Inspector S. K. Sundram.
42. Mr. A. E. Minns, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
43. Mr. G. T. O. Martin, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
44. Probationary Inspector Seah Kee Seng.
45. Mr. T. F. Flynn, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
46. Mr. G. D. Hunter-Gray, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
47. Mr. G. Barbour.

The Commisison visited the Police Radio Control Room at Pearl's Hill.

* Indicates witness recalled.

11TH SESSION

28th February, 1951

48. *Mr. R. C. B. Wiltshire, Acting Commissioner of Police.
49. Mr. B. J. Bleasdale, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
50. Mr. G. W. Jackson, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
51. Detective Major Singh.
52. Mr. S. D. M. Jepson.
53. Chief Inspector Gurdial Singh.
54. Inspector Lim Seng Huat.
55. Probationary Inspector A. J. Wilson.
56. Mr. A. H. Frew, Assistant Superintendent of Police.

12TH SESSION

1st March, 1951

- Mr. A. H. Frew (*continued*), Assistant Superintendent of Police.
57. *Mr. S. D. M. Jepson, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
 58. *Chief Inspector Gurdial Singh.
 59. *Chief Inspector A. L. Boudewyn.
 60. Mr. J. G. Watson, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
 61. Mr. A. W. Mahmood.
 62. Mr. J. C. Barry, Acting Deputy Secretary for Defence and Internal Security.
 63. Mr. W. L. Blythe, Colonial Secretary.

The Commission saw a film of the Riots at the office of the Censor of Films (Malaya).

13TH SESSION

2nd March, 1951

- Mr. W. L. Blythe (*continued*), Colonial Secretary.
64. Mr. J. L. M. Gorrie, Private Secretary to His Excellency the Governor of Singapore.
 65. Mr. D. K. Daniels, Under-Secretary.
 66. Mrs. M. G. Blythe.
 67. Mr. J. S. Dumeresque, Director of Broadcasting, Malaya.
 68. Mr. K. W. Sutton, Chief Editor, Department of Broadcasting.
 69. Mr. G. G. Thomson, Public Relations Secretary.
 70. *Mr. K. W. Sutton, Chief Editor, Department of Broadcasting.
 71. Mr. A. G. Burr.
 72. Mr. C. J. Hards.

14TH SESSION

3rd March, 1951

73. Dvr. J. L. Heppenstall.
74. R.S.M. J. R. Nash.
75. Lieutenant E. L. Mortimer.
76. Sergeant B. Franklin.
77. Corporal F. C. Smith.
78. Lance-Corporal D. Andrews.
79. Lance-Corporal J. M. Prest.
80. Major A. W. Beadle.
81. Lance-Corporal L. C. Thomson.
82. Mr. Tan Teck Choon.

* Indicates witness recalled.

15TH SESSION
5th March, 1951

83. Major-General D. Dunlop, C.B., C.B.E., G.O.C., Singapore Base District
84. Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. O. Croker, M.C.
85. Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. B. Palmer, M.C.
86. Major F. J. Lusty.
87. Major R. F. D. Pemberton, M.C.
88. Major R. Cleasby.
89. Captain J. R. W. Swindell.
90. Captain D. Neighbour.
91. Lieutenant P. H. J. Knott.
92. Captain D. Booth.
93. Captain P. Jobson.
94. Major T. F. Phillips.
95. Major D. A. Spain.

16TH SESSION
6th March, 1951

96. *Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. M. Palmer, M.C.
97. *Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. O. Croker, M.C.
98. Major E. J. S. Burnett, M.C.
99. Lieutenant R. S. Beresford.
100. Mr. A. R. Anderson, Superintendent of Police.
101. Police Sergeant Mohamed Shariff bin Omardin.
102. *Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. R. Croker, M.C.
103. Mrs. V. Halliday.
104. Mr. J. A. Morais.
105. Mr. W. Fox.
106. Mr. D. B. J. Ambler.
107. W/O.I. Atam bin Yatim.
108. W/O.I. Jamil bin Marson.
109. Mr. M. G. Murchison.
110. Miss L. E. Bach.
111. Mr. C. O. L. Salvesen, Deputy Commandant, Volunteer Special Constabulary.
112. Mr. J. P. Pennefather-Evans, Commissioner of Police.
113. Mr. P. S. Bolshaw.
114. Mr. G. S. Murray.

17TH SESSION
7th March, 1951

115. Sir Charles Murray-Aynsley.
116. Mr. J. R. Weight.
117. Mr. H. Jervis.
118. Mr. D. Moore.
119. Mr. R. V. Morris.
120. Mr. C. G. Merton.
121. Mr. R. R. Cornelius.

* Indicates witness recalled.

17TH SESSION—continued
7th March, 1951—continued

122. Mrs. D. Ridders.
123. Mr. H. L. Velge.
124. Mr. J. Morgan.
125. Mrs. A. H. Boyer.
126. Mrs. A. F. Britton.
127. Mrs. E. O'Hare.
128. Mr. J. D. Joseph.
129. Mr. H. W. Roberts.
130. Mr. R. A. Allan.
131. Mr. E. H. Kent.
132. Mr. P. H. Hopkins.
133. Mr. D. S. Frazer.
134. Mr. H. H. Glohoff.
135. Mr. P. G. M. Lee.
136. Mr. E. C. Daniels.
137. Mr. J. N. G. Grace.
138. Mr. J. S. Hamilton.
139. Mr. S. M. Hope.
140. Mr. J. Laycock.
141. Mr. A. J. Fernandez.

18TH SESSION
8th March, 1951

SESSION HELD IN CAMERA AT BLAKANG MATI ISLAND.

142. *Mr. N. G. Morris, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police, C.I.D.
143. *Mr. A. H. Frew, Assistant Superintendent of Police.
144. Dr. Burhanuddin bin Mohamed Noor.
145. Mohamed Taha bin Kalu.
146. Mohamed Mustaza.
147. Darus Shariff.
148. Syed Ali Al-Atas.

The Commission watched a demonstration of Anti-Riot Drill by the First Singapore Regiment, Royal Artillery. (Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. Richey).

19TH SESSION
9th March, 1951

149. *Mr. A. R. Anderson, Superintendent of Police.
150. *Mr. W. L. Blythe, Colonial Secretary.
151. *Mr. N. G. Morris, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police, C.I.D.
152. Mr. E. J. Davies, Attorney-General.
153. *Mr. J. G. Watson, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
154. *Mr. N. G. Morris, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police, C.I.D.
155. *Mr. B. S. Bleasdale, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
156. *Mr. G. G. Thomson, Public Relations Secretary.
157. Mr. J. M. Mason, Commandant, Volunteer Special Constabulary.
158. Sq./Ldr. J. M. Gillen, R.A.F.
159. Flt./Lieutenant R. D. England, R.A.F.
160. *Mr. W. J. Parks, Assistant Commissioner of Police.
161. *Mr. R. A. H. Cowan, Assistant Superintendent of Police.

* Indicates witness recalled.

19TH SESSION—*continued**9th March, 1951—continued*

162. Mr. W. A. Raby, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
 163. Mr. D. Lewis, Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police.
 164. Mr. R. Middleton-Smith.
 165. Mr. P. R. Metcalfe.

10th March, 1951

The Commission visited Kandang Kerbau Police Station.

13th March, 1951

The Commission sailed for the United Kingdom.

APPENDIX C

LIST OF PERSONS WHOSE STATEMENTS WERE ACCEPTED AS WRITTEN EVIDENCE

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|--------------------------------------|---|
| L.A.C. J. Bailey, R.A.F. | Mr. C. E. MacCormack. |
| Wg. Cdr. D. R. S. Bevan-John, R.A.F. | Mrs. C. Mason. |
| Mr. C. H. F. Blake. | Mr. Wong Chong Meen. |
| A.C.I. E. Brown, R.A.F. | Mr. R. Middleton-Smith. |
| Mr. J. C. Chen. | Mr. G. T. Moffett. |
| Dr. Yahya Cohen. | Capt. R. J. McNeill. |
| Mr. D. Cooper. | A.C.I. McPhail, R.A.F. |
| Mr. L. Cornwell. | Mr. E. H. D'Netto. |
| Mr. E. R. de Cruz. | A.C.I. M. Nicholson, R.A.F. |
| Mrs. L. M. Elloy. | Mr. M. Ogle. |
| Mr. A. T. Fernandez. | Professor A. Oppenheim. |
| L.A.C. C. Findley, R.A.F. | Mr. A. Platt. |
| Mr. N. J. A. Frigout. | Mr. J. Pooler. |
| Mr. A. W. Frisby. | A.C.I. R. Raynard, R.A.F. |
| Mr. D. L. Goldsmith. | Sgt. J. R. Ritchie, R.A.F. |
| A.C.I. R. Goodwin, R.A.F. | Mr. S. H. Roberts. |
| Mr. W. Gordon. | Flt/Lt. P. B. Robinson, R.A.F. |
| Mr. F. Gordon-Smith, K.C. | Professor R. A. Robinson. |
| L.A.C. J. Gray, R.A.F. | Mr. I. G. Salmond. |
| Mr. F. M. Grosse. | Mr. S. A. Shahab. |
| Mr. T. J. R. Hale. | Statement by a Sub-Committee of the
Singapore Chamber of Commerce. |
| L.A.C. K. Hart, R.A.F. | Mr. Dhanwant Singh. |
| Mr. P. J. H. Heycock. | Mr. T. F. Stevenson. |
| Mr. Heng Peng Hoe. | Mr. G. A. P. Sutherland. |
| Cpl. R. C. Holden, R.A.F. | Mr. D. F. Taylor. |
| Mr. R. J. Hollis-Bee. | Mr. K. Tolson. |
| Mr. D. C. Horton. | Mr. R. K. Tyers. |
| L.A.C. C. E. Janes, R.A.F. | Dr. W. J. Vickers. |
| Rev. T. A. Jenkins, R.A.F. | Mr. G. W. Webb. |
| Karim Ghani | Mr. Glan Williams. |
| Mr. Low Hock Kiat. | Mr. A. H. d'A. Willis. |
| Mr. F. Kinsey. | Flt/Lt. T. A. Wrigglesworth, R.A.F. |
| Group Captain A. H. S. Lucas, R.A.F. | Mrs. E. York. |

APPENDIX D

REGISTER OF EXHIBITS

No.	DESCRIPTION
1.	Statement of number of Police Officers outside the Supreme Court on 11th December, 1950.
2.	Riot Drill Manual of the Singapore Police Force.
3.	Singapore Police Baton and Riot Drill Handbook.
4.	Singapore Police Pamphlet on use of Firearms.
5.	Malay translation of Exhibit 4.
6.	Singapore Police Force Routine Order No. 137 dated 5th October, 1949.
7.	Orders of High Court, Singapore, in the matter of Maria Hertogh.
8.	Chart showing organization of C.I.D.
9.	Summary of extracts from local Press concerning Maria Hertogh.
10.	Form of questionnaire completed by all Police Officers concerned in the disorders.
11.	Copy of Memorandum from Mr. A. E. G. Blades to Colonial Secretary dated 7th December, 1950.
12.	Extract from Minutes of Second Meeting of C.I.D. Weekly Conference held on 7th December, 1950.
13.	Copy of Newspaper <i>Dawn</i> of 11th December, 1950.
14.	Cuttings from Malay Newspaper <i>Utusan Melayu</i> dated 7th December, 1950.
15.	Record sheet of C.I.D. from 11th December, 1950 to 17th January, 1951.
16.	Order of the day dated 13th December, 1950 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Police (in Romanized Malay).
17.	Order of the day dated 13th December, 1950 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Police (in Jawi Script).
18.	English Translation of Extract from <i>Utusan Melayu</i> of 7th December, 1950.
19.	Communist Pamphlet dated 12th December, 1950.
20.	Copy of Newspaper <i>Dawn</i> of 9th December, 1950.
21.	Photograph of vehicle burning in Victoria Street.
22.	Photograph of vehicle overturned and burning.
23.	A history of the Hertogh case.
24.	Statement of Mr. R. C. B. Wiltshire, Acting Commissioner of Police.
25.	Handbook 'Imperial Policing and Duties in aid of the Civil Power'.
26.	Extract from Police Operations Room Diary. Entries of 11th and 12th December, 1950.
27.	Chart showing organization of Police Force.
28.	Statement showing strength of Police Force.
29.	Statement concerning staffing position in the Police Force.
30.	List of Officers in the Police Operations Room on the 11th and 12th December, 1950.
31.	Monthly Police report for July, 1950.
31A.	Monthly Police report for July, 1950, as amended by Colonial Secretary.
32.	Radio Patrol Standing Orders.
33.	Extracts from Mobile Net Operator's Log Book for 11th December, 1950.
34.	Copy of letter dated 16th March, 1950, from Mr. Foulger, Commissioner of Police, to Colonial Secretary.
35.	Statement of Mr. R. E. Foulger, C.M.G.
36.	Annexure 'B' of letter dated 8th May, 1950, from Mr. Foulger to Colonial Secretary.
37.	Copy of letter dated 18th September, 1950, from Colonial Secretary to Commissioner of Police.

REGISTER OF EXHIBITS—continued

No.	DESCRIPTION
38.	Statement of Mr. A. H. Frew.
39.	Photographs of the riots.
40.	List of Police Officers carrying out various duties on the 11th and 12th December, 1950.
41.	Lists of police rank and file living out of barracks.
42.	Names and Divisions of police rank and file on duty on 11th and 12th December, 1950, showing whether living in or out of barracks.
43.	Schedule of Police Officers available on 11th December, 1950.
44.	Statement of composition of Police Force on 11th December, 1950.
45.	Copy of Proclamation of Emergency dated 22nd July, 1948.
46.	Government <i>Gazette</i> Supplement dated 2nd June, 1950.
47.	Government <i>Gazette</i> Supplement dated 23rd July, 1948.
48.	Certified copy of evidence of Mrs. Crowley given before H.M. Coroner, Singapore.
49.	Copies of Messages dated 21st December, 1950, from Deputy Commissioner, C.I.D. to Military Liaison Officer.
50.	Application for a Licence to acquire Arms by Mr. Velge.
51.	List of Police cars on duty on 11th December, 1950.
52.	List of standard equipment carried by Police radio cars.
53.	List of radio cars with their numbers.
54.	List of destruction of property reports received by Police Radio Control on 11th and 12th December, 1950.
55.	List of messages received by Police Radio Control dealing with assaults on persons on the 11th and 12th December, 1950.
56.	Statutory Declaration by Mr. Velge dated 17th July, 1947.
57.	Copy of Police Routine Order No. 134 of 1st October, 1947.
58.	Specimen of card issued to members of Special Constabulary.
59.	Extracts from <i>Sunday Times</i> and <i>Sunday Tribune</i> of 3rd December, 1950.
60.	Extract from <i>Straits Times</i> and <i>Singapore Standard</i> of 4th and 5th December, 1950.
61.	English Translation of extracts from <i>Melayu Raya</i> dated 10th, 11th and 12th December, 1950.
62.	Copy of <i>Melayu Raya</i> and placard dated 10th December, 1950.
63.	Copy of <i>Melayu Raya</i> dated 11th December, 1950.
64.	Copy of <i>Melayu Raya</i> dated 12th December, 1950.
65.	List of members of the Nadra Action Committee.
66.	Papers concerning certain members of the Nadra Action Committee.
67.	Document entitled "Steps taken by Government to restore public confidence after the riots".
68.	Instructions issued to the Muslim Publishing House by Karim Ghani.
69.	Copy of <i>Dawn</i> dated 9th December, 1950.
70.	List of Curfews imposed.
71A.	Report of Mr. Sullivan, Department of Broadcasting.
71B.	Report of Mr. Sutton, Department of Broadcasting.
71C.	Report of Mr. Hickley, Department of Broadcasting.
71D.	Copy of various statements issued by Department of Broadcasting.
71E.	Broadcast statement of Chief Kathi.
72.	Film of Riots.
73.	Address broadcast by Karim Ghani, 11th December, 1950.
74.	Summary of cases received by Singapore General Hospital 11th to 14th December, 1950.

REGISTER OF EXHIBITS—*continued*

No.	DESCRIPTION
75.	Large scale plan of area of Sultan Mosque.
76.	Photographs of Sultan Mosque Area.
77.	Iron bar used by rioters.
78.	Singapore Headquarters Base District brief general summary of events, 11th to 29th December, 1950.
79.	Statement of Major-General Dunlop.
80.	Papers tendered by Major-General Dunlop.
81.	Parade State and Diary of events of "A" Coy. I.S. Bn. West.
82.	Map of Singapore Island showing Police Divisions.
83.	List of Malay Military Units on duty during the riots.
84.	Singapore Base District Instructions to Officers acting in aid of Civil Power.
85.	Extract from Headquarters Singapore Base District Operation Instruction No. 15.
86.	Statement of matters relating to Police Accommodation.
87.	Original copy of <i>Dawn</i> dated 9th December, 1950.
88.	Special free supplement in English to <i>Malaya Nanban</i> dated 7th December, 1950. (4 p.m. edition).
89.	Special free supplement in English and Tamil to <i>Malaya Nanban</i> dated 7th December, 1950. (8 a.m. edition).
90.	List of persons treated in Singapore General Hospital.
91.	Statement of Mr. J. Russell Weight.
92.	Warrant of Mr. Velge as special constable.
93.	Statement by Mr. N. G. Morris, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police.
94.	Statement of Dr. Burhanuddin bin Mohamed Nur.
95.	Statement of Mr. Taha Kalu.
96.	Statements of Mr. Mohamed Mustaza.
97.	Statement of Mr. Darus Shariff.
98.	Statement of Mr. Syed Ali Al-Attas.
99.	C.I.D. record sheets relating to Dr. Burhanuddin, Mr. Taha Kalu and Mr. Mohamed Mustaza.
100.	C.I.D. Appreciation of political aspects of the riots.
101.	Statement regarding leave granted to Mr. Longden.
102.	Table of Police salaries and allowances and level of earnings in comparable employments in Singapore.
103.	Statement by Mr. G. G. Thomson, Public Relations Secretary.
104.	Memorandum on Recent Police Pensions.
105.	Memorandum on <i>Melayu Raya</i> .
106.	Certified copy of report of Mr. T. F. Flynn.
107.	Statement of Sq/Ldr. J. M. Gillen, R.A.F.
108.	Statement of Flt/Lt. England, R.A.F.
109.	Statement on the activities of Volunteer Police during riots.
110.	Strength of Gurkha Regiment.
111.	Statement of Mr. W. A. Raby.
112.	Statement of Mr. O. Lewis.
113.	Statement of Mr. A. J. Longden.
114.	Statement concerning compensation claims submitted to Riot Claims Tribunal.
115.	Statement of Mr. P. R. Metcalfe.

APPENDIX G

Extracts from DAWN, 11th December, 1950

MUSLIM LEADER'S OPEN LETTER TO THE POLICE

May I kindly request you as your well-wisher, not to repeat the Gurkha mistakes. It is human to err; but it is angelic to forget the error and correct ones self. Is it not?

If the police want, I can arrange insha-allah to give you thirty-three Nadras to control any Muslim crowd provided each Natra is armed with a Quaran. Natras are enough to tackle a Muslim mob. The police pistols are meant for the Gog and the Magog.

If saner Counsels do not prevail, we are ready for stronger doses of Cold War mixture. You know how German Nazis were defeated by winter's Ice. And our Pen could also become sharper than sword, more biting than the winter tasted by the Nazis. And enough preparatory work and organisation exist, in the framework of the Islamic Brotherhood to deal with any situation as it may arise.

We hoist this white Flag and want Peace! We not want to hoist white Flags in every house and have mourning processions in white. To the Christins Black may signify mourning; to us it is white because a dead Karimghani for instance would be wrapped for a Muslim burial in white and not in black. And if the Police want I can offer myself as volunteer to control any Muslim mob? I can ask the Chief Kathi and the other Kathis to come and if you think that you do not want fellows of local significance, I can offer a man of world fame Moulana Siddiqui.

OPEN LETTER TO THE TRINITY WHO WILL SIT IN JUDGEMENT TO-DAY

Dear Brothers,

I am writing to you not in your capacity as Judges but in your capacity as human beings responsible to God as every other human being. If a man wears black coat and wigs and sits for a few hours a day on a particular chair, he need not cease to be a Man. As a man in the pulpit addressing to a Man in the judicial chair, in a personal capacity, as man to man, I have written to you not with contempt in my heart but with human brotherhood. And I ask you not to Judge in our favour, because though in legal terminology it is Amina vs. Mrs. Hertogh, before the higher Tribunal of spiritual values it is a case of Muslims vs. Catholics. Christ whom not only the Protestants and Catholics but also the Muslims honour said "render unto God what is due to God; render unto Caesar what is due to Caesar" (I quote from memory without time to refer). And because we Muslims try to follow Christ and Mohamed who came after him, we try to be loyal to God and to the King. But, when my duty to God demands that to do a thing, it does not matter if the King is displeased and I have to stand before a modern Pilate to be expelled from Singapore or sent to solitary confinement at the worst because in the reign of the Caesar to whom we are trying to be loyal there is no crucifixion. And so I am writing to you taking the risk which my friend Dato Onn's son and secretary has warned about. I take the risk of being haulted up in the Court for contempt of Court for my standing up for a claim that the Court in trying to establish its prestige should not become guilty of contempt of the higher court of humanity and the still higher Court of the Judgment Day. Tomorrow you will be Pilates trying NATRA who is imprisoned in a convent which though not in law but in fact is a prison, where she stays against her will in spite of the Atlantic Charter. Of course, they in the convent are not torturing her there as Christ was tortured on his way to the Cross but the blind fanatics who did the crucifixion about 1927 years ago only whipped the

body and nailed the hands finally speared the hips while NATRA whom all Muslims regard to-day as either own sister or daughter is having Torture of the Heart. To we Orientals, bleeding the heart of a human being is more torturous than the crucifixion of past history. I do not ask the Trinity who will play vital part in the Drama of Life to be enacted tomorrow to decide this way or that way. My only appeal will be to postpone this tense situation, more tense in the hearts of People than in what concerns my police friends, at least because it is December wherein falls Christ's birthday and it also happens to be Rabi-ul-Awwal wherein falls the Prophet's Birthday. Let the judgment day be postponed at least. And let us continue our Cold War Tactic to try to melt the heart of Mrs. Hertogh, her Committee or Helpers in Amsterdam, her nation and her Queen. After the prophet's Birthday and Christ Birthday, they can allow Justice to do its duty if before that time the LAW of GRACE which is higher than the law of Justice does not prevail. May I also ask you to see the cartoon published in *Melayu Raya* to-day because it speaks for itself.

APPENDIX H

STATEMENT BY MAJOR-GENERAL DERMOTT DUNLOP, C.B., C.B.E.

General Officer Commanding Singapore Base District.

I am the General Officer Commanding Singapore Base District.

I assumed Command in July 1948 and, except for a break between July to October, 1950, to organise and form a new South Malaya District, my Command has been continuous to date.

I produce for the Commission the following documents:—

- (a) My complete Headquarters Singapore Base District report covering the action of the Army in aid of Civil Power during the disturbances including relevant background information, my Headquarters diary of events, and orders; records of daily conferences with the Commissioner of Police and my Commanding Officers and unit diaries. It includes also, two folios of useful photographs taken both by the Press and C.I.D. during the period.
- (b) The War Office pamphlet *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of Civil Power*.
- (c) A copy of my evidence to be given before the Commission.

My duty to you, Sir, and members of the Commission is to assist you to establish the facts under the terms of reference.

For the first part an expression of opinion from me on behalf of the Army as to the cause of the outbreak of disturbances last December would, I feel, be impertinent in view of the wealth of evidence at your disposal from those sources best qualified to judge. The Army, however, is concerned in this instance with the second part of your terms of reference—that is to enquire into the measures taken to establish law and order in this Colony after the outbreak of the disturbances.

I feel it is important, in the first place, to clarify the position of the Army in aid of Civil Power. The primary task of maintaining law and order rests, of course, with Civil Power. Individually members of the Forces are bound by the Common law which requires every citizen to come to the aid of Civil Power when that Civil Power requires assistance to enforce law and order. (May I remark that all citizens of Singapore might do well to heed their obligations in this respect!) Although provision is made for the Army to take action under certain circumstances without request from Civil Authority, the normal prerequisite to Military action in aid of Civil Power is that there shall be an official request for aid and that, if the Military Commander deems that the request for such aid is justified, he will not refuse it. He will, however, himself decide on the extent of the assistance to be given and how the troops under his Command will operate. When acting in aid of Civil Power, units down to the smallest detachments do not under any circumstances operate under Command of police officers or N.C.O.'s. The latter with their local knowledge of any particular situation will, of course, be consulted by Military Commanders at all levels. Both Military and Police must always endeavour to work in close co-operation and harmony. The Military Commanders, however, at all levels down to those Commanding detachments are required to make their own decisions, plan their course of action and issue orders to their own men to meet the requirements of any particular situation. These are regulations of long usage and fully established by instructions contained in relevant Army Manuals including the Manual of Military Law. I feel that this clarification is necessary in view of wrong impressions which may have been caused by loosely worded statements made in earlier evidence before your Commission.

Similarly, of course, police forces at any level do not operate under Command of Army Officers or N.C.O.'s unless Martial Law is declared.

POLICE/MILITARY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION

I should like to impress on the Commission the close co-operation and liaison which has existed between the Army and Police in Singapore in spite of evidence given here which might well give an impression to the contrary.

From the time of my arrival here in July 1948, I had the closest possible link and personal friendship with Mr. Foulger and, also during Mr. Foulger's absence on leave, with the late Mr. Fowler, who acted for him. Our minds were continuously riveted on the Internal Security problem.

Every fortnight (and earlier in 1948/49 every week) an Emergency Committee Meeting is held at Government House under the chairmanship of His Excellency the Governor to discuss matters relating to Internal Security based on up to date C.I.D., Special Branch and other reports. The Commissioner of Police, and Deputy Commissioner C.I.D. and the General Officer Commanding are all members and we work in the closest harmony: Government, Police and Army. As examples of our co-operation I select the following.

Combined Police/Military exercises were carried out in the Harbour area in 1948 and 1949.

I issued instructions that Officers Commanding Battalions and Companies who would be concerned with Internal Security duties would effect close liaison with the Police Divisions within their allotted areas in order to gain full knowledge of the local geography, layout of streets and so on; I issued many copies of the Army pamphlet, *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of Civil Power* (Exhibit) to Mr. Foulger, in order that Police training to cope with civil disturbances might be in harmony with that of the Army, and to ensure that the Police would clearly understand the principles governing the employment of the Army in support of Civil Power should the need arise for the Army to assist them in suppressing internal uprising.

In the spring of 1950 we planned, at my request, to hold a full scale joint Police/Military exercise to test out our respective organisations, but owing to the large number of Singapore Police deployed to assist the Federation of Malaya during anti-bandit month in February 1950 and in subsequent weeks, this had to be postponed until the Commissioner judged that the standard of Police training in anti-riot drill, apart from other forms of essential Police training, was adequate.

On return to my present command from South Malaya District at the end of October 1950, Mr. Wiltshire was about to become Acting Commissioner of Police, so I decided NOT to press my desire to hold this full scale exercise until he was firmly established. I mention this matter to show that both Mr. Foulger and I were fully alive to the need of co-operation and joint training of the Police and the Military. We were at pains also to encourage an interchange of visits on official sporting and social occasions between members of all ranks of our respective forces.

There is another matter I wish to mention in this connection. During the period I was responsible for the conduct of Anti-Bandit operations in Johore between August 1948 and November 1949, up to 150 members of the Singapore Police (including Detectives) were, at my request, and with the agreement of the Singapore Government, attached by Mr. Foulger to Infantry Battalions of the Army operating against the bandits. The very notable successes achieved by my units in dealing with the Johore bandits during these months, would have been greatly lessened without the valuable assistance and co-operation of Mr. Foulger and his Force. I would add that both Mr. Wiltshire and Mr. Parks at different times during this period played a notable part in superintending and organising the activities of their police force whilst operating with my Regiments in the jungle.

Having regard to the relatively short tenure of office of Mr. Wiltshire prior to the riots in December 1950, our relationship was equally cordial and co-operative.

ARMY ORGANISATION FOR INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES

On assuming Command in July 1948, two Infantry Battalions were located in Singapore.

In August 1948 I was given responsibility for the conduct of Anti-bandit operations in Johore, and immediately added the two Singapore Battalions to the Johore Brigade. As this Brigade was under my Command, I could, if need arose, employ any of the Battalions in aid of Civil Power in Singapore.

Fifteen months later, in November 1949, the Anti-bandit campaign in Johore was judged to have progressed well enough to move the greater part of the Brigade for operations further north in Malaya and centralise Command of all troops in the Federation under the General Officer Commanding Malaya District.

Under these circumstances I no longer had military control over any Infantry Battalions for Internal Security duties on this Island. Only when a Battalion was withdrawn to Singapore from the jungle for refit and re-training would it be under my direct control for Internal Security duties.

With the possible activities of the Malayan Communist Party in mind, Mr. Foulger had forecast at that time, November 1949, that he would be able to give me 7 days notice of any serious internal unrest in the Colony which might need the assistance of the Army in aid of his very strong Police Force. In consequence, and in order not to restrict any Units from their operations in the jungle, it had been agreed by my Commander-in-Chief, and arranged by General Headquarters, that, on request by me, one Battalion would be made available from Malaya District at four days notice and a second Battalion at seven days notice.

I necessarily had to accept this position in view of the prime importance of the maximum number of troops being employed against the bandits in Malaya.

Although fully confident in Mr. Foulger's judgment and the large armed Police Force at his disposal, I felt, however, that it was imperative to have available under my own hand a substantial force fully trained in Internal Security duties, in order to meet any unexpected situation which might arise.

In view of the important position which Singapore occupies, the Army obviously should not be found unprepared to come to the immediate aid of the Police under any circumstances.

Freedom from internal unrest in Singapore is of paramount importance in the present unsettled situation in South-East Asia. I, therefore, set to work in November 1949 to build up a specialist Internal Security Force armed, equipped and fully trained for these duties. I ordered that all Base Units on the Island, including Base Installations and Services, together with General Headquarters and my own Headquarters Camp Staffs and 1 Singapore Artillery Regiment, would undertake intensive specialist training in Internal Security duties. I ordered that all officers and men would be trained accordingly in every Base Unit and that a proportion of each such Unit would be permanently available in platoons and companies to form part of two Internal Security Battalions which could be called out at short notice in aid of Civil Power. These two Battalions would, in the early stages of any uprising, effectively take the place of the two regular Infantry Battalions by now under the command of the General Officer Commanding, Malaya District. I calculated the proportion of men in each unit (approximately one quarter) to be used in the manner indicated at any one time was sufficient to provide an adequate Internal Security Force and, at the same time, avoid the disruption of the working of the Base. I additionally arranged that any Armoured Cars in my District Workshops would be manned by trained personnel of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

Personnel of the specially constructed Internal Security Battalions were given regular and realistic training from November 1949 onwards. This included the employment of mock rioting crowds, a role much enjoyed by the soldier players, the display of specially devised 'warning banners' with the words 'disperse or we fire' written in three languages thereon, and the use of tear gas. I ordered a close study by all officers and N.C.O.'s of the War Office pamphlet I have produced to the Commission, and that regular lectures should be given to the men on relevant aspects thereof. I issued orders too, that all newly arrived officers and men in the Colony joining Base Units would immediately be trained in these duties in aid of the Civil Power and that a close liaison would be kept with the Police Divisions wherein they were likely to operate. I personally visited each major unit early in 1950 to ensure that training was thorough, realistic and to give directions on points of detail.

I draw attention to the complex organisation of these two Internal Security Battalions. (Details are given in Section A of my report before the Commission). They differ materially from the ordinary normal Infantry Battalions in that

the sub-units of these local battalions are spread out in Camps and Barracks all over the Island, and that by their deployment they have to be collected together in Company (and if necessary Battalion) rendezvous, instead of being concentrated in one barracks like a normal Infantry Battalion. Thus before these two local battalions can be effectively deployed, they require much more warning than in the case of regular Infantry Battalions located under peace conditions, in one barracks. Furthermore, a specially devised transport system is necessary to collect these sub-units from their stations before they can be put to effective use as a composite whole. In the events of 11th and 12th December, 1950 these arrangements worked extremely well and smoothly.

It was stated in the Press here, and repeated in *The Times* of London on 13th December, that complaints had been made that 'Combat Troops' were not immediately available on 11th December 1950, but only 'Internal Security' troops. It is important to appreciate that the training of troops for 'Internal Security' duties is a highly specialised business. Combat troops fully committed on jungle operations obviously cannot have the same opportunities of training and practising for dealing with rioting mobs. They have not the local geographical knowledge of Police Divisions, streets and districts of Singapore. They can have no opportunity of previous liaison with the Civil Police Officers alongside whom they may be required to work. The art of restoring law and order on the part of military forces requested in aid of Civil Power lies in the use of minimum force as required by law. In the case of 'Combat Troops' who have not received up to date, continuous and specialised instructions in this role, there might well be a risk of them using too great a degree of force against the rioting crowd and thereby incense public opinion and, at the same time, breed a degree of hatred which will not be expunged in a generation. The Amritsar Riots when machine guns were used on a rioting mob is an illustration in point.

ARMY ACTION TO DEAL WITH DISTURBANCES, DECEMBER 1950

The first knowledge of anything more serious than the crowd assembled outside the Supreme Court came to my Headquarters as a direct result of the Military Police incident in the Mosque area about 3 p.m., referred to in previous evidence. My Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal, Major Beadle, who had driven in his own car to investigate the situation (as a result of the report from this Military Police party) was beaten up and his car badly damaged. He was able, however to escape and telephone District Headquarters to report to my General Staff Officer I (Lieutenant Colonel Croker) at 3.25 p.m. As a result of this report I immediately instructed Lieut.-Colonel Croker to ring up the Commissioner of Police on the direct line to enquire whether military assistance was required. (Time 3.40 p.m.) Although his reply was to the effect that the Police did not require any assistance, I immediately ordered the two Singapore Internal Security Battalions to certain states of readiness as a purely precautionary measure, one Battalion to be at one hour's readiness to move. May I say that, with my fairly intimate knowledge of the Police Force, with every outward appearance of excellent discipline, I had, at that time, complete confidence in their ability to cope with the situation. Further, I had no reason to suppose that the Commissioner was not receiving a clear picture of the situation at this time in his Operations Room. In fact I knew of the very special efforts by the Police during the past years to build up and perfect their communications and radio system with the latest apparatus and had witnessed convincing demonstrations of the latter. Under normal conditions this was most impressive and worked very well. At about 5.55 p.m. I had occasion to speak to the Commissioner on the telephone with regard to a request made to me by the Chief Justice in connection with the provision of a military guard at his residence during the night. I took the opportunity to ask the Commissioner again if he required any assistance from the Army but he still expressed the opinion that the Police could cope with the situation. In spite of this assurance, and again as a precautionary measure, I ordered one Internal Security Battalion to "immediate readiness" (time 6.10 p.m.) at sub-unit locations, and the other to be at "immediate readiness" and concentrated from 7.30 a.m. the following morning, 12th December. I visualised if military assistance was requested by Government at any time after 6 p.m. that one Internal Security Battalion would be adequate to deal with the situation; that the men of that Battalion might be "on the job" all night and that the second Internal Security Battalion should, therefore, have a full night's rest and be fresh and ready to relieve the first Battalion the following morning, if the situation was not fully restored by that

time. At approximately 6.45 p.m. the Colonial Secretary phoned me and asked for military assistance. He indicated that the situation had deteriorated and was getting beyond Police control. After consultation by telephone with Police Headquarters, as to the area where support was required, I ordered X Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel Palmer) already at immediate readiness at sub-unit locations, to concentrate at the Shackle Club area and that he should establish contact with the Police Superintendent at Beach Road Police Station as soon as possible. He arrived there with his Battalion Headquarters at about 7.40 p.m. and the companies comprising the Battalion arrived in succession at the Shackle Club concentration area between 8 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. One of the platoons of this Battalion had to disperse a gang of hooligans opposite the main gate of Government House on the way to the Shackle Club. I also ordered a Military Liaison officer to report at the Police Operations Room, Pearl's Hill, where he arrived at 7.20 p.m. For reasons I have already stated, I ordered the other Internal Security Battalion to be concentrated at Nee Soon Barracks ready to move at 7.30 a.m. the following morning.

Although at this time (7 p.m. on the 11th December) I still had no indication or information from any source of widespread disorders, I was concerned at the apparent failure of a strong police force to break up the rioting mob in the general area of Beach Road and the Mosque after so many hours. The implications of this failure were so obvious, especially when coupled with the religious background of the Maria Hertogh case and the safety of Singapore of such paramount importance, that I requested General Headquarters (Chief of Staff) that two Battalions of Infantry and a Squadron of Armoured Cars should be sent with the maximum urgency from the Federation. This request, which was immediately agreed to, was in accordance with Headquarters Singapore District Internal Security Scheme, though the notice required in the Scheme to be given for such reinforcement and which was in accordance with previous Police calculation, was, in fact, much longer. I have referred to this point earlier in my evidence.

With this indication of Police failure the situation was obviously fraught with danger unless it could be rapidly brought under control. Under any circumstances two local Internal Security Battalions, acting in support of a strong reliable Police Force, would be entirely adequate to deal rapidly and effectively with unarmed rioting mobs. It is probable that the two Internal Security Battalions alone would have been adequate to restore law and order even in this event, but there can be little doubt that the additional substantial forces from the Federation, which were provided at such short notice at my request, were, on Tuesday, 12th December, instrumental in restoring the situation with a minimum of delay.

At about 8.20 p.m. a guest in my house (Major-General Hedley), who earlier in the evening had gone in my official car to Bukit Serene, returned and reported to me that about one mile north of Bukit Timah Village on the main road the car had been heavily stoned in passing by a number of hooligans; that he and the driver had escaped injury but that the car was badly knocked about. I knew that both His Excellency the Governor and my Commander-in-Chief, General Harding, had been attending a conference at Bukit Serene and had not left before General Hedley. I immediately telephoned to Bukit Serene to warn them of the situation on the main road but found that they had already left some minutes previously. I therefore telephoned the Commissioner of Police to suggest that immediate steps should be taken by the Police to intercept the official cars on the main road and turn them back pending provision of a military escort from Johore Bahru. This was done.

At about 11 p.m. His Excellency the Governor, accompanied by my Commander-in-Chief arrived at Government House with a strong military escort. By previous arrangement, the Chief of Staff to my Commander-in-Chief (Major-General Poett) and I, together with the Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General and the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Wiltshire, were at Government House to meet them. An appreciation of the situation was given by the Commissioner of Police and I was able to inform the meeting of the military measures already taken and also planned in aid of Civil Power and of the considerable reinforcements from the Federation, which would be available for deployment at or after first light the following morning, 12th December.

I feel it important to mention here that, as the reinforcing regiments from Malaya were fully engaged on anti-bandit operations and had not been warned to move to Singapore until after dark on the 11th December, I had not expected

that anything more than a token force, say a squadron of armoured cars and one company of infantry, could arrive in Singapore during the morning of 12th December. I was informed, however, at about 10 p.m. that at least 50 per cent of the reinforcing regiments were likely to arrive here during the night and be available for my purposes at first light on 12th December.

I left Government House at about 11.35 p.m., having previously warned my General Staff Officer I to stand by for my orders re deployment of troops. The Commissioner of Police accompanied me to my Headquarters and gave his opinion as to the districts in which military assistance would be required on the following morning, 12th December. Based on his appreciation and in his presence at 11.55 p.m. I issued my orders for the deployment both of the Internal Security Battalions and the incoming units from the Federation. The operation order giving details of this deployment is in Folio I of my report before the Commission. I had, of course, earlier given instructions for the initial assembly of these units on arrival.

The rapid move of the latter units, some companies of which were actually taking part in jungle operations in Johore, when called for after dark on the 11th December, was a remarkable achievement. About 50 per cent of the total strength of these units were either deployed or ready to deploy in accordance with my plan at first light on 12th December and the remaining 50 per cent were substantially available by noon the same day. "B" Squadron, 13/18 Hussars actually arrived complete before first light and were despatched by me on a "flag march" round the main trouble centres starting at 7.30 a.m. This Squadron, too, dealt very effectively with a riotous assembly, mainly Indonesians, in the Cathedral grounds at about 9.30 a.m. Information with regard to this assembly was telephoned to me direct by Mr. Gilmour, Secretary for Economic Affairs, at about 9.15 a.m. and I sent the Squadron straight off to deal with it after informing Police Headquarters, which had not apparently received this information. Thirty of the rioters were arrested and handed over to the Police and the remainder were dispersed with a liberal use of tear gas grenades. No shots were fired.

There were six incidents where military units had to open fire. Evidence will be given before the Commission of these incidents. Except for the Mosque area which provided convenient sanctuary for rioters until the afternoon of the 13th December when it was entered and cleared by Malay Police, there were no really serious incidents or major rioting assemblies recorded in military unit diaries after 7.30 p.m. on the 12th December, that is to say 24 hours after the first military unit was deployed. The military units were, of course, actively patrolling over a comparatively wide area during daylight on the 12th December and two following days and were able to ensure in conjunction with the Police that the curfew, imposed from 6 p.m. on the 12th December and afterwards, was complied with.

On 12th December and subsequent days I held daily conferences with Commanding Officers at my Headquarters. Mr. Wiltshire or his official Police representative was present to give his appreciation of the current situation. I then issued orders for the military tasks to be carried out; for redeployment or for the relief or standing down of units to accord with the information given by the Commissioner.

These day-to-day details are contained in Folio I of my Headquarters Singapore Base District report before the Commission, but in view of the number of regiments and units or parts thereof which took part, and the frequent daily changes, I have prepared a consolidated schedule for the convenience of the Commission and now hand it in. (Exhibit).

I hope that this schedule will serve to give a full picture of the Army deployment from 11th December onwards and to clarify what might otherwise appear to be a confused picture. It was, of course, necessary for the Army to watch the situation very closely for many days after 12th/13th December; to assist in restoring public confidence and also the confidence of the public in the Police force. These matters are, however, outside the terms of reference of the Commission.

As a matter of interest this might be regarded as an excellent example of the use of military in aid of Civil Power in that a minimum of force was used in order to achieve our purpose of restoring law and order without undue delay. Only 20 shots in all were fired, 8 of them in one major incident.

If, however, there had been any prolongation of mob violence and hooliganism, casualties among the rioters and agitators would have been substantially higher within a very short time. I issued orders to ensure that this would be so. We could not accept any prolonged disruption to the life of the Colony with a risk of disorders spreading to the Federation. If fanned by Malayan Communist Party propaganda, the situation would have become doubly dangerous.

In future, our arrangements provide for the Army being at immediate readiness to meet any Government request for aid in support of Police on the first indication or even forecast of possible unlawful assembly.

Apart from dealing with hostile crowds, the Army was engaged in many other duties during the 11th and 12th December and subsequent days, e.g. removing road blocks; rescuing beleaguered victims (mainly Eurasians); providing escorts for senior officials and important goods; conveying key personnel to and from work; arresting looters and curfew breakers; getting injured to hospital and recovering dead; and finally, with Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers breakdown lorries, removing all derelict vehicles (83 of them) from the streets to two main dumps.

In conclusion I would like to stress the exemplary highly disciplined behaviour of all the Malay troops of whom a large number were engaged as part of the Internal Security Battalions. They carried out their duties excellently and without hesitation, often under great provocation and physical strain.

Throughout the so-called Xmas holiday period I stationed three batteries of the 1st Singapore Artillery Regiment, consisting almost entirely of Malay Other Ranks, in the Beach Road area (S.V.C. Headquarters) in case of possible further outbreaks of violence which had been forecast during that period. They marched through the main streets of Singapore on Xmas Eve with bayonets fixed, behind the band of the Seaforth Highlanders, with their heads held high and I never had any qualms that these men would fail to do their duty in dealing with rioting mobs under any circumstances. They had already proved themselves on the night of 11th December.

APPENDIX I

INFORMATION RECEIVED BY ACTING COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AT RADIO CONTROL BETWEEN THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL AND THE CALLING IN OF MILITARY AID ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 11TH DECEMBER, 1950

- 2.20 p.m. On arrival at Radio Control was informed of revolver shots fired in front of Supreme Court.
- 2.28 p.m. Report of several cases of stone throwing and of one vehicle destroyed in Beach Road.
- 2.45 p.m. Report of continued rioting in Beach Road area.
- 3.00 p.m. By this time five cases of assault had been reported, but there was no information as to their seriousness.
- 3.23 p.m. Report of crowd of 300-400 and of two trucks burning at Sultan Gate.
- About 3.30 p.m. Deputy Commissioner, Uniform Branch, informed him personally on the telephone of rioting at Sultan Mosque and gave him an account of the attempt to pacify the crowd which was interrupted by the arrival of the Military Police. Said that rioting was over the question of the shooting in front of the Supreme Court and that the Malay police were "useless". Added that he (Deputy Commissioner) had been hit by a bottle or a stone. Acting Commissioner also gathered from Deputy Commissioner that the crowd at the Mosque had been broken up into small parties. With regard to the report that the Malay police were useless, he thought this meant that they were slow or indolent but did not get the impression that they were reluctant to do their duty.
- 3.40 p.m. Crowd reported going along Thomson Road, making for the convent.
- 3.33 p.m.- During this period received several situation reports from
4.30 p.m. Deputy Commissioner, Uniform Branch, from which he received the impression that the situation was deteriorating and that small bands were stoning cars and dispersing when a riot squad appeared. At this stage, it did not appear to him, from the description of rioting which was being sent to him at the Control Room, that there was any right to open fire.
- 4.25 p.m. Information of police lorry having been burnt, a detective officer robbed of his revolver and two radio cars destroyed.
- 4.37 p.m. The information received at Radio Control up to this time indicated that rioting had broken out, that five to eleven people had been injured, none fatally, and that about ten vehicles had been destroyed. It also indicated that at that time there was sporadic rioting in the Beach Road area and that small bands were stopping buses and overturning cars. The rioting was confined to the Beach Road area with the exception of the crowd which had attempted to march to the convent but had been stopped and dispersed.
- 4.50 p.m. Acting Commissioner informed Colonial Secretary that there had been rioting, casualties and destruction of cars, that the Army had a battalion at one hour's notice but that he believed he could control the situation.
- 5.00 p.m. Up to that time 11 cases of assault had been reported, but there was still no information as to their seriousness.
(NOTE: By this time one person had been murdered and two had received injuries from which they subsequently died.)

- 5.50 p.m. Acting Commissioner had conversation with General Dunlop and informed him that there was still sporadic rioting, bottle throwing and damage to vehicles, but that it was confined to the beach Road area except for the crowd that had gone towards the convent.
- 6.00 p.m. Information of another crowd moving up Thomson Road towards the convent.
- 6.04 p.m. Acting Commissioner had conversation with Deputy Commissioner, Uniform Branch, who reported that the situation at Beach Road was easier, that the crowd had broken up into small groups and that there was no dangerous concentration of rioters anywhere.
- 6.18 p.m. Received message from Mr. Webb, Secretary of Social Welfare, of attacks on Europeans in Jalan Besar.
- 6.25 p.m. Information of bottle throwing in Geylang area in the Joo Chiat Division. Further reports of attacks on Europeans including one in which one man was killed and another injured.
(NOTE: In fact, both were killed.)
- 6.43 p.m. Deputy Commissioner, Uniform Branch, informed Acting Commissioner of large crowd advancing on Police Station in Beach Road. Acting Commissioner saw in this the first opportunity for bringing the mob to action, but two minutes later received a report that the attempt to stop the crowd had failed.
- 6.46 p.m. Acting Commissioner called in military aid through the Colonial Secretary.
By this time he had reports of 24 assaults, but no report of any fatal casualties and no details of the seriousness of injuries inflicted. He also had 13 reports of damage to, or destruction of, vehicles.
- 7.00 p.m. Beach Road situation reported to be worse.
- 7.48 p.m. Military Headquarters arrived and troops began to arrive from 8.30 p.m.

APPENDIX J

PERSONAL RECORD KEPT BY MR. WILTSHIRE ON THE AFTERNOON
ON THE 11TH DECEMBER

- 3.20 p.m. Col. Croker to keep MORs and Europeans out of the town to-night.
- 3.22 p.m. 300-400 at Sultan Gate. Two MV truck burnt 4.5 cars.
- 3.30 p.m. Arab Street x Victoria Street thousands burning cars etc.—smoke required.
- 3.31 p.m. Message from Ewing—is deflecting buses.
- 3.35 p.m. Message from Col. Cristies—will keep all ranks clear of town.
1 Sgt.
2 Cpls.
5 PCs.
29 SCs.
- 3.40 p.m. Dutch Consul—crowd proceeding to convent.
- 3.40 p.m. 250 at Beach Road.
- 3.40 p.m. Drive—DCU from Stamford Road through to Arab (237).
- 4.10 p.m. All traffic for east of Lavender Street to be diverted, Orchard Road, Cavanagh Road, Thomson Road, Braddell Road (to Giam).
- 4.15 p.m. DCU (327) informed says he has sent Rajaratnum to prevent traffic coming west from Kallang.
- 4.25 p.m. Abrams Longden and Police Party dispersed in Arab. Street Police Lorry burnt (two?)
- 4.28 p.m. Police Radio car burnt in North Bridge Road.
- 4.31 p.m. Det. robbed of gun—North Bridge Road.
- 4.31 p.m. Two Radio Cars to patrol Clifford Pier on information that they will be destroyed.
- 4.35 p.m. DC.CID reports kidnapping of a number of European women and children.
- 4.37 p.m. One Batt. at 1hrs. notice—Town area out of bounds to all.
- 4.42 p.m. One sten two pistols taken from a Radio car by thirty Chinese in North Bridge Road area.
- 4.45 p.m. Adml. Faulkner will stop liberty men.
- 4.50 p.m. C.S. on phone—give him sitrep. 7385
83000
- 5.30 p.m. Assistant Municipal Secretary phones to say that Army Fire Brigade will deal with fires outside the riot area if there is trouble. Agreed.
- 5.30 p.m. Ewing to say that buses are being redirected and in some cases diverted.
- 5.30 p.m. P.S. H.E. to ask if Lady Hone should go to Bukit Serene—advised against.
- 5.50 p.m. Gen. Dunlop—1 Batt. at immediate notice—warning others—to send a liaison officer to operations room.
- 6.04 p.m. DC. U. (AC. "R" present) reports situation easier—gangs broken up into small groups.

- 6.15 p.m. Phone from Dickson (R.N. Base) to say that they were alerted there. *Will tell him when to stand down.*
- 6.18 p.m. Phone from Webb (S.W.) Jalan Besar attacks on Europeans and thrown into River.
- 6.31 p.m. Fire Brigade refused to put out fires of cars.
- 6.31 p.m. P.R.S. now meeting with Action Committee.
- 6.31 p.m. Commandant P.T.S.—crowd making for Farrer Park from Thomson Rd.
- 6.31 p.m. Minns keeping a boat standing off Swimming Club with view to evacuation of women and children.
- 6.36 p.m. Fire at Arab St. Insp. Sundram using sten gun "R" car off the air.
- 6.36 p.m. Colonial Secretary on the phone—report to him.
- 6.43 p.m. Phone from Beach Rd. (DC. U) crowd coming down the Road—unable to stop—instructed use smoke first—fire if essential.
- 6.46 p.m. Reptd. above to Colonial Secretary who is contacting Gen. Dunlop and requesting men to S.V.C. Drill Hall to clear the area opposite Beach Road Police Station.
- 6.50 p.m. T. Katong Road Geylang Road crowd creating disturbance. (passed to "F" Div.).
- 6.58 p.m. Tel. message from undisclosed person—20 Europeans lying dead in J. Besar—Radio cars passing and doing nothing about it.
- 7.00 p.m. Phone from DC. "U" crowd at Beach Road, dispersed—informed DC. U that Gen. Dunlop was sending units to S.V.C.—they must be contacted by an officer of "C" Div. Repeated my order to retreat (if attacked) to the Station—final gas attack while gates are secured and take posts to defend the station by fire if any attempt made to attack it.
- 7.23 p.m. Message from C.S. reported situation as known C.S. directed that warning must be given before firing. C.S. directs the defence of Police Station Road must be by men on the spot—C.P. to take control from Radio Ops. room.
- 7.27 p.m. Ewing phones he is taking off all buses and will defend the Depts. against attack.
- 7.35 p.m. Brooksmith leaves to order Gurkhas from Victoria Memorial Hall to K.K.
- 7.45 p.m. PRs, says Karim Ghani, Vanuhuddim to town area in 2 or 3 cars—telephone signal.
- 7.50 p.m. No Gurkhas at Vic. Hall (BS. returning).
- 7.55 p.m. Livett reports now has smoke—Inform him to contact Col. Palmer at Shackle Club. Army will bring reserves of smoke to Fort Canning.
- 7.59 p.m. Tel. from Major Heard—3 vehicles loads of Indonesians with sticks proceeding up Orchard Road. (pass to "E" Div. if in sufficient strength intercept; 2 V. Sc cars from "R").
- 8.05 p.m. Tel. that crowds are destroying vehicles near Wearnes Bros.
- 8.08 p.m. Fire behind Y.W.C.A.—no fire engines available.
- 8.09 p.m. Cars stopped at G.H. roundabout. Instrucs to send T.P. a Marine squad.
- 8.11 p.m. Cars being stopped outside Rochore Police station.

- 8.13 p.m. Liaison officer reports contacted Col. Croker calling up reserve Battalion. To patrol 2 vehicles in areas outside Beach Road.
- 8.15 p.m. From O/c "A" CJ. concerned about arrangements for court tomorrow—advised wait to see situation.
- 8.18 p.m. Car burning on Orchard Road T.P. and Marine squads are on the way.
- 8.19 p.m. Major and Mrs. Lee were stopped several times in Joo Chiat Road told that crowd stopping and killing Europeans.
- 8.38 p.m. Livett to send a company to Joo Chiat.
- 8.36 p.m. Ewing to arrange for increased guard on S.T.C. establishments tonight—informed will give instructions to repulse attacks by shooting.
- 8.43 p.m. Instructions to send Traffic reserves to Orchard Road for duty.
- 9.26 p.m. Livett reporting Orchard Road now quiet.
- 9.26 p.m. Rioters heading for Changi—Mellersh R.A.F. warned.
- 9.30 p.m. A. Gilmour—crowds now Dunearn Road X Adam Road.
- 9.35 p.m. D.N. Turner reporting for duty on phone. Told to take one Radio car but *not to run into trouble.*
- 9.54 p.m. Insp. Retnasingham found unconscious with arms missing at Changi Road. Shelmerdine is looking for Pat Johnson.

SINGAPORE

13th July, 1951.

No. 79

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry which I appointed in February last, after consultation with you, "to enquire into and report on the recent disorders in Singapore on 11th December and subsequent days, with special reference to the causes of those disorders, and of the measures taken to protect life and property and to restore law and order". I wish to record my gratitude to the Commission for undertaking this task and my appreciation of their valuable Report, to which I have given the most careful study.

2. As much of the Report inevitably deals with the failure of the Police to control the outbreak of violence on the 11th December, I wish to make it known that energetic measures have already been taken to increase the efficiency of the Police and other measures are under urgent consideration. I do not feel it necessary to go into detail on all the matters mentioned in the Report, but I do feel obliged to comment on certain of the Commission's conclusions.

3. Conclusion (2) of the Commission's Report contains the following passage:—

"It is to be regretted that the Colonial Secretary rejected the advice tendered to him by the Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department in Mr. Blades' letter of the 7th December. If he had been unable to persuade Mrs. Hertogh to consent to her daughter being placed elsewhere he could have asked for an order from the Court."

The Commission no doubt refer here to paragraph 5 of the document in question which reads as follows:—

"Pending an official decision in the case, the chief grievance appears to be that Maria has already been put under Christian influence. Criticism would subside temporarily if Maria were to be placed in neutral religious custody, for example the Social Welfare Department. There was no complaint when she was earlier placed in the custody of the York Hill Home."

4. It is agreed that the presence of the child in the Convent between the 2nd and the 11th December was an important factor contributing to the outbreak of violence which occurred on the 11th and that, had the child been removed from the Convent during the course of that period as suggested by the Special Branch, the subsequent course taken by events might not have been so serious. The Commission's conclusion is, however, open to the interpretation that, in their opinion, the Colonial Secretary is deserving of criticism. Having regard to the information at the disposal of the Colonial Secretary at the time (and it is not suggested that in coming to his decision he failed in his duty to ensure that he was fully informed) such an opinion is one with which I cannot agree. The document of the 7th December did not indicate that the suggestion for the removal of the girl was made in order that the risk of an outbreak

of violence might be avoided or minimized, and, indeed, as the Commission state in paragraph 109 of the Report, at no time before the event did the Special Branch expect an outbreak of violence. On the 8th December Mr. Blades, the writer of the document, saw the Colonial Secretary on another matter but did not mention the question of the child and the Convent; and no further representations of any kind were made to any Administrative Officer either by the Special Branch or by the Acting Commissioner of Police, to whom a copy of the Memorandum of the 7th December had been sent. It should also be noted that no leader of the Muslim community made any approach whatever to the Colonial Secretary on the question of the child and the Convent.

5. In view of Conclusion (21) of the Commission's Report I should wish to take this opportunity of paying tribute to the strenuous and devoted efforts made towards the rapid rehabilitation of the Colony by Officers of all Departments of the Public Service and, indeed, of all those Members of the Community, who had the misfortune to be held in Japanese hands during the Occupation of Singapore.

6. Finally the Commission refer to "the failure of the Acting Commissioner to give to the Colonial Secretary full and frank reports of the situation." I hope that the word "frank" in this paragraph is not intended to imply any deliberate withholding of information by Mr. Wiltshire whom I regard as an officer of undoubted sincerity.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,
F. C. GIMSON,
Governor.

The Right Honourable
JAMES GRIFFITHS, P.C., M.P., ETC., ETC., ETC.
Colonial Office.